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

KPU

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FROM THE EDITOR

I would like to congratulate the authors of this year's *Emergent Historian*, the KPU Undergraduate Journal of History. The Kwantlen Polytechnic University History Department is happy to publish Volume 2, a History Journal, which will complement the growing and diverse History Department.

The *Emergent Historian* is a compilation of the best student papers for the Spring 2015 semester. All six papers contained herein have been selected by professors within the Department and approved for publication by the students whose papers were nominated for the journal.

Thanks to the participation of professors and the hard work of students, we sincerely hope that the *Emergent Historian* will be helpful to students and serve as an example for writing their own papers. Further, the *Emergent Historian* displays the breadth of our Department, the capacity of our students and raises awareness of the spirited community within the KPU History Department. Finally, a special thanks for Dr. Tracey Kinney for organizing within the Department, communicating through a multitude of emails, and providing valuable input for the Journal.

Fabio McLeod

B.A. (with Distinction) in History, Minor Political Science
2015 Editor-in-Chief

FROM THE DEPARTMENT

Welcome readers to the second issue of *The Emergent Historian*, a student-led project celebrating some of the very best papers produced in the History Department at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in 2015. I would like to most especially acknowledge the efforts of Fabio McLeod in spearheading the creation of the journal, as well as taking on the editorial responsibilities for 2015.

The Department thanks the six students whose work appears here for agreeing to contribute their work to this undergraduate journal. Your papers demonstrate the crucial abilities that students gain in a History degree: critical thinking and analytical skills, an understanding of research methodology, writing and organizational skills, and an independent viewpoint.

Congratulations to all the students featured in *The Emergent Historian*. May this be the first of many publications for each of you. I hope that this journal will serve to inspire the students in our program to produce papers of the very highest calibre.

"Why So Angry?"

John Braine's "Room at the Top" and "The Angry Young Men"

History 4407 – British Society and Culture

Book Analysis, April 13th 2015

Clea J. Hargreaves

100255822

"There is always room at the top"[1].

Daniel Webster

[1] http://www.brainyquote.com

Set in post World War II Britain, John Braine's novel, *Room at the Top*, follows a cast of salacious, and at times downright vulgar, characters through the apparent realities of everyday life. Dominated by the arrogant, and deadly ambitious social climber, Joe Lampton, the story revolves around his sordid quest for upper class legitimacy. Largely based on the writer's perceived societal outlook as a member of the alternatively dubbed, "angry young men"[2] movement, *Room at the Top* inspires the question of how far one goes to attain wealth and prestige and ultimately attempts, in the end, to reveal that which is truly important in life.

As mentioned above, Joe Lampton spends much of the story focused solely on his determined attempts to reach the "top", the crème de la crème of what he perceives as the ultimate upper class life[3]. Existing mostly of material images conjured up in his head; Lampton bases all of his future happiness upon the guarantee of a one thousand pound per year salary[4], an amount, which would surely bestow to him, all of the luxuries to which he believes he wholeheartedly "deserves". Lampton's sense of entitlement is strong, to say the least, and the superficially self important lead character is often found scheming his way into other peoples lives, based firmly on the goal of his own advancement. This tends to leave the reader with a sour taste in terms of Lampton, a taste that further develops as the story progresses.

Throughout the novel Lampton abuses not only people and relationships, but also the opportunities given to him. Thoughts of his ultimate objectives are never far from his mind, and it seems as though nothing can dissuade him from reaching the top. It is only towards the end of the book when Lampton finally reveals the slightest hint of a conscience, though it takes an

[2] Danni Ma, "Angry Young Playwrights with respect of Three Representatives", *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 3, (2013): 211.
[3] Maria Zackariasson, "Angry Young Men? Masculinities and Emotion among Young Male Activists in the Global Justice Movement", *The Journal of Men's Studies*, Vol. 17, (2009): 32.
[4] John Braine, *Room at the Top* (UK: Eyre and Spottiswoode, UK, 1957). eReader edition.

extraordinary tragedy for this to come about. Lampton literally needs to be smacked across the head by his own guilt before any reflection or questioning in regards to his life long pursuit of wealth and luxury, not to mention the all-exclusive social acceptance from those that "matter" at the top, can be challenged. Ultimately though, Lampton's revelations are illuminated too late, as he is already bound to the life he so painstakingly ached for, and eventually created. And though it seems somewhat sad, the reader cannot help but feel vindicated that a portion of the misery he caused will continue to haunt him, from his cushy place at "the top".

Perhaps the most fascinating complexity presented throughout the narrative is that of contradiction. There is no doubt that Lampton is an aspiring social climber. While at the same time it is said that the "angry young men", though differing in their levels of contest and dislike of the "system", both class as well as political within Britain, were consistently rallying against the societal constructs of an "us and them" mentality, i.e., they were attempting to fight the status quo[5]. However, the very premise of a social climber is the fact that, not only has one bought into the stratification of the class system which separates and further delineates value accordingly to said distinctions, but that they have also relegated themselves to actively pursuing a spot at the top amongst those with whom they are supposed to be against. How then, one asks, can Lampton be a catalyst for change? And more importantly, why were these men so angry?

To further compare this amalgam of anger and ambition, one must investigate the differences within the "angry young men" and the movement associated with writers such as Braine. It is said that the name given to the writers in question was from John Osborne's 1956

[5] Stephanie Lawler, "Heroic Workers and Angry Young Men: Nostalgic Stories of Class in England", *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Vol. 17, (2014): 706.

play entitled "Look Back in Anger"[6]. Aimed largely at a group of working and middle class British playwrights and writers, this heavily male dominated undertaking, supposedly, took on the disillusioned vision of those frustrated by Britain's archaically traditional social climate. It is interesting to read novels like *Room at the Top*, with this in mind, as it seems that the angry young men, as portrayed by Lampton, are not so much disenchanted with traditional British class stratification, but instead desperately trying to attain their rightful place at the top within the traditional confines of the class system in Britain. It is thorough contradictions like this, which leads the reader to believe that the movement was more about reaching the top themselves, and less about bringing the top down, as the term suggests. Perhaps the title aimed at these fellows should have been "the ambitious young men", the "socially judgmental and shallow young men", or the "anti-elitist, desperately want to be one of them, walking contradictions…young men".

The sister term to the "angry young men" came in the form of the "angries"[7] and may address this discrepancy. Writers like Braine, who came from a lower class origin, were said to have a more aspirational political and social economic agenda. This could explain the need for a "top class" acceptance, while attempting to get there by exposing the upper class for what it was, or what they believed it to be. Though confusing, and certainly contradictory, the ideals of the movements seem to have provoked, though only for a short time, a discussion of British social politics, and how one should, or could, "get ahead"[8].

It is believed that the terms "angry young men" and the "angries", were rejected by the very people they were aimed at. For reasons unknown, the groups seemed reluctant to accept the

[6] Ma, "Angry Young Playwrights ," 210.

[7] Manuela Odeta Belei, "The Angry Young Men", *Journal of Humanistic and Social Studies*, Vol. 2, (2010): 17-30.

[8] Ma, "Angry Young Playwrights ," 211.

title or the notion of being a cohesive "angry" movement[9], and instead remained steadfast in using their creative endeavors as a way to narrate their social commentary, real or perceived, on the state of Britain's commitment to traditional hegemony.

Whether or not the motivation for the movement or the acceptance of the name was loved or hated, it does not matter, for the "angry young men", along with the "angries", managed to generate an immense amount of attention for their musings on the state of Britain's social environment, post World War II. Through characters such as Lampton, who journeyed away from "zombie"[10] land towards a life of the happiness, one is sure to find through great wealth and prestige, served as a catalyst, not for change, but for awareness. Unfortunately for Lampton his awareness came too late, and he was left haunted at the "top" by a life long theory, which no longer seemed true.

Perhaps that is why these men were seen as being so angry. Conceivably they were indignant because they realized that in reaching the top, it did not secure the divine happiness they believed would be waiting for them[11]. As Alice so brilliantly points out in the book, what they find instead is that "people at the top, they are the same as anyone else"[12]. How disappointing. Surely this was a frustrating way to come to the realization that social standing, wealth and esteem were not the most important things in life. Lampton realized this, along with a whole host of others one assumes, and though profound at the time, in the end nothing seems to have changed. This novel, and the entire premise of the "angry young men" movement could be just as pertinent today as it was towards the end of the 1950's. Relationships, complications, the

[9] Peter J. Kallineg, "Cities of Affluence: Masculinity, Class and the Angry Young Men", *MSF Modern Fiction Studies*, Vol. 47, (2001): 93.

[10] Braine, *Room at the Top,* eReader edition.
[11] Zackariasson, "Angry Young Men?" 33.

[12] Braine, *Room at the Top*, eReader edition.

desire for something just out of reach, are all universal themes, timeless in their nature and fascinating in their complex and contradictory outcomes. Overall, the things that bring the most happiness, prestige and wealth in life are not material, and as Lampton realized far too late, superficial longings will only get you so far.

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The Bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau

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100295499

Hist 4430

March 26, 2015

> "The corpse of a people lies on the steps of civilization. Behold it. Here it is! And no voice is heard to cry halt to the slaughter, no government speaks to bid the murder of human millions end."
>
> -Committee for a Jewish Army, 1944.

Millions of Jews, Poles, Roma, and homosexuals as well as an immense number of others were killed throughout the European countryside during the course of the Holocaust. Despite courageous stories of heroism by individuals, as well as efforts of grassroots rescue movements, the Allied military powers, which had arguably the greatest power to save lives, made little to no official efforts to save the prisoners and victims of the Nazi Final Solution. In the latter stages of World War II, the Allies attained strategic air superiority over the European continent, which resulted in numerous calls for the U.S. and Britain to bomb Auschwitz-Birkenau, as well as the other Polish extermination camps and their supporting railway infrastructures. While the true reasons that the Allies chose not to bomb the camps and railways may never be known, it was likely due to a myriad of differing reasons, most notable of them a lack of proper military intelligence, lack of available resources, and most significantly, a historically prevalent underlying tone of anti-Semitism. This paper aims to conclusively prove these motivations as the major factors as to why the Allied forces made no significant strategic actions to intervene and subsequently rescue the predominantly Jewish interned population. In doing so, it will conclusively prove a number of key claims made by Jewish historians that Allied inactivity was a conscious sign of negligence and hostility towards Jewish peoples, and directly contributed to inflated death tolls of the Jews in Europe.

Despite numerous claims made by Jewish organizations in the early 1940's of the Nazi enslavement of Jews, it was not until mid-1944 that any reports began to receive any real

attention and consideration. After the dramatic escape of Rudolph Vrba and Alfred Wetzler from the Auschwitz camp, and their subsequent flight to Slovakia, a series of personal interviews of the two conducted by Oskar Krasnaský provided a twenty-six page report in German about the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp. With this, Krasnaský made one of the first 'substantiated' calls for western governments to bomb the crematoria and gas chamber buildings of Birkenau, as well as its approaching railroads.[13] Paired with this, a telegraph report on 24 June 1944 by Roswell McClelland, the U.S. representative of the War Refugee Board in Switzerland, to the U.S. State Department and leadership of the War Refugee Board in the United States was sent and only then, were Jewish claims of genocide deemed fully credible, and subsequently removed all doubt of the mass extermination of Jews occurring in Auschwitz and beyond.[14] Despite its interpretation, Richard Foregger argues that the purpose of this Vrba-Wetzler report, along with its accompanying sketches of Auschwitz-Birkenau was to "explain the technical details of the process of mass extermination combined with utilization of slave labour…rather than to provide maps for bombing."[15] Whether actually true or not, the report was referred to directly by numerous Jewish leaders as a basic strategic plan for aerial bombardment; notable amongst them Slovak Rabbi Michael Dov Ber Weissmandl.

Shortly after the release of the Vrba-Wetzler report in April of 1944, Rabbi Weissmandl made one of the earliest 'substantiated' requests for the Allies to bomb deportation railways leading to Auschwitz. In May, asking for the movement of Hungarian Jews to be blocked, he pleaded for the sustained bombing of the Košice-Prešov railway within Hungary.[16] Shortly after

[13] Erich Kulka, "Attempts by Jewish Escapees to Stop Mass Extermination," *Jewish Social Studies* 47, no. 3/4 (Summer-Autumn, 1985): 300.

[14] Ibid., 302.

[15] Richard Foregger, "Two Sketch Maps of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Camps," *The Journal of Military History* 59, no. 4 (Oct., 1995): 693.

[16] James H. Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Re-Examined," *The Journal of Military History* 58, no. 2 (Apr., 1994): 234.

the request however, in June, the U.S. War Department rejected the Košice-Prešov plea due to apparent 'impracticality' which would have resulted in a diversion of needed resources. Subsequently, in August, the British Air Ministry refused the call as well, citing poor strategic intelligence, 'hazards', high casualties and 'dubious results.'[17] Although Weissmandl was noted, officially, as the first religious proponent of Allied bombing, he was not the most widely known religious figure to have made pleas for American and British involvement.

Over two years earlier, in January 1942, the Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Wales, speaking for the entire Anglican Episcopate, called on the British government to move immediately to save the Jews and to provide sanctuary for all who could escape from Nazi Europe.[18] Despite this, British government officials made no substantial movement to help the plight of the Jewish population in Europe, most heavily in Poland, and often elicited degrading remarks toward the Jewish peoples. Shortly after the publication of the Vrba-Wetzler report, Victor Cavendish-Bentnick, the 9th Duke of Portland, whom would later become the British Ambassador to Poland, stated "…that in my opinion, it is incorrect to describe the Polish information regarding German atrocities as 'trustworthy.' The Poles and to a far greater extent the Jews tend to exaggerate German atrocities in order to influence us."[19] While perhaps extreme in his message, Bentnick's statement provided the basis for much of the British bureaucratic response towards the plight of the Jews in Eastern Europe; indifference and inactivity.

On 11 July 1944, Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed that "there is no doubt that this is probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world, and it has been done by scientific machinery by nominally civilized men in the name of a

[17] James H. Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Re-Examined," 234.
[18] David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews* (New York: Random House, 1984), 104.
[19] Erich Kulka, "Attempts by Jewish Escapees to Stop Mass Extermination," 300.

great state of one of the leading races in Europe."[20] Despite this revelation, the RAF made no movement towards rescue missions for the Jews, much to the insult of the international Jewish community. Official reasoning provided by government officials remained consistent: twin issues pertaining to the feasibility and the utility of bombing Auschwitz-Birkenau. It was voiced by proponents of British intervention that the Germans were able to repair railway lines rapidly, but would have taken them much longer to rebuild the gas chambers and crematoria;[21] yet nothing happened to either.

In light of Churchill's aforementioned claim, three lines of defense have been proposed for the Prime Minister, and his apparent unwillingness to intervene directly:

i) He had determined in 1943 on a strict set of military priorities, as everything would be done to pursue the war effort, whether controversial or not, and nothing be done that 'was not *bona fide* for the war.'

ii) He was too busy directing the war effort; and

iii) The Whitehall bureaucracy sabotaged the bombing project behind Churchill's back, while he was out of the country.[22]

Issues with bureaucratic channels and domestic policies were not contained solely to Britain however, as political bickering and inter-governmental backlogs played a significant role in the response of the United States as well.

Upon receiving numerous requests, some of which have been previously mentioned, Lt. Colonel H.A. Gerhardt of the United States Army claimed that "the suggested operation is impracticable," and later stated that "I recommend no action to be taken on it since the matter has been fully presented several times previously. It has been

[20] Michael J. Cohen, "Churchill and Auschwitz: End of Debate?" *Modern Judaism* 26, no. 2 (May, 2006): 129.
[21] Ibid., 131.
[22] Ibid.

our position which has been expressed to the War Refugee Board, that the bombing of Polish extermination areas should be within the operational responsibility of the Russian forces."[23] This indifference to the plight of the Jewish population bore no relation to the military situation for the United States Air Force however, as at the time which Gerhardt made his statement, in October 1944, the U.S. had already gained significant control over the European skies, and missions striking Auschwitz were no longer out of the realm of possibility. Previously, the American Air Force had recommended deep penetration into German territory in early 1944 with increasing numbers of bombers and fighter escorts. While the fierce battle for air superiority had proven costly for both sides, by 1 April 1944, the Allies had clearly emerged as the winner. The German Air Force had essentially lost daylight air superiority and the air war as a whole.[24] While eminently successful to victory in the war, the Allied airmen were not actually able to take immediate advantage of this newfound superiority as the cross-channel invasion in Normandy had taken precedence. As a result, it was not until late summer 1944 that the strategic air forces turned their attention from support of the invasion to the bombing offensive; subsequently it must be noted that over seventy-two percent of the bombs dropped on Germany fell after 1 July 1944.[25] As Gerhardt had made his statement three months after this however, his argument did not remain valid, in light of the quickly deteriorating German air defenses.

With this newfound superiority over the German *Luftwaffe*, issues surrounding helping the interned and soon to be deported Jews shifted from what was perhaps possible toward what would be deemed 'plausible.' With the influx of requests for bombing and

[23] Kulka, 303.

[24] Kenneth P. Werrell, "The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments," *The Journal of American History* 73, no. 3 (Dec., 1986): 706.

[25] Ibid., 707.

Allied intervention in Poland ongoing, the governmental bureaucracy of the United States had to make their position officially known as well, apart from Lt. Colonel Gerhardt's. According to John J. Mcloy, the Assistant Secretary of the Army,

> …after a study it became apparent that such an operation could be executed only by diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations elsewhere, and in any case be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not warrant the use of our resources. There has been considerable opinion to the effect that such an effort, even if practicable, might provoke more vindictive action by the Germans.[26]

The Allied idea that Nazi malice could increase towards the Jews in Poland, illustrated their lack of understanding and concern of the situation at the time. David S. Wyman proposed that the largest fears which the U.S. State Department possessed was not for the safety of Jews, but rather that they might have actually escaped out of Axis controlled territory.[27] He continued, that this fear determined the State Department response, as well as that of the British, to the entirety of the Holocaust. Behind their supposed concerns loomed the problem that both governments regarded as unsolvable: where could masses of Jews be put if they did come out of German areas?[28]

This apparent problem of relocating European Jews, worked in tandem with the Allied hesitation to bomb the Polish extermination camps and their surrounding railways. Just several months prior to the release of the Vrba-Wetzler report, pre-emptive policies already in place by the U.S. War Department stated that "it is not contemplated that units of the armed forces will be employed for the purpose of rescuing victims of enemy oppression unless such resources are the direct result of military operations conducted with

[26] Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-4* (Rahway: Quinn & Boden, 1970), 257.
[27] David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews*, 189.
[28] Ibid.

the objective of defeating the armed forces of the enemy."[29] As a result, it effectively removed the possibility of the War Department from participating in rescue efforts, except when they had arisen incidentally to regular planned military operations. These restrictions were not placed solely on military operations in Europe however, as policies on immigration and the possibility of vast populations immigrating to both Britain and the U.S. provided no outlet for those fortunate enough to not have been interned or executed already.

The apparent motivation for the inactivity of the State Department, as well as the British government, was the concern about the possible release of hundreds of thousands of Jews. A secondary factor within this, was arguably the fear held within the Roosevelt administration that special steps to help the Jews would encourage anti-Semitic and anti-Roosevelt forces to attack the administration as pro-Jewish.[30] Theodore S. Hamerow reiterates this claim by stating:

> The resolve of American government officials to dispel any popular perception that the war effort was even in part a crusade to save European Jewry appeared repeatedly in their rejection of demands for the bombing of death camps in Poland. Many believed that the Germans would be sure to point to such air raids as proof that the Allies were following the orders of cunning Jewish manipulators and wire-pullers.[31]

Perhaps loudest of those who opposed Jewish immigration on a wide scale to the United States was Breckenridge Long, the assistant Secretary in the State Department who supervised immigration regulations. Throughout his tenure, Long was consistently able to neutralize the potential for Jewish groups to force administration to make any real policy changes regarding the rescue of Jews.[32] This was illustrated most clearly during the largely

[29] Wyman, 291.
[30] Ibid., 107.
[31] Theodore S. Hamerow, *Why We Watched: Europe, America and the Holocaust* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 403.
[32] Wyman, 101.

unproductive Bermuda Conference, which was held to 'plan effectively the possibility of rescue and relocation of European Jewish residents.' Ironically, the island location of Bermuda was chosen to shield the conference from public opinion, the press, and Jewish organizations; wartime regulations restricted all access to the island.[33]

One issue which did arise from the conference however, was the widespread concern held by the Allied governments that if they intervened, would the bombing of Auschwitz, its surrounding railways and the accompanying Polish camps, actually be legal? Kitchens asserts that attacking Auschwitz might have been illegal under international law, notwithstanding the Allied perception that it was a morally dubious proposition.[34] He continues that under the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 25 stated that "the attack or bombardment, by whatsoever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."[35] While seemingly trivial, it created major concerns for military and civilian strategists, and created debate over Allied involvement; it caused some to question that if they had bombed the camps, would it have actually been moral? Kitchens poses the question "…would it have been moral to kill a minimum of several hundred internees in trying to save others; with no assurance of success, and if so, what ratio of deaths would have been acceptable?"[36] This concept of questionable morality led into another of the major debates as well: was the bombing of Auschwitz even technically feasible given the available resources and technology of the Allies at the time.

Information and opinion has varied since WWII whether or not the aerial bombardment of the camps was even possible. Acting as a precursor for the proposed

[33] Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-4,* 177.
[34] James H. Kitchens, 262.
[35] Ibid., 264.
[36] Ibid.

camp attacks, proponents for aerial bombing campaigns pointed towards the attack on Amiens prison on 18 February 1944 as a prime example of the precision which could be utilized in the Polish context. While deemed highly effective, the mission to attack the French prison was seen by Allied strategists as a much simpler, safer attack than those which were proposed in Poland. The mission actually took over three weeks of planning, and Allied military planners claimed that effectively supplying and planning for an attack on Auschwitz would take considerably longer and require far more resources, which essentially rendered it impossible.[37]

Michael J. Cohen asserts that this belief was not necessarily true however, as at the exact same time when government officials in London and Washington were telling Jewish agencies that British aircraft did not have the range to reach Auschwitz, the flight paths being taken by RAF bombers to Warsaw had taken them directly over the Auschwitz camp.[38] In addition, Alan J. Levine questions the lack of available bombing resources touted by the Allies, as he claims that they were in a far better state than they had actually perceived, and that they did not realize how effective their previous aerial attacks had been, and that they were already leading to the collapse of the German economy. By January 1944, just months previous to the calls for bombing of deportation rail lines, German rail traffic was estimated to have fallen by approximately forty-percent, even before the conventional bombing campaign of transportation hubs had even begun,[39]which would have resulted in available bombers which could have been used in the camp missions. He continues, that the relentlessly falling bombs left marshalling yards unable to form trains and keep traffic moving, and had created a struggle of repair efforts for Germans against

[37] Kitchens, 249.
[38]Michael J. Cohen, "Churchill and Auschwitz: End of Debate?" 132.
[39] Alan J. Levine, *The Strategic Bombing of Germany*, 1940-45 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 185.

growing, cumulative damage.[40] It is therefore conceivable that the unnecessary continued bombing of conventional railways could have easily been shifted to targeting deportation railway lines and had a similar effect, and thus hindered the transport of Jews to killing installations. In light of these claims, the feasibility of whether or not the camps could be bombed due to available resources, or available technology seems definitely possible. What is not addressed however, is the last major deterrent to bombing the camps: the inherent risks of collateral damage.

"Many have contended that U.S. airmen regarded civilian casualties as an unintentional and regrettable side effect of bombs on military or industrial objectives; whereas the RAF campaign to destroy cities themselves and kill or dislocate their inhabitants was a deliberate strategy."[41] If this statement is deemed even partially truthful, why the Allies did not act on the camps despite the reality of civilian casualties becomes problematic. Under absolutely optimal conditions, half of the bombs dropped on Auschwitz would have fallen at distances greater than 500 feet from the aiming point, had the Allies utilized the B-24 bombers which proponents of bombing had advocated for. The northern pair of gas chambers in Auschwitz were 650 feet from the nearest huts; the southern pair were about 300 feet away, which resulted in conservative estimates that approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of bombs dropped from the flying altitude of 15,000 feet would have fallen within housing areas in the camp.[42] As Birkenau held about 36,000 people in April 1944 and upwards of 135,000 in August, a minimum of 500 to 1,000 deaths could reasonably have been expected, with a realistic possibility of at least

[40] Alan J. Levine, *The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-45*, 168.

[41] Conrad C. Crane*, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 1.

[42] Kitchens, 253.

2,000 to 3,000 deaths under adverse circumstances.[43] While both significant in their own right, the numbers paled in comparison to the number of civilian lives lost in Germany due to strategic military bombing, as well as the huge numbers of Jews who had died in the Auschwitz camp already. According to Werrell, Allied bombs killed approximately 600,000 German civilians, which was roughly ten times the number of British civilians killed by German bombs and missiles. In total, almost as many civilians died in individual German cities, Berlin, Dresden and Hamburg, as died in all of Britain during the entire war.[44] As a result, the Allied portrayal of their concern for the loss of life, due to collateral damage, begins to lose its validity as well, and as such points their inactivity towards the underlying perception of widespread anti-Semitism yet again.

According to Michael L. Gross, bombing Auschwitz would have been a humanitarian gesture, designed to save the lives of non-combatant victims of war crimes, who were of little or no strategic value. Potential gains of the venture were great: to save thousands of lives. He argues, that as a result the Allies incurred a *prima facie* obligation to save those innocent lives.[45] Whether or not Allied leadership viewed it in the same way, much like their motivations for not bombing Auschwitz, its accompanying deportation railway system, or the other extermination camps, will never be known. In light of the information presented, the belief that Allied inactivity was due to three major contributing factors: an arguable lack of available resources, lack of proper military intelligence, and foremost, an underlying theme of anti-Semitism remains credible in most scenarios. Most compelling of these factors, was anti-Semitism which led to the formation of policy around

[43] Ibid., 254.
[44] Kenneth P. Werrell, "The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments," 709.
[45] Michael L. Gross, "Is There a Duty to Die for Humanity? Humanitarian Intervention, Military Service and Political Obligation." *Public Affairs Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (Jul., 2008): 213.

both military intervention, as well as punitive immigration quotas, or lack thereof, which made it virtually impossible for European Jews to extricate themselves from the terrible situation they were in. Ultimately, the inactivity of the Allies, particularly the U.S. and Britain, not only failed in contributing to the rescue of European Jews, but significantly aided their demise. As a result, the Allies cannot, and should not be absolved of any and all responsibility, as they ultimately had the ability to act and chose not to do so.

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Evolution of the Former Outcaste:

The Burakumin Since the Meiji Restoration

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According to Shinto, Japan's indigenous ideology, all Japanese people are descendents of Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess and as such, all Japanese people are born into Shinto. Yet, in 1859, a group of people beat a young man to death for trying to enter a Shinto shrine.[46] The young man in question, though ethnically Japanese and no different from his attackers, belonged to Japan's outcaste class, at the time referred to as *eta*. His attackers went unpunished because, according to the magistrate, "The life of an *eta* is worth about one seventh of a townsman."[47] During the Tokugawa period, the *eta* class was hereditary and included people who worked in certain "polluted" professions including butchering, leatherwork, and prostitution, or degrading professions, such as village watchmen. Another outcaste class, called the *hinin*, was not hereditary and allowed for more social mobility than the *eta* class, but government edicts issued during the early eighteenth century strengthening the class system made it more difficult for *hinin* to return to mainstream society.[48] However, with the transition from shogunal to imperial rule with the Meiji restoration, the government officially abolished the class system. Rather than lift the stigma against outcastes in Japanese society, the Meiji government's abolishment of the class system in 1871 created a shift in the type of discrimination the underclass faced and while government policies have been weak in changing the situation of outcastes, now called *burakumin*, efforts from within the outcaste community have helped improve the *burakumin* situation.

Tokugawa period Japan subjected outcastes to legally sanctioned discrimination but they received the benefit of maintaining monopolies over undesirable occupations. Prior to Tokugawa rule, outcastes had suffered social prejudice but in the early eighteenth century, the Tokugawa

[46] Lill Scherdin, "The Creation of 'Strangers' and Punishment in Japan," *Social Justice*, 21 (1994): 226.
[47] Scherdin, "Creation of Strangers," 226.
[48] Ian J. Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," in *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity,* ed. Michael Weiner (London: Routledge, 1997), 63.

bakufu developed a definition for the outcaste status, thus legalizing discrimination.[49] The Tokugawa rulers controlled many aspects of outcastes' lives including living quarters and freedom to roam. The term *burakumin*, the name given to outcastes after the Meiji restoration, refers to people residing in the special communities to which the Tokugawa rulers forcibly relocated outcastes. Regarded as a source of pollution in accordance with Buddhist and Shinto beliefs, outcastes had to live on marginal land in communities separate from the general public.[50] In addition to confining outcastes to certain regions, laws also dictated their housing conditions. For instance, members of the *eta* homes were not allowed windows facing the road for fear that they may pollute passers by from mainstream society.[51] The Tokugawa rulers also restricted the movements of outcastes. Laws even forbade outcastes from entering towns at night and, in many cases, from entering religious sites altogether.[52]

However, despite the restrictions imposed on them, outcastes in the eighteenth century enjoyed some benefits. While, originally, association with polluted occupations dictated their low position in society, some outcastes were able to change occupations. In desperate need of farmers following the famine of the 1730's, Tokugawa lords allowed outcastes to work in agriculture.[53] Yet, a career change did not offer a means of escape from outcaste status. Rather than association with polluted occupations, place of residence became a determining factor for the social status of outcastes working in agriculture.[54] Despite the possibility of occupational mobility, outcastes remained confined to their social class because of their heredity. This confinement to class, however, allowed some advantages. In exchange for performing services

[49] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 63.
[50] Ian Neary, "The Burakumin at the End of History," *Social Research*, 70 (2003): 270.
[51] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 64.
[52] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 64.
[53] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 63.
[54] John Price, "A History of the Outcaste: Untouchability in Japan," in *Japan's Invisible Race*: *Caste and Culture in Personality*, ed. George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 22.

related to execution, outcastes received the right to self-government within their communities and protection over occupational monopolies.[55] Although legal regulations sealed the fate of outcastes as outcastes, Tokugawa rulers afforded them some financial security.

Whereas, during the Tokugawa period, *burakumin* faced institutionalised discrimination, during the Meiji period, *burakumin* problems became increasingly economic and social in nature. The abandonment of the class hierarchy of feudal Japan with the Edict of Emancipation, issued in 1871, implied the absorption of members of the *eta* and *hinin* classes into the *heimin,* or commoner, class.[56] In theory, the outcaste class should have disappeared. Yet, after the implementation of the Edict of Emancipation, the outcastes, now referred to as *burakumin*, faced new challenges. Although, legally, the *burakumin* had gained freedom from their outcaste status, changes to the law brought financial disadvantages. During the Tokugawa era, outcastes had lived on tax-exempt land and enjoyed a monopoly over professions such as butchering and leatherwork; with the Meiji restoration, they lost both of these advantages. The levelling of the commoner class allowed members of mainstream society to pursue financial interests in industries such as leatherwork.[57] As such, it should have followed that former outcastes could freely pursue other commoner occupations while refusing former outcaste work. However, this was not the case. In 1872, the Meiji government compiled the *koseki*, or family records, and ensured that the lists made former outcastes distinguishable.[58] Potential employers could now use this lists to perform background checks and the law did not prevent discriminatory hiring

[55] Price, "Untouchability in Japan," 24.
[56] Neary, "End of History," 270.
[57] George O. Totten and Hiroshi Wagatsuma, "Emancipation: Growth and Transformation of a Political Movement," in *Japan's Invisible Race*: *Caste and Culture in Personality*, ed. George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 34.
[58] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 73.

practices against *burakumin*. Furthermore, by not protecting the outcastes' confidentiality, the government's actions contradicted the supposed equality proposed by the 1871 edict.

In addition to being subjected to discriminatory hiring practices, *burakumin* became the scapegoats of poor farmers who viewed the newly emancipated outcastes as unwelcome competition. While legal restrictions no longer bound *burakumin* to outcaste occupations and the stigma of pollution associated with the outcaste class had no place in a society shifting towards egalitarianism, prejudice persisted. In an incident in a village in Nara Prefecture in 1872, when *burakumin* refused to continue performing degrading work, other villagers imposed restrictions on the rights of *burakumin*, such as the to collect firewood and to order sake at shops.[59] Discrimination of this sort was no longer a legal stipulation of outcaste status but an escapable social problem. As a result of the 1872 incident in Nara Prefecture, an angry mob killed four *burakumin*, leading to the arrest of the mob leaders. The villagers later responded to the arrest of the mob leaders by raiding the *burakumin* community, after which the government sentenced three of the mob leaders to death.[60] Although the execution of the mob leaders conveyed the message that discrimination against outcastes was no longer legally justifiable, the law did little to actually protect *burakumin* from social prejudice.

Moreover, the law did not always show sympathy for the *burakumin* in cases of discrimination. For instance, the law did not prevent religious and political leaders from making discriminatory, potentially harmful, remarks against the former outcaste class. In 1902, over thirty years after the enactment of the Edict of Emancipation, A Buddhist monk encouraged people to donate money by saying that "real humans" should donate more than "worthless *eta*."[61]

[59] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 36.
[60] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 36.
[61] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 38.

This incident shows that three decades after the abolition of the *eta* class, people had not changed their attitudes regarding the former outcastes. These attitudes prevailed even within the government. Also in 1902, a political figure claimed the simultaneous discussion of two bills with little in common to be as preposterous as "a son of a wealthy family walking hand in hand with an '*eta*' girl."[62] Such an opinion did not reflect the government's supposed attempt to level the social status of commoners. The politician also reinforced the stigma against marriage between former outcastes and mainstream members of society. Even though the *burakumin* community demanded an apology and the removal of the politician from his political party, the government made no amends.[63] Further discrimination came in the form of the District Court of Hiroshima's approval of a divorce. A woman divorced her husband because of his *eta* ancestry, again propagating the message that non-*burakumin* should disdain marriage with *burakumin.*[64] Therefore, the law did not always emulate the idea of a classless society as per the Edict of Emancipation.

In fact, the abhorrence of marriage between *burakumin* and members of mainstream society continued to a large extent, often resulting in dire consequences for *burakumin* communities. Similar to discriminatory employers, non-*burakumin* parents could use the *koseki* lists to identify *burakumin* and, essentially, could prevent the marriage of their children to *burakumin.* Generally, a non-*burakumin* who married a *burakumin* had to convert to *burakumin* status.[65] For these reasons, while the lists remained available, the majority of *burakumin* married other *burakumin*. In the 1960's, the Buraku Liberation League, an anti-discrimination movement formed by the *burakumin*, demanded the restriction of access to the *koseki* lists. The lists became

[62] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 38.
[63] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 38.
[64] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 38.
[65] Hiroshi Wagatsuma and George De Vos, "The Ecology of the Special Buraku," in *Japan's Invisible Race*: *Caste and Culture in Personality*, ed. George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 118.

inaccessible to the general public. Following the restriction of the *koseki* lists, some anonymous companies developed the *Chimei Sokan*, which were lists identifying the approximately 5,300 *buraku* areas.[66] Though illegal, these lists remained in circulation as late as 2006, providing prospective parents-in-law with a means by which to discriminate against *burakumin.* For *burakumin* who experienced discrimination in the form of rejection for marriage, suicide was often the simplest solution.[67] By upholding and reinforcing prejudice, members of mainstream society denied the *burakumin* social freedom and the opportunity to assimilate. These problems developed due to the Meiji government's negligence in properly enforcing its policy of equality.

Furthermore, under the guise of advocating equality among commoners, the Meiji government's decision to introduce compulsory education in 1873 created a new set of complications for *burakumin* communities. The compulsory education system did not make distinctions within the commoner class, meaning that *burakumin* children would share classrooms with non-*burakumin* children.[68] The education system itself did not advocate discrimination since all children were supposed to receive the same education. However, problems with compulsory education emerged on a social level. *Burakumin*, already facing financial hardship, often could not afford to pay tuitions. Also, schools employed teachers from the samurai and wealthy landowner classes and these teachers did not hide their prejudice against *burakumin* children.[69] In addition to the social tensions within school communities, *burakumin* disapproved of some of the subject matter taught in schools. They believed that history classes

[66] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 74.
[67] Scherdin, "Creation of Strangers," 227.
[68] Hiroshi Wagatsuma, "Non-Political Approaches: The Influences of Religion an Education," in *Japan's Invisible Race*: *Caste and Culture in Personality*, ed. George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 99.
[69] Wagatsuma, "Non-Political Approaches," 100.

taught that "only warriors are Japanese citizens."[70] Even while the government portrayed itself as aiming for the modernization of Japan, the education system continued to advocate old ways of thought which negatively affected the *burakumin*. Regardless of their legal emancipation from outcaste status, the *burakumin* viewed the early compulsory education system as an enforcement of social barriers. Despite its non-discriminatory premise, the early compulsory education of the Meiji period allowed for the continuance of discrimination against former outcastes.

Problems in the education system continued to plague *burakumin* throughout the twentieth century, but the *burakumin* community strove to instigate positive change. As in the nineteenth century, some teachers during the twentieth century harboured prejudice against *burakumin.* In 1957, a teacher named Shinkai on Shikoku island referred to a fellow teacher as *eta* and when *burakumin* students questioned him about the use of this word, he shared his opinion that *burakumin* descended from Korean captives and that if *burakumin* students wished not to be referred to as *eta*, they should study harder. The *burakumin* community demanded that Shinkai be fired, that the school's principal take responsibility, and that other teachers' discriminatory attitudes be eliminated. Shinkai was indeed fired, but the school took no further action. However, on discovering the jobless teacher in financial jeopardy, the *burakumin* community had him study *buraku* problems at the Research Institute of Buraku Problems in Kyoto, later hiring him as a teacher for *buraku* children.[71] The *burakumin* understood the important role education played in bringing about change. While government efforts fell short of promoting real change in attitudes towards former outcastes, the *burakumin* community used re-education to fight back against problems in the existing education system.

[70] Wagatsuma, "Non-Political Approaches," 101.
[71] Hiroshi Wagatsuma, "Postwar Political Militance," in *Japan's Invisible Race*: *Caste and Culture in Personality*, ed. George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 80-81.

The prevalence of discrimination clearly showed the government's failure in enforcing the Edict of Emancipation and the *burakumin* took several measures in their struggle for equality beginning with the formation of a liberation movement. In 1922, the *burakumin* formed the *Suiheisha*, or the Levellers Association, which later evolved into the Buraku Liberation League.[72] Born out of Marxist influence, the early manifestation of the *Suiheisha*, led by Kimura Kyotaro and later, by Matsumoto Jiichiro, worked closely with the Japanese Communist Party and advocated the slogan *tetteiteki kyuudan*, or "thorough denunciation."[73] As the slogan "thorough denunciation" implies, the associations employed a "denunciation struggle" in order to educate discriminators.[74] This involved seeking reparations by publicly denouncing discriminatory acts. In 1922 alone, the association received 69 public apologies.[75] The *Suiheisha* had found a means by which to change the way Japanese people thought about and treated *buraku* problems and those members of mainstream society that apologised had no choice but to realize their mistakes. However, in some situations, a simple apology did not suffice and the *Suiheisha*, therefore, employed various methods to ensure the enforcement of the Edict of Emancipation. In 1933, authorities arrested two men for concealing their identities as *burakumin* but the *Suiheisha* leaders protested that such a basis for arrest violated the Edict of Emancipation; as a result, the men were released.[76] Had the *burakumin* community not reacted, the Edict of Emancipation would have been ignored, deeming its policies worthless. Fortunately, when the government failed to uphold its own laws, the *Suiheisha* protected the legal rights of the *burakumin*.

[72] Chong-do Hah and Christopher C. Lapp, "Japanese Politics of Equality in Transition: The Case of the Burakumin," *Asian Survey* 18 (1978): 489-490.
[73] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 45.
[74] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 68.
[75] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 45.
[76] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 58.

While the *Suiheisha* served its purpose in the first half of the twentieth century, as social attitudes changed, the association's goals and methods became obsolete – a fact its members understood. Often, under Kimura and Matsumoto's leadership, the *Suiheisha* engaged in militant action. A case of discrimination the *Suiheisha* targeted in Nara prefecture in 1923 resulted in gun violence and hand-to-hand combat involving swords and spears; following the incident, police prosecuted thirty-five *Suiheisha* members.[77] Physical violence could not necessarily incite the positive change the *burakumin* sought. A shift towards becoming more actively involved in politics during the 1930's and 1940's more appropriately represented the needs of the *burakumin*. In 1936, the militant, radically leftist *Suiheisha* leader Matsumoto was elected to the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet and, despite government pressure to do so, refused to dissolve the *Suiheisha*.[78] For the first time, the *burakumin* had a voice in the government. Moreover, by refusing to disband the *Suiheisha*, Matsumoto confirmed the *buraku* people's resistance to giving up their struggle.

Following the Second World War, the *Suiheisha* again underwent changes to reflect the changing political and social environment. During the 1940's, leaders of the *Suiheisha*, including Matsumoto and Asada Zennosuke, decided to change the name of the association to the National Committee for Buraku Liberation; in the 1950's, they changed the name to the Buraku Liberation League.[79] Asada's goals differed from those of Matsumoto and as leadership of the BLL passed from Matsumoto to Asada, the association's work changed. Asada, unlike Matsumoto, did not support the Japanese Communist Party and focused on gaining government aid – a goal the JCP criticized.[80] Yet, Asada's leadership introduced important, positive changes

[77] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 47.
[78] Totten and Wagatsuma, "Emancipation," 59-60.
[79] Hah and Lapp, "Politics of Inequality," 489-490.
[80] Hah and Lapp, "Politics of Inequality," 493.

for the *burakumin*. Since 1871, the Edict of Emancipation had existed as a façade; the government could easily ignore *buraku* problems while claiming that, legally, Japanese society was equal. For this reason, the BLL took matters into its own hands and pressured the government. In 1969, the government put into effect the Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects. This law promoted the recognition of *buraku* problems and assimilation of *burakumin* into mainstream society; additionally, it brought the widespread availability of the *koseki* lists to an end.[81] Under the Special Measures Law, municipal governments undertook projects to improve the living standards of and protect the rights of *burakumin*. When the *koseki* lists resurfaced in 1975, the Osaka office of the Ministry of Justice recognized the lists as a violation of human rights and encouraged companies to gain a better understanding of *buraku* problems.[82] The ministry's reaction complied with the Special Measures Law, which, implemented nearly one hundred years after the abolition of the class system, created more effective measures by which to attain the equality that the Edict of Emancipation supposedly offered.

Further efforts of the Buraku Liberation League to create awareness of their situation included publications and the use of the Internet, which granted them access to audiences outside of Japan. Beginning in 1977, the Buraku Liberation Research Institute began publishing the *Buraku Liberation News*, a bimonthly Japanese language newsletter; in 1981, the institute began publishing an English language counterpart.[83] These publications encouraged discourse of the often-overlooked *buraku* problems. The *burakumin* also began to employ the use of the Internet by creating websites that could disseminate information about their situation. Significantly, they

[81] Hah and Lapp, "Politics of Inequality," 495.
[82] Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," 74.
[83] Nanette Gottlieb, "Language, Representation and Power: Burakumin and the Internet," in *Japanese Cybercultures*, ed. Nanette Gottlieb and Mark McLelland (New York: Routledge, 2003), 193.

used English in order to appeal to non-Japanese people.[84] The use of English made the *buraku* problem one of international scale rather than keeping it confined to Japan. Again, the *burakumin* exhibited innovating thinking in their struggle for equality. However, use of the Internet to create awareness of *buraku* problems also invited more discrimination. In 2001, the *Chimei Sokan* lists identifying *burakumin* names and communities surfaced on a website's message board.[85] Like the incident in 1975, the distribution of these lists posed a threat to the rights of *burakumin*. The *burakumin* received the support of the Network against Discrimination and for the Research on Human Rights and the United Nations in having the lists removed.[86] Online, the BLL managed to create global awareness of their problems to the extent of receiving UN assistance.

The question of the effectiveness of the BLL's efforts towards equality remains. A large portion of the BLL's efforts have involved educating the public about *buraku* problems, but critics of the BLL claim that creating awareness of the problem makes it worse. Japanese historian Hatanaka Toshiyuki claims that policies such as special entry systems to universities that acknowledge *burakumin* as minorities among Japan's Korean residents, Ainu, and Okinawans keep the *buraku* problem alive; in order to solve the *buraku* problem, the concept of the *buraku* must cease to exist.[87] Opposition to the BLL also believes that the benefit programs under the Special Measures law contribute to more prejudice.[88] Projects under the Special Measures law provide aid only to *burakumin*, therefore, impoverished non-*burakumin* may not benefit. Non-*burakumin* may view this as discrimination and, for this reason, resent *burakumin*.

[84] Gottlieb, "Burakumin and the Internet," 191.
[85] Gottlieb, "Burakumin and the Internet," 200.
[86] Gottlieb, "Burakumin and the Internet," 201.
[87] Neary, "End of History," 282-285.
[88] Neary, "End of History," 290.

The BLL remains active but, according to historians like Hatanaka, the *buraku* problem is close to its end.[89]

Yet, statistics from 1993 showed that, while the situation had improved, *burakumin* had not yet caught up to national averages. From 1975 to 1993, the percentage of *burakumin* relying on welfare payments reduced from 76% to 52%, compared to the national average of 7.1%. The *burakumin* have, through efforts such as those of the BLL, improved their position, but they have yet to achieve equality. Surveys from 1995 suggested that 70% of *burakumin* from Osaka aged between 24 and 29 married members of mainstream society and only 5% of people opposed the marriage of their children to *burakumin*.[90] Yet, according to anecdotal evidence, more than the stated 5% of parents actually pay for background checks on their children's prospective spouses.[91] While the stigma surrounding marriage with *burakumin* has significantly declined, it still exists, albeit in smaller amounts. Until this stigma disappears completely, it is not possible to, as Hatanaka would suggest, abandon the concept of *burakumin* altogether. However, as critics, including the JCP, suggest, the privileges of special projects benefiting only *burakumin* maintain the differences between *burakumin* and mainstream society.[92] For this reason, it is important that the BLL once again update its approach to the struggle towards equality; after all, its efforts helped bring about vast changes throughout the twentieth century because it was able to adapt for current situations.

Ultimately, the *burakumin* struggle for equality has compensated for the Japanese governments incompetence in applying its own laws. Somehow, the *burakumin* inherited the problems of their outcaste ancestors and discrimination against *burakumin* continued long after

[89] Neary, "End of History," 282.
[90] Neary, "End of History," 288.
[91] Neary, "End of History," 289.
[92] Neary, "End of History," 291.

the Meiji government's 1871 Edict of Emancipation, under which commoners, including former outcastes, should have become equal. However, on a social level, members of mainstream society shunned *burakumin* and the government did little to change the situation. In fact, by creating the *koseki* in 1873 and making *burakumin* clearly identifiable by name, the government took a step towards promoting discrimination rather than equality. Luckily, the *burakumin*, recognizing their government's ineptitude, pursued their own methods for attaining equality. At times, *buraku* activism resulted in violence, but overall, they succeeded in instigating changes that may not have been possible had they relied on the government and legislative systems alone. Through their organization and adaptation to changing times, *buraku* activists have encouraged action towards equality not only in Japan but also worldwide.

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Imperial Japan: The Road to Militarism

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The Imperial Japan which bullied and brutalized its way to dominance of Asia during the Pacific War was the unintended child of a nobler intention. The founders of the modern Japanese state set out to build a nation which was modern in thought and practice. Their mistakes, which eventually led to the hijacking of the state by a chauvinistic military regime, were born out of haste and a degree of naiveté.

The seeds of Imperial Japan's ultra-nationalist and militarist regime of the 1930s and 40s were first planted by the leaders of the Meiji Restoration in the 1880s, albeit unwittingly. In their desire to secure their own power, they formulated a system of government which gave real power to themselves and their puppet emperor, and paid lip service to democracy. Articles 5 through 7 of the Meiji Constitution of 1889 place the Emperor above the Imperial Diet, stating that he governs with the "consent" of the Diet, but also gives him the power to open, close, or dissolve it.[93] The elected Diet, therefore, was a hollow institution from its very conception, having a "say" only when its policies were already in line with the Emperor's will, and by extension the will of his unelected advisors in the House of Peers and the appointed members of the Cabinet. This left open the question of just who would fill the ranks of the Peerage and Cabinet once the founders of the regime began to die out. The Meiji architects also built inherent contradictions into the new Japan they were creating. They promoted Western scientific knowledge, but simultaneously prevented the application of scientific enquiry into the divine nature of the imperial line. And they sought to encourage modern Western social conventions while preserving the traditions of a patriarchal culture .[94] The Meiji leadership also desired to eradicate the samurai class whilst keeping the warrior virtues of that class alive and well in the new army. The latter was a challenge as the army was doomed to lose the leadership of former

[93] Mary L. Hanneman, *Japan Faces the World 1925-1952* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 120.

[94] James B. Crowley, "An Empire Won and Lost," *The Wilson Quarterly* Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter, 1982): 122, accessed February 28, 2015, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40256592.

samurai such as Yamagata Aritomo as time went on. To accomplish this goal, the military ethos of the samurai was to be drilled into every recruit.[95] In their desire to create a strong state the Meiji leadership may have failed to realize that they were simply fostering the formation of an all new warrior elite, one every bit as dangerous to their ideal state as the samurai class they had only just rid themselves of. The new warriors of Japan came to be influenced not only by traditional samurai ideologies, but also new nationalist ideas which could be far more extreme.

The origins of ultra-nationalist sentiments in Japan came from two main sources, one being a sense of racial superiority borrowed from Western racial theory. This was a direct result of the Meiji era drive to acquire Western science wholesale, and the consequent tendency to accept many Western ideas uncritically. Racial science imparted value onto physiological differences between human groups, and as it gained popular acceptance it became increasingly common for patriotic Japanese to see themselves as the master race of the Asian peoples, with a natural role to lead their less superior neighbours.[96] Both the Meiji leadership and their political opponents had seized upon ideas of racial homogeny to create a sense of national belonging as a way to unify the population behind their ideologies. The Western powers were doing the same thing, and Japanese leaders found it necessary to mimic their ethno-racial nationalism as a bulwark against other nations, for reasons of self-defence.[97] By the 1920s, pseudoscientific race theory had been thoroughly integrated into the public discourse. The word *jinshu*, referring to race with biological connotations, had been thoroughly confused with *minzoku*, which referred to cultural or ethnic groups. As a result, the growing nationalist sentiments fostered in schools and army training camps were gaining an increasingly racist bent. There came to be many similarities

[95] Edward J. Drea, "In the Army Barracks of Imperial Japan," *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 15, No. 3 (Spring, 1989): 330, accessed February 23, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0095327X8901500301.

[96] Michael Weiner, "Discourses of Race, Nation, and Empire in pre-1945 Japan," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1119): 442-43, EBSCOhost accessed March 10, 2015.

[97] Weiner, 445.

between the Japanese idea of *minzoku* and the German idea of *volk*.[98] In both cases the acceptance of these notions by a broad swathe of society would eventually make it easier for terrible crimes to be carried out in the name of the people's benefit. Textbooks of this era cited racial superiority as the reason for inevitable Japanese progress and victory in all endeavours.[99] Government sponsored organizations such as women's groups, youth groups, and community organizations ensured a steady diet of nationalism was continuously fed to the people, helping nationalism to gain broad social acceptance by the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905.[100]

Another foundation of ultra-nationalism was intense public admiration of the military, as nurtured by the Meiji leaders and successive governments. The Grand Manoeuvres of the Japanese Army were something akin to a public holiday, and children were given time off school to attend. In the words of Captain M. D. Kennedy, a British Language Officer who was stationed with the Japanese 34th Infantry Regiment beginning in November 1918, the military authorities were,

> …always alive to the necessity for popularising the army, and they are not slow to realise the advantages to be gained by using Grand Manoeuvres for that purpose. Every opportunity and encouragement is therefore given to the civil population to see as much as they can in order that their martial ardour and loyalty may be roused and that they may be shown on what their money is being spent.[101]

Wars with China and Russia convinced the ruling elite early on that the key to Japan's economic growth, and therefore its survival in the modern world, would be warfare with the aim of acquiring goods and territory via expansion and colonialism.[102] Keeping the average Japanese citizens proud and in awe of their military protectors was a way of maintaining support for military endeavours which were expensive in lives and money. After decades of war, the

[98] Weiner, 441, 448.
[99] Weiner, 447.
[100] Weiner, 447.
[101] Captain M. D. Kennedy, *The Military Side of Japanese Life* (London: Constable & Company LTD., 1924), 43-44.
[102] Crowley, 124.

Japanese people could generally be counted on to support the military. Even armies on routine marches at home in Japan were greeted by the people as if they were, in the words of Captain Kennedy, "…part of a victorious army returning from the fray."[103] Postcards were released in the 1930s depicting happy soldiers content with army life, and finding a sense of belonging or even of family with their fellow recruits and officers.[104] This normalized military service for the consumption of the general public, making it appear as simply an extension of the everyday life people enjoyed at home, and no doubt allaying the concerns of worried mothers and anxious conscripts alike. The people trusted the military to defend their borders, and this eventually bled into a general trust that military men knew best how to run the affairs of state as well.[105] The link between patriotism to the state and admiration of the military became more bluntly stated as time went on, and by 1937 the War Ministry was circulating pamphlets with maxims referring to war as the "father of creation and mother of culture."[106]

From the Meiji Period onward, the Japanese state focussed great care and attention on ensuring that children grew up on a steady diet of propaganda aimed at making them loyal subjects of the emperor, hardworking members of society, and obedient soldiers when required. To this end, the Imperial Rescript on Education was pronounced in 1889 in conjunction with the Constitution. Along with general commands to be hard-working, virtuous and learned, this document, recited by schoolchildren every day, incited total obedience to the Emperor and the state, and called for selfless sacrifice in times of "emergency."[107] The Meiji architects desired a future population which was fiercely loyal to the emperor's authority, and by extension, them. However, they perhaps failed to understand that the authority they held at the time might one day

[103] Kennedy, 88.
[104] Drea, 331-32.
[105] Toshio Iritani, *Group Psychology of the Japanese in Wartime* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1991), 23.
[106] Crowley, 131.
[107] Hanneman, 121.

lie in the hands of men who did not share their vision of what the Japanese state should look like or strive for. Imperial universities taught Japan's future leaders in business, labour, and government to be obedient to a government that ruled in the name of the Emperor, and thereafter the government could count on them to lead society along official lines, whatever the government's policies might be.[108] Youth organizations sprang up across Japan to fill the void in moral education in the years between school and adulthood. These were coopted by the Home Ministry in 1910 and made centres of conservative propaganda, indoctrinating the young away from liberal ideas which challenged the ordered Confucian model of society. Also in 1910, two army officers and future Prime Ministers, Tanaka Giichi and Terauchi Masatake, formed the Military Reserve Association along similar lines as the youth groups, but with the added desire to indoctrinate future soldiers and win popular support for military invention in the realm of politics.[109] The government had set the tone for youth education, and interest groups wasted little time in exploiting it.

Conscription meant that an enormous segment of the Japanese public would not merely be introduced to the military in school or during parades. From school through mandatory military service, most young men spent the majority of their lives being indoctrinated with Japanese exceptionalism and the duty to defend it at all costs.[110] The "moral" education begun in their youth was continued in the army. Soldiers were often taken on marches to places of historical significance, in order to give them a sense of continuity with the warriors of their country's past, and to teach lessons about the virtue of keeping old warrior virtues alive. At the burial place of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the troops were shown a collection of armour and weaponry spanning the Tokugawa period, showing how the utility of earlier pieces gave way to opulent,

[108] Crowley, 125.
[109] W. G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 128-29.
[110] Drea, 335.

showy pieces from the latter which provided little in the way of usefulness. This was a lesson on the importance of remaining prepared, even when there is cause to let down one's guard. To become too comfortable was to become weak. The soldiers were often retold stories of heroes past, such as the Forty-seven Loyal retainers, whose selfless loyalty to their master and willingness to die with honour were held up as the archetype of the perfect sort of soldier Japan now needed.[111] While Captain Kennedy was stationed with the Japanese army, several instances of *hara-kiri* occurred, and he mentions two which spoke to the selfless duty to honour and the group which had been bred into the mentality of the army. In one case, an officer committed suicide simply for falling out of a march from exhaustion. In the other case an officer ended his own life after failing, due to circumstances outside his own control, to issue orders to his soldiers during war exercises.[112] That these men and others like them would kill themselves on home soil, and for the slightest injury to their own honour, is a sign of just how effective the years of indoctrination had been. Officers and men alike lead a Spartan existence, making them extremely tough. Frugality and simplicity were chief virtues.[113] This fostered a powerful sense of pride which could border on disdain for those outside the Japanese military brotherhood. In Kennedy's experience, the Japanese were often prejudiced against foreigners, as they believed, until proven otherwise, that others were unable to handle the same hardships the Japanese were able to take in stride, and also believed that Foreigners saw the Japanese as racially inferior. Kennedy goes on to state that,

> …the Japanese is seen at his worst when he thinks that he is being slighted or looked down on, as, for instance, in China and other parts of the Far East, where he comes into contact with large numbers of foreigners.[114]

[111] Kennedy, 58-60.
[112] Kennedy, 63-64.
[113] Kennedy, 48, 52.
[114] Kennedy, 49.

The pride of the military made an enemy out of any fellow citizen who failed to live up to standards of bravery and proper conduct. Endless repetition of arcane military doctrine, including the "Five Principles of the Soldier," a shortened version of the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, which recruits had to study daily, were used to promote group thinking and the erosion of individuality. The slightest failure to adhere to expectations, such as dirty equipment or unkempt appearance, would lead to physical punishment by officers or older soldiers. This was because falling short of the ideal was seen as a direct insult to the Emperor and one's fellow soldiers. The obsession with obedience was so entrenched that soldiers were even to show complete deference to members of their own rank if another soldier had simply been in the army a little longer.[115] Draft dodgers were more likely to be from the educated classes, and so peasants who reported for duty were given a sense of being more patriotic, even superior, to their traditional betters in society. Recruits were barracked with others from their home region where possible, in order to further unit cohesion.[116] A soldier was more likely to follow the rules and avoid slacking off or disobedience when his friends and relatives were nearby and stood to be either shamed or honoured by his actions. This policy may have had the added benefit of limiting soldiers' contact with new ideas and concepts not explicitly forced upon them by the army.

At the same time that conservative and nationalist elements in the government and military were attempting to create an obedient state homogenous in thought, Western liberalism had taken root amongst the educated urban populations, the press, and some members of the Diet. In the 1920s the Japanese press became loudly critical of the iron hold of the military over the world of politics. Their attention focussed on the constitutional roles of the Army and Navy Ministers, and the Chiefs of the Naval and Military General Staffs. The former had special

[115] Drea, 336.
[116] Drea, 333-34.

access to the emperor and were immune to political upheaval, their positions not being linked to change in government or a Cabinet. The latter had the power to make policy without reference to other politicians, requiring only the Emperor's personal ratification of their suggestions.[117] In 1924 the main political parties, both liberal and conservative, felt powerful enough to push for the appointment of a Cabinet representative of the elected body. This was opposed to the traditional "transcendental Cabinet," which the Emperor usually appointed without reference to party majority in the Diet. The new Cabinet was formed from the majority Kenseikai liberal party. This was hailed as a victory for democracy, although it would prove to be short-lived. The Kenseikai Cabinet presided over the granting of universal male suffrage 1925. The Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara Kijuro, reduced military spending to its lowest percentage of the national budget since 1894.[118] The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 is evidence of the spiritual crisis facing Japan at the time. Enacted immediately prior to the introduction of universal male suffrage, it was meant to pre-empt any resulting challenges to the system. The government felt pressure enough to give the people a sense of power, but simultaneously enacted measures to curtail any real popular power.[119] The economic prosperity of the 1920s went hand-in-hand with a surge of enthusiasm for western media and cultural trappings. When the market crash of 1929 shook people's trust in the system, the decadence of Western ways was blamed, along with the democratic system itself, which was still fragile. The irony of this is that it was partly due to the Kenseikai's policies of tight money management and military spending cutbacks that Japan had remained competitive through the 20s. The military and the people of the countryside had fared

[117] Kennedy, 319-20.
[118] Crowley, 127-28.
[119] Hanneman, 124.

worse than the city-dwellers in the 20s, however, and it was here that calls for a return to more direct imperial rule took root.[120]

The brief flowering of liberalism in government occurred under the reign of the Taishō Emperor, Yoshihito, and its end came about under the reign of his son, the Shōen Emperor, Hirohito. It is important to understand something of Hirohito's experiences and upbringing in order to understand his place in Japan's slide towards military rule. Hirohito was born at a time when worship of and obedience to the emperor were fully entrenched in the national zeitgeist. This came about due to the conscious efforts of the government, who feared that an expanding population and ever-modernizing nation needed renewed clarification of the role of the citizen in relation to the state and the emperor. By 1911, when Hirohito was yet a young boy, school textbooks had been rewritten to promote the idea that the emperor was more than a ruler descended from the divine. The Japanese people were part of one great family, with the emperor as mother and father to all. In his biography of the Emperor Hirohito, Herbert P. Bix states that,

> Children continued to be taught the foundation myths: that they were the subjects of the emperor and had to obey him just as they obeyed their fathers and mothers. But for the first the impersonal emperor-state itself was presented as the supreme entity that took priority over all other values.[121]

Hirohito's grandfather, the Meiji Emperor, had appointed General Nogi, a hero of the Russo-Japanese War, as president of the Peers' School which young Hirohito attended. Nogi stressed military virtues above all else, undoubtedly influencing both Hirohito and his co-generational members of the elite.[122] Hirohito entered adulthood surrounded by contemporaries who had been reared on the national dogma of service and obedience to the state, and were eager to return to a more conservative society based on old martial virtues. Several crises surrounded the beginning

[120] Crowley, 128-29.
[121] Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 30-32.
[122] Bix, 35-37.

of Hirohito's reign that would help spur the call for a crackdown on an increasingly liberal society. In June of 1923 authorities discovered and illegal underground Communist party which was calling for the abolition of the monarchy. Then, on September 1, the Kantō earthquake devastated the plain on which Tokyo stood. The resulting fires were blamed on leftists, and on the Korean minority, and members of both groups suffered in pogroms aided by the police and military.[123] On December 27 there was an assassination attempt on Hirohito, and the next day the House of Peers met in secret for the first time in 16 years to discuss the incident. They focussed their attention on the would-be assassin's background and motivations, and decided there was a need to restrict ideas they deemed dangerous.[124] As Emperor, Hirohito was the only man who could have stood against the resulting government crackdowns, but his upbringing had likely chosen for him which side of the debate on liberalism he would sympathise with.

By the early 1930s the zeitgeist had truly begun to leave the liberals behind. It was common knowledge that corruption amongst elected officials remained rampant during the brief period of party rule. This was not the fault of liberalism as a political ideology, but it was an easy image to sell to the public.[125] Rural folk had, on average, not benefited from modernization or liberalization to the same extent at city-dwellers. Farm life had remained little-changed, despite technological advances producing larger yields, and the rural population saw little benefit from the liberalization of society. Wages during the 1920s had risen far faster for industrial workers in the cities than it had for farmers. As such, they could be counted upon as a source of support for conservative elements in the government.[126] In the late 20s through the 30's, a number of right-wing radicals began to call for drastic change to the political order. Too varied in their particular

[123] Bix, 139-40.
[124] Bix, 140-1.
[125] Beasley, 138-139.
[126] Beasley, 122-4.

ideals to form a single clear voice, they none the less stirred a large number of military men to right-wing radicalism. The common theme was that the liberals and politicians were ruining Japan, and had to go. Ishiwara Kanji, who taught military history at the Staff College, called for the marshalling of all Japanese people and resources to make war, first in Manchuria and then with Japan's other regional rivals, and that success in war would win Japan the resources it would need to keep on fighting until none could stand against it. This was a doctrine of war to feed war. By 1931, a hawkish bloc within of the General Staff was echoing Ishiwara's ideas.[127] After the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, in which elements of the Japanese military conspired to create a casus belli for the complete annexation of Manchuria, the civil government at home was discredited. It had proven itself ineffectual at controlling the military, and of preventing a simultaneous wave of extremist violence at home. "National Unity" Cabinets replaced party rule, and were more or less puppets of the military faction. The new government doubled military spending under finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo. This was not enough for extremists in the officer corps, who assassinated Takahashi in 1936. Later in the year the government re-introduced the practice of naming only active-duty officers to the role of War Minister, effectively giving the military a veto in the Cabinet. This coincided with a quadrupling of military spending over the following four years.[128] To say that the military "took over" the government may imply less support than the Japanese military really had in both official circles and the public consciousness.

The race to alter the political, economic, social, and cultural landscape of Japan begun by the Meiji architects sowed the seeds of future conflict that would ruin millions of lives across East Asia. The result of glutting the nation with a jumble of Western thoughts, practices, and

[127] Beasley, 66-69, and Crowley, 129-130.
[128] Crowley, p. 130.

customs created an atmosphere of confusion which bred reactionary ideologies based on wrenching back the clock. Japan's old martial spirit, twisted and reimagined, awoke to undo much of the progress which the Japanese had so earnestly acquired in their strive for modernity, and a herculean effort was required to put it back to sleep.

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HORRORS AND HAPPINESS:

MAKING SENSE OF CANADIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS

Rachel Beskau

History 1114 (L10): Canada since 1867

Professor Thor Frohn-Nielsen

March 31, 2015

Residential schools are a dark and shameful chapter in Canada's history. Their legacy remains tarred with reports of abuse, ranging from physical and sexual, to psychological, spiritual and even blatant murder. The fact that former students are now labelled "survivors," speaks volumes to the way that residential schools are portrayed. Since their closure in the late twentieth century, masses of literature has been produced to document the horrors of these institutions. Although the injustices of many of these schools are evident, it is unfair to simply generalize all residential schools in the same manner. To suggest that all residential schools participated in cultural genocide, and that all staff members were abusers, fails not only the history of Canada, but the history of the Natives as well. In uncovering the truth of the residential schools, we must remember not only the instances of abuse and injustice, but also the institutions that served as happy, loving places and stood for the benefit of the Native population.

The most infamous of these horrors include the physical and sexual abuse that occurred in these schools, which have resulted in the common assumption that all residential school employees were abusers. Students have reported forced sexual touching and intercourse by authority, routine physical harm and beatings, and inhumane forms of punishment. Former students have noted that physical punishment not only took place in the common form of strapping, but also in other forms such as choking, kicking, beating, being forced to eat regurgitated food, and even the electric chair.[1] In addition to this, students have described multiple occasions of sexual abuse by their teachers, principals, and other authorities.[1] For instance, Willie Blackwater, who had attended the Alberni Indian Residential School, reflected upon leaving the school that, "I was eighteen, an adult, but I had been a sex object, a toy, from the time I was ten. It wasn't just Plint [the Dorm Supervisor] preying on young boys; there were other supervisors and older students."[1] Mr. Blackwater's story is not uncommon either.

Countless documents are filled with stories of sexual abuse and, as a result, former staff members are often afraid to even admit they had worked in a residential school for fear of the job's implications. It is unreasonable to assume, however, that all staff members were abusers. In fact, due the nature of sexual abuse, cases in general are very hard to prove. Sexual abuse, for the most part, is between two individuals, with no witnesses or hard evidence. An Alberta journalist, Patrick Donnelly, points out that, "While there have been some documented cases of sexual abuse over the 120-year history of the schools…the available evidence is vague and almost entirely anecdotal."[1] This is not to say that sexual abuse did not occur in these schools, but instead that it is important to note that since it requires that we accept one person's word, in most cases the victim's, over another's, there is the very real possibility for false accusations and even convictions. Mr. Lorenz suggests, "Victimhood gets money," and that, "there are certain vested political interests who have no reason to say anything good about residential schools."[1] Although it is cynical, it is important to consider Mr. Lorenz's point when evaluating accusations of physical and sexual abuse in the residential schools, and certainly when forming opinions about those who have worked there.

Equally important, it seems, is the recorded psychological and spiritual abuse that has tarred the residential schools. One of the biggest complaints by and large, is the loss of traditional language, spiritual, and cultural practices amongst the Natives who attended residential schools.[1] The schools were designed to prepare Natives for a European dominated world and therefore are often accused of bluntly, "killing the Indian in the child." Upon arriving to the schools, Native children were assigned a European name, and were given haircuts and clothing to fit their new European identity.[1] There are many records of students being threatened or beaten for speaking their Native language or participating in any cultural activities. A former

student recalls that, “At the Indian residential school, we were not allowed to speak our language; we weren’t allowed to dance, sing because they told us it was evil.”[1] Another student claimed that it felt like the government was a superior force and that they, “try to mold you into something else”[1]—and in many cases they were. It is important to note, however, that in frequent instances, this complied with the wishes of the Native population. Many Natives encouraged the building of these facilities and saw value in their children acquiring English and a European style education in order to have tools to survive in their vastly different world.[1] Donald Cardinal, a former student, explains that because there was such widespread poverty on the reserves, “Many parents thought the school was a blessing.”[1] Nevertheless, arguments of cultural abuse seem to overshadow the demand and encouragement on the part of the Natives in favour of this form of education and surely the favourable outcomes that have resulted because of it. Former priest, Duhaime, reflects, “It’s very disappointing; all the years we worked in these schools, trying to make a difference and all you hear today is negative.”[1] Certainly, the positive side of the residential schools is valid as well.

Due to the overwhelming pressure of being politically correct, there has been little to no media coverage on the positive experiences that have resulted from these schools and the benefits they have provided for the Native population. The development of the federal Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada has provided a means for Native individuals who have attended these residential schools to tell their story.[1] This of course, plays an important role not only in terms of the healing process for former students, but also contributes to documenting the nation’s history and hopefully repairing the relationship between Natives and non-Natives. Saying this, the commission overwhelmingly fails to tell the stories of individuals who benefited from these institutions and saw them as a positive experience. For instance, Mr. Goodstriker

remembers, “It was good teaching for survival in society... I’m a rancher now, and I use a lot of what I learned at the school.”[1] Similarly, another individual notes, “My own mother attended the residential school in Lebret… and she loved it. The nuns taught her everything; how to sew, cook, read and write. How would she have learned otherwise?”[1] Correspondingly, Rita Galloway argues, “Of course there were good and bad elements, but overall their experiences were positive. Today these people are now productive citizens; professionals, consultants, and business people. They learned the ethic of hard work.”[1] Likewise, Rev. Stanley Cutherand clarifies, “They were certainly not prisons, although the principals were a little strict.”[1] Furthermore, with research, other stories like these can be found, yet they lack proper representation. Therefore, if Canada wants to truly comprehend residential schools and their impact, it must begin with a full understanding of all the experiences from these institutions, including the positive ones.

Ultimately, these positive stories are important, because they happened. If one values history, and more significantly the truth, then it is not only ignorant to suggest that all residential schools were prison-like, and that all staff members were abusers, but it is also inaccurate. Thus, in the process of accessing the residential schools in Canada, we must not only remember the overwhelming injustices, but also recognize the institutions that stood for the well being of the Natives.

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The Fight for the 'Wall:' An Analysis of the Controversies Surrounding the Construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington.

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April 27, 2015

History 4480: The Vietnam War

Presented to: Dr Tracey J. Kinney

The historiographical significance of memorials cannot be understated, particularly as they are highly visible historical narratives which a community has accepted as their official consensus. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim theorized that memorials were physical manifestations of the collective memory, and indicated that they convey not only what a group wished to valorise from its past, but also the values it strove to emulate in its future.[1] Within the American context, memorials occupy an almost sacred status, particularly those which stand in the capital, Washington DC, that commemorate the greatness of past leaders, social achievements, and military victories. However, one lone memorial presents itself as an anomaly to the proud assortment of shrines dedicated to American exceptionalism: the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Occupying a humble plot in the heart of the National Mall, this memorial commemorates a contentious period in American history upon which no broadly accepted consensus was ever reached by the nation; thus it serves as a humanizing reminder of the inescapable fallibility of the world's most powerful nation.

Calls for the country to recognize the over 58,000 American men and women who lost their lives during the Vietnam War began just four years after the end of the war, and against all odds their dreams materialized symbolically on Veterans Day of 1982. Capitalizing on the political overtures made by the Carter administration, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial movement was quickly able to establish itself as a populist campaign; however, it fell victim to a controversy sparked by an influential minority which took issue with its unconventional design, its architect, and its inability to promote a narrative that conferred a retrospective legitimacy on the Vietnam War. Actively fanning the flames of hostility were the Washington establishment which sought to politicize the issue, and the national media which reported on each development of the controversy fervently. Debate would also plague the subsequent push for the addition of a

Vietnam Women's Memorial, though this would stem from the unaddressed sexism endemic to the nation's most conservative institutions.

While the fall of Saigon in 1975 marked the official end of the Vietnam War, its harmful legacy endured through a proliferation of societal ailments within a sizeable veteran community of over two million Americans.[2] Whether draftees or volunteers, a substantial segment of the nation's youth would return to its homeland only to find it bitterly divided between those who supported the war, and those who opposed it. The rejection and hostility many experienced from members of the public may have even compounded the effects of untreated depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) acquired over the course of their tour of duty, and drove many to self-medicate through alcoholism and substance abuse.[3] Thousands of veterans committed suicide, and an estimated three-quarters of a million became homeless due to high rates of unemployment, incarceration, and the denial of medical and educational benefits from the chronically underfunded Veterans' Administration (VA).[4] While some rehabilitative programs were introduced by both Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford during their presidential terms, it was not until Jimmy Carter's Democratic administration that significant measures were taken to "cure the Vietnam Syndrome" in the US.[5] Acutely aware of the unique issues which plagued the Vietnam veteran community, in 1977, Carter appointed Max Cleland, a Vietnam veteran, as the leader of the VA.[6] Under Cleland, mental healthcare was expanded at VA facilities, and began focusing specifically on the prevalence of PTSD among combat veterans.[7] To accommodate this increased programming, the VA opened ninety-one new centres across the US during the Carter era.[8] The desire to heal the wounds left by Vietnam were encapsulated in both Carter's Executive Order which granted clemency to military draft evaders in January of 1977, and his proclamation announcing the creation of a Vietnam Veterans' Awareness Week in March 1979,

during which discourse on veterans issues was encouraged.[9] When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1980, he too made attempts to reach out to the Vietnam veteran community. While he was willing to label the Vietnam War as a "noble endeavour" in the fight against communism, his belief in fiscal conservatism drove his cabinet to slash the programming budget for the VA by twelve billion dollars.[10] His compromise instead was to create the Vietnam Veterans' Leadership Program, an initiative helmed by elitists from the officer class which "encouraged its peers to uphold the masculinity implicit in military service by rejecting government 'handouts.'"[11] By the early 1980s, the influence of both presidencies had prompted a general softening towards the needs and status of Vietnam veterans on both the right and the left, and led to a societal atmosphere which would be conducive to the push for a Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

In the same month as President Carter's Vietnam Veterans' Week proclamation, a young veteran named Jan Scruggs viewed the 1978 film *The Deerhunter*, and was subsequently inspired to organize a movement to memorialize the sacrifices made by Vietnam veterans in the capital.[12] In addition to the film, his decision may have also been influenced by his contemporaneous study of the psychology of veterans as a postgraduate student at the American University in Washington.[13] In April 1979, Scruggs presented his idea for a proposed monument to an assembly of prominent veterans organized by the Vietnam Veterans of America.[14] During this presentation Scruggs shared his vision of a "black marble obelisk" inscribed with the names of all the American casualties of the war towering over Washington.[15] He also stipulated that the project would rely solely on funds raised by donations from the American public, in order to combat the prevailing societal belief that the Vietnam veteran community was a drain on state finances.[16] While some were excited by the prospect of a memorial, others argued that a high-profile campaign could detract attention from more pressing issues such as the need for more

effective substance abuse counselling programs at VA centres.[17] Despite the criticism, Scruggs along with two other veterans, Robert Doubeck and John Wheeler, created the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial Fund (VVMF), a non-profit organization which would oversee the memorial project to its projected completion on Veteran's Day in 1982.[18]

Scruggs, the director of the VVMF's steering committee, proved to be a charismatic spokesperson for the memorial movement as it garnered national coverage by the media. Politically astute and willing to compromise, he managed to attract sympathy from most segments of the population throughout the heated memorial controversy. Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz theorize that his appeal was due in large part to the fact that he was a rare media representative of a Vietnam veteran who was educated, employed, and sober.[19] His influence in the veteran community may have in part been attributed to his status as a Purple Heart medal recipient for having been hit with shrapnel during active duty, along with being a 'grunt,' a foot soldier and a member of the working class who had made up the bulk of the troops drafted for combat.[20] Scruggs was keenly aware of the apprehension which existed in the American public regarding their nation's involvement in Vietnam, to which he responded that the project was staunchly apolitical as it aspired to "honor the soldiers, not the cause."[21] Even the name of the project reflected this stance, as it was aptly titled 'The Vietnam *Veterans'* Memorial,' instead of 'The Vietnam *War* Memorial.'

Scruggs' strategy proved fruitful, and soon donations began pouring in from across the nation, revealing that large segments of the American public supported the push towards reconciliation with the Vietnam veteran community. While most of the contributions were provided by small-scale donors whose average offering was a humble twenty dollars, the VVMF attracted a host of extremely high-profile and wealthy supporters who belonged to a wide cross-

section of American society.[22] Celebrities, religious figures, athletes, politicians, academics, and even some members of the former anti-war movement, publicly announced their support for the VVMF and encouraged others to donate.[23] Its patrons included the actress Carol Burnett, the comedian Bob Hope, the First Lady Roslyn Carter, and the former First Lady Betty Ford.[24] Some organized their own philanthropic events to raise funds; Senator John Warner of Virginia hosted a charity breakfast which featured food prepared by his wife, the actress Elizabeth Taylor, and managed to raise $40,000.[25] This prominent patronage may have had an influential effect on the numerous grassroots campaigns launched by schools, hospitals, businesses, and veteran's organizations throughout America.[26] The freeing of the hostages taken from the American embassy in Tehran in January 1980 also led to an increase in the volume of donations to the VVMF as a new wave of patriotism gripped the country.[27]

Although it enjoyed significant popularity, the memorial movement also attracted some condemnation. Most of this indignation was expressed in critical letters sent to the VVMF, one of which cautioned it to refrain from propagating "the memory of such dishonourable events [through the erection] of monuments to them."[28] The letter went on to accuse Scruggs personally of "buttering up Vietnam veterans as 'forgotten heroes,'" thereby delivering "a slap in the face to the millions in this country who resisted the war."[29] In addition to the remaining vestiges of the vocal anti-war movement, the steering committee also recognized Washington's notoriously inefficient bureaucracy as a major hindrance to the memorial's projected progress.[30] It was instead decided that courting the support of federal legislators would be a suitable alternative to ensure its desired completion by Veterans Day of 1982.

Capitalizing on the contacts of its most politically active member, John Wheeler, the VVMF swiftly secured the land it desired for its proposed memorial via a bipartisan bill which

sailed through both federal legislative bodies in 1980.[31] Wheeler served as an advisor to the secretary of the Security and Exchange Commission, and had been able to recruit Republican Senator Charles Matthias of Maryland as an early partner to the movement in September 1979.[32] Though he had opposed the war, Matthias was eager to lend his support to the concerted effort which sought to recognize the sacrifices of the nation's Vietnam veterans.[33] It was Matthias who offered to draft a bill which would reserve a two-acre plot in the National Mall as an effective solution to avoid exorbitant real estate costs.[34] The suggested location was located in Constitutional Gardens, nestled between the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument, a prestigious plot which would affirm its sacred significance.[35] In May 1980, Matthias' bill was introduced to the senate, where it received unanimous support from both Democrats and Republicans—even uniting the hawkish Barry Goldwater and the anti-interventionist George McGovern.[36] The VVMF's carefully crafted apolitical image was, however, threatened by the cavalier comments of the bill's Democratic co-sponsor, who boasted during its discussion that the memorial would "reclaim the space" on the Mall upon which the anti-war protestors had convened several years earlier.[37] Fortunately the careless remarks were overlooked by the national media, which was not inclined to report on the banal proceedings of the Congress.[38] In the Congress, the bill attracted 177 co-sponsors, and was signed into law by an enthusiastic Jimmy Carter on July 4, 1980.[39] Although the land was successfully acquired, the VVMF was prohibited from commencing any construction prior to obtaining approval of the memorial's blueprint from a host of bureaucratic agencies. To ensure their satisfaction, the VVMF consulted with prominent art critic Wolf Van Eckhart, who recommended a simplistic motif for the design, and also suggested the creation of a competition in lieu of hiring an architect.[40] The publicity of a

national competition could act equally as leverage to pressure the choosy commissions into granting a permit, in addition to providing further promotion for the ongoing donation drive.[41]

The design competition and its aftermath would emerge at the epicentre of the memorial controversy; it exposed the schisms within the veteran community, and ignited a highly publicized national debate over the proper memorialisation of those who served in Vietnam. Fissures began to appear from the outset when VVMF members discussed appropriate candidates for the competition's jury. Some were adamant that veterans should have either complete or partial representation as jurors, and argued that special consideration should be made to accommodate "interest groups" such as racial minorities and female veterans.[42] Although sympathizing with these desires, the steering committee ultimately decided that artistic objectivity should be emphasised over emotional attachment. As a compromise it was decided that the jury would be composed solely of professional artists, who would be selected through a vetting process to adequately ensure that they understood "what service in Vietnam meant to veterans."[43] The eight jurors were assured complete autonomy over their selection, and were instructed to choose a design which "recognized and honoured" the departed and that abstained from referencing the war itself.[44] The competition was formally announced on Veteran's Day 1980, and would require a twenty dollar submission fee, but would offer a twenty thousand dollar prize.[45] The media was mostly supportive of the contest, and happily advertised it on behalf of the VVMF; however, one reporter expressed his scepticism of the whole endeavour by asking them if they planned to unveil a sculpture of "a hippie hugging a marine."[46] The competition itself was received positively by the public; though its nonpartisan image was threatened by one of its most generous financiers, the billionaire Henry Ross Perot. In April 1981, Perot boastfully announced that he would personally offer $160,000 to "underwrite" the

competition in the event of an unsatisfactory design selection, stating that he did not wish to see a "flower power memorial."[47] This alarmed the VVMF which had taken great pains to distance itself from Perot's polarizing media presence, particularly his unabashedly hawkish views.[48] The competition closed on March 31, 1981, and collected 1,421 entries in total.[49] The jury was painstakingly provided with one month to review each proposal, and was even provided a security detail to ensure the safety of the designs in the unlikely event of an attack from anti-war activists.[50] On May 1, 1981, they unveiled their selection to the VVMF, and unwittingly ignited the heated controversy which threatened to postpone the memorial's construction indefinitely.

The winning design was inspired by postmodernist artistic themes of minimalism and abstractionism: a stark contrast to the conventional war memorial genre, which enshrined neoclassical motifs. It featured two black walls, which intersected at a 125° angle forming the shape similar to that of a chevron.[51] Each wall was to be composed of seventy-two distinct panels, which would all be of varying heights in order to create two sloping inclines.[52] The free-standing panelled ends of the walls would be no higher than eight inches, though they reached ten feet at their confluence.[53] Its two tapered ends paid tribute to the memorial's prestigious neighbouring monuments—with one pointing towards the obelisk of the Washington Monument complex, and the other to the Lincoln Memorial.[54] The designer had been inspired by the ridge of land which was included in the VVMF's two acres on the National Mall, and recommended that the walls be placed before it, thus mirroring "the contours of the earth."[55] Finally the names of the casualties were to be engraved on the polished black granite surface of the walls in the chronological order of their death: perhaps the most unique feature of the intricately thoughtful design.[56] When it was first presented to the VVMF, most members were initially perplexed by its unconventional structure; Scruggs described his first reaction to the proposal by likening it to a

child's rendition of "a bat from Mars."[57] While some were confused, others were insulted. They failed to see how the heroism which was implicit in the sacrifice of one's life in service to the nation was recognized by the simplistic walls. No nationalistic symbols were incorporated in the design, and its colour and stylistic elements were atypical of the American war memorial genre, though some believed this to be a snide reference to the atypical nature of the Vietnam War itself.[58] The design was also devoid of an inscription, or any mention as to the conflict during which the men and women listed lost their lives.[59] Many veterans had recommended that the sculptor Fredrick Hart be contracted to create the memorial.[60] Hart had been the apprentice of the renowned Felix De Weldon, the sculptor of the Marine Corps Memorial just outside of Washington which immortalized the rising of the American flag over the Japanese island of Iwo Jima.[61] Much to their chagrin, Hart's proposal had come in third place, while the winning design had been submitted by a twenty-one year old university student named Maya Ying Lin.[62] Internal disagreement over the jury's decision would become incredibly hostile, and ultimately lead to the fragmentation of the VVMF into two competing factions: a majority which supported Lin's design, and a vocal minority which opposed it.

The VVMF had taken great care to project itself as an apolitical entity from the outset; however, this is not to say that the organization was ideologically homogenous. Some of its members had been critical of the war upon their return from Vietnam and had joined the large student led protests against it, while others were zealous supporters of the war, and reflected on their service with patriotic pride.[63] Most vehemently pro-war veterans had been volunteer recruits, and had expected a hero's welcome upon their homecoming, much as the veterans of the Second World War had received in the previous generation.[64] Instead they returned to a nation in which public support for the war was rapidly declining, and whose Vietnam veterans were

disrespected and reviled.[65] It was this group of slighted veterans who had felt disappointed that Lin's memorial design did not challenge the dishonourable stereotypes associated with their community, as it failed to affirm the Vietnam War as a "morally just" war on par with past American conflicts in retrospect.[66] The push for a modified design which represented a pro-war perspective was led by Tom Carhart, a veteran who had served briefly as the head of the infamous "Tiger Force," an infantry platoon which allegedly committed a series of war crimes against Vietnamese combatants and civilians alike.[67] Carhart was supported by Jim Webb, an employee of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, as well as Ross Perot, who was readily willing to finance a veteran-approved design.[68] The members of the VVMF steering committee, however, were largely dismissive of their demands and began eagerly singing the praises of Lin's artistic vision during appearances on nationally broadcasted television programs such as *The Today Show* and *Good Morning America*.[69] Lin's design had obviously struck a chord with the American public, as donations to the VVMF increased substantially following its unveiling ceremony in May 1981.[70] When interviewed, an admiring Scruggs had described its politically neutral appeal by explaining that the design "said exactly what we wanted about [the] Vietnam [War] —absolutely nothing."[71] Ultimately the VVMF's fundraising campaign collected eight million dollars, an impressive sum which was four times their projected goal of two million dollars.[72] While the inflated yield was certainly heartening, it also signified a widespread confidence in Lin's design as the appropriate manner by which the Vietnam War and its veterans should be remembered by the nation.[73] Maintaining this tenuous approval became incredibly salient to the steering committee, making it less willing to consider proposed modifications suggested by the anti-Wall party.[74] Scruggs was particularly weary of their aims, and even went

so far as to accuse them of attempting to advance a revisionist agenda by "whitewashing" the Vietnam War's controversial status in American history.[75]

In the summer of 1981, Lin's design earned the tentative approval of both the Fine Arts Commission (FAC) and the National Capital Planning Commission, the two main bureaucratic bodies which oversaw the maintenance of the National Mall.[76] Their warm reception was due in large part to the design's horizontal rather than vertical orientation, as well as its avant-garde influences, which allowed Washington's pristine sight-lines to be maintained while also providing a much needed contrast to the city's neoclassical architecture.[77] When the FAC reconvened for the second meeting on the design proposal in October 1981, the anti-wall coalition ensured its criticisms were aired through a series of speeches which both presented its grievances, and proposed modifications.[78] Jim Webb called for the addition of an American flag "in a conspicuous place," an inscription which denoted "the values for which our countrymen fought and died," and recommended that either the walls be constructed of a white stone, or that the memorial be raised to a taller height.[79] The idea of a chronological list of names was also attacked, and was alleged by Webb to be "confusing," it was suggested that the list present the names in alphabetical order, or be excluded altogether.[80] Carhart's testimony was instead more personalized, during which he likened the design to "a black trench," and reiterated that its colour was a universal symbol of "shame and sorrow and degradation."[81] He took specific issue with the memorial's partial sub-terrestrial anchoring, and accused Lin of insensitivity towards disabled veterans who would find the memorial inaccessible to wheelchairs.[82] In his closing statements, he acknowledged the memorial's popularity with the public, though he implored the FAC to consider the unique difficulties encountered by Vietnam veterans, and stated that "perhaps [it was] an appropriate design for those who would spit on us, but can America truly mean that we

should feel honoured by that black pit? [sic]."[83] Despite their lengthy critiques, the FAC approved the original and unmodified design in November 1981, as advised by Jan Scruggs, who reaffirmed the VVMF's "commitment to affecting a reconciliation between the nation and its Vietnam veteran population" in his rebuttal testimony.[84]

Incensed by this perceived unwillingness to compromise, the anti-wall veterans turned to the Congressional Republican Caucus and conservative elements in the Executive Branch for assistance.[85] Jim Webb, undoubtedly the most politically influential member who opposed the memorial resigned from the VVMF sponsoring committee in early November 1981.[86] Following the 1980 presidential election which brought Ronald Reagan to power, the Republican party experienced an ideological shift to the right in accordance with their leader's electoral success.[87] Henry Hyde, a Republican Congressman from Illinois, was particularly eager to align himself with Webb and his associates against the erection of what he perceived to be a "liberal monument."[88] On November 20, 1981, Hyde authored a letter addressed to Reagan's Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, requesting he use his executive power to prevent further development on the memorial site.[89] In the letter, which was signed by twenty-seven other House Republicans, Hyde alleged that the VVMF had "somewhat twisted things [by] selecting a memorial to the dead" in lieu of a design which "honored and recognized the [surviving] men and women who served in the Vietnam War," as per the original congressional mandate which authorized the VVM's spot on the National Mall.[90] A self-avowed "super-conservative," Watt had expressed a personal dislike of the memorial in June 1981, due in large part to his suspicions that the design paid homage to the leftist anti-war movement.[91] His suspicions would ultimately be confirmed by a slanderous letter in which Tom Carhart alleged that Garrett Eckbo, jury member from the design competition had ties to the Communist Party—a clear attempt to stoke the secretary's

latent McCarthyism.[92] The culmination of both letters prompted Watt to halt any further progress on the memorial in early January 1982.[93]

As the debate surrounding the memorial intensified, harsh criticism was lodged at its designer for her artistic influences, background, and eventually her polarizing media persona. In response to the trepidation some expressed over her design, Lin began dissecting its multifaceted components in her interviews with the press. Its horizontal orientation was explained through her desire for "something that took you in, that made you feel safe, yet at the same time also reminded you of the dead," thus provoking her to imagine "opening up the Earth."[94] When asked about the chronological sequence of the names, she explained that she wished for its visitors to experience "coming full circle with the war," with the first casualty in 1959 which built up to the crescendo of the Tết Offensive years, then gradually deescalating until the end of the war in 1975.[95] The mosaic of names also displayed the country's inherent ethnic pluralism, thus serving as a testament to America's status as "a nation of immigrants."[96] She addressed her choice of its contentious black colour by explaining her vision of a polished black surface which could catch its visitors' reflections, thus leading to a heightened emotional response.[97] Finally, Lin dismissed the rumours regarding its ambiguous letter 'V' shape as a veiled reference to the words 'Vietnam,' 'Vietcong,' or 'Victory,' by flatly stating that its angle was obtuse, therefore much wider than a 'V,' and explained that each of the two walls' tapered ends pointed to the Washington Monument and Lincoln Memorial respectively.[98] Rather than defusing the situation, Lin's artistic analysis was seen as elitist by her critics, thus cementing their belief that her design was "something for New York intellectuals," and alienating for the vast majority of working-class veterans who might find it confusing.[99] As a student of Yale, she was blasted for her ties to an ivy-league institution which had hosted 'teach-ins' and protests at the height of the anti-war movement.[100]

Even her bohemian style of dress and long hair were seen uncomfortable reminders of the hippies of the 1960s.[101] Her Asian heritage was perhaps the largest source of consternation; thus exposing the unresolved racist views held by some veterans.[102] While Jan Scruggs was thrilled that Lin was Chinese-American, as it reinforced the VVMF's apolitical agenda, Tom Carhart was alleged to have privately suggested that the memorial be inscribed with the phrase "designed by a gook," the slur by which many American soldiers referred to the people of Vietnam.[103] Conservative demagogue Bob Arnebeck, a writer for *The Progressive*, even speculated that Lin had a familial relation to Ho Chi Minh himself.[104] Suspicions were raised by an article profiling Maya Lin in *The Washington Post*, in which she attributed her family's adherence to Taoist principles as the inspiration for the design's minimalism, and labelled its reliance on self-reflection as "very Eastern."[105] In another interview, she lambasted the proponents of the traditionalist war memorial genre by stating that her design was unlike the "phallic memorials that rise upwards [and that she did not] set out to conquer the Earth or overpower it like the Western man usually does."[106] This led to speculation that Lin sought instead to emasculate those who served in an unsuccessful war.[107] As Lin gained more exposure in the media, her own outspoken and headstrong personality began contributing to her downfall, and were even seen as a liability by some in the VVMF. She was dismissive of the calls for a statue to be added to the walls, accusing its supporters of being "materialistic."[108] When approached by the VVMF with proposed alterations to the design, she was said to have been standoffish, and advised them to "reconvene the jury" instead.[109] This even led to vehement supporters of her design, such as Robert Doubeck, to refer to her as "a brat."[110] When she expressed her dissatisfaction with her reduced role in the construction process on an appearance on *The Today Show* in July 1982, even

her allies in the art world such as Professor Charles B. Leidenfrost called it "petulant," and reminded her that the project was "a memorial to the veterans, not to Miss Lin."[111]

The media, which had initially provided the memorial movement with crucial publicity and exposure, would also play a significant role in stoking the flames of the subsequent controversy it generated. America's major periodicals followed the debate intently, as it involved the nation's top politicians, bureaucrats, and figures such as Jan Scruggs, Tom Carhart, and Maya Lin, all of whom attained celebrity status in their own right. The design itself had been reviewed quite positively by *The New York Times*, whose art critic appreciated the unconventional nature of Lin's design, as it was an accurate representation of a deeply contentious war, and stated that "ideas about heroism, or art, for that matter, are no longer what they were before Vietnam; and there is certainly no consensus yet about what cause might have been served by the Vietnam War."[112] The staunchly conservative *New Republic*, however, was fiercely critical of Lin's design; it was labelled "an unfortunate choice," and was even compared to a list of victims of vehicular accidents by claiming that it was "contextless [and] meaningless; to treat the Vietnam dead like the victims of some monstrous traffic accident is more than a disservice to history [sic]."[113] The very pages of major American newspapers served as the battle ground between the proponents of the Wall and their antagonists. Carhart was the first figure in the memorial debate to pen an Opinion letter, published in *The New York Times* on October 24, 1981, in which he revisited the notion that the monument's black colour was indicative of the nation's "shame and sorrow," in regards to its Vietnam veteran population.[114] He went on to claim that it was "pointedly insulting to the sacrifices made for their country by all Vietnam veterans," and denied that the controversy was a conflated disagreement over art and rather a question of historical depiction, explaining that "if the black trench [was] allowed to be dug, future generations will

understand clearly what America thought of us."[115] On November 4, 1981, Scruggs responded to Carhart's editorial through his own opinion letter in which he accused him of bitterness over his own submission to the design contest being judged inferior to Lin's walls.[116] Some staff writers took direct aim at the anti-wall faction of the VVMF for their disruptive calls for the addition of a statue. William Greider of the *Washington Post* was particularly harsh, and asserted that "only revisionist fools still insist that Vietnam was [akin to the battles of] Gettysburg or the Ardennes; if the government built such a statue, it would be worse than amnesia."[117] Carhart responded to this chastisement by declaring Lin's walls to be a flagrant rejection of the design competition's apolitical requirement, and argued that Lin had expressed contempt for the suffering of veterans by making "a political statement of dishonor and shame" through her "black gash of shame."[118] Jim Webb also capitalized on the publicity offered by opinion pieces, and penned his own in December 1981 to the *Wall Street Journal*, in which he claimed that the memorial was "a mockery to the service" of Vietnam veterans, and predicted that it would serve as "a wailing wall for future anti-draft and anti-nuclear demonstrators."[119]

Whilst most media coverage on the Veterans Memorial served only to antagonize its headstrong dissenters, it also prompted some to push for a swift resolution to the heated debate. On December 22, 1981, just two weeks after a high-profile press conference organized by the anti-wall faction, the Veterans of Foreign Wars organization held a cheque presenting ceremony at which Rocky Bleier, a Vietnam veteran and halfback for the Pittsburgh Steelers football team, delivered an impressive $180,000 cheque to the VVMF.[120] This generous contribution was outdone by the presentation of the largest single-party donation to the Memorial Fund on January 26, 1982—a payment of one million dollars by the American Legion.[121] Both lavish and publicized donations reflected the continued support enjoyed by Lin's design by the vast majority

of Vietnam veterans, and signified that Carhart and his associates espoused a minority viewpoint. As progress began to be blatantly stalled by December 1981, hundreds of letters were sent to the Department of the Interior and the Fine Arts Commission from average Americans, the majority of who urged the two governing bodies to work with the VVMF to reach a suitable compromise.[122] Among the more notable citizen lobbyists was General William Westmoreland, the former Army Chief of Staff at the height of the Vietnam War, who wrote a letter which spoke admiringly of Lin's vision and which was addressed to Tom Carhart.[123] The office of James Watt also received a letter which endorsed Lin's design from Ellsworth Bunker, the former American ambassador to Saigon.[124] Of all the criticism lodged at the ineffectiveness of the memorial movement, the most scathing commentary came from Milton Copulos, a disabled Vietnam veteran from the Heritage Foundation.[125] In an article for *The Washington Post*, Copulos expressed disappointment over the delayed commencement of the "healing process," which was guaranteed by the VVMF during their initial fundraising campaigns.[126] The article was equally dismissive of both factions within the memorial movement, and accused them of "adding yet another element of controversy to one of the most controversial episodes in our history."[127]

In addition to the media, Washington's political elites also prolonged the memorial's construction by fracturing the executive branch along ideological lines. As the memorial controversy generated more interest from prominent conservative legislators such as Congressman Hyde, centrist voices began urging the Secretary Watt to refrain from using his executive power to complicate a disagreement within a private organization. In a letter sent to Watt in the days following his decision to delay the memorial's construction, Representative Lawrence DeNardis, a moderate Republican from Connecticut, informed the Secretary that there appeared to be "an odour of mischief in this last minute attempt to discredit the Vietnam veterans

design selection process."[128] DeNardis also included a detailed critique of the inflammatory letter sent by Hyde to Watt, in which he included a list of veterans groups in Hyde's own congressional district which conducted fundraising campaigns in support of Lin's design.[129] This correspondence was followed by yet another anti-Lin letter signed by four Republican senators, which asserted that "no memorial should be built that is offensive to those who served in Vietnam," and that the memorial should "adequately convey our gratitude to future generations."[130] Amidst this oscillation in the halls of the Capitol, conservative activists threatened to escalate the debate even further. In a newspaper interview Ross Perot called for a national survey which would ascertain the level of support the wall design enjoyed within the veteran population.[131] Numerous congressional Republicans began calling on the President to publicly reject Lin's design, though no official comments were released by the White House.[132] Reagan chose instead to distance himself from an issue that he believed could conceivably resurrect the wider societal debate on American interventionism.[133] To maintain this neutrality, the First Lady Nancy Reagan was advised to resign from the VVMF sponsoring committee in December 1981.[134]

Ultimately cooler heads would prevail when Senator John Warner organized a congressional hearing on January 27, 1982, during which measures to enact a compromise were discussed by both the pro-wall and anti-wall factions of the VVMF.[135] Predictably the meeting devolved into a shouting match between the two sides regarding almost every physical feature of Lin's design.[136] When the issue of its disputed colour was raised, General George Price attacked the anti-wall faction for the racial undertones in its critique of the colour black; as an African American veteran he refuted the notion that it was "the color of shame," and affirmed that "we are all equal in combat—color should mean nothing now."[137] Ultimately it was decided that an

inscription would be included on the walls itself, and the VVMF even agreed to the addition of "a flag and statue of a serviceman" in order to placate their traditionalist adversaries.[138] In early February 1982, Secretary Watt expressed that he found the inclusion of certain nationalistic symbols to be a "minimally acceptable" compromise, and agreed to issue a construction permit once the newly modified design was approved by the necessary Washingtonian bureaucrats.[139] This would prove difficult, as the compromise stipulated that a flagpole would be inserted at the confluence of the two ten-foot walls, thus threatening to mar the precious sight-lines of the National Mall.[140] J. Carter Brown, the chair of the Fine Arts Commission was particularly reluctant to approve the design, and only acquiesced after a personal guarantee from Watt that the flag's position was negotiable.[141] Upon Brown's recommendation, both the flag and the sculpture would be included on a pathway leading to the main memorial, thus serving as its "introduction."[142] The arduous process concluded on March 3, 1982, when the VVMF finally acquired the approval of the Department of the Interior in a letter which affirmed Watt's belief that the modifications would bring "honour to all 2.7 million Americans who served in Vietnam [sic]."[143]

In the months following Watts' approval of the modified design, the main Vietnam Veterans Memorial controversy began to deescalate considerably, although marginal dissatisfaction over the compromise still lingered. Construction on the two-acre site officially began on March 26, 1982, and featured a ceremony at which 120 VVMF members and Washington elites shovelled soil onto the National Mall.[144] In accordance with the terms of the compromise, a VVMF subcommittee was created and staffed by four veterans, two of whom supported Lin's wall and two of whom opposed it, in order to select the accompanying sculpture for the memorial site.[145] A smaller-scale design contest resulted in the selection of Fredrick

Hart's sculpture proposal as the winner. Hart's proposal featured a statue of three male figures, servicemen in their uniform, which would be depicted with an awed expression as they gazed perpetually at the Memorial Wall.[146] While more typical of the war memorial genre than the postmodernist wall, Hart's sculpture did not glorify the soldiers as exaggeratedly hyper-masculine. Instead the three figures, one Black and two White, appear weary and almost haggard; their sculptor had wished for them to appear as if they had just returned from active duty to find "themselves as an island before a tsunami," referring to the wall.[147] While most critics were appreciative of Hart's subtle sculpture, Maya Lin expressed her revulsion towards it and the general memorial building process in a fiery interview with the *Washington Post* in July 1982.[148] Labelling her diminished role as "farcical," Lin berated the compromise reached by the VVMF, and predicted that the addition of a flagpole would make the site "feel like a golf green."[149] The article described her desire to maintain the sanctity of her artistic vision, and prevent the design from resulting in the erection of "a 250-foot-long-nothing."[150] Her most scathing criticism was reserved for Fredrick Hart, whom she accused of "drawing moustaches on other people's portraits."[151] Lin's anger would eventually subside, and her threats to pursue a legal injunction against the VVMF were never acted upon. Against all odds, the VVMF met its goal on November 11, 1982, when the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was officially dedicated and unveiled to a crowd of thirty thousand spectators.[152] Although President Reagan was not in attendance, he and his wife did make an appearance at the candlelight vigil which honoured the casualties of Vietnam held at the National Chapel the day before.[153] The fanfare and accolades which the Memorial Wall subsequently received, however, may have compelled the commander-in-chief to not only attend, but officiate at the dedication ceremony of Hart's statue on Veterans' Day 1983.[154]

Three years after the dedication of the 'Wall,' another controversial movement, which sought to erect an additional sculpture to honour the sacrifices made by female Vietnam veterans, was initiated; though the unique hurdles it faced reflected the latent sexism which persisted in both the military and the media in regards to the contribution of servicewomen. In 1985, Diane Carlson Evans, a former military nurse who had served in Vietnam, began lobbying the VVMF for an addition to Lin's Wall and Hart's statue, which would recognize "the invisible veterans of the war;" the women.[155] Although no females had served in active combat roles, hundreds had enlisted to serve mostly as nurses, but also as communication operators, clerks, and in kitchen staffs.[156] Many had been sent to base camps which came under fire; Carlson herself described the hospital at which she worked as a target of Vietcong rocket and mortar strikes.[157] The first female casualty of the war, Sharon Lane, was killed during one such attack on a hospital in Chu Lai.[158] Lane's name, along with the names of seven other females, do appear on the main memorial; however, Carlson believed that neither the wall nor the accompanying statue adequately portrayed the distinct hardships faced by female veterans, and asked the VVMF steering committee "if you go to the wall and see the fighting men, do you think of the women?"[159] Many servicewomen struggled to come to terms with the magnitude of death and injury the encountered in Vietnam. When interviewed, Kathy Cordova, a former nurse, expressed feeling "angry, guilty, and confused" upon reflection on the lives she could not save.[160] Most American casualties died in hospitals rather than the battlefield, meaning that nurses were the last people to have interaction with them before they succumbed to their injuries.[161] When they arrived home, numerous female veterans reportedly suffered from the same mental ailments as their male counterparts, such as PTSD, flashbacks, depression, anxiety, and insomnia.[162] Most veterans' organizations barred women from joining, thus contributing to their sense of

alienation.[163] When Carlson finally acquired the approval of the VVMF, her first challenge was to secure the support of the numerous veterans' organizations, which aided in the construction of the first memorial. However, many were reluctant to champion the newly formed Vietnam Women's Memorial Project (VVMP), as they felt that female veterans had escaped the same level of stigmatization that male veterans had faced in the immediate post-war years.[164] Carlson and a small union of eight former nurses, began a campaign to raise awareness of female contributions to the war effort, and began a petition which was entitled "Not All Women Wore Love Beads in the Sixties," referencing the correlation made by many between women and the anti-war movement.[165] Eventually the VVMP initiative earned the support of five major veteran organizations: the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled American Veterans, Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Vietnam Veterans of America—whose combined membership was six million people.[166] In the wake of this achievement, the VVMP was disappointed when Maya Lin spoke out against the newly proposed addition, as she believed her own design was devoid of gender, and included the names of several women.[167] This hostility was echoed by the Fine Arts Commission, which rejected the addition in October 1987.[168] Perhaps exasperated with the unending chain of Vietnam-themed memorials, its chairman J. Carter Brown famously likened the VVMP's endeavour to a hypothetical movement which sought "to the recognize the contributions made by the sentry dogs of the canine corps."[169]

Once again the media took an interest in the events, *The Washington Post*'s Benjamin Forgey came out in support of Brown's comments, and alleged that a women's memorial would inspire more frivolous accommodation, and asked " Why not [a statue depicting] an American Indian, or an Italian American soldier? Why not engineers, Seabees, pilots or supply sergeants."[170] Conservative elements of the military establishment also declared their opposition.

Author and veteran John Ketwig acknowledged that women had been present in Vietnam, "but so had water buffalo, and no one asked to commemorate them."[171] The most egregious example of sexism in the military, however, was revealed in a 1989 report which found that the Department of Defense was unable to "arrive at a reasonable estimate of how many women [had] actually served in Vietnam."[172] Despite the backlash, Carlson and the VVMP persisted and gradually secured a congressional resolution which overruled the FAC decision, and mandated that a statue dedicated to the "women of the Vietnam War" must be added to the memorial site.[173] In November 1989, President George H. W. Bush enthusiastically signed the resolution into law, though it took four years for the funds to be raised and the design to be selected and constructed.[174] On Veterans Day 1993, President Bill Clinton's Vice President, Al Gore, officiated over the dedication ceremony of the Vietnam Women's Memorial.[175]

While nowhere near as intense as the debate surrounding the period which it sought to memorialize, the controversial nature of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Movement truly encapsulated the difficulties faced by those who wished to commemorate a "difficult past."[176] Though a general societal softening towards the veterans of the Vietnam War had already begun during the Carter years, the visceral memories of the conflict itself continued to haunt the American psyche for decades. The success of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund in erecting a monument so soon after the war had ended should be considered all the more impressive when one takes into account the difficult political and social environment with which it had to contend. This Herculean task would be further complicated by the agenda of a small, yet politically and financially influential minority, which threatened to derail the project indefinitely should its demands for a more traditionalist design go unfulfilled. Motivated by an unrequited need for legitimacy and respect on par with the veterans from past "just wars,"[177] these veterans found

allies in both the prominent neoconservative legislators and executives who served in Washington during the early 1980s, as well the often overbearing presence of the media commentators who actively scrutinized the process . The designer of the memorial was also injected into the debate, and was treated by some as an extension of her work, and thus ridiculed and reviled for almost every facet of her being, including her often thoughtless comments to the public. The final iteration of the memorial debate involved the oft neglected female veterans of Vietnam lobbying for their own recognition in Washington; though this unwittingly initiated a deluge of ignorance from the establishment, stemming from the belief that women's contribution to the war effort was inherently inconsequential. Today, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial attracts an average of two million visitors a year, establishing it as one of Washington's most popular tourist attractions.[178] The 'Wall,' as it has affectionately called by the veteran community, has become a site of sanctified reflection upon the sacrifice of all who serve in the nation's military, and is theorized by some anthropologists to be a "site of collective mourning."[179] Its own unique rituals have been observed, namely the tradition of placing heartfelt mementos along the walls as a means to honour its unique position as a memorial which valorises the nation's resilience in the face of military defeat rather than triumph in victory.[180]

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