

A Journal by and for Undergraduate History Students at KPU

A photograph of a study desk. On the left is a book with a blank page. In the center is a tablet with a black screen. To the right is a yellow cup of coffee. A brass compass is on the book. The background is a wooden desk.

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The Emergent Historian is published by the Kwantlen Polytechnic University Department of History. Its annual publication provides us with a chance to showcase the very best of our students' work – from first-year classes to fourth-year seminars – from the previous academic year.

This year's edition is the most substantial yet, featuring a broad range of research projects, digital history, and material history projects. Together they celebrate the diversity and the excellence of our students' work.

Congratulations to everyone whose work is featured here!

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Communist China and Christianity in the Modern Period

Matt Beamish – April 2022

HIST 3350 – China in the Twentieth Century: Reforms & Revolutions

Dr Jack P. Hayes

In 1949, the Communist Party took over China after a civil war with the Kuomintang (KMT). This brought on the end of the “century of humiliation”, which had seen China go from conflict to conflict in a time period of one hundred years, and saw China fractured by multiple regime changes. This tumultuous series of events brought a multitude of changes to China, but what changes did it bring to Christianity? Although Christianity is a Western religion, it had been in China since the Nestorian Christians entered Tang China in 635 and had been preached since the colonial era until the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), having somewhat of an influence before the CCP takeover of China.¹ So what changed for Christians in China, how were Christians treated, and how did Christianity function in this new regime? This paper seeks to explore how Christians were treated in China, why they were treated in these ways, and how Christianity functioned in this new regime. It will do this by going into certain historical periods in a 50-year timeframe, from 1949 until 1999. The first will explore this topic from 1949 until the start of the Cultural Revolution, the second part will look at the Cultural Revolution, and the third part will look at the period after the Cultural Revolution until the end of the century.

The Chinese Communist Party meant something different for both Protestant and Catholic Christians in China, as it was the first time in recent memory that they had to deal with a governmental entity that was as powerful, centralized and as willing to intervene in Church and mission affairs as the People’s Republic of China (PRC).² The PRC sought to transform China according to its socialist ideals, and as a result, religious groups were scrutinized.³ The PRC wanted the compliance and borderline allegiance of the Christians, but was more focused on subjugation than the outlawing of religion, as they had other problems to tend to like fixing rampant inflation and the agricultural system; rebuilding transport and communication after the

¹ Daniel H Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China* (Chichester, 2011), 5.

² Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 144.

³ Fuk-Tsang Ying, “The CPC’s Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, nr. 89 (2014): 884.

war; and dealing with violent Guomindang activity, as well as gang activity.⁴ Protestantism and Catholicism were targeted by the Communist Government particularly because of their ties to the Western imperialist powers.⁵ As a result, the goal in the early days of the PRC was to cut off Protestant and Catholic groups from their former western associates and institutions, and put them under the jurisdiction of party bodies that were assigned to monitor them.⁶

This goal was normal for Communist countries to undertake according to *The Guardian*; in an article published in 1951, they say that Eastern European countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact were trying also trying to cut off churches from Western Europe and the United States so that they would denounce imperialists and praise the new peace put in by the Communists.⁷ The only difference in China was that Christianity was seen as a foreign religion that was spread through imperialism.⁸ In the past this had resulted in some outbursts against Christian missionaries as during the Boxer Rebellion from 1899 until 1901, though reactions like that had long subsided by the 1950s.⁹ Christianity had also been protected by these past imperial governments because of the unequal treaties of the era, further proving the imperialist nature of the spread of Christianity at this time.¹⁰ Western Imperialism ended up evolving into “American Imperialism,” as China sent volunteers into Korea against the US during the Korean War.¹¹ As a result, the CCP ended up propagating an ideology that linked Christianity to the century of humiliation by foreign powers.¹²

The attempt by the PRC to stop any Christians from being influenced by the west manifested itself in a few ways. One of the first discussions of Christianity was at the First National Conference on United Front Work One in Beijing on March 6th, 1950.¹³ This talk essentially laid the foundations of the PRC’s attitude towards Christianity in these early years.¹⁴ They essentially laid out that religion must be severed from imperialism as mentioned before, but also that religions in China should be run by the Chinese masses, and that the state action against religion should not get involved with religious beliefs.¹⁵ Later that August, the first memo about the

⁴ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 144.

⁵ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 145.

⁶ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 145

⁷ “The Christian Churches in China,” *The Economist*, October 6, 1951, 789 (The Economist Historical Archive).

⁸ “The Christian Churches in China,” *The Economist*, 789.

⁹ “The Christian Churches in China,” *The Economist*, 789.

¹⁰ “The Christian Churches in China,” *The Economist*, 789.

¹¹ Ying, “The CPC’s Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957,” 887.

¹² Carsten T. Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party?* (London, 2017), 28.

¹³ Ying, “The CPC’s Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment,” 887

¹⁴ Ying, “The CPC’s Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment,” 887.

¹⁵ Ying, “The CPC’s Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment,” 887.

party's policy on Christianity came out.¹⁶ The focus of the memo was on the "disclosure of religious ties to imperialist cultural invasion and espionage," the "opposition to the few reactionaries who still colluded with imperialism" and the "wiping out the influence of imperialism over churches and severing their economic relationship."¹⁷ In short, the party was trying to make the people more patriotic, but they had no problem with free religious belief, as long as it was run by the Chinese.¹⁸ The PRC used the three-self concept tactic to stop potential foreign influence on Protestant and Catholic groups.¹⁹ The three-self idea had to do with self-support, self-government, and self-propagation, and was ironically a concept that foreign Christian missionaries from the American Board for Foreign Missions and the British Church Missionary Society had tried to implement.²⁰ Though these groups often talked about implementing the three-self rules in China, they never really did as these groups' foreign missions still wanted overall control, so China used this framework to cause foreign missions to give up control over their boards.²¹ These policies caused Protestants and Catholics to go down different routes until the start of the Great Leap Forward.

What was the effect of this on the Protestants? It is important to note that the Communist victory did not lead to a suppression of the Church overnight, though there was some persecution in CCP-held areas during the civil war.²² However, it did lead to expropriation of all Protestant schools, hospitals, and publication enterprises, and by 1952 almost all foreign missionaries had left the country.²³ The Protestant Christians that submitted to the party had to go through ideological and organizational changes that ended up capitulating them into CCP control anyway.²⁴ The CCP demanded loyalty from the Christians to the PRC, and requested they join the masses even though they were not even considered part of the masses, something that was in line with Marxist thinking.²⁵ As a result, they had to submit to the United Front, which was an alliance of non-communists who supported the party and actively supported the CCP powerbase.²⁶

¹⁶ Ying, "The CPC's Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment," 887.

¹⁷ Ying, "The CPC's Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment," 887.

¹⁸ Ying, "The CPC's Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment," 887.

¹⁹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 145.

²⁰ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 145.

²¹ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party?* 29.

²² Xi Lian, *Redeemed by Fire: The Rise of Popular Christianity in Modern China*. (New Haven, 2010), 197.

²³ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire: The Rise of Popular Christianity in Modern China*, 197-198.

²⁴ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party?* 28.

²⁵ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 29.

²⁶ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 29. They were overseen by the Party's United Front Work Department.

There were some mixed feelings about this for Protestant Chinese, as many distrusted the Communists, but some hoped for better relations with the regime, with some Christian intellectuals being sympathetic to the Communists in the late 1940s.²⁷ There was also resentment from some Chinese Protestants as foreign mission boards would not give up control of their missions to the resident Chinese Christians, and some of them were attracted at the idea of running their own mission organizations.²⁸ This 'bending of the knee' so to speak also meant full submission to the CCP, which would blend politics and religion. A Protestant named Wu Yaozong said that the CCP had essentially taken God's place in China's salvation, basically putting the CCP over God.²⁹

There were certain tactics that the Communists tried to get Protestants on their side, such as sending out a Christian Manifesto to denounce imperialism as well as the Three Self Reform Movement which would manage the affairs of the Protestants.³⁰ Some Protestant leaders even ended up being coopted by the Government through bribes, and even lay believers ended up supporting the CCP due to threats of force, fear of punishment, and ideological brainwashing.³¹ But some Protestants did not support the Government because of the Denunciation Movement, as they would rather worship in private.³² To them, the supporters of the CCP were essentially not Christians and looked on with suspicion.³³ By August 1955, a nationwide movement against counter revolutionaries had started.³⁴ This resulted in many Pastors who were in leadership roles for the Chinese being basically put in prison with the accusation of working for imperialists or for criticizing the Protestants who allied with the party, so the CCP essentially toppled the power of all the relevant Christian leaders at this point.³⁵

For Catholics, the PRC was less successful in getting them to support the Communist movement. Relations between both sides did not start off great as the CCP reduced or took Catholic land and redistributed it and also treated priests harshly and even killed a few.³⁶ It also did not help that the Pope, Pius XII, was an anti-communist along with his predecessor, Pius XI.³⁷ They ended up sending Antonio Riberi to be the Papal representative in China.³⁸ He was tied to the Chinese

²⁷ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 147.

²⁸ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 29.

²⁹ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 29.

³⁰ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 147.

³¹ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 30-31.

³² Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 30-31.

³³ Ying, "The CPC's Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949-1957," 981-892.

³⁴ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 200-201.

³⁵ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 151.

³⁶ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 154.

³⁷ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 154.

³⁸ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 154.

Nationalists and incited protests against the communists, telling the Catholics in China not to deal with the Communists under threat of excommunication from the Catholic Church.³⁹ At the beginning, the Catholics were free to worship, though regulated by the government and even the role of foreign priests was tolerated for a time.⁴⁰ However, heavy taxes were put on their properties, and curriculum at the Catholic schools were substantially modified with all elements of Catholicism being removed.⁴¹ This ended up changing in 1951, as the CCP started to interrogate and deport priests, along with Riberi himself, with accusations of espionage being the reason.⁴² This resulted in a martyrdom of Father Beda Zhang⁴³, which upset many Catholics, and many young Catholics joined groups like the Legion of Mary.⁴⁴ This caused the CCP to take steps to stop any hint of rebellion, as they continued to jail and deport foreign priests for imperialist espionage, insist that they supported religious freedom when they did not in actuality, and call believers to participate in mass denunciations of imperialism.⁴⁵ They tried to divide the church so priests could be coopted and accused priests who were not supportive of the CCP of crimes, both actions pressured members of the Legion of Mary to leave the group.⁴⁶ This caused the regime to win against the Church, as the Church was too powerless to do anything against the Communists, though they mounted more resistance than the Protestants.⁴⁷

This essentially came to a head in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which saw multiple negative things happen to Christians of all denominations. The Anti-Rightist Movement, of which Protestants and Catholics were both accused of being a part, was arguably the worst thing to happen to Christians according to Daniel Bays.⁴⁸ This was because hundreds of thousands of Christians were arbitrarily punished, which shut down dissent and dialogue with the state, and nearly criminalized religious beliefs itself despite the fact that the CCP said it was going to protect religious freedom.⁴⁹ The Anti-Rightist movement ironically targeted pastors and leaders who had not only had been in support of the three-self movement, but had been leaders in it as two

³⁹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 155.

⁴⁰ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 156.

⁴¹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 155.

⁴² Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 155-156

⁴³ Wade-Giles: Beda Chang, usually transliterated in Pinyin as Zhang Boda; Bays transliterates his name as Beda Zhang. Born Chang Cheng-Min [Zhang Zhengming] in 1905; he died while imprisoned in 1951. For a brief biography see <https://www.catholicism.org/downloads/Mancia1-2-12.pdf>, accessed July 22, 2022. Ed.

⁴⁴ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 156. Founded in 1921 and tacitly endorsed by Pope Pius XI, the Legion of Mary promoted conversion to Catholicism and was staunchly anti-Communist, encouraging its followers to reject the CCP regime. Ed.

⁴⁵ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 158.

⁴⁶ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 158.

⁴⁷ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 158, 160.

⁴⁸ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 160.

⁴⁹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 160.

thousand leaders became rightists according to the state.⁵⁰ The Great Leap Forward followed, which ended up resulting in denominational leaders being urged to join in productive labour and also to hold joint worship on Sunday.⁵¹ This essentially merged Protestant churches and caused the closure of twenty-thousand churches; only 100 churches remained.⁵² This caused the growth of the house church or unregistered churches for Protestants and Catholics alike, with the Catholics essentially cut off from Rome.⁵³

The Cultural Revolution, which started in 1966, was devastating for Christians. The Cultural Revolution was not aimed at Christians to begin with and was instead intended to remove power from several top leaders in the Communist Party, seek allies in the youth of China, and the People's Liberation Army.⁵⁴ Mao essentially brainwashed the youth to challenge old institutions representing the 'four olds', which were the ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting class.⁵⁵ This resulted in Mao's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism being the only interpretation of Marxism that was accepted, all the other ones being heresy.⁵⁶ Mao made an atmosphere in which all truth (which was propaganda) would be sprung up by the people (as spoken for by Mao) through class struggle, which was violence.⁵⁷ This resulted in Christianity being banned twice, as China tried to wipe out all forms of old religion.⁵⁸ Enthusiastic to do the Chairman's bidding, the Red Guards formed by the youth ran amok in cities, hounding those who had contact with foreigners or were venerable to the previous leaders.⁵⁹ This resulted in them ransacking homes, destroying, the beating of people, sometimes to death, or public spectacles where people were humiliated or tortured causing many suicides.⁶⁰ Christians were one of the many targets of the Red Guards in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, with many not surviving.⁶¹ Many were sent to labour camps or driven to apostasy like Zhu Dawei who famously renounced his faith and became Zhu Dage or 'Zhu the Great Revolutionary'.⁶² Reactionary priests or ministers were forced to wear dunce caps as they were paraded through the streets.⁶³ There were also book burnings of Bibles and hymn books as well as a taking of churches to be converted to government

⁵⁰ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 201-202.

⁵¹ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 202. The Great Leap Forward was an effort to move away from the Stalinist model of development, and instead combine agricultural and industrial production through massive cooperatives. Ed.

⁵² Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 202.

⁵³ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 161-162.

⁵⁴ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168.

⁵⁵ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168.

⁵⁶ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168.

⁵⁷ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168-169.

⁵⁸ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 204.

⁵⁹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168.

⁶⁰ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168.

⁶¹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 168.

⁶² Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 205.

⁶³ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 205.

buildings or warehouses.⁶⁴ The result was that Christianity was almost completely driven underground, as under these pressures it was impossible to run churches, with the exception of foreign churches that the state allowed only foreigners access and to worship at on Sundays.⁶⁵ This resulted in house churches becoming increasingly influential, with Protestants ending up adapting to the circumstances and out growing Catholics, and details of Christian history being scarce to the outside world.⁶⁶

Why would the CCP try to ban all religion when they had supported free expression at one point. One reason could be the atheistic beliefs of some Marxists in the party. It is known that the PRC drew heavily from Soviet sources when they took over China, and the Soviets had promoted atheism.⁶⁷ This was important, because communist authorities in China understood religion from the view of Marxist atheism, which effected policy against religions since the PRC came into power.⁶⁸ Since the establishment of the CCP in 1921, there has been two types of atheism that had been built up, enlightenment atheism and militant atheism.⁶⁹ Enlightenment atheists essentially thought that religion was a false consciousness, being unscientific and backward, with its roots being in the enlightenment.⁷⁰ In policy, enlightenment atheism would provide a theoretical basis for limited tolerance of religion, with atheistic propaganda, and hopes for the gradual elimination of religion through things like science and propaganda.⁷¹ Militant atheists meanwhile were more forceful seeing religion as a dangerous opiate for the people, a wrong ideology which would serve the interests of counter-revolutionaries and exploiting classes.⁷²

The result was that political forces were used to control or the elimination of religion, so anti-religious measures were needed to facilitate this.⁷³ Both kinds of Atheism have been written about by communists like Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, but one can argue that there was an influence of militant atheist sentiment as this sentiment shows up heavily in Lenin.⁷⁴ Tang Yao who wrote many pieces on Marxist-Leninism before the Cultural Revolution basically calling for the acceleration of the termination of religion in *Red Flag*, a “organ of the CCP.”⁷⁵ In this way

⁶⁴ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 205.

⁶⁵ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 169.

⁶⁶ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 169-170.

⁶⁷ Fenggang Yang, *Religion in China: Survival and Revival under Communist Rule*. (Oxford, 2011), 47.

⁶⁸ Yang, *Religion in China*, 45.

⁶⁹ Yang, *Religion in China*, 45-46.

⁷⁰ Yang, *Religion in China*, 46.

⁷¹ Yang, *Religion in China*, 46.

⁷² Yang, *Religion in China*, 46.

⁷³ Yang, *Religion in China*, 46.

⁷⁴ Yang, *Religion in China*, 46-47.

⁷⁵ Yang, *Religion in China*, 48.

religion because a political issue or public concern.⁷⁶ The Cultural Revolution targeted all religions as reactionary accomplices to their political enemies, something that very much lined up with Marxist thought.⁷⁷

After the death of Mao, the Cultural Revolution gradually ended, and Deng Xiaoping took over the party within a period of a few years. This would see the loosening of control on some aspects of life because of Deng's policies on rehabilitation, which allowed Christians to be back in the public sphere.⁷⁸ *The Times* gave an outsider's perspective as they reported in 1979 that "Church services for Chinese Christians had started again in Shanghai after 13 years of prohibition."⁷⁹ A church service in Shanghai was packed, with a thousand people going inside the recently reactivated church and others worshipping from outside of it.⁸⁰ The reality was, the CCP did not care what you worshipped at this point, they only cared about whether or not you went against the government, and Christianity was not the greatest threat to China in terms of religion, Islam was.⁸¹ Deng had put out a religious tolerance edict that would become known as Document 19, which granted the legal existence of all major religions including Protestant and Catholic Christianity, but back under state sanctioned patriotic associations and not outside of them.⁸² With that said, CCP regulation of Christianity and religion in general was still pretty heavy handed, as it only protected normal religious activities which was in reality arbitrarily decided by administrators and forbids any proselytizing outside state sanctioned buildings, and forces atheistic propaganda to be carried out constantly in religious venues.⁸³ Despite that, it was a better protection than anything that came before it, and guarantees the existence of the Church.⁸⁴ There were also other ordinances passed by the CCP before 1999, which sought to increase their grip onto religious organizations.⁸⁵ Examples of these are like expanding the number of Religious Affairs Bureau in 1991, the require all religious groups to register with the government and ban of foreign proselytizing in 1996.⁸⁶ There also seems to be a lack of the ability for foreign Christians, like the Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. George Casey to proselytize unapproved by the CPP earlier than 1996, as he was only allowed to bring religious books for themselves, could only have

⁷⁶ André Laliberté, "The Politicization of Religion by the CCP: A Selective Retrieval," *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Asienkunde. Asiatische Studien* 69, no. 1 (2015), 185

⁷⁷ Laliberté, "The Politicization of Religion by the CCP," 186.

⁷⁸ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 171.

⁷⁹ Charles Douglas-Home, "China's Christians go to church again," *The Times* (London, England), Nov. 13, 1979

⁸⁰ Douglas-Home, "China's Christians go to church again." *The Times*.

⁸¹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 171.

⁸² Yang, *Religion in China*, 75.

⁸³ Yang, *Religion in China*, 75.

⁸⁴ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 173.

⁸⁵ Yang, *Religion in China*, 75-76.

⁸⁶ Yang, *Religion in China*, 76.

approved meetings and could only preached at approved places according to a *Independent* article in 1994.⁸⁷

The opening of churches in 1979 was accompanied by a surge in the growth of Christianity. This comes from a place where Protestants and Catholics did not have so much external pressure on them, so they focused on running the church well and making provision for spiritual growth by establishing seminaries and bible schools.⁸⁸ This was important for the Protestants especially, as that group had not trained pastors for the last three decades at that point, and therefore relied on the older generation to teach, which they were happy to do.⁸⁹ There was a growth of Protestantism in the countryside, and still had a divide between registered churches and home churches.⁹⁰ The Catholics meanwhile grew less, were divided as they still had a faction that had anti-communist sentiment that existed since the late 1940s, while there were CCP had religious organizations that had influence, and picked their own priests, whether or not they were Vatican approved or not.⁹¹ It is also true that there was likely some growth during the Cultural Revolution, as Protestant groups opened up areas called “free spaces,” which allowed Protestants to escape social control of religion and be in a safe place to read scriptures.⁹² Official figures even accounted for the this growth as in 1949, official figures had the Protestant population penned at 700,000 people while in 1983 they had the Protestants penned for three million believers population wise.⁹³ Catholics also seemed to grow at the same rate as the population growth of China.⁹⁴ This could be because heavy religious regulation does not lead to extinction of religion, but leads to the complication of the religious market, with religious black and grey markets being established to fulfill that need, which it would have.⁹⁵ This would result in the growth of Christianity in China as they provided a grey market for their own growth so that their population could grow past the Cultural Revolution and beyond, as in the year 2000 the Registered Protestant population is 15 million with five million Catholics and the unregistered population being estimated to be 30 million for Protestants and several million for Catholics.⁹⁶

In conclusion, this paper sought to explore how Christians were treated in China, why they were treated in these ways, and how Christianity functioned in this new regime. In the years before

⁸⁷ Teresa Poole, “Dr Carey will find his hands are tied in China,” *The Independent* (London, England), Sept. 10, 1994

⁸⁸ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 174.

⁸⁹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 174.

⁹⁰ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 174.

⁹¹ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 174-175.

⁹² Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 32.

⁹³ Vala, *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China*, 32.

⁹⁴ Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, 170.

⁹⁵ Fenggang Yang, “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2006): 96-97.

⁹⁶ Lian, *Redeemed by Fire*, 205

the Cultural Revolution, the CCP tried to end any Christian ties with imperialism, as Christianity was tied to imperialism in their eyes. To this end, they sought to enact policies that would achieve this like making churches more patriotic or using the three-self concept to this effect. It affected Protestants and Catholics differently as some Protestants submitted to the party and were coopted or were originally sympathetic to the Communists, while others did not, and the leadership was punished for it. For Catholics, they basically went against the CCP, but the CCP eventually suppressed them. The Anti-Rightist Movement and the Great Leap Forward had negative effects, as Christians of all stripes were accused of being reactionaries and locked up while many churches were closed and combined with other denominations. The Cultural Revolution then happened, causing Christian persecution, the banning of all religion and the Church to go underground thanks to polarization resulting from Leninist-Marxist Militant Atheist policies. After the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping allowed for religions to worship legally with more protections in the short history of the CCP to that point but allowed this with some caveats. This essentially caused the Christian population to grow and caused the as they were well set up by past growth during the Cultural Revolution. Overall, the Christians were treated badly because of ideology and because of potential imperialist ties, but most Christians stayed true to the gospel and did not waiver in the face of persecution. Finally, this topic interests me because as a Christian myself, I do not really have a great background of the history of Christianity in China at this time, so I thought it would be a great topic to pursue.

Annotated Bibliography

Bays, Daniel H. *A New History of Christianity in China*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2011.

This book is good for not only my paper but is great for the study of Modern China because it basically gives a good summary of the history of Christianity in China from mainly the 1800s till the early 21st century, but this book even goes earlier than that. With this book, one can not only study Christianity in China from 1949-1999, covering all parts of my paper, but they could compare the treatment of Christianity in before the Communists took over versus after they took over by studying before as there is info on that. Therefore, I am not only using it for its knowledge from 1949-1999, in which there is a lot of, and which covers all parts of my paper, but I also might briefly use it for its knowledge of the treatment of Christianity by Republican and Imperial governments in China to briefly compare.

Douglas-Home, Charles. "China's Christians go to church again." *The Times* (London, England), Nov. 13, 1979. <https://tinyurl.com/59pufa8p>

This is one of my new primary sources that I am using for this assignment, and it is important to my paper as well as the study of Modern China because it shows an outside view of what was happening when religious restrictions were going down. I am using this article because it shows from a outside view that people were allowed to legally worship again.

"The Christian Churches in China." *The Economist*, (October 6, 1951): 789. The Economist Historical Archive (accessed February 10, 2022). <https://www.gale.com/c/the-economist-historical-archive> [Accessed April 2022].

This primary source is important to the paper and the study of Modern China because it helps shows what was happening in China and why Christians were being persecuted in the early days of the CCP.

Laliberté, André. "The Politicization of Religion by the CCP: A Selective Retrieval." *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Asienkunde. Asiatische Studien* 69, no. 1 (2015): 185-211.

This article is important to my paper as well as the study of Modern China because it looks at how the Chinese Communists used politization against religions like Christianity. It talks about the history of politization of Christianity before the CCP takeover and talks about the methods in how the CCP made religions a political issue, which is why it is an important article for my paper. It is used to talk about polarization during the Cultural Revolution.

Lian, Xi. *Redeemed by Fire: The Rise of Popular Christianity in Modern China*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

This book is important to my paper and the study of Modern China because it looks at the growth of the Church in China by looking at a bunch of kinds of primary sources. I am adding this to my paper because it talks about what happened to certain Chinese Christian groups, as well as house churches, and it would be useful to have a more in-depth source on both issues.

Poole, Teresa. "Dr Carey will find his hands are tied in China." *The Independent* (Sept. 10, 1994).

This is the second of my new primary sources and this is important to my paper and the study of Modern China as it shows that the CCP had a tight leash of Christian activity in China. The article shows that Dr. Archbishop Carey could not convert anyone or hold any private prayer meetings

outside of the approved meetings, because of a fear of the overthrow of their government through the help of the Church. I am using this source as an example of the tight leash that the CCP had on Christianity.

Vala, C.T. *The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party?* London: Routledge, 2017.

This book is important for my paper and the study of the Modern China because it talks about the history of Christianity at this time from the Protestant perspective during the governance of the CCP in China. It is mainly used to talk about the effects of CCP policies on Protestants in the 1950s.

Yang, Fenggang. *Religion in China: Survival and Revival under Communist Rule*. Cary: Oxford University Press, 2011. Accessed February 10, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.

This book is important for my paper as well as the study of Modern China because it looks at the how some religions (including Christianity) survived religious suppression and ended up reviving and getting stronger despite restrictions. This book will be used in my paper to highlight the ideology of the Communists and how that factored into policy.

-----, "The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China." *The Sociological Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2006): 93–122.

This journal article is important to the paper and to the study of Modern Chinese history because it talks about the markets of religion in a sociological way in relation to communism, talking about red, grey, and black markets. I use this near the end in talking about possibly why the Christianity grew in China during the Cultural Revolution.

Ying, F.-T. "The CPC's Policy on Protestant Christianity, 1949–1957: an overview and assessment." *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, Nr. 89 (2014): 884–901.

This article is important for my paper and the study of Modern China because it talks about Christianity in China from and the policies of the CCP, from 1949 to the Anti-Rightist movement of 1957. I am using it in my paper because it would be good for the first part of my paper as it goes into factors on why the policies that the Communists established were there to begin with in early Communist China.

Jammu and Kashmir: The Unfinished Business of Partition

Jeremy Cristiano – December 2021

HIST 3361 – The Indian Subcontinent since 1949

Dr Robert Menzies

The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir has been a diverse region in Southeast Asia for centuries. This diversity, in the contentious Indian subcontinent, has done it more harm than good, as multiple authorities have tried to claim the region. Under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh at the time of Partition, the objective was to maintain the region's independence. Pakistan saw the Muslim majority region as its ticket to claiming the land, while India observed its legal status as Kashmir's "holders," in addition to the cultural significance of the region, as granting them authority. Tibet remained relatively meek on Kashmir and its claim to the region, Ladakh, saw the inevitability of the region going to India or Pakistan—hoping to be part of India if they had to choose. This raises the questions why this argument over Kashmir existed post-Partition and who was at fault for starting the conflict? This essay will prove that the complex circumstances surrounding Kashmir's history and diversity make it difficult to give Kashmir a rightful 'owner'. Additionally, there are multiple viewpoints one can take to assess who is at fault for the conflict in Kashmir by considering the historical factors, policies, and battles that led to Kashmiri accession.

Why Kashmir?

Kashmir as an addition to the dominion of Pakistan or India provided very little advantage to make it worth this fight. Most of the importance in the fight for Kashmir was perceptible. India did not want to appear weak or submissive to Pakistan, who thought the religious make-up of the region made them the rightful takers. The cultural importance of the region also gave added value, having significant historical ties to Hindu and Sikh tradition. India also thought having a Muslim majority region (Valley of Kashmir) would make them a religiously heterogenic and secular state.¹ India appeared overly aggressive in this fight for another reason, they hated Partition and the idea of their separated state. The problem with this is that Britain did not want

¹ Chitralkha Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," *Asian Intercultural Contacts* 14, no. 2 (2009): 10. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1040734>.

to see Pakistan fall, since it was under their guidance that it was formed. From this, Britain chose to risk sacrificing their relations with India to keep Pakistan afloat. The Commonwealth Relations Office's reaction to the troubles from October 25-27, 1947, saw that India was trying to reverse Partition and bring about the collapse of the Dominion of Pakistan through the accession of Kashmir and the airlift of troops.² This brings many troubles to the countries' leadership. Both sides expected Kashmir to be a part of their country for reasons similar to the issue of Partition itself. India wants to maintain the status quo and Pakistan wants to form their own religious majority state.³

History

The State of Kashmir was held by the British in 1846 after a series of conflicts that weakened the Sikhs in the region. Kashmir was then sold to the ruler of Jammu, Raja Gulab Singh, and he was given independent possession and rule over the land and her people. This included the power to levy heavy taxes on the people which was exercised, if not abused. This power passed hereditarily to Maharaja Hari Singh.⁴ Within its history, there is one major problem surrounding the state and that is unity. Jammu and Kashmir was not one ethnically, culturally, or religiously homogenous area. Kashmir is predominantly Muslim; Jammu is a Hindu and Dogri-speaking region, that supported acceding to India; and there is Ladakh in the east which is ethnically and culturally Tibetan and Buddhist.⁵ All of these things together produce a small-scale version of pre-Partition India, meaning that something or someone would have to prevent it from following the same dangerous path.



Figure 1: Maharaja Hari Singh. Source: <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/features/banished-from-his-own-land-818375>

1947

British representatives stated on June 3, 1947, that they planned to hand their power to two independent dominions that would be formed out of the regional religious majority. This declaration did not include any princely state boundaries and instead, that was referred to in a future address by Lord Mountbatten on July 25, 1947, that gave them the right to be independent.

² Rakesh Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 42.

³ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," 11.

⁴ Adarsh Sein Anand, "Kashmir's Accession to India." *Journal of the Indian Law Institute* 6, no. 1 (1964): 70. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43949788>.

⁵ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue." 8.

However, he advised that they accede to India or Pakistan before the transfer of power on August 15. All but three of Princely States—Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh—followed his advice.⁶ The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, did not want to be a part of the democratized India or the Muslim Pakistan and offered a standstill agreement to both India and Pakistan, with only Pakistan agreeing. They also offered Singh a continuation of royal privileges if he acceded.⁷ This gave Pakistan a false impression that Kashmir would eventually accede to them, and they got impatient and started pressuring Singh. They imposed economic sanctions and threatened “the gravest possible trouble.”⁸ This was a tribal attack launched by fighters who supposedly wanted to rescue their fellow Muslims. These fighters were a mix of several thousand Pathans who were supported and possibly instructed by Pakistani leadership. The Pathan raid would be successful against the Dogra troops of Hari Singh with the supposed help and assistance from Pakistan, and so Singh called India for aid. India offered aid on the condition that Kashmir accede to them, seeing as they wanted Kashmir and could avoid interfering in an independent entity’s internal conflict from a diplomatic standpoint. On October 26, 1947, Kashmir and India signed the Instrument of Accession and India sent troops to their aid in Srinagar. This was understood to be a temporary accession with the terms to be discussed once the conflict had ended. Lord Mountbatten signed the official document the following day and Kashmir was officially recognized as acceding to India.⁹ Pakistan refused to acknowledge this accession which they viewed as a fraudulent; a cowardly act from the Maharaja with the aggressive help of Delhi. This claim had no support from the July declaration by Mountbatten and suggested that it was unjust for Singh to accede against his people’s wishes (even though they were not required to be given a say in the state’s accession, this was supposed to be addressed later with a plebiscite).¹⁰

Claims to Kashmir

Pakistan

Pakistan has held that Kashmir is a legitimate part of its nation. The Governor-General of Pakistan, Khawja Nazimuddin, stated that “The liberation of Kashmir is a cardinal belief of every Pakistani. It is an integral part of Pakistan, and Pakistan would remain incomplete until the whole of Kashmir is liberated.” This idea of liberating Kashmir from the hands of India—whose constitution treated Kashmir as part of their state—has fueled Pakistan’s aggressor attitude and has started multiple wars between the two nations after Partition.¹¹ Early accounts that supported

⁶ Anand, “Kashmir’s Accession to India.” 75-76.

⁷ Zutshi, “India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue.” 10.

⁸ Anand, “Kashmir’s Accession to India.” 77-79.

⁹ Zutshi, “India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue,” 10.

¹⁰ Anand, “Kashmir’s Accession to India.” 83.

¹¹ Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 17. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kwantlen-ebooks/detail.action?docID=356080>.

a Pakistani Kashmir presented the dispute within a Two-Nation Theory. Religious bonds, geography, economic ties, transport, and communication links indicated Kashmir's natural integration would be with Pakistan.¹²

India

Indian accounts used the advantage of Kashmir's accession as proof of their legal "ownership." Additionally, they attacked Pakistan for aiding the Pathan forces which started the conflict as an invasion of an independent state and of Indian territory once Jammu and Kashmir acceded. India's claim to Kashmir has been criticized by Pakistan since the days of Partition as being attempts to establish Indian imperialism. This frightened Pakistan, along with some of the Muslims in Kashmir that wanted to accede to Pakistan to escape the "repression" they faced from India.¹³



Figure 2: The 1947 movement of Pakistani troops into Kashmir. Source: <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/black-day-october-22-pakistan-kashmir-invasion-pakistan-what-happened-in-1947-1734011-2020-10-22>

Tibet

Tibet's claims to the region were minor as they didn't have any interest in competing with India or Pakistan. At the time, most of the reaction in the culturally Tibetan Ladakh was fearful because of this. They wondered which nation they would be forced to join, Pakistan or India. Additional conflict rose in the region as the wazir of Ladakh, Lala Amarnath, was assassinated by the maharaja's army in Skardo. Pro-Pakistani Gilgit Scouts went to Ladakh and occupied Kargil, Nubra, Sham, and Zangskar. Indian forces eventually settled the conflict and evicted most of the Scouts in 1948. Ladakh had favoured India and



Figure 3: Competing claims to Kashmir. Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286>

¹² Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict*, 3.

¹³ Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict*, 4.

made this clear by the Ladakh Buddhist Association sending a memorandum to Hari Singh in a three-option solution in hopes that it would not join Pakistan—they received no reply. When the cease fire line was drawn in 1949, the major districts of Leh and Kargil were under Indian control while Baltistan was under Pakistan.¹⁴

Who's to Blame for the Conflict in Kashmir?

With all of this context, the blame for conflict in Kashmir can be approached from both a simple and a complex perspective. First, there is the simple; looking at who was the major aggressor/perpetrator of this conflict in Kashmir. Looking at the 1947 invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani forces it is easy to see who started it. The Pakistan-inspired invasion with the Pathans marked the beginning of murky relations between the dominion and the princely state in spite of the religious similarity. It is also inevitable to look at the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir as not having a role in acceding to India. He made it clear that he did not want to join the Muslim majority Pakistan—perhaps, because he was Hindu—but also did not want to join the democratic India that would restrict his power.¹⁵ This issue of having a ruler that did not ethnically align with the people of Kashmir made it difficult for ethnic Kashmiris and Muslims to accept, as policies favoured the minority Hindus and Jammu people.¹⁶ With the invasion by Pakistani tribesmen into Kashmir, India was brought into a perfect situation for them to gain the trust of Hari Singh—contributed through the subsequent distrust of Pakistan. Pakistan overstepped their boundaries when it came to trying to claim Jammu and Kashmir as quick as possible in 1947.¹⁷ Realizing the ethnic differences between them and the Maharaja, it was in their best interest to wait for the plebiscite and do everything they could to make sure it was done, including withdrawing troops in 1948. India's troops were heroically able to enter Kashmir and confine the Pakistan sponsored vigilantes into a small section of Kashmir. The United Nations insisted that the opinion of the Kashmiris should be considered, but India wanted to wait until




Figure 4: The partition of the Indian Subcontinent. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Partition_of_India_1947_en.svg

¹⁴ Ravina Aggarwal, *Beyond Lines of Control* (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 37-38.

¹⁵ Anand, "Kashmir's Accession to India," 77.

¹⁶ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," 10.

¹⁷ Anand, "Kashmir's Accession to India," 78-79.

all of the irregulars were expelled, not wanting Muslims coming over to support Pakistan and then leave right after the plebiscite. This plebiscite would never happen as it was conditioned on the removal of troops by both India and Pakistan which never came to fruition.¹⁸

Pakistan's assumption that Kashmir was and is undoubtedly theirs based off the ethnic majority is not an irresponsible thought — after all, it was this belief of separation by religious majority that granted them independence in August of 1947. However, their action of supporting (and perhaps inspiring) the tribal attacks to force the Maharaja into submission was one of their problems in sparking the conflict and the call for India's aid which only made them a more favourable country to accede to.¹⁹ India went to the United Nations in January of 1948 to get a condemnation of Pakistan's invasion into Kashmir—they left shorthanded. A resolution was drawn for both countries to withdraw and reach a ceasefire in August and to hold a referendum for the people to decide who to accede to. The ceasefire came into effect on New Year's Day 1949, but the plebiscite was not held because Pakistan didn't withdraw its troops.²⁰ Another problem for Pakistan was their refusal to recognize that India had gained the legal authority to add Kashmir to their five hundred plus list of princely holdings in the Instrument of Accession. Further provoking regional conflict was the idea of rescuing Kashmir and its Muslim majority from India. But there was really nothing to protect Kashmir against. It would be more reasonable to state that out of fear of their national sovereignty, Kashmir needed to accede to its Muslim neighbour. India had control over was the external affairs, defence, and communication over the state, the rest were still governed by the Maharaja, Hari Singh. With the constitution of India being written in 1950, all of the princely states that acceded (except for Kashmir) effectively joined into India. Kashmir didn't accept the conditions of the constitution and insisted that its Instrument of Accession would be the terms and conditions they follow.²¹

Then there is the complex context of the Kashmir conflict. This can first and foremost be directed at Britain and Partition. The British Secretary of State for India in the 1940s, Leopold Amery had stated that Britain cannot help but regret the sale of Kashmir after the Sikh war. Had this been the case, it would have only resulted in Kashmir being involved in Partition which would have likely increased the death toll of the population transfer but would have stunted any conflict in the region to which multiple wars have erupted since 1947.²² The violence that came with Partition in the great migration paved the way to a future war, Kashmir was just the issue and battleground it happened to be. This resulted in many problems for the Kashmiri as they would experience the

¹⁸ Burton Stein, *A History of India*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 358.

¹⁹ Stein, *A History of India*, 358.

²⁰ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," 11.

²¹ Anand, "Kashmir's Accession to India," 84-85.

²² Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict*, 3.

threat of violence for the rest of the century and were excluded from refugee status since they came from neither Pakistan nor India.²³ Additionally, the integral idea of Partition, the separation of the states based on majority rule, was really the backing ideology behind this conflict. Early signs of this were shown in the peasant revolt in Poonch, Kashmir, where they protested against Hindus and Hari Singh. Hindus then responded by attacking Muslims in Jammu and the military of the Maharaja joined in the conflict as well.²⁴ In many ways, the conflict in Kashmir was against Partition, not against each other. From the Indian side this was clear to see. This is what historians have concluded about the reasons for India's involvement in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁵ The Two-Nation Theory proposed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah stated that within the British Raj were two separate states, two separate constituencies, and two separate peoples that needed their separate needs addressed. Proposed by the Muslim League, it advocated for the separation of the Muslim population from India to much of India's discontent. There is little use in having a secularized state if the country is based off religious identity, which is why India desired the Muslim Valley of Kashmir.²⁶ That being said, many Muslims living in India did not feel the need to migrate to Pakistan and insisted on maintaining a dual loyalty, one to their religion and one to their nation. Although supported at the diplomatic level, this was complicated through pressure from the Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist group that had penned India as a Hindu nation in 1920s and Muslims as subordinates, well before Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory.²⁷ A compromising figure could be found in the "Lion of Kashmir," Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, an ethnic Hindu whose father converted to Islam at the turn of the 19th century. Abdullah believed in secularism and did not support Partition and therefore, felt the same towards Pakistan. He also believed that acceding to Pakistan would only repress the Kashmiri Muslims, so his outlook was typically pro-India. India swore him in as Prime Minister of Kashmir after Kashmir's accession.²⁸ It has been argued that Abdullah's secularist outlook was not all that




Figure 5: Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah
Source: <http://www.kashmirconnected.com/publications-news/category/sheikh-abdullah>

²³ Chitrallekha Zutshi, "An Ongoing Partition," *Contemporary South Asia* 23, no. 3 (2015): 270. <https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/india-pakistan-and-the-kashmir-issue-1947-and-beyond.pdf>

²⁴ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," 11.

²⁵ Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict*, 42.

²⁶ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," 11.

²⁷ Stein, *A History of India*, 409.

²⁸ Zutshi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Issue," 10.

successful in Kashmir and was one of the factors preventing some form of unity between the religious dichotomy—ignoring the Buddhist Ladakh.²⁹

In summary, the complex circumstances surrounding Kashmir's history of different rulers, one that includes Britain, the Dogra Princes, and other Asian countries complicate the question of ownership. Following the Two-Nation Theory and the model established by Partition, separating the state and having each subregion join its desired country seemed like the reasonable thing to do—until consideration is given the mass atrocities that occurred under Partition's population transfer. This likely what would have been the solution had Britain kept Kashmir in the mid-19th century instead of selling it to Raja Singh. Nevertheless, looking at the conflict in Kashmir at first glance, one would see that Pakistan is at fault for the conflict. They invaded Kashmir and disrespected the wishes of the Maharaja in favour for the perceived wishes of the Kashmiris, a majority Muslim population, and that of their own nation. Looking within the context of the situation, one can assess that India shares in a lesser part of the conflict as their words and policies posed imminent national sovereignty threats to the new Pakistan—albeit a Pakistan that was starting wars with independent states. These two claims together are met with one foundational starting point which is Partition, to which most of the blame belongs. The guiding principles of that separation inspired both countries to claim the region and encouraged conflict, especially in the diverse but Muslim-dominated region of Jammu and Kashmir. This is why Kashmir has been coined as the unfinished business of Partition, as all the problems that came before and after 1947 can be found in this one, unique state that has mimicked Partition's sentiments without engaging in its biggest backlash in a largescale population transfer.³⁰

²⁹ Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Rulers: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2012), 25-28.

³⁰ Ankit, *The Kashmir Conflict*, 3.

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The Rise of Urbanized China

Emilio Da Silva – April 2022

HIST 3350 – China in the Twentieth Century: Reforms & Revolutions

Dr Jack P. Hayes

In the last several decades, China's urban growth has increased exponentially, and today, more than 60% of the country's population resides in cities. When compared to other urban centres around the globe, China's cities grew at a far greater speed and volume than ever before at any time in global history. China, formerly a primarily agriculturally-based economy, now contains twenty-five of the world's largest 100 cities. There have been costs associated with this rapid growth and accompanying industrialization, and some of them still remain to be seen. However, negative effects on the environment, including high emissions levels, overcrowding, and concerns regarding habitability are some of the consequences of this rapid growth. This research essay looks at the causes and effects of urbanization in China since the 1949 Revolution and considers how changes to the *hukou*¹ system sped up urbanization in the 1980s and onward.

The most significant finding from this research is that the rapid urbanization that started to take place in 20th century China was unprecedented and quite complex but was born out of a political and social desire to become a leading world power. However, urbanization presents major challenges to China as far as maintaining an acceptable environmental state to ensure the health and wellness of citizens, ensuring safe and habitable cities, while also preserving the growth of the economy, as well as social and political power in China. In the end, we concluded that for China, urbanization was a necessary evil that pushed along economic progress with unintentional costs – China is now a major world power, fulfilling the seemingly impossible vision that was born with the revolution in 1949. However, the consequences of urbanization were inevitable and largely unpreventable for China, as this rapid growth was unprecedented the first of its kind in human history.

¹ A system of registration designed to control the movement of population. Its origins can be traced to Ancient China. For more see, Farzana Afridi, Sherry Xin Li, and Yufei Ren, "Social Identity and Inequality: The Impact of China's Hukou System," *Journal of Public Economics* 123, (2015): 17-29. Ed.

Today, China stands on the precipice of surpassing several major world powers in a number of avenues, including economically. China is without question a major player on the world stage, and other powerful nations are aware of the possible threats that China poses to their countries. However, “some components of the Chinese path deviate substantially from the “standard” Western model,” meaning that unlike other models spurred on by industrialization and technological change, China experienced an “uprooting” of much of their rural population.²

The unprecedented urban growth taking place in China is changing the physical environment of the country, as well as cultural aspects, as hundreds of millions of people moved from rural areas to urban ones. However, the current state of Chinese urbanization does not provide a clear picture on what took place in the 20th century that spurred along this process. We must look back on the events following the 1949 Revolution and the moves made by the party to encourage urbanization in China. When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the focus of the government was to recover the economy via two means: rural land reform and urban industrialization.³ In 1950, a land reform law was introduced that “abolished feudal land ownership and offered land ownership to the peasant class,” which effectively changed who could own and adopt land for various uses.⁴ By 1952, the land reform movement was mostly completed, and millions of farmers gained ownership of land, pushing forth economic recovery in the rural regions of China. However, the process was not as swift as it could have been in the eyes of Mao Zedong. On July 31, 1955, Mao delivered a speech in which he proclaimed that “a new upsurge in the socialist mass movement is in sight throughout the Chinese countryside. But some of our comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet, always complaining that others are going too fast”.⁵ Although this visual may have struck some as funny, Mao’s insistence that the countryside catch up entirely to the social reforms being implemented was forceful and blunt. Mao urged the Chinese people to keep up their duty to growth and proclaimed, “this is a huge socialist revolutionary movement, which involves a population more than five hundred million strong...we should guide this movement vigorously, warmly, and systematically, and not act as a drag on it”.⁶ Mao further explained that China, at that time, had a shortage of cultivated land and therefore had to take a socialist approach to ensure the improvement of lives via nourishment and economic benefit. Working in combination with land reform and Mao’s vision of a cooperative agricultural state, China also embarked on a massive industrialization plan that

² Kam Win Chan, “Fundamentals of China’s Urbanization and Policy,” *The China Review*, 10, no. 1 (2010): 64.

³ Chaolin Gu, Lingqian Hu, and Ian G. Cook, “China’s Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces,” *Chinese Geographical Science*, 27 no. 6 (2017): 848.

⁴ Gu, et al., “China’s Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces,” 848.

⁵ Mao Zedong, “‘The Question of Agricultural Cooperation,’ (Speech, July 31, 1955). (Columbia University, n.d.) http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/mao_zedong_agricultural_cooperation.pdf/, accessed March 2022.

⁶ Mao, “The Question of Agricultural Cooperation.”

emulated actions taken by the Soviet Union. These industrialization plans will be discussed in the next section.

After the execution of land reforms, China devised plans to carry out large-scale industrialization in the 1950s. An article by Ji Yun appeared in the Party paper, the *People's Daily*, in 1953, calling for the implementation of industrialization to follow the Soviet Union in their pattern of massive growth. In Yun's call for action, he wrote that the Soviet Union was worthy of emulating because they "succeeded in building up, from an economic structure complicated with five component economies, a unified socialist economy; [and] in turning a backward agricultural nation into a first-class industrial power of the world".⁷ Yun emphasized that the "foundation of socialism is large industrial development," and cited Lenin, proclaiming that "industry must first be developed to provide possibilities of collectivization and mechanization of agriculture" in order to reach a goal of economic independence.⁸ Large-scale industrialization was not far behind, and China then launched 156 major industrial projects with both "technical and financial support" from the Soviet Union.⁹ The primary makeup of these industrialization projects in the USSR was "heavy industries with capital-intensive technologies," and effectively created a planned economy under which all factories were state-owned and the government was able to make all important economic decisions.¹⁰ In 1952, China launched its first five-year-plan., which included an urban development policy that stressed "constructing key projects [and] making steady progresses".¹¹ At this time, what was described as "parallel development" took place in China between both "urban and rural areas, industry and agriculture, urban growth and economic growth" – a process later referred to as "synchrouurbanization".¹² It was at this time that entire cities were created in China with the main goal of serving as a production city in which consumption was to be minimized and the development of industry was to be maximized. In this time period, from 1953 to 1957, China's urbanization boomed with an annual growth rate of 70.5%, and at the same time, sixty-three new cities were established, while the total urban population in China exceeded 100 million by the end of the first five-year plan.¹³ Although this growth appeared massive at the time, it was just the beginning for urbanization in China, although there were some setbacks in the interim.

Following this massive boom in urbanization in 1950s China, there was a period of slow growth until the 1980s. During the 1960s, China faced economic ruin, partially due to the end of Soviet

⁷ Ji Yun, "How China Proceeds with the task of Industrialization," *The People's Daily*, 1953.

⁸ Ji Yun, "How China Proceeds with the task of Industrialization."

⁹ Gu, et al., "China's Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces," 848.

¹⁰ Gu, et al., "China's Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces," 848.

¹¹ Gu, et al., "China's Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces," 849.

¹² Gu, et al., "China's Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces," 849.

¹³ Gu, et al., "China's Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces," 849.

aid and the Sino-Soviet split that took place in 1960.¹⁴ At this time, China adopted a policy focused on “readjustment, consolidation, strengthening and improvement,” and by the mid-1960s, the urban population in China had declined.¹⁵ In addition to anti-urbanization actions taken by the government, there was also ongoing confusion about what the definition of a city was. According to Reeitsu Kojima, since 1949, the Chinese government has changed and redefined the definition of a “city” three different times:

The first was in November 1955 when the State Council decided on the criteria for urban-rural zoning. According to the decision, cities and towns that fulfilled any of the following criteria could acquire urban status: (1) those areas with a population of 100,000 or more permanent residents, (2) those areas with a population of 20,000 or more where local administrative offices of the county level or higher were situated, (3) those areas that had a population of 2,000 or more permanent residents, 50 per cent of whom were in nonagricultural occupations, and (4) those areas with 1,000–2,000 permanent residents, 75 percent or more of whom were in non-agricultural occupations.¹⁶

On the second occasion, in December 1963, the Central Committee of the CCP “issued a directive adjusting the official definition of cities and towns in order to reduce the number of designated towns and to disqualify many of the suburban areas of cities from urban status”¹⁷ Finally in October 1984, the Civil Service Department eased the interpretation of the definition of cities and towns, which were then defined as “those areas where local governments of the county level or higher are located are defined as urban areas irrespective of the size of their permanent resident population,” or rural areas governed by a village with a population of 20,000 or more.¹⁸ In addition to these shifting definitions of what made a city or a town, another factor that played a part in China’s long-term urbanization was a massive change of occupation that took place in rural areas from farming to nonfarming employment. A rise of rural industries in the latter part of the 20th century led this shift, and “this dramatic rural transformation has been accompanied by the in situ spatial shift of the rural labourers, who are widely reported in Chinese publications as having ‘left the land but not the village’ (*litu bu lixiang*) and ‘entered the factories but not the cities’ (*jinchang bu juncheng*)”.¹⁹ Urbanization in China is not only made complicated by the literal changing definitions of what qualified a city throughout the 20th century, but also by the choices made by rural labourers and peasants as far as whether they wished to migrate to a city, or remain

¹⁴ Gu, et al., “China’s Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces,” 849.

¹⁵ Gu, et al., “China’s Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces,” 849.

¹⁶ Reeitsu Kojima, “Urbanization in China,” *The Developing Economies* 33, no. 2 (1995): 121.

¹⁷ Kojima, “Urbanization in China,” 122.

¹⁸ Kojima, “Urbanization in China,” 122.

¹⁹ Laurence J.C. Ma, “Urban Transformation in China, 1949 – 2000: A Review and Research Agenda,” *Environment and Planning* 34 (2002): 1553.

in the rural areas of the country. An understanding of how China became so rapidly industrialized and urbanized is incomplete without taking a closer look at the *hukou* system and its effects on the Chinese population. This will be examined in the next section.

In order to better understand how and why urbanization increased so swiftly in the late 20th century, we must look at the changes made to the *hukou* system, which had origins in Ancient China as a household registration system. During the Zhou dynasty, for example, a system of registration records was used that specifically defined the population by occupation, and other various forms of registration systems existed between that period and 1949, mainly for the purpose of administering taxed and assigning farmland.²⁰ The *hukou* system was formally implemented in its modern form in the late 1950s but has undergone many changes since. The *hukou* system created near-impossible institutional and social barriers between rural and urban China, and “in the Maoist, pre-reform period, these barriers enabled the state to pursue development plans by binding peasants to the countryside and fostering the transfer of value from agriculture to industry”.²¹ The *hukou* system forced the rural Chinese population to produce their own goods and build their own homes, placing them at major economic and social disadvantage. During the Mao era, the *hukou* system essentially held the Chinese population in place, and the system “acted like an internal passport system regulating mobility and granting people citizenship in the locality...in which their mother was originally a citizen”.²² One’s status in the *hukou* system was rarely changed, save for events such as recruitment by the government for work, job assignments, and/or relocation programmes – otherwise the system generally impeded movement from rural to urban areas. However, in the early 1980s, reforms and changes to regulations of the *hukou* system aided in spurring along rural-urban migration, and some reforms were quite impactful on creating the highly urbanized China that we know today.

In October 1984, an order for temporary migration was issued by the State Council, which proclaimed that “peasants working in towns would be granted the “self-supplied food grain” *hukou*, marking the first opening in the rigid border between city and country-side” and temporary residence permits were created, along with the “increased marketization of food, housing, and other daily necessities,” essentially causing rural Chinese to have to live and work in urban areas.²³ Next, the practice of “selling” *hukou* became commonplace, with local governments charging large amounts of yuan – up to tens of thousands in exchange for what was essentially a passport to travel to cities and experience certain benefits, and “town and city governments justified this practice on the grounds that they should be compensated for extending

²⁰ Cindy Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household* (London: Routledge, 2008): 43.

²¹ Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*, 55.

²² Kam Win Chan, “Fundamentals of China’s Urbanization and Policy,” 69.

²³ Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*, 50.

urban benefits to migrants”.²⁴ In the 1990s, major cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen offered what was called “blue stamp *hukou*,” which worked like a green card, and attracted “the most desirable elements of the migrant population by providing them right of abode and certain benefits in urban areas”.²⁵

In addition to these changes, there were also reforms made to *hukou* in large cities, but it is generally a rule that the larger a city, the more difficult it is to obtain a *hukou* to live there, and “in most large cities, *hukou* reform is minimal; only an extremely small minority of rural migrants who satisfy stringent criteria such as educational attainment, skills, financial ability, health, and a clean criminal record are awarded local *hukou* and given access to urban benefits”.²⁶ These limitations on *hukou* affected the course of life for millions of Chinese people beginning in the 1980s, as the access to *hukou* that one had essentially formed whatever chances at economic and/or social success one had. After the *hukou* system loosened restrictions on migration, large swathes of the population started to leave rural areas and populate the cities of China. As China transitioned to a market socialism system, migrants were able to move out of rural areas and into urban centres for better opportunities, leading to rapid urbanization that persists to this day, and still growing. Next, a look at other reforms that shaped urbanization in China in the 20th century is warranted.

In addition to the major shifts that took place because of China ramping up its industrialization to become a more effective socialist state, as well as changes to the *hukou* system, other factors spurred along urbanization. As discussed previously, industrializing the country based on the model provided by the Soviets was set into motion in the 1950s, but these plans stalled in the 1960s. Reforms that took place in the 1970s were critical to shaping the migration patterns in China in the 20th century. By 1976, China was on the verge of economic collapse, and the need for reform and the de-collectivization of agriculture became critical, and leaders believed these actions would open the country to foreign investment. Agricultural productivity was emphasized, and “peasants were given user-rights of farmland and were allowed to work separately on their designated farmland”.²⁷ The year 1978 was significant for further reforms, and the Communist Party introduced rural economic reforms in December, in the form of a new Household Responsibility System (HRS). This system allowed rural Chinese households to contract land and farm machinery in order to participate in a managed and unified economic system of agriculture. The HRS, adopted in rural Chinese lands, effectively transferred decision-making about agricultural labour to individual households. Under the HRS, peasant households

²⁴ Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*, 50.

²⁵ Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*, 50.

²⁶ Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*, 51.

²⁷ Gu, et al., “China’s Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces,” 850.

were able to contract from village authority farmland, and this new system was credited with boosting production of agricultural goods.

According to scholar Cindy Fan, who serves as Professor of International Studies at UCLA, there were two major effects on the lives of peasants after the adoption of this policy: first, “improvement in agricultural productivity further exacerbated the problem of surplus labour that had been hidden in the form of underemployment during the collectivized period,” and second, “abolition of communes signifies the state’s increased disengagement from peasants and from agricultural work”.²⁸ This disengagement proved to be harmful to peasants because they are quite poor to begin with, and they were then burdened with financing local economic development via having to pay high taxes, feeds, and rents to cadres. As a result, many peasants started to desire leaving agriculture in favour of possibly migrating to urban centres to seek out new opportunities. A surplus of farm workers was displaced by this policy and moved from rural to urban parts of China. As a result, urban centres in China continued to grow, especially in correlation with the previously discussed reforms to the *hukou* system. Next, we will look at the unique aspects of Chinese urbanization and how the process has had some negative effects on migrants and the overall environment.

In this essay, we are limited to the discussion of 20th century China, therefore, the current state of China and its vast urban growth due to technological advances, as well as the presence of several “mega-cities” is not really part of this narrative. However, the effects of urbanization, both positive and negative, started to accumulate in the late 20th century and would feed into those processes. One of the main risks of urbanization in China was the exclusion of unassimilated migrants from urban benefits and programmes, but long-term, this was believed to be “much more costly in social and political terms” and China, since the 1980s, ran the risk of “breeding a huge urban underclass”.²⁹ Protests conducted by migrants regarding their treatment in urban centres, as well as by peasants in rural areas sounded the alarm on human rights issues caused by an inability to keep up with the demand for benefits and other aid. Geographic mobility that was achieved by reform of the *hukou* system has also created an economic efficiency issue and as of the late 20th century, one may argue that there were “too many urban centres in China, and most of them...too small in population size to benefit from agglomeration,” or the joining of suburbs and urban areas.³⁰ In addition to these problems, habitability of cities is an important factor that must be considered when thinking about urban China and the citizens who live in urban centres.

²⁸ Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*, 6.

²⁹ Chan, “Fundamentals of China’s Urbanization and Policy,” 84.

³⁰ Chan, “Fundamentals of China’s Urbanization and Policy,” 84.

When China first entered the arena of its industrial experiment, its leaders had taken into consideration the needs of an urban population. For example, in March 1956, Liang Sicheng, considered one of the most famous Chinese architects of all time, gave a speech on the subject of how “urban development should support industrialization,” with habitability being a priority.³¹ Some examples of habitability included Liang’s assertion that “running water should be provided to improve health, and municipal governments should control pollution and protect the environment,” and he envisioned city centres with trams made a priority over cars.³² Liang was a staunch believer in urban planning, and he proposed 15 objectives that would allow cities to provide the four necessities of life. These included a healthy residential environment with sufficient light, clean air, and green space. Elementary schools and shops selling daily necessities should be within walking distance of people’s homes, and places of work had to be close to residential neighborhoods to save time, energy, and money. Turning to transport, motor and pedestrian traffic should be split wherever possible, and roads in residential districts should be narrow. Finally, large shops, museums, theaters, and other public buildings should be constructed in city centres³³

This vision for the future of an urbanized China was quite idealistic, and it certainly did not consider or anticipate the massive exponential growth that took place in the country through the rest of the 20th century. One major negative effect on China was the choice by the government to promote car ownership, and this choice, which can be traced to the 1990s, “radically changed Chinese cities and their habitability more than anything else,” creating massive traffic jams and air pollution.³⁴ Pollution as a result of car use and industrialization became so bad that the Chinese government started to issue alerts when it is deemed safe to go outside. Additionally, China has suffered the negative effects of “ballooning carbon pollution” that accompanied massive urban growth, and concerns over environmental impacts as a result of urbanization have increased over time.³⁵

Overall, the intense urbanization that took place in China since the 1949 Revolution and the changes to the *hukou* system have been beneficial to many Chinese people who sought to improve their lives, especially economically. The goal of Chinese leadership was to emulate the USSR and become its own massive world power – China did all of that and more. However, urbanization in China came with many costs, the full extent of which remains unknown, but have and will

³¹ Lincoln Toby and Xu Tao, eds. “Introduction: The Habitable City in Chinese History,” *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Lincoln Toby and Xu Tao (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 16.

³² Toby and Tao, “Introduction: The Habitable City in Chinese History,” 16.

³³ Toby and Tao, “Introduction: The Habitable City in Chinese History,” 1.

³⁴ Karl Gerth, “Conclusion: Are Chinese Cities Becoming More Habitable?” in *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Lincoln Toby and Xu Tao (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 221.

³⁵ Gerth, “Conclusion: Are Chinese Cities Becoming More Habitable?” 222.

continue to affect the health of the environment, pollution levels, rates of carbon fuel burning, and more. These costs relate to effects on the environment that impacts humans and terrain, and geographically, China changed drastically during the 20th century, never to return to its former proud agriculturally-based economy. Instead, China became a leading world power to be reckoned with, thanks to several reforms and a desire to imitate the success of the Soviet Union, as urged along by Mao Zedong. The causes of effects of urbanization on China in the 20th century was at the core of what this research note explored. Since China's stance in the world grew immensely and they stand among the largest world powers of modern history, China's urbanization programs and efforts to build the economy were overall a success. The cost of this success will remain to be seen but will emerge in the next century. The subject matter of urbanization in China fascinates me simply because of the rapid speed in which it took place – this was something I thought about since childhood, as China grew immensely in my relatively short lifetime. After conducting the research, it is clear to me that China's urbanization is possibly still at the early stages, and the remainder of the 21st century will bring even more urbanization as the world continues to globalize and become more connected. This is a subject that should intrigue anyone wanting to know more about China's rise to global power.

Annotated Bibliography

Chan, Kam Win. "Fundamentals of China's Urbanization and Policy." *The China Review*, 10, no. 1 (2010): 63 – 93.

This is a journal article that analyzes the urbanization of China from the 90s through the aughts, focusing on administrative and economic policies that comprise China's urbanization policy and urban system. The article discusses the reasons behind the rapid rural-urban transformation in China from the 1980s and onward, and how the pattern of China urbanizing does not follow a standard Western model. This article provided supportive evidence about how the urbanization policy shifted from the 1980s and forward, and how it varies from any western transformation.

Fan, Cindy. *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*. London: Routledge, 2008.

This academic book explores the various reasons behind migrant activity in China in the 20th century and how it led to the massive growth of urban centres. The book also discusses the *hukou* system at length and outlines the reforms that were crucial to Chinese urbanization in the 20th century.

Gu Chaolin, Hu Lingquian, and Ian G. Cook. "China's Urbanization in 1949-2015: Processes and Driving Forces." *Chinese Geographical Science*, 27 no. 6 (2017): 847 – 859.

This peer-reviewed article introduces and reviews some of the underlying driving factors of urbanization in China from 1949 to 2015. This article handily included a timeline of the reforms that took place since 1949 that contributed to the growth of China. A bit scientific in tone but quite a useful source that helped to put this time period in perspective.

Kojima, Reetsu. "Urbanization in China." *The Developing Economies* 33, no. 2 (1995): 121 – 154.

This peer-reviewed article discusses the "peculiar pattern" of urbanization in China taking place from the 1950s to the 1980s. Kojima discusses the topics of the structure of urbanization and changes over time of levels of urbanization. This source helpfully parses out the difficulty of understanding why China's urbanization process was so complex.

Lincoln, Toby and Xu Tao, eds. *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Gerth, Karl. "Conclusion: Are Chinese Cities Becoming More Habitable?" in *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Lincoln Toby and Xu Tao, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017.

This book discusses the subject of urbanization in China and how cities were planned to accommodate a massively growing population. The authors also describe the necessities of living in a city and how China started to plan cities. This source provides insight on the urbanization process in China and how cities were initially planned to be "habitable" and how modern China is struggling to ensure basic necessities such as clean air and water. Habitability is a major concern for a rapidly growing urban area. I utilized the introductory

Ma, Laurence J.C. "Urban Transformation in China, 1949 – 2000: A Review and Research Agenda." *Environment and Planning* 34 (2002): 1545-1569.

This is a peer-reviewed journal article in which the author discusses both achievements and deficiencies in China's process of urbanization and urbanism in the latter half of the 20th century that will be used to support my thesis conclusion of how China's urbanization helped or hurt Chinese people. Part of the focus of the author's arguments is on the concept of "transformation" and how China economically moved away from state socialism in a very long process, unlike most countries with state socialism having a quick transition to Western-style capitalism. The source also contains information regarding "hidden urbanization," which the author defines as "massive occupational change from farming to nonfarm employment in rural areas" as the *hukou* system shifted (pg. 1553).

Mao Zedong. "The Question of Agricultural Cooperation," (Speech, July 31, 1955). (Columbia University, n.d.) http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/mao_zedong_agricultural_cooperation.pdf.

This primary source is a speech given by Mao Zedong on July 31, 1955 regarding the importance of speeding along industrialization in order to strengthen China and become a fully-formed socialist state.

Song, Yan. *Urbanization in China: Critical Issues in an era of Rapid Growth*. Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2007.

This book is a publication resulting from a symposium sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, discussing issues specific to rapid growth and urbanization in China during the early 2000s, divided into four sections. One section focuses on land acquisition during the urbanization process and its controversial nature. This source highlights the challenges and controversies faced by Chinese citizens at the hands of the government as they transformed into a more economically powerful state.

Yun, Ji. "How China Proceeds with the task of Industrialization." *The People's Daily*, 1953.

This is a primary source consisting of an article that appeared in the *People's Daily* in 1953 concerning China's need for and goals of achieving industrialization. The *People's Daily* is an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and was established in 1948, just months before the revolution and the establishment of the PRC in 1949. This excerpt shows how China viewed the Soviet Union for their movement toward industrialization.

An Analysis of the Islamic Resistance Movement and its Campaign of Terror

Simran Dhami – November 2021

HIST 3397 – Guerrillas in the Mist: Terrorism in the Modern World

Dr Tracey J. Kinney

Whether a terrorist organization has accomplished anything of substance is subjective. However, through an analysis of a organization's origins, motives, achievements, failures, and actions, one can create a base of information to help answer the question. In analyzing these elements, an argument can be made pertaining to the Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as Hamas, and whether it has accomplished anything of substance in the modern world. While Hamas has succeeded in a number of ways, it has failed to achieve its fundamental goals and aims. Furthermore, Hamas has inflicted on the Palestinian population difficulties, loss, and destruction. With that, it can be concluded that Hamas has failed to achieve anything of substance.

The creation of Hamas stems out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The roots of the conflict trace back to the 1920s and the Balfour Declaration which was issued by the British government. The Balfour Declaration perpetuated the notion and ideology of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The Plan of Partition proposed by the United Nations in 1947 also added to the conflict, as it divided Palestine into two states. Furthermore, it allocated 56 percent of the land to the Jewish State, while the Arab population was given 43 percent despite representing two-thirds of the population.¹ The outcome of these combined factors was the 1948 Arab Israeli war. Following the war and the establishment of an Israeli state, the Arab population was left with even less land than the initially planned. As a result, there was a mass displacement of the Arab population which creates a refugee problem. As there is no accurate record, it is estimated that there were around 550,000 to 600,000 Palestinian Arab refugees.² In effect, the Six-Day War of 1967 is similar to the war of 1948. The Six-Day War left the Arab Palestinian population with no land that was not occupied by Israeli forces. In addition, the war also exacerbated the refugee problem as it created another wave

¹ Leila Farsakh, "The "Right to Have Rights": Partition and Palestinian Self-Determination," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 47, no 1 (2017): 60.

² Efrain Karsh, "How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?" *Israel Affairs* 17, no 2 (2011): 224.

of displacement. However, the outcome of the Six-Day War was collective emphasis among the Arab population of an armed struggle as being the only means of liberating Palestine.

The origins of Hamas are directly connected to The Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood participated in the Palestinian struggle from the beginning of the conflict. The Brotherhood's participation and show of solidarity led to the emergence of a Palestinian wing.³ Following the 1948 Arab Israeli war and the division of Palestine, the Palestinian wing of the Brotherhood also split. The split in administration created a Gaza based offshoot of the Brotherhood which sets the stage for Hamas's emergence.⁴ The Gaza based offshoot continued to grow through the work of prominent leaders like Sheikh Ahmed Yasin. Most of the growth is done by spreading its message at the mosque, which functions to explain that the number of mosques in the Gaza tripled between 1967 and 1987.⁵ Hamas emerged during the first Intifada in 1987 as a resistance wing for the Muslim Brotherhood. This exemplifies the public shift toward Islamic message and movements as well. As Palestinians shifted toward organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the support for more secular organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization decreased. Herman, "Hamas the New Establishment. The leader Sheikh Ahmed Yasin created Hamas a means for the brotherhood to participate in the Intifada without being directly involved.

An analysis of Hamas' motives is also integral in determining what it has been able to achieve. Hamas's motives are outlined in two documents that underscore what the central goals and aims of the organization are. The first document is the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement which was issued in 1988 following the formation of the organization. One of the primary goals of the group is the restoration of the homeland. Another goal is for the re-establishment of the state of Islam. At its core, the charter is enriched with religious rhetoric. The Islamic dimension of the charter is illustrated by the goal of re-establishing an Islamic state, but also by the Quranic verses in its discourse.⁶ In addition, the charter puts forth the goal of "supporting all vulnerable people and advocating the rights of all those oppressed in every place that can be reached and affected."⁷

In addition, the second document that outlines the organizations goals and aims is The Hamas Principles and General Policies document which was published in 2017. The first goal of the organization is the liberation of Palestine. While the charter refers to the homeland, the new

³ Lyndall Herman, "Hamas the New Establishment," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 30, no 4 (2013): 96.

⁴ Herman, "Hamas the New Establishment," 96.

⁵ Herman, "Hamas the New Establishment," 97.

⁶ Issam Adwan, "Hamas Charter: Changes and Principles," *Politics and Religion* 13, no 1 (2019): 22.

⁷ Adwan, "Hamas Charter: Changes and Principles," 21.

document refers to it as Palestine, which underscores the Palestinian dimension and cause. The second goal that is outlined is facing the Zionist project. The document outlines the Zionist project as “a racist, aggressive, colonial and expansionist project based on seizing the properties of others.”⁸ It also sets forth that the Zionist project is hostile toward Palestinian and their fight for self-determination, liberation, and rights. The new document removes the objective of re-establishing the state of Islam, as well as supporting all vulnerable people. In addition, the new document outlines that Hamas “does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine.”⁹ In effect, the new document is clearer and more concise on the Palestinian dimension of the cause, the people, the movement, and the struggle when compared to the charter.

Hamas’ ability to keep the public support while carrying out acts of terrorism and violence is one of its main achievements. One way that Hamas has done this is by opposing the Oslo Accord of 1993 and the Palestinian general election in 1996.¹ The accord is problematic as it called for the mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. In addition, the accord also entailed the agenda for negotiations on Palestinian self-government in the occupied territories. Hamas opposed the accord as its charter outlined the refusal to recognize Israel as a legitimate state, but also because the Palestine Liberation Organization supported it.² As a result of its opposition to the accord, Hamas gained credibility among the Arab population as it stood by its charter. In addition, Hamas also became the counter-establishment to the Palestine Liberation Organization. This image of activism and the foundation of public support only strengthened with the Palestinian general elections. Hamas demonstrated its opposition to the elections just as it had before, which strengthened its credibility.

In addition, Hamas’ structure is another one of its achievements, as it illustrates Hamas’ organizational strengths and explains its ability to continue surviving. The structure of Hamas is comprised of two factors, with the first one being its consultative system. The system is comprised of three constituencies, which are the Gaza and West Bank populace, the prison populace, and the external populace.³ Essentially, the leadership in each of its constituencies formulates a compromise decision based on the overall constituency. This system allows for Hamas to best represent the general membership’s perspectives. The second factor that comprises Hamas’ structure internal dynamic and organization. Hamas’s organizational strength can be

⁸ “A Document of General Principles and Policies,” <https://hamas.ps/ar/uploads/documents/06c77206ce934064ab5a901fa8bfef44.pdf>, accessed November 5, 2021.

⁹ “A Document of General Principles and Policies,” <https://hamas.ps/ar/uploads/documents/06c77206ce934064ab5a901fa8bfef44.pdf> [accessed November 5, 2021].

¹ Herman, “Hamas the New Establishment,” 97.

² Herman, “Hamas the New Establishment,” 97.

³ Herman, “Hamas the New Establishment,” 101.

conceptually operationalized into three attributes.⁴ The first attribute is a centralized hierarchy which consists of professional personnel that is well-trained and educated.⁵ The second attribute is education and training. This attribute entails an education and training system which increases the competence of its members, while also reinforcing Hamas' hierarchy. The third attribute is Hamas's ability and skills in mobilizing the public in local communities. This attribute consists of its trained members utilizing personal interactions and communication to provide information about discontent, sources of opposition, and an understanding of local preferences.⁶

Furthermore, Hamas has used strategized and well-planned acts of terrorism to further its own political agenda, which underscores its success in the utilization of terror. Hamas' execution of suicide bombings entails decision-making processes which are "markedly balanced, combining realistic considerations with traditional beliefs and arguments, emphasizing visionary goals but also immediate needs."⁷ The utilization of suicide bombings as a strategic tactic is exemplified in various ways. One way in which this is exemplified relates to factional rivalries and power imbalances. During times of political instability, Hamas utilized suicide bombings to confront the Israeli government, while also challenging the Palestinians Authorities dominance.⁸ Another exemplification is the use of suicide bombings as a tactic to inflict the maximum amount of pain and loss to the Jewish state. For that reason, suicide bombings are seen as a the most effective and logical means. The use of suicide bombings as a producer of fear and anxiety is another example of Hamas' strategic use of it as a tactic. Essentially, suicide bombings are a means of eliminating any possibility of compromise between Palestinians and Jews, as it worsens the preconceptions about Palestinians.⁹

Primarily, the transition from terrorism into mainstream politics is Hamas' key achievement. In 2006 Hamas made the decision to participate in the Palestinian Authority legislative elections, running under the party name of Change and Reform. Hamas not only participated in the elections, but it also wins through a fairly democratic and free election. While the purpose of participation was supposed to be the first step in integrating into the establishment, Hamas became the establishment itself.¹⁰ The decision to run also functioned to ensure that public support for Hamas remained strong, as listening to the public opinions and interest would

⁴ Iman Alsoos, "What Explains the Resilience of the Muslim Brotherhood Movements," *Mediterranean Politics* (2021): 5.

⁵ Alsoos, "What Explains the Resilience of the Muslim Brotherhood Movements," 5.

⁶ Alsoos, "What Explains the Resilience of the Muslim Brotherhood Movements," 6.

⁷ Dipak Gupta and Kusum Mundra, "Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no 4 (2005): 577.

⁸ Gupta and Mundra, "Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon," 577.

⁹ Gupta and Mundra, "Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon," 590.

¹⁰ Herman, "Hamas the New Establishment," 102.

guarantee that. By utilizing its sophisticated consultative system, Hamas concludes that its general members were in favour of its participation in the election. While the decision to run contradicts Hamas's charter and initial opposition to the elections, the support that its constituents showed for its participation acted as a binding agreement between the two.¹¹

However, the conflict that follows Hamas' victory exemplifies its failures, as its actions have created difficulties, loss, and destruction for the Arab Palestinian population. The elections and escalating conflict led to the "de facto political separation of the West Bank and Gaza, and catapulted Hamas from majority party to the sole government in Gaza."¹² The Battle of Gaza was fought between Hamas and Fatah in the summer of 2007. In order for Hamas to seize control of Gaza from Fatah, it had to use violence and warfare. Hamas' victory and use of violent force also resulted in the implementation of a blockade on the boarder of Gaza by Israel. The blockade functioned to stop Hamas 'terroristic activities and attacks. The blockade was imposed on land, sea, and the air, as it functioned to block and restrict the flow of goods and individuals.¹ It immediately created a humanitarian crisis, as the conditions become unlivable due to the restricted access to essentials such as food, fuel, and medicine. The blockade also has economic, social, and political implications as it blocks of the population of Gaza from the rest of the world. The economic decay caused by the blockade has created poverty and declining conditions of essential public services and infrastructures such as hospitals and schools.

Additionally, since Hamas' electoral victory there have been multiple ceasefires violated by Hamas, as well as three Gaza wars which have broken out between the organization and Israel. Operation Cast Lead took place in December of 2008 and destroyed more than 60,000 housing units.²The operation ultimately failed, and Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza continued to launch attacks on Israel. Due to the continued attacks, Israel initiated Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012. While Hamas and Israel signed a ceasefire to stop this war, Hamas proceeded with its rocket attacks. Following this, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in 2014. This war is considered to be the most destructive of the three, as it killed around 2,300 Gazans, wounded 10,000, and displaced more than 500,000.³ More recently, Hamas and Israel signed a ceasefire after multiple rocket attacks from both sides which resulted in the death of

¹¹ Herman, "Hamas the New Establishment," 102.

¹² Benedetta Berti, "Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: The Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority and Resistance," *The Middle East Journal* 69, no 1 (2015): 15.

¹ Manzoor Khalid Butt and Abid Anam Butt, "Blockade on Gaza Strip: A Living Hell on Earth," *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no 1 (2016): 158.

² Sultan Barakat, Milton Sansom, and Elkhahlout Ghassan. "Reconstruction Under Siege: The Gaza Strip since 2007." *Disasters* 44, no. 3 (2020): 483.

³ Barakat, Sansom, Ghassan, "Reconstruction Under Siege," 488.

around hundreds of Palestinians. However, the fighting continues as Hamas launched incendiary balloons into Israel.

To conclude, it becomes evident through an analysis of Hamas' history since its formation that it has failed to achieve anything of substance. In addition, the difficulties, loss, and destruction Hamas has caused underscores how it has failed the Palestinian people. Seeing as Hamas has been a unified and active organization for almost 34 years, it has not been able to liberate Palestine or secure the rights of the Palestinian people. Rather it has created a humanitarian crisis through its continued terror campaign, specifically suicide bombings. The war and conflict that Hamas continues to inflict on the Palestinian people outweighs any moments and events of success that the organization has had since its formation.

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The Crisis of Ignorance & Greed: An Overview of Wetlands & Burns Bog Throughout History

Harneet Dhindsa – April 2022
HIST 3180 – North American Environmental History
Dr Jack P. Hayes

I am surrounded by ever-growing greenery and trees mighty and high as I walk the path on a wooden ground level boardwalk. It is the beginning of spring; the sun is beaming through the tall trees hitting the various shrubs and skunk cabbage plants by the side of the walkway. In the distance I can see an umbrella of colour, ranging from muted green shrubs to bright purple laurel flowers. Pollinators such as bees, butterflies, and dragonflies swarm around the bog, tying in different spring colours in contrast to the surrounding greenery. The bog is wet, the soil is acidic, and a pungent smell comes from below. I continue to walk the pathway, but I cannot help but think about what is beneath the boardwalk. As I turn the corner, I see some heavy metal parts sinking into the peat as though it was a tractor. Just by navigating myself through the bog I realized that the peat would not be able to hold weight, let alone a heavy tractor. The sunken tractor made me realize that there is more history than beneath these boardwalks. As I am walking, I see various signs and boards guiding me on my walk, educating me about wildlife and native plants. Parts of the bog have been closed off to the public as an ecological reserve, the fresh boardwalks that I walk on make me wonder how history has played a part in the formation of the peatland. The environmental history of Burns Bog has been altered by political and economic factors and by ignorance. Incomprehension of the trees, wildlife, and the ecosystem of Burns Bog has negatively impacted its flora and fauna.

Developments neighbouring Burns Bog today include Highway 91 and residential homes. Before these developments and the influence of politicians, Burns Bog was perceived with a different outlook that was heavily admired. Burns Bog is on the traditional, unceded territory of the Coast Salish Peoples, including the Stó:lō, Katzie, Kwantlen, Semiahmoo, Tsawwassen and Musqueam First Nations¹. Burns Bog was peaceful, quiet, and respected by Indigenous communities. Birds would sing in harmony while berries were harvested. Burns Bog offered Indigenous peoples

¹ Burns Bog Conservation Society "First Nations and the Bog". www.burnsbog/firstnations.com, accessed March 31st, 2022.

natural resources that was used in their daily life ranging from curing rashes to medicine². One of the types of mosses that grew in the bog was sphagnum moss³. The Indigenous community used the moss in a variety of ways that bettered their quality of life. Due to the soft nature of Sphagnum moss and its ability to hold moisture, Indigenous families utilized the moss by using it as household items like diapers and an antiseptic like wound dressing and cleaning fish⁴. The use of moss, lavender tea and other natural resources reflect their admiration of mother nature and their beliefs of Indigenous craftsmanship⁵. Colonizers focused on the potential profits that could be reaped from the Bog, rather than the importance of its preservation. Marginalized communities who maintain natural productivity were denied access to any developmental decisions. Indigenous communities suffered due to a lack of territorial acknowledgement by political leaders, and a lack of consideration in economic decisions.

Wetlands are one of the biggest epicentres of environmental degradation and political influences are a primary driving factor in this continuous decline. Similar to Burns Bog, the Everglades in Florida face ongoing environmental restructuring. The Everglades was once known as the natural garden of America, providing fresh produce and organic soil to locals and farmers. With the demand for land and trends of settlement in nineteenth century Florida, the United States military began the drainage of the Everglades in defiance of any extensive research⁶. The southern area of Lake Okeechobee extends to the Everglades, becoming a pivotal element of their hydraulic system.⁷ Adjacent to Lake Okeechobee are cattle farms, where substantial amounts of phosphorus are used in cow fertilizer daily⁸. Massive amounts of phosphorus from cattle farms became a dominant source of chemicals in the watershed, thereby spewing large amounts of phosphorus into the Everglades⁹. Wetlands have high biological productivity, providing wildlife with nutrients to thrive on. However, with the presence of chemicals like phosphorous, the biodiversity of the Everglades is negatively impacted. The increasing trend of settlement in Florida meant an influx in food production and processing. Florida's surge in settlement and agriculture continued to trend upwards, altering the structure and composition of wetlands significantly.

² Burns Bog Conservation Society. www.burnsbog/firstnations.com, accessed March 31st, 2022.

³ Cameron Butler, "From Reclaiming to Conservation: A History of Settler Place- Making in Burns Bog, British Columbia," (master's thesis, York University, August 2019), 36, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/287659555.pdf>

⁴ Butler, "From Reclaiming to Conservation," 36.

⁵ Butler, "From Reclaiming to Conservation," 36.

⁶ Kristin Schade-Poole, and Gregory Möller, "Impact and Mitigation of Nutrient Pollution and Overland Water Flow Change on the Florida Everglades, USA," *Sustainability* 8, no. 9 (2016): 5. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su8090940>

⁷ Poole and Möller, "Impact and Mitigation," 5

⁸ Monica Reimer and David Guest, "The Lake Okeechobee Pollution Crisis and the St. Lucie River and Estuary," Nov. 9, 2006. 3, <https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/reports/lake-okeechobee>, accessed March 31st, 2022.

⁹ Reimer and Guest, "The Lake Okeechobee Pollution Crisis," 4.

The composition of Wetlands consists vastly of deteriorated plants, holding large sums of water and ultimately molding into a dome shape. Wetlands, also known as peatlands, cover large surface areas. With increasing trends of settlement across the globe, peatlands are consequently subject to deforestation and drainage to facilitate those urban developments. Both the Everglades and Burns Bog are perceived through a business lens, hence allowing for municipalities to achieve monetary gain through environmental exploitation. Increase in settlement became notable in northern Florida, whereas southern Florida would soon follow under desirable offers by Governor Napoleon Bonaparte Broward¹⁰. Broward not only saw an opportunity for settlement in Florida, but he also saw an opportunity to obtain economic growth¹¹. The decision to drain the Everglades was heavily influenced by Broward, however he failed to examine the peatland's structure and assumed that the drainage would be dependent on gravity¹². By selling five hundred thousand acres of land for a profit of one million, salesperson Richard Bolles also became strongly involved in the real estate process of the Everglades¹³. Remaining unperturbed about any complications, the ploy to increase settlement and make a profit began¹⁴. Environmental exploitation became the primary principle for municipalities to acquire economic gain from peatlands. In the Everglades, environmental exploitation consisted of the drainage of the wetland to accommodate urban developments. Broward and Bolles allured prospective buyers with the promise of a ten-acre plot of Everglades land, which would in return provide them with a successful market garden that would eventually be sold directly to consumers and supermarkets¹⁵. Newcomers blindly put their faith in Broward and Bolles without first seeing the property. Unfortunately, upon their arrival, they found water still covering their land¹⁶. The blame shifted towards engineering operations and the state for their careless approach to sketching the plots and completing the drainage¹⁷. Wetlands have high biological productivity, providing wildlife with nutrients in order to thrive. The drainage of the Everglades caused an influx of chemicals, resulting in harmed wildlife and biological productivity. The drainage of over one half of the wetland has caused irreversible habitat alteration. Animals, such as the Florida panther, and wading birds, such as the tricoloured heron, are all affected by environmental exploitation¹⁸. Entitlement and greed fueled the urbanization of the Everglades. Plans for

¹⁰ Jack E. Davis and Raymond Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida: Paradise Lost* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 2005), 144.

¹¹ Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 144.

¹² Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 144

¹³ Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 144

¹⁴ Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 145.

¹⁵ Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 145.

¹⁶ Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 145.

¹⁷ Davis and Arsenault, *The Environmental History of Florida*, 145.

¹⁸ United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Everglades Ecosystem Assessment: Water Management and Quality, Eutrophication Mercury Contamination, Soils and Habitat," August 2007, 14. Academic Source, EPA (904-R-07-001), <https://tinyurl.com/yvmak2pw>, accessed March 31st 2022.

development failed to attempt to understand the composition of the wetland and instead shifted their resources, time, and energy into fostering settlements that would promote economic growth.

Similarly, Burns Bog has faced environmental exploitation through the process of peat mining and has been negatively impacted by political decisions between the City of Delta and the Vancouver landfill. Economic growth was sought by both business ventures, but the consequent effects to the bog's biodiversity through peat mining resulted in a decline that remains largely irreversible. During the 1950's, WW2 was ramping up in the United States and the demand for resources heightened. Thirty-five thousand years ago, slabs of rotting plants gathered over clay, resulting in peat. Peat was initially most popular for its ability to provide heat for homes. With the increased pressures at the time, peat became a valuable resource used in the war¹⁹. The process of peat extraction began in the 1930's to serve in the production of firebombs²⁰. Two peat factories were constructed and built by Atkins and Durbrow Peat Company, establishing an industry where five thousand workers were on payroll from 1940 to 1965²¹. Employed workers on the peat plant had a variety of jobs, including preparing walls of peat, building peat bales, and digging and drainage work²². The peat goes through an initial gas-fueled drying operation, then it is further dried to fifty percent moisture content where it is packaged and sent off to Las Vegas²³. Bales of peat shipped for war contributions totaled more than one hundred thousand, and more than seventy percent of the bog was affected by peat extraction²⁴. Peat extraction propagated by the war became one of the earliest signs of environmental change caused directly by human actions. Burns Bog had been altered into a state of decline to make weaponry for the US. The same weaponry that would then continue to kill numerous individuals just for political advancement and major power. The urgency for countries to politically rise and dominate during the war had overpowered the need to study the consequences to ecosystems when engaging in environmental exploitation. Peat was looked at as a steppingstone to advance in warfare tactics against other countries. The exploitation of natural resources was used to politically advance when countries desired power most. Extraction of peat yielded short term benefits for the war but resulted in long term damage to Burns Bog. The funding of factories, machines, vacuums, and transportation to the US was all supported by the prospect of economic growth. The preservation of natural resources and wildlife was dismissed upon the decisions to extract peat from native lands. Peat mining became a natural resource that was extracted for over two decades, establishing businesses globally. Burns Bog was forced to deal with the aftermath of it all which ultimately

¹⁹ John Macdonald, *North Delta History and Heritage* (Delta Heritage Society, 2020), 177

²⁰ Macdonald, *North Delta History and Heritage*, 177

²¹ Macdonald, *North Delta History and Heritage*, 178.

²² Macdonald, *North Delta History and Heritage*, 178

²³ Wayne Griffin Biggs, "An Ecological and Land Use Study of Burns Bog, Delta, British Columbia," (master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1976), 36, <http://hdl.handle.net/2429/41949>.

²⁴ Macdonald, *North Delta History and Heritage*, 179

changed the entire ecosystem of Burns Bog. Native plants and wildlife became endangered by invasive mining, in exchange for economic growth.

Although Wetlands differ from one another based on their physical and biome nature, they all contribute to society in similar ways. Burns Bog serves multiple purposes to the biosphere, wildlife, and water resources. Wetlands protect fish and wildlife by providing them with a habitat where they are able to readily access nutrients. The progression of plant materials breaking down into smaller particles, it growingly becomes increasing of nutrients for the reason of active fungal and bacteria²⁵. The value of Burns Bog as a rich and diverse ecosystem was not widely recognized, but rather was considered primarily an open space for business ventures. The City of Vancouver was looking for a landfill and decided that Burns Bog would be an ideal location for disposing of garbage, holding little value for the composition of the peatland²⁶. As Burns Bog did not hold any significant value to either city; Vancouver and Delta turned the wetland into a cost-effective landfill ²⁷. Between the two municipalities, Delta and Vancouver initiated formal meetings surrounding the landfill on April 28, 1961²⁸. Conversations revolving royalties and fees began. On top of Delta receiving free dumping privileges in the Bog, they received eight hundred thousand dollars in annual royalties from the city of Vancouver²⁹. The mutual relationship that Delta and Vancouver formed provided both benefits and savings. Vancouver had a site to dump their landfill, an amount that would have been otherwise put towards a landfill in proximity of Vancouver. Approximately, five hundred thousand tons of waste is dumped into Burns Bog each year³⁰. Because of the rise of urbanization, residential and construction waste was also dumped into the landfill, increasing the amount of chemicals and metals³¹. There were several reported violations by the British Columbia Landfill Criteria in 1998. The Burns Bog Conservation society confirmed these breaches:

- location within an unstable area
- gas emissions to the atmosphere
- waste in contact with the groundwater
- impact on sensitive ecosystem

²⁵ U.S Environmental Protection Agency“ Wetland Functions and Value” [Accessed March 31st, 2022]. 2, <http://www.epa.gov/watertrain>

²⁶ Hailey Venn, “Dumping like a State: An Environmental History of the City of Vancouver Landfill in Delta 1958 – 1981,” (master’s thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2020), <https://summit.sfu.ca/item/20807>

²⁷ Venn, “Dumping like a State,” 14

²⁸ Venn, “Dumping like a State,” 33

²⁹ South Delta Today, “Vancouver Destroys for Profit,” 7, South Delta June 19, 1993

³⁰ “ Vancouver Destroys for Profit,” 7.

³¹ Damon Matthews, “ Landfill to get Bigger” Burns Bog News, 1998

- leachate discharge into groundwater³²

Despite the infractions, the City of Vancouver continued to dump an additional ten million tons of garbage³³. Families residing close to Burns Bog reported concerns of illegal dumping and low-quality air to councils and newspapers³⁴. As the council would make efforts to reject responsibility, the blame was mostly directed towards Vancouver. With increasing complaints, Delta mayor Dugald Morrison invited Vancouver's mayor Tom Campbell to visit the site³⁵. Campbell declined and opted for a report from city administrators instead. A meeting was held at the site with Vancouver engineers, but the meetings only reinforced their mutually beneficial relationship³⁶. An agreement was signed in 1999 where both municipalities settled to close the operational life of the landfill in 2023, in addition to Vancouver transferring the site over to Delta³⁷. The arrangement to place a landfill next to Burns Bog caused the biosphere to decline. Because of the urgency for a landfill was felt in both Delta and Vancouver, both parties solved a temporary problem. The issue surrounding garbage disposal was solved, which led to economic growth from both ends of the partnership. The success of finding a landfill fulfilled the needs locals requested, the overwhelming issue surrounding access garbage would not be a problem. Both municipalities benefited from their agreement, without any intensive research or interference the landfill would continue. Convenience and economic growth are both factors in causing lasting detrimental effects on Burns Bog. The exposure to toxins and metals has altered the wetland, an oversight that could have been avoided with more extensive research. The composition and structure of Burns Bog was ignored as it was not perceived as an area of high interest or value. It was more so seen as a place that could be altered and used for accommodation, hence only being of high value until it could solve a temporary problem and was able to increase economic growth through both parties.

Residents of Delta became more environmentally aware of the value of Burns Bog and brought more awareness to the preservation of the peatland. Support was seen through several campaigns and newspaper columns; school-aged children were also involved in the hopes of protecting Burns Bog. The Burns Bog Conservation Society was formed in 1988, where dedicated volunteers helped towards saving the bog from development proposals. David Bellamy became an honorary chairman of the Burns Bog Conservation Society; born in the UK, Bellamy was an ecologist and a world bog expert³⁸. Bellamy expressed his feelings towards bog preservation in

³² Matthews, "Landfill to Get Bigger"

³³ Matthews, "Landfill to Get Bigger"

³⁴ Venn, "Dumping Like a State", 44

³⁵ Venn, "Dumping Like a State" 38

³⁶ Venn, "Dumping Like a State" 38

³⁷ Sandor, "What Should be Future Uses of Vancouver Landfill in Delta" 0

³⁸ David Bellamy, "Donations to Burns Bog," Common Ground, 20 August 1999

various newspapers and attached tax deductible slips for donations, in addition to recruiting members, whether it be a family or a group. He makes the following remarks about the importance of peatland preservation in *Common Ground* magazine in 1999:

This is your chance to help save a key site of the world's most biodiversity and the safeguard of the environmental health of the Vancouver region. Burns Bog is the largest piece of environment "software" on the west coast of North America. So big that it can be seen from outer space. It is vibrant with wildflowers and wildlife. A buffer against global warming and estuarine pollution. A producer of oxygen and an air purifier. Growing more than 5000 years, its peat contains a detailed record of all our pasts. It must be saved for all our futures. For the sake of yourself, your children and grandchildren please join us and save Burns Bog for all futures.³⁹

With increasing development proposals, urbanization became a threat to Burns Bog. Having recognized this, locals in Delta focused on preserving the bog and encouraging the longevity of the wetland. With increased newspaper columns on the importance of wetlands and their contributions to air quality, water filtration, wildlife and much more. The awareness of environmentalism was felt in classrooms as well, as Burns Bog Society helped kids navigate through a program which educated them about the importance of Burns Bog and its biodiversity. Eight-year-old Tammy from an elementary school in 1993 South Delta communicates her feelings towards Burns Bog. "At Burns Bog they put a garbage dump that is hurting the Bog. The garbage that you will make will go to the dump at Burns Bog. So please STOP making garbage and help the Bog. We need your HELP! -Love Tammy, your friend of the world."⁴⁰

Locals in Delta have taken the initiative to rebuild and preserve Burns Bog as much as possible. The growing number of individuals supporting the preservation of Burns Bog has motivated change in the environment. Efforts to educate members of society about Burns Bog and installing boardwalks and benches are all actions that have benefited the environment. Locals are joining campaigns in planting trees and protecting native plants to continue to see the "lungs of the lower mainland" thrive.

Indigenous communities have preserved the nature of Burns Bog; they have been guided by their belief and intuition to let the environment flow freely. The bog was once nurtured in gentle hands, but then targeted for its peat, and exposed to the Vancouver landfill only to suffer the effects of toxins. Through a business lens, Burns Bog was a simple solution from which others were able to benefit. What once was seen to have little value became a focal point for economic growth; the

³⁹ Bellamy, "Donations to Burns Bog"

⁴⁰ "Dear People," *South Delta Today*, June 13, 1993

value of the Bog then shifted to what the bog could do for us instead of what the bog needs from us. The trees and native plants stood tall despite all odds, standing for protection and world peace. Society became so blinded by greed that the bog became a symbol of gold; cash would overflow from those engaged in environmental degradation while the soul and physicality of Burns Bog was ignored.

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Love, Hate, and Everything In-Between: The *Vancouver Sun's* Portrayal of the Hippies

Jordan Fenske – April 2022
HIST 4490 – History of British Columbia
Dr Eryk Martin

The countercultural Hippie Movement took the U.S. by storm in the 1960s. As this movement grew more widespread in popularity, it soon hopped the border into Canada. The Hippie movement in Canada had a significant affect within the country. The movement strove for ideals of Liberalism and peace through devices such as drugs, sexual experimentation, and music to break away from the dominant conservative culture that had emerged after the conclusion of the Second World War.¹ In Vancouver, many facets of society looked upon the Hippies with disdain, offence, and frustration. Politicians, law enforcement, and the everyday people within society who held those conservative values were the ones who felt negatively regarding the countercultural movement's ideals and strategies.² There also existed those who supported the Hippie Movement as well as those who remained neutral.³ Those voices of politicians and law enforcement are strongly known, however, what about newspapers? The newspaper was still one of the main forms of communication and media of the day, so it held an important voice regarding responses to the countercultural wave. How was the "Hippie" Movement represented in the *Vancouver Sun* during the late 1960s and early 1970s? Research showcased how the expected negative responses to the Hippie Movement did not dominate the *Vancouver Sun*. The majority of the paper housed negative responses; however, it was not an overwhelming majority. A significant number of sympathetic responses to the Hippie Movement were prevalent throughout the years. Furthermore, many responses acknowledged counterpoints to their views. In other words, some of those who held negative views did touch on certain positives, and vice versa.

¹ Peter Braunstein and Michael William Doyle, *Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960s and '70s* (London, 2002), 42.

² Daniel Ross, "Panic on Love Street: Citizens and Local Government Respond to Vancouver's Hippie Problem, 1967-68," *BC Studies* no. 180 (2013): 17.

³ Ross, "Panic on Love Street," 18.

The Hippie Movement was largely comprised of the youth from the Baby Boomer generation which resulted from the spike in birth rates after the Second World War ended.⁴ Those who went on to join the countercultural movement found issues within the conservative and idealized culture that was created by society after the Second World War. This was a society characterized heavily by consumerism and materialism, which to many of the youth was a confined, hollow, and prison-esque way to live.⁵ That disdain for the ideal life created by society based around these superficial ideals, led to the emergence of a mass desire to protest and live against that way of living.⁶ The youth began to coalesce which, in turn, led to the emergence of the ideals of the counterculture and the Hippie identity. As the culture of the time was strongly conservative, the countercultural ideals of the Hippies worked to contrast the ideal lifestyle within North American society. Those contrasts included, but were not limited to, sexual experimentation, drug use, rock music, communal living, and long hair.⁷ The whole idea of the Hippie Movement was to create an uproar through their protests using counterculture strategies, and an uproar was exactly what they created. All the countercultural protests were accelerated due to the eruption of the Vietnam War, especially with the introduction of the Draft.⁸ As the war progressed, and the death tolls mounted, the counterculture movements became heavily involved with the anti-war movements and protests.⁹

Furthermore, the counterculture quickly swept into Canada, bringing with it strong influences and impressions. The Hippie Movement in Canada, especially Vancouver was characterized by significant influences by the American counterculture, as argued by Aronsen.¹⁰ Despite this however, the Canadian counterculture did form its own ideals, traditions, and attitudes that fit into their own specific context.¹¹ Those differences showcased how the counterculture was a vastly complex network that held both inter-crossing influences as well as uniqueness. The counterculture itself, as argued by Braunstein and Doyle, should be described more as a “inherently unstable collection” of ideals, attitudes, and lifestyles as opposed to the dominant narrative which holds that it was a solitary social movement.¹² This argument works to explain

⁴ Lawrence Aronsen and Julian Benedict, “Hippies and their Discontents: Cultural Conflict in Vancouver, 1965-1970,” *West Coast Line* 41, no. 2 (2007): 23.

⁵ Tina Block, “‘Most of Today’s Teen-Agers Laugh About God’: Youth Secularization, and the Sixties in British Columbia,” *BC Studies* no. 203 (2019): 169.

⁶ Michael Boudreau, “Hippies, Yippies, the Counterculture, and the Gastown Riots in Vancouver, 1968-71,” *BC Studies* no. 197 (2018): 182.

⁷ Lawrence Aronsen, *City of Love and Revolution: Vancouver in the Sixties* (Vancouver, 2010), 29.

⁸ Henry John, “American Exiles Beyond the Politics of the Draft: Nudity, Feminism, and Third World Decolonization in Vancouver, 1968-71,” *BC Studies* no. 205 (2020): 99.

⁹ John, “American Exiles,” 125.

¹⁰ Aronsen, *City of Love and Revolution*, 113.

¹¹ J. I. Little, *At the Wilderness Edge: The Rise of the Antidevelopment Movement on Canada’s West Coast* (Montreal, 2019), 187.

¹² Braunstein and Doyle, *Imagine Nation*, 96.

the drastic differences that existed within the divergent pockets of the Hippie movement in different parts of the world, such as the more radical compared to the less radical. As the Vancouver Hippie Movement was characterized by both American influence and its own unique creations, the city's history with the counterculture offers an insightful look into the praises, critiques, and analyses that were published through the *Vancouver Sun*.

The most dominant group of articles about the Hippie Movement in the *Vancouver Sun* were strongly opposed to the counterculture and offered unflinching critiques and oppositions. Those critiques were multi-faceted in their approaches to the various aspects and characteristics of the counterculture. A significant critique and condemnation that often arose within those articles was the view that Hippies naturally attracted problems for society. The Hippie Movement was often characterized by communal living, which expectedly attracted runaways from many different places.¹³ Many in society viewed this as a problem because the undesired Hippies were attracting more problems in the form of runaways who were viewed with negative connotations. Significant numbers of runaways ended up in "Hippie pads" in Vancouver where those children faced the dangers of Hippie life which threatened their moral and proper developments.¹⁴ Furthermore, the article touched on how many of those runaways, especially the females, were often subject to sexual exploitation by older members.¹⁵ This article offered up a take on the negatives of the promoting of free love and sexual experimentation. Another often touched on critique of the Hippies surrounded an economic factor. Many decried Hippies for their laziness regarding finding jobs and steady, proper work. One particular article criticized Hippies for choosing to panhandle and steal when many jobs were available as evidenced through ads of the time.¹⁶ Furthermore, the writer of the article described how they held no sympathy for the Hippies as they chose to go unwashed and remain decrepit.¹⁷ This article, along with many others, viewed the counterculture in Vancouver as an economic and social burden to society as they were seen as to not contribute and often stole. In other words, they took and did not give back. Furthermore, a significant critical view emerged, a view that would come to be held by several scholars. That perspective held significant opposition to the counterculture due to the prevalent American influences. Some of the opposition came out of fear, others out of resentment for the American radicalism unfurling into Canada.¹⁸ Those opponents of the influences put forth the argument that the Americanized Hippie Movement did not address the specific needs within Canada, as

¹³ Marcel Martel, "'They Smell Bad, have Diseases, and are Lazy': RCMP Officers Reporting on Hippies in the Late Sixties," *The Canadian Historical Review* 90, no. 2 (2009): 238.

¹⁴ "Teen-age Runaways Hide in the City Hippie Community," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 15, October 17, 1967.

¹⁵ "Teen-age Runaways Hide in the City Hippie Community," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 15.

¹⁶ "Hippies in BC," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 5, August 1, 1970.

¹⁷ "Hippies in BC," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 5.

¹⁸ Dave Ablett, "Protest," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 62, December 31, 1969.

the context of the U.S. was too different, in their view.¹⁹ That form of critique played into the rising re-evaluations of history which claimed that the counterculture differed within each unique context as some strategies that worked in one place might not have worked in another. Further, that aspect of the critical view touched on the underlying narrative regarding Canadian opposition to the Americanization of their culture, media, and society. Therefore, the critiques that emerged surrounding the counterculture not only touched on the Hippie Movement itself, but also broader historical contexts. The aforementioned critical articles focused mainly on the negative effects from the Hippie Movement. There exists another subgroup of those who criticized the counterculture with an emphasis on the use of derogatory terminology and imagery.

The use of hateful terminology essentially took the judgment of the countercultural movement to the next level. The use of such language worked to reinforce and justify any heavy critiques, loathing, or disgust held by those who penned those articles. Research portrayed how numerous articles on the matter used many different derogatory terms when describing the Hippies themselves. The term Hippie itself was used in a strongly negative way by those critics of the movement.²⁰ However, it is important to note that the counterculture adopted the term and used it essentially as a term of identity which turned the negative connotations surrounding the term into positive ones.²¹ To get back to terms used to describe the Hippies, many articles included language such as “longhair,”²² “dope fiend,”²³ and in some cases “anarchist.”²⁴ Most of the terminology used related to aspects that were characteristic of the movement. The terms often touched on the strategies of protest that the movement used which were seen as working against the idealized society.²⁵ This meant focusing on the Hippies’ drug use, their long and unkempt appearances, and aversions to authority. The negative use of words was not only used to shame the Hippies themselves, but also the actions of protest they were undertaking. One article saw its writers condemn a sit-in that turned into a rally that occurred at UBC. The sit-in was led by Jerry Rubin who was a leading player in the countercultural movement.²⁶ To the Hippies, that sit-in was a positive form of peaceful protest. However, to some critics that action was more sinister. The writers of the article on the sit-in described the event as an “invasion” of a part of Vancouver.²⁷ The authors of the article condemned this peaceful form of protest but ignored condemning the UBC students who used violence against the Hippies because of the

¹⁹ Ablett, “Protest,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 62.

²⁰ Ross, “Panic on Love Street,” 13.

²¹ Braunstein and Doyle, *Imagine Nation*, 54.

²² “Respectable Hatemongers,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 6, August 16, 1971.

²³ “Respectable Hatemongers,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 6.

²⁴ “Rubin’s Yippies Break up UK Show,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 2, November 9, 1970.

²⁵ Aronsen and Benedict, “Hippies and their Discontents,” 30.

²⁶ Alf Strand and Robin Taylor, “All Night Sit-in Ends in Rally,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 1 ; 3, October 25, 1968.

²⁷ Strand and Taylor, “All Night Sit-in Ends in Rally,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 1 ; 3.

disruptions.²⁸ This offers a deep insight into the attitudes held by many in Vancouver. The peaceful protest was labelled an invasion which invoked images of violence, and those who actually used violence against the protestors were seen as defenders of society or glossed over as irrelevant to the bigger problem. Another perspective regarding the use of terminology touched on how the use of language with negative connotations was not exclusive to the critics of the counterculture. One example spoke directly to the idea that terminology existed both within the spheres of critics of the counterculture and within the counterculture itself. A journalist from the *Vancouver Sun*, Fred Cawsey, attempted to attend a party at a park in Vancouver to get a firsthand look for a report. Cawsey was quickly stopped by Hippie “security” who accused him of being a “Pig” because he appeared to be “straight.”²⁹ Cawsey was then barred from entry and subsequently photographed out of suspicion he was an undercover police officer.³⁰ Cawsey noted that his experience at this event was not isolated as it happened to several people who appeared straight. There are several items to break down regarding the terminology used during this altercation. Pig became a widely popular term adopted by the counterculture movement as it was a derogatory term for a police officer.³¹ Furthermore, the term straight did not refer to sexuality in that context but rather it meant to be affiliated and sympathetic to the dominant culture of the day as they appeared well kempt to fit societal expectations. That altercation led Cawsey to hold very negative opinions about the movement. The negative terminology used against himself, caused Cawsey to form a distaste for the counterculture as he was verbally abused and excluded. This occurrence showcased how negative terminology was widespread and often used fervently by all sides. The above-mentioned examples portray the prevalent articles which strongly opposed the Hippie Movement. However, several articles exist which aligned with the other end of the spectrum as they offered full support and sympathy for the countercultural movement that arose in Vancouver.

Though the articles in support did not hold the majority, a surprising amount were published which goes against the dominant narrative that the Hippie Movement was widely condemned by most, if not all, outsiders. Similar to the articles in opposition, the articles sympathetic to the movement offered up their support for various reasons. The first example came from an article that touched on the same party in the park at which Fred Cawsey had the negative experience. Cawsey’s experience led to a very negative description of the event and those participating, which served to cast a shadow over that party. The article, penned by Lorne Mallin and Jack Todd, broke through that shadow to shine light on all the positivity that the event brought. Mallin and Todd described how that party at False Creek was an overall happy, free of charge festival that was

²⁸ Strand and Taylor, “All Night Sit-in Ends in Rally,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 1 ; 3.

²⁹ Fred Cawsey, “Park Posse Doesn’t Dig Pigs,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 17, June 29, 1970.

³⁰ Cawsey, “Park Posse Doesn’t Dig Pigs,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 17.

³¹ Boudreau, “Hippies, Yippies,” 44.

organized by the youth for the youth.³² They further noted that the majority of the event was characterized by high spirits and camaraderie and worked to spread the message of the Hippie Movement in a positive way.³³ This was a stark contrast when comparing it to Cawsey's experience, which proves that perspective matters when it comes to how events, occurrences, and experiences are perceived. Moreover, many articles took strong positions of outright support for the counterculture in Vancouver while condemning society for its treatment of the generally peaceful protestors. One article strongly criticized the police for their brutality against the Hippies and those who supported that brutality.³⁴ Additionally, the article told how the police relied on labels, such as "dope fiend," to justify their use of force as opposed to proper evidence.³⁵ The article, concluded by calling on the people to stand with the Hippies and to hold the police accountable as to ensure they did not get away with their harsh actions.³⁶ This article brought up the importance of terminology within this movement, both for and against. In addition, this work reflected how many in Vancouver supported the Hippies' peaceful means of protest as opposed to the iron-fist methods of violence used by the police. The next group of articles in support all came from Bob Sarti, a member of the countercultural group Yippie. His works within the *Vancouver Sun* offered up sympathetic insights into the movement, the Hippies, and the actions they took. The first article by Sarti touched on the significance of the countercultures' approach to obtaining their goals. Sarti described the Hippies as revolutionaries, as opposed to critics who would label the same people as anarchists, who have turned their backs on conventional party politics.³⁷ The unconventional methods used by the counterculture in Vancouver worked to amuse its supporters and frustrate its opposers. Sarti described how the movement, including himself, reveled in the frustration because it meant their tactics to upset the established order were working.³⁸ The next article authored by Sarti touched on the positivity of the free rock events held by the movement throughout the province. Sarti described how those shows created a space for people of the movement, and those sympathetic to it, to come together to celebrate, experiment, exchange ideas, and spread the Vancouver Hippie Movement messages.³⁹ The last article to be touched on by Sarti discussed the benefits of creative non-violence as a tactic. Sarti praised the counterculture for its creative and non-violent approaches when protesting. The article offered full support for the use of sit-ins, smoke-ins, free concerts, and peaceful rallies to bring about the desired change.⁴⁰ Furthermore, there existed many critics who either fully

³² Lorne Mallin and Jack Todd, "The Party: Peaceful Times for the People," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 17, June 29, 1970.

³³ Mallin and Todd, "The Party," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 17.

³⁴ "Respectable Hatemongers," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 6.

³⁵ "Respectable Hatemongers," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 6.

³⁶ "Respectable Hatemongers," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 6.

³⁷ Bob Sarti, "VLF Debunks Leader Cult," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 17, June 30, 1970.

³⁸ Sarti, "VLF Debunks Leader Cult," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 17.

³⁹ Bob Sarti, "Individuality Growing at Rock Events," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 23, July 31, 1970.

⁴⁰ Bob Sarti, "Creative Non-Violence Best tactic," *Vancouver Sun*, p. 15, April 26, 1972.

supported the counterculture or fully opposed it. However, many articles showcased how a significant amount of people took a more balanced approach to the matter.

Whether in support of or in opposition to the Hippies, the following articles took a more critical approach by acknowledging opposing views, reasonings, or justifications. One example of an article in opposition that followed this approach touched on Hippie dropouts returning to school. This article condemned the Hippie Movement as many of its members were educational dropouts.⁴¹ However, the author described how those dropouts could find redemption if they returned to school as they would be proving that they were willing to comply with societal expectations.⁴² This portrayed how some people were willing to accept the Hippies back into society as opposed to condemning them as lazy criminals for the rest of their lives. The next article offered up a stance of support for the counterculture, with some acknowledgement of the opposing view. This article, by Moira Farrow, described how many Hippies were not work-shy unlike how popular beliefs would hold.⁴³ Farrow, touched on the flip side of this argument by claiming how those against the Hippie Movement could view those claims as proof that they could still become “straight,” contributing members of society.⁴⁴ This presented just how complex a seemingly simple argument could become based on which perspective was viewing it. The last article that followed this pattern held both criticism and hope regarding Hippie parents. The article described how the off-spring of Hippies faced a danger as they ran the risk of growing up with the same backward ideals as their parents.⁴⁵ The writer offered a narrative of hope for other critics of the Hippies by claiming that those children could rebel against their parents and return to the life that their parents rejected.⁴⁶ This article continued to showcase the narrative that many were willing to accept former Hippies back into society if they were willing to take the steps to prove it. These articles prove that, like all things in the study of history, the counterculture movement was not simply black and white regarding those who supported or opposed it, but rather often complex and grey.

In conclusion, how did the *Vancouver Sun* portray the Hippies during height of the countercultural movement? The portrayals were a complex web of opposition, support, and all things in-between. Oppositional responses made up the majority of the articles touching on the Hippie Movement. However, those articles did not make up the overwhelming majority as might be expected. The number of articles in support were significant enough to create a strong voice

⁴¹ Bob Wilson, “Hippie Dropouts Return,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 15, October 17, 1967.

⁴² Wilson, “Hippie Dropouts Return,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 15.

⁴³ Moira Farrow, “Hippie Girl Goes Straight for a Day,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 35, October 24, 1968.

⁴⁴ Farrow, “Hippie Girl,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 35.

⁴⁵ Jurate Kazickas, “Diaper Hippie Off-Spring Part of the Psychedelic Scene,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 37, November 22, 1969.

⁴⁶ Kazickas, “Diaper Hippie Off-Spring,” *Vancouver Sun*, p. 37.

that was sympathetic to the counterculture movement in Vancouver. Furthermore, a surprising number of articles that relied on critical thinking were spread throughout the years of publications. Those articles held a general stance of critique or support but took the time to acknowledge the opposing view. Just like the countercultural movement itself, the conversations on the topic in the *Vancouver Sun* were vastly complicated, multi-faceted, and deeply insightful. These articles sparked a long-lasting debate between the differing views. This debate, over time, has turned into a conversation between many different aspects of society. It is up to contemporary scholars and researchers to ensure that this conversation remains strong as it is important regarding change, reflection, and critical analysis.

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Colonialism & Resistance through Sewing: Religion, Gender, and Education in Sierra Leone in the Nineteenth Century

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HIST 4499 – Gender in Africa
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Christianity was an integral part in the development of the British colony that would become known as Sierra Leone.¹ In the late 18th century / early 19th century, Sierra Leone was established on the premise of abolishing slavery by disseminating Christian values and teachings.² Given this, missionaries in Sierra Leone, especially those from the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS), used education as a way to instill Eurocentric gender values and expectations in young African girls.³ As evidenced by the curriculum in these schools and the attitudes shown by missionaries in Sierra Leone themselves,⁴ Christianity worked with the colonial project to create institutions that perpetuated the ideas of patriarchy and Eurocentric values being synonymous with “modernity” and “civility.”⁵ Thus, while boys went to school to learn about academic subjects, the girls went to school to learn about domestic skills, like sewing.⁶ The implementation and institutionalization of the Christian mission schools’ curriculum in Sierra Leone contrasted with traditional ideas of gender in West Africa, especially in terms of labour, the public sphere, and leadership positions, because West African women held positions of power and worked in the public sphere.⁷ Moreover, throughout the 19th century, Christian missionaries used education

¹ Sierra Leone would remain a colony up until 1961. See Ambe Njoh *et al.*, “Africa’s Triple Heritage, Land Commodification and Women’s Access to Land: Lessons from Cameroon, Kenya and Sierra Leone,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52, no. 6 (2017): 763-765.

² Hazel McFerson, “Women and Post-Conflict Society in Sierra Leone,” *Journal of International Women’s Studies* 13, no. 1 (2012): 46-47.

³ Silke Strickrodt, “African Girls’ Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s),” *History in Africa* 37 (2010): 192-193, 210.

⁴ Ernest Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years* (London, 1894), 33, 48-49, 71, 94, 187, 190.

⁵ Catherine Hall, “Making Colonial Subjects: Education in the Age of Empire,” *History of Education* 37, no. 6 (2008): 774, 787, 782.

⁶ Unless specified, “sewing” hereafter will refer to European-style sewing because it was this type of sewing that was a part of the colonial project; it will not refer to West-African-style sewing that had been done traditionally / prior to colonialism. See Fiona Leach, “Resisting Conformity: Anglican Mission Women and the Schooling of Girls in Early Nineteenth-Century West Africa,” *History of Education* 41, no. 2 (2012): 133, 136, 138, 141.

⁷ McFerson, “Women and Post-Conflict Society in Sierra Leone,” 49.

to ostracize African cultures by emphasizing difference and by claiming to “liberate” African girls from traditional cultural rituals.⁸ In addition to Christian missionaries using education as a way to undermine the authority of women in Sierra Leone and undermine traditional gender roles, English women were also part of the colonial education process in that they trained West African women in things like nursing and domestic chores.⁹ However, there were some girls who resisted the missionaries’ schooling and who refused to stay silent about their mistreatment.¹⁰ Even though the intention of mission schools was to relegate African girls and women in Sierra Leone to the domestic sphere,¹¹ some women and girls not only defied the hierarchies within the colonial education system,¹² but also used the knowledge learned from these schools to subvert and challenge the system.¹³ Most notably, the process of learning and resisting colonial gender roles happened through and because of sewing.¹⁴ Therefore, this paper will prove how sewing became an area of both enforcing colonial values and challenging them: while sewing reflected the larger concept of British femininity and had socioeconomic consequences, it also revealed how African girls and women in Sierra Leone both resisted colonialism and used what mission schools taught to their advantage.

Sewing as a Reflection of Colonial, Christian Femininity

Eurocentric gender roles and expectations were an important part of the colonial project throughout Africa, especially when it came to making African women and girls conform to these expectations.¹⁵ Specifically, in Sierra Leone in the 19th century, mission schools were institutions that indoctrinated young African girls into colonial, Christian womanhood,¹⁶ and one of the main way these institutions did so was through sewing.¹⁷ As evidenced by the archival presence of sewing in the CMS’s archives, sewing dominated the mission school education system’s curriculum.¹⁸ Since sewing was a mandatory part of African girls’ education in mission schools, it was an important vessel for conveying Christian and British notions of family and marriage,

⁸ Fiona Leach, “African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative,” *Gender and Education* 20, no. 4 (2008): 337-338.

⁹ Katrina Keefer, “The First Missionaries of the Church Missionary Society in Sierra Leone, 1804–1816: A Biographical Approach,” *History in Africa* 44 (2017): 209, 226.

¹⁰ Leach, “African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative,” 344.

¹¹ Job Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa* (Dayton, 1898), 101, 163.

¹² Inge Dornan, “Conversion and Curriculum: Nonconformist Missionaries and the British and Foreign School Society in the British West Indies, Africa and India, 1800–50,” *Studies in Church History* 55 (2019): 424-425.

¹³ Maeve Ryan, “‘It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women’: Colonial Governance and the ‘Disposal’ of Women and Girls in Early Nineteenth-Century Sierra Leone,” *Gender and History* 0, no. 0 (2021): 9.

¹⁴ Ryan, “‘It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women,’” 9.

¹⁵ Felicity Jenz, “Missionaries and Indigenous Education in the 19th-Century British Empire. Part II: Race, Class, and Gender,” *History Compass* 10, no. 4 (2012): 308-309.

¹⁶ Ryan, “‘It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women,’” 4-5, 9.

¹⁷ Leach, “Resisting Conformity,” 138-139.

¹⁸ Leach, “Resisting Conformity,” 136, 138-139, 140.

thus demonstrating how religion was integral in teaching African women and girls to accept being relegated to the private sphere:¹⁹ for instance, Reverend Job Smith Mills discussed how one of the main reasons African girls were taught domestic chores in school, including sewing, was because African girls were expected to become wives in monogamous marriages and "...establish Christian homes."²⁰ Additionally, the reinforcement of Christian femininity and values was also present through how textile samples from African girls in mission schools in Sierra Leone contained Bible verses.²¹ By teaching African girls to sew and instructing them to include Bible verses, female teachers at missionary schools, who were often wives of missionaries, used sewing as a form of transmitting religious and gendered values.²² Moreover, teaching African girls to emulate this femininity was further consolidated through how sewing was understood to embody "feminine virtues."²³ In particular, sewing was seen as representative of how Christian, British women were expected to be subservient and "modest."²⁴ In light of this, while the curriculum reflected the centrality of sewing (and domestic labour) to the ideals of Christian femininity and British womanhood, sewing was also viewed as integral to girls' curriculum in mission schools because of how Victorian-era values associated nudity with immorality; thus, femininity was seen in relation to morality.²⁵ The Victorian era in Britain was well-known for its emphasis on regulating women's bodies and for how British women during this era were expected to be sexually "pure";²⁶ these values were reflected in how missionaries saw the nudity of African people in Sierra Leone as indicative of them being unprincipled "heathens."²⁷ Hence, sewing was used to cover the bodies of African girls and women because having exposed bodies went against acting in a "moral" feminine conduct.²⁸ As a result, the act and product of sewing were both used to socialize African girls into British expectations of being modest.²⁹ Another aspect of covering the bodies of African women and girls also revolved around regulating their sexuality since the clothes African girls learned to sew in missionary schools were used to assimilate them into the Victorian-era's expectation of morality.³⁰ Ultimately, sewing was an

¹⁹ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 139.

²⁰ Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa*, 100-102.

²¹ Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 190-192.

²² Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 190-192, 198, 217, 219, 223, 229, 231.

²³ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140.

²⁴ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 339-341.

²⁵ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 342-344.

²⁶ Gretchen Braun, "'Untarnished Purity': Ethics, Agency, and the Victorian Fallen Woman," *Women's Studies* 44, no. 3 (2015): 352, 356, 358, 364.

²⁷ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 337, 341-342.

²⁸ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 337, 339, 341-342.

²⁹ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140.

³⁰ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 341-342.

important part of the mission school's agenda to assimilate African girls and women into colonial social roles because of its presence in education and because of its role in policing female bodies.³¹

The Role of Time and Labour in Supporting the Colonial Agenda

Because sewing was a mandatory part of the curriculum and because the missionary school system's curriculum made African girls spend so much time on sewing, there were significant socioeconomic repercussions that greatly affected African women and girls.³² Since the act of sewing itself was a tool used to control the behaviour of African girls and was representative of how women were expected to dedicate all of their time to domestic labour and to their families,³³ missionary schools used the act of sewing to make African girls spend their time developing Christian values and to prevent them from engaging in "immoral" activities.³⁴ Presented under the guise of being diligent, a significant amount of the time African girls spent in missionary schools was dedicated to sewing: the time spent on sewing severely hindered their academic growth and learning experiences because while African boys could spend the entire time they were in missionary schools focusing on reading and writing, African girls had less time to focus on their studies due to the fact that they had to sew for hours.³⁵ In CMS schools, it was recorded that African girls spent ten hours, over the course of five days, sewing in missionary schools as part of their curriculum.³⁶ Using this unequal education system, mission schools intentionally made African girls spend much of their time sewing because it prevented them from learning how to be socioeconomically independent.³⁷ Teaching African girls to be socioeconomically dependent on a male provider by only teaching them sewing and other domestic chores perpetuated Victorian-era patriarchy because these skills would be of little to no help to African girls outside of the private sphere, thus excluding African women and girls from the public sphere.³⁸ Victorian-era values believed that women were supposed to be reliant on a male breadwinner;³⁹ in terms of assimilation, the socioeconomic consequences of preventing African girls from being financially independent forced them to adopt colonial gender roles and to abandon traditional African gender roles that saw African women as integral to the economy.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the time African girls spent on sewing in mission schools was exploited by colonial

³¹ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140.

³² Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 343-344.

³³ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140, 149.

³⁴ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5.

³⁵ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 140.

³⁶ Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 198.

³⁷ Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa*, 101-102.

³⁸ Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa*, 100-102.

³⁹ Wally Secombe, "Patriarchy Stabilized: The Construction of the Male Breadwinner Wage Norm in Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Social History* 11, no. 1 (1986): 53-55, 62, 65.

⁴⁰ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 344.

authorities who saw African girls' labour as a source of clothing production for Sierra Leone.⁴¹ Since sewing was a large part of the curriculum at missionary schools, African girls produced clothing and textiles in large quantities, and the missionary schools used this opportunity to not only further exacerbate the unequal education between African boys and girls,⁴² but to also further exacerbate the unequal socioeconomic opportunities between them.⁴³ Additionally, producing and distributing this clothing also had another agenda in that this clothing reflected a style that was considered acceptable to Christianity,⁴⁴ meaning that the outcome of African girls' sewing was used to enhance the colonial agenda.⁴⁵ Clothing, in general, was a vital part of the colonial project, and to the point that the clothes African school boys and school girls wore to church were provided by the colonial government.⁴⁶ Thus, African girls experienced multifaceted discrimination from the missionary school system through how the system prevented them from having socioeconomic independence,⁴⁷ and through how the time they were supposed to spend on learning ended up being used to perpetuate colonial, Christian femininity as well as to produce clothing for Sierra Leone.⁴⁸

Resisting Colonialism Through Sewing

Even though these missionary schools used sewing as a way to make African girls adopt colonial, Christian values, and forced African girls and women to conform to colonial, Christian gender roles, there were cases of African women and girls challenging and defying colonial systems of power that aimed to oppress them.⁴⁹ Firstly, these girls and women used the sewing skills they learned to gain economic independence.⁵⁰ In pre-colonial West Africa, sewing already existed but it was a different style from European sewing.⁵¹ Equipped with the knowledge gained about European-style sewing from missionary schools, African women and girls were able to make money from their sewing skills.⁵² The fact that African women and girls were able to make income and develop some socioeconomic independence went against the whole missionary education system's whole purpose of teaching African girls sewing because the missionary schools taught African girls European-style sewing for the sake of keeping African girls in the private sphere.⁵³

⁴¹ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5.

⁴² Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 140.

⁴³ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5.

⁴⁴ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 341-342.

⁴⁵ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5.

⁴⁶ Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, 215

⁴⁷ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 140.

⁴⁸ Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 191, 199-200.

⁴⁹ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 140, 142, 148, 150-151.

⁵⁰ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9.

⁵¹ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138.

⁵² Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9.

⁵³ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9-10.

Subverting this expectation by making money in the public sphere from sewing proved how African girls and women both resisted and subverted colonialism.⁵⁴ In contrast to how African girls and women resisted colonialism by using sewing to gain socioeconomic independence, a different example of how African girls resisted colonialism was by refusing to sew.⁵⁵ While the presence of sewing in the curriculum demonstrated how integral sewing was in perpetuating British, colonial femininity,⁵⁶ another thing that demonstrated sewing's importance in the colonial project was how it was enforced.⁵⁷ Given that African girls were made to spend so much time sewing, there were cases of resistance in school documents and letters written by the African girls at these schools.⁵⁸ Contextualized within Reverend E. G. Ingham's reports of how one missionary in particular would "...[send] home all [the] dirty and broken clothes to be mended at the sewing school,"⁵⁹ and within how some missionaries claimed to give African girls more sewing tasks in order to provide them with more sewing and mending lessons, it was evident that some of the reasons behind African girls running away from schools and not going to classes were directly connected to sewing.⁶⁰ African girls were expected to adopt colonial and Christian values without question, and failing to do so led to them being punished and mistreated by missionaries' wives.⁶¹ However, as seen by the fact that some African girls wrote letters in protest of their mistreatment and by the fact that some African girls demonstrated their refusal to sew by not showing up altogether, African girls in missionary schools actively resisted colonialism and did not accept the fact that these schools were denying them control over their own lives.⁶² Thus, African women and girls defied colonialism's and missionaries' expectations of African and female subservience by both profiting off of sewing and refusing to sew.⁶³

Missionary schools in Sierra Leone throughout the 19th century were important institutions in pushing the colonial agenda and its gendered values.⁶⁴ Through sewing, and other related activities such as mending, the missionary school education system denied African girls a formal education.⁶⁵ As the embodiment of British "feminine virtues,"⁶⁶ sewing was a large part of the curriculum for African girls in CMS schools because these schools believed that African girls and

⁵⁴ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9-10.

⁵⁵ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 150-151.

⁵⁶ Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 190-191, 198-199.

⁵⁷ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 140, 142, 150.

⁵⁸ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 150-152.

⁵⁹ Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, 250-251.

⁶⁰ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 139-140, 150.

⁶¹ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 343-345.

⁶² Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 140, 150-152.

⁶³ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9.

⁶⁴ Hall, "Making Colonial Subjects," 774, 777-779, 787.

⁶⁵ Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 191, 198.

⁶⁶ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140.

women, as well as African people in general, needed to be saved from their immorality.⁶⁷ Specifically, sewing was used as a form of social control to teach African girls how to do domestic chores and to regulate what their bodies should look like.⁶⁸ Moreover, the time that African girls were forced to spend on sewing in missionary schools was done so intentionally to give them less time to learn skills that would help them gain financial independence;⁶⁹ the CMS schools also used sewing in the curriculum to exploit the labour of African girls.⁷⁰ Finally, despite the missionary school system being designed as a way to enforce colonial, Christian patriarchy that confined women to the domestic sphere,⁷¹ African women and girls undermined the system by using what was meant to oppress them as something that could benefit them and by also refusing to do it.⁷² The fact that African women and girls generated income from a task that perpetuated the ideal of femininity that prevented women from being financially independent,⁷³ and the fact that some African girls defied the hierarchy within missionary schools by resisting the curriculum (especially in terms of sewing), demonstrated that African women and girls in Sierra Leone in the 19th century were not passive, silent historical objects:⁷⁴ they were historical actors that destabilized the CMS education system and colonial expectations through their resistance and ingenuity.⁷⁵ Therefore, between conforming to the colonial, Christian expectations and defying them, sewing served as a medium for conflicting beliefs and values.⁷⁶ Beyond the 19th century, the legacy of these colonial attitudes that were perpetuated through sewing and directed towards African women and girls persisted, as seen by how women's financial independence in Sierra Leone was looked down upon,⁷⁷ and as seen by how the fight for gender equality continues to be an ongoing endeavour.⁷⁸ Sewing was considered an everyday activity for African girls in CMS schools,⁷⁹ but it was through the frequency of this task and its implications that normalized attitudes that denied women opportunities in the public sphere and attitudes that contributed to gender inequality in Sierra Leone.⁸⁰ CMS schools used sewing to control the lives of African girls

⁶⁷ Hall, "Making Colonial Subjects," 781

⁶⁸ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140.

⁶⁹ Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa*, 101-102.

⁷⁰ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5.

⁷¹ Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa*, 101, 163.

⁷² Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9.

⁷³ Ryan, "It Was Necessary to Do Something with Those Women," 5, 9.

⁷⁴ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 150-153.

⁷⁵ Leach, "African Girls, Nineteenth-Century Mission Education and the Patriarchal Imperative," 344-345.

⁷⁶ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-139, 150-151, 153.

⁷⁷ Richard Fanthorpe, "Neither Citizen nor Subject? 'Lumpen' Agency and the Legacy of Native Administration in Sierra Leone," *African Affairs* 100, no. 400 (2001): 384.

⁷⁸ Richard Maclure and Myriam Denov, "Reconstruction Versus Transformation: Post-War Education and the Struggle for Gender Equity in Sierra Leone," *International Journal of Educational Development* 29, no. 6 (2009): 613-614, 617-618.

⁷⁹ Strickrodt, "African Girls' Samplers from Mission Schools in Sierra Leone (1820s to 1840s)," 198.

⁸⁰ Mills, *Mission Work in Sierra Leone, West Africa*, 100-102.

and make them fit into the image of British femininity,⁸¹ but it was clear that the negative sociocultural and economic impacts of colonialism and the CMS education system were not restricted to the 19th century.⁸² However, the perseverance of African girls and women in Sierra Leone was also not restricted to the 19th century,⁸³ and sewing continued to be a vessel of African girls' and women's resistance against systems that aimed to silence and ignore them.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Leach, "Resisting Conformity," 138-140.

⁸² Caroline Bledsoe, "The Cultural Transformation of Western Education in Sierra Leone," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 62, no. 2 (1992): 182-183, 185-188, 201.

⁸³ Hussainatu Abdullah, Aisha Ibrahim and Jamesina King, "Women's Voices, Work and Bodily Integrity in Pre-Conflict, Conflict and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Processes in Sierra Leone," *IDS Bulletin* 41, no. 2 (2010): 38, 42, 44.

⁸⁴ Masego Madzwamuse, "How The Sewing Machine Gave Power — And Fashion Cred — To African Women," <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/05/13/979994551/how-the-sewing-machine-gave-power-and-fashion-cred-to-african-women>, accessed April 13, 2022.

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Coast News and Homosexuality

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British Columbia had dedicated groups of gay activists as early as 1964.¹ At the time, homosexuality was still subject to harsh penalties under the Criminal Code, the Canadian government was highly fearful of connections between communism and homosexuality, and the public believed that homosexuality was an immoral offence. Throughout the following three decades, Canada would go through a public re-evaluation on its beliefs surrounding the states' right to control certain types of morality, and the caricature of a homosexual male. This essay examines how one local newspaper, *Coast News*, covered homosexual individuals throughout these three decades. The newspaper took for granted the public moral beliefs of its readership, as well as the scientific knowledge classifying homosexuality as a mental disorder. Despite massive political changes occurring federally regarding homosexuality, the paper is more concerned on homosexuality's effect on the new federal Divorce Act. Virtually no coverage is given to activism taking place at the time. What is given coverage, however, is a plethora of movies, television shows, and novels exploring homosexual characters. These reviews provide some insight into the changing attitudes around homosexuals at the time, as the characters are given increasingly intricate narratives. Homosexuals are embraced as suffering victims worthy of compassion as the HIV crisis begins to affect the heterosexual community.

Homosexuality was classified by many as primarily a moral failing. The RCMP went as far as to classify it "...as a character weakness."² Many members of parliament, in opposition to Bill C-150 that attempted to decriminalize homosexuality, opposed it on the basis of "...moral, religious...reasons, decrying the decline of society and decency that would ensue."³ This is

¹ Manon Tremblay, *Queer Mobilizations: Social Movement Activism and Canadian Public Policy*. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 143.

² Gary Kinsman and Patrizia Gentile, *The Canadian War on Queers: National Security as Sexual Regulation*. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2010), 67.

³ Tom Hooper, "Queering '69: The Recriminalization of Homosexuality in Canada," *Canadian Historical Review*

despite other MPs' apathetic response that the bill "...does not even legalize this kind of conduct."⁴ Even after the passing of the criminal code amendment, the justification was based on a belief that "...sexual immorality should *not* be punished criminally."⁵ The morality of homosexuality was never a part of the debate. This view of homosexuality took shape in the public's imaginations often as an immoral, villainous caricature. Older, predatory, gay men preying on innocent boys became the stereotypical image of the homosexual community. Issues of *Coast News* throughout the 1960s and 1970s reinforce this image to its readership. An article covering MLA Dave Barrett's recommendations regarding prison reform to protect young men from homosexuals, and other convicts. The article specifically warns that in the current prison system, "[t]he younger boys are a prey for the more worldly older homosexuals." Youths are in particular danger because "[b]roken, sick men exert a most painfully ill influence on young minds that are fertile ground for exploitation."⁶ By emphasizing that the minds of youth are in danger, (as opposed to focusing on potential sexual or physical abuse,) the article is directly concerned with the spread of homosexual behaviour through infected minds, or taught behaviour. It portrays homosexual men as evil people who will instruct, and then get other men dependent on homosexual behaviour in a manner similar to drugs. These men are directly grouped with drug pushers in the article.

Fictionalized stories of evil gay men continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. John Burnside's weekly opinion column, "Musings," uses the commonly understood trope to criticize a teacher he once had, whom he found to be creepy – the writing "...there was a homosexual professor of French with a penchant for individual interviews in his office that most of the young men tried to avoid."⁷ A later issue of the newspaper recommends *Forbidden Colours*, a novel with a plot that relies on the homosexual character's exploitation.⁸ The character's "moral weakness" costs him. Expanding outside of book reviews and personal columns, the newspaper reinforced the image of a prowling homosexual through publicizing weekly segments of a fictional story. The March 1, 1982, copy of the paper published the chapter "The Counting House Part II," in which the protagonist describes changing clothes in prison: "The trusty who receives the clothes is a homosexual. I know by the sight and reputation from scruffier Granville Street bars. I sense his eyes on me as I strip and all the jail horror stories I've ever heard, shudder through my mind."⁹

100, nr. 2 (2019): 261. doi:10.3138/chr.2018-0082-4. C-150 (originally C-195) was an omnibus bill that introduced a broad range of criminal law amendments, including changes to the laws on reproductive rights, homosexuality, and gun laws. Ed.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁵ Stuart Chambers, "Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Bill C-150: A Rational Approach to Homosexual Acts, 1968– 69", *Journal of Homosexuality*, 57, 2 (2010): 251. DOI: [10.1080/00918360903489085](https://doi.org/10.1080/00918360903489085). 251.

⁶ "In the Legislature," *Coast News*, p.8, 31 March 1966.

⁷ John Burnside, "Musings," *Coast News*, p.2, 26 November 1978.

⁸ John Moore, "Book Review: Avoiding reading ruts," *Coast News*, p.5, 23 January 1979.

⁹ "The Counting House Part II," *Coast News*, p.6, 1 March 1982.

The later 1980s moved past these fictionalized anecdotes emphasising the evils of homosexuality, to instead educating people to turn away from the lifestyle. Green Thumb theatre, a group creating productions that discussed societal ails, had been asked by schools to create a play that discussed aids. The newspaper was promoting their work.¹⁰ Despite being asked specifically to create a play discussing an event that was believed to have been a result of homosexual behaviour, the school board rejected the concept of a play that included a homosexual father.¹¹ Canada for Christ Crusade took a more direct approach in their attempt to persuade people to reject a variety of sexually immoral acts. Also working to combat aids, the organization took out an advertisement arguing that “[t]he answer to Aids and unwanted pregnancies isn’t condoms or abortions...homosexuality, [and] lesbianism are deadly sins leading to eternal torment in hellfire.”¹² The unwavering belief that homosexuality was an immoral act continued to be present from the 1960s throughout the 1980s, heavily influencing how organizations attempted to end the AIDS epidemic.

While homosexuality was being aggressively pursued as immorality that needed to be punished, it was simultaneously being diagnosed as a psychiatric disorder that needed to be treated. The 1969 amendment to the criminal code provided a legislative opportunity to shift “...homosexuality from a legal-criminal paradigm to a medical-scientific one.”¹³ Canadian state was able to use the psychological classification of homosexuality to use popularized scientific theorizes to discriminate against homosexuals. A simple semantic change, “character trait” as opposed to “character weakness” was all the state needed to declare that homosexuals are more likely to be blackmailed or dishonest, and therefore a danger to national security.¹⁴ Personal testimonies from former service members discuss how psychiatrists were used to diagnose individuals as homosexuals, and then force them to leave their security job. In one individual’s case, it was the psychiatrist at her military hospital who named her sexuality for her, allowing her to embrace her identity in a way she had never been able to before.¹⁵ Unfortunately, most psychiatry was used to identify and exploit suspected homosexuals. The fruit machine, an attempt by the RCMP to “...devise a or a battery of psychological tests that could scientifically detect homosexuals...” was one such attempt to use psychology to target homosexuals.¹⁶

¹⁰ Leslie MacFarlane, “Writers’ Festival: Green Thumb’s Foon to Speak,” *Coast News*, p.11, 14 July 1996.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² “Blanket Classified Advertising,” *Coast News*, p.18, 14 March 1988.

¹³ Hooper, “Queering ‘69,” 267.

¹⁴ Kinsman and Gentile, *The Canadian War on Queers*, 310.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 168.

Articles in *Coast News* reflect the belief that homosexuality was an illness as well as immoral. One details how psychiatrists, enthralled with the apparent success their new shock therapy on treating obesity, claim that the treatment can also be used to treat homosexuality.¹⁷ The article outlines how effective the treatment has been, reporting that “[a]fter the sixth session with those food slides Hector’s obese patients are so well trained that they don’t even need shock to feel panic at the sight of food.”¹⁸ These articles appeared prior to 1973, when the American Psychiatric Association removing homosexuality from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.¹⁹ There is no *Coast News* article in the database published after that date arguing that homosexuality is a mental disorder, though it continues to publish articles condemn it on moral, and political grounds.

Canadian security forces were paranoid about homosexuals in the security positions falling prey to communist, (specifically KGB,) blackmail. In the 1960s, RCMP officers provided security training that emphasized the danger of homosexuals as “...high security risks...” and especially vulnerable to blackmail.²⁰ Post the 1969 Criminal Code reform, Canadian security forces were still highly suspicious of homosexuals, and continued to blackmail and end the careers of its homosexual members.²¹ This campaign against members continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s.²² This concern does not appear to have been a main public concern. Of all the *Coast News* newspapers available on the database, only one article links the Soviet Union, blackmail, and homosexuality. John Burnside quickly references British intelligence as “...an intelligence service riddled with homosexuals being blackmailed into the service of the Soviet Union...”²³ His article indicates that the concept of homosexuals in the government services being blackmailed was one in public discourse, although it fails to indicate whether he believed the same was occurring in Canada’s branches.

As political changes affecting the legal status of homosexuality occurred, the paper referenced these changes usually as a by-product of a larger issue. “A Backlash in Quebec” details how then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau²⁴ had been losing political support in Quebec. The proposed decriminalization of abortion and homosexuality “...is undoubtedly a factor of decline of his

¹⁷ Shocks check obesity,” *Coast News*, p.3, 11 November 1988.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Stuart Chambers, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Bill C-150: A Rational Approach to Homosexual Acts, 1968–69”, *Journal of Homosexuality* 57, no. 2 (2010): 250. DOI: [10.1080/00918360903489085](https://doi.org/10.1080/00918360903489085).

²⁰ Kinsman & Gentile, *The Canadian War on Queers*, 121, 139.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 221.

²² *Ibid.*, 336.

²³ John Burnside, “Musings,” *Coast News*, p.2, 31 March 1981.

²⁴ When Trudeau was Minister of Justice, he had introduced bill C-195, the progenitor of C-150. Ed. As Prime Minister he was a vocal supporter of the passage of C-150.

popularity.”²⁵ One letter of the editor echoed Quebec’s displeasure with the new bill. The author’s main objection is to the provision of the bill that would require Canadians to register all firearms. He argues that this, as well as “...liberalizing sections on abortion and homosexuality” should cause Canadians to be concerned that they are beginning to embark on the political road to communism.²⁶ The Divorce Act caused a furious number of letters to newspapers, as readers sought to understand the new regulations surrounding divorce. Homosexual acts are one of the grounds on which one can seek a divorce.²⁷ In a follow-up segment answering more questions about the Act, the undesirable nature of the homosexual accusation is emphasized: “If however the petitioner was a woman and the grounds were the commission of a homosexual offence the man might very well wish to clear his name of such an odious allegation, if it was untrue.”²⁸ It was well understood that the issue was more moral than legal, and the articles strongly reflect that sentiment.

The majority of references to homosexuals occur starting in 1974. These surround a seemingly explosive obsession with homosexuals and homosexual behaviour in films, television, and books. A film review published in 1974 describes the characters as “...whores, freaks and lesbians...” and the film altogether as a “...most enjoyable film.”²⁹ A book review, after detailing shocking hetero-and-homosexual sex scenes, ramped drug use, and horrific violence, the reviewer states: “So, really, the book has it all: perverted sex, violence, money and used cars. A lot of people will buy this book, read it, and fail to be shocked.”³⁰ The various mediums and storylines exploring homosexual characters begin to expand beyond a creepy, perverse man throughout the following decades. Stories begin to be used to explore societal rules, (and people more generally,) through mediums that can be justified as entertainment. One book review praises a novel with homosexual orgies for its exploration of gender roles.³¹ Meanwhile, an ongoing fictional story in the newspaper has a gruff character who has “...no love for queers...” feel sympathy for the homosexual victims of a crime.³² There’s even a movie review detailing how the plot revolves on how a fictional group of gay men help in a murder investigation.³³ Media is used to explore fantasies involving gay and lesbian people, as the public grapples with the political and societal changes making homosexuality more visible.

²⁵ “A Backlash in Quebec,” *Coast News*, p.7, 20 June 1968.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ “Point of Law,” *Coast News*, p.2, 8 August 1968.

²⁸ “Point of Law,” *Coast News*, p.9, 28 October 1970.

²⁹ Allan Crane, “Smiles Film Gives Delight,” *Coast News*, p.12, 18 December 1974.

³⁰ John Faustmann, “Books,” *Coast News*, p.5, 24 January 1978.

³¹ John Moore, “Book Review: Golding Compelling,” *Coast News*, p.5, 3 April 1979.

³² “The Counting House Conclusion,” *Coast News*, p.6, 19 April 1982.

³³ “At the Twilight,” *Coast News*, p.6, 14 June 1982.

HIV and AIDS reflect a change in media portrayals, as the disease forced the public to re-examine its beliefs about gays and lesbians and approach the issue of homosexuality differently. The underlying cause of this change of heart had more to do with the public's concern for its own protection, as the disease spread. As previously mentioned, schools began to request educational plays addressing controversial topics, including HIV.³⁴ "World Aids Day Marked" provided readers with a summary of the disease, and emphasized number of people who had the illness in B.C.³⁵ "Most important, the face of AIDS was changing. Once only found in homosexual men, the disease is spreading...to heterosexual men and women."³⁶ This article reflects the alarm that has caused the change in approach towards HIV. As the 1980s began, "[n]ews stories gave audiences views into the lives of gay men that were previously hidden, and outpouring of sympathy, as well as charity, grew steadily..."³⁷³⁵ The response pivoted from sympathy to panic as it became clear that aids were a growing problem in the heterosexual, as well as the homosexual community.

Articles in the years following empathized with the readers' concern over interacting with homosexuals, whilst humanizing victims of aids. The coverage of an author's experience engaging with homosexuals, including a man living with HIV. She "...admits she was initially apprehensive about getting too closely involved with AIDS victims. She would gradually lose this fear as her research progressed...Through her association with Jim and his friends, [the author] came to realize that there was a serious need for a proper facility for AIDS patients."³⁸ The 1990s continue to produce articles that sought to educate readers on the difficulties of living with HIV. One reporter writes about the experience of getting tested for HIV, and the stressful, agitating waiting process.³⁹ On the same page, there are published interviews with men currently living with HIV.⁴⁰ To appeal to the literary audience, there's a Shakespeare studied offered, in which his plays are being used to study minority members of society, including homosexuals.⁴¹ There was a deliberate attempt from the late 1980s to the 1990s to influence readers to have compassion for gay men suffering from HIV.

³⁴ McFarlane, "Writers' Festival," 11.

³⁵ "World Aids Day Marked," *Coast News*, p.2, 28 November 1988.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Robert Andersen and Tina Fetner, "Cohort Differences in Tolerance of Homosexuality: Attitudinal Change in Canada and the United States, 1981-2000." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 72, no. 2 (2008):325.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25167627>.

³⁸ Peter Trower, "Festival Winds Up with Big Guns," *Coast News*, 21 August 1989. 12.

³⁹ Don Anderson, "Reporter Experiences the Fear of HIV Test Results," *Coast News*, p.2, 4 April 1994.

⁴⁰ "HIV Victim Accepts Reality of Death," *Coast News*, p.2, 4 April 1994.

⁴¹ "Bard Explored in Rockwood Course," *Coast News*, p.14, 5 October 1992.

The reason for the compassion is in part due to alarmist fears that the disease would rip through the heterosexual population. Because of this fear, statistics and pleas are used to convince readers that action needs to be taken in regard to this issue. An article warned readers of how little teenagers know about HIV, how often they have sex, and how young. The article calls for action to be taken, to prevent the spread of HIV.⁴² "AIDS testing shows increases" warns that HIV is spreading and breaks down the number of positive cases into several categories; homosexuals, bisexual men, drug users, hemophiliacs, and heterosexuals.⁴³ The article is a warning from the medical community that the disease is not just amongst homosexual men. The front page story of another issue of *Coast News* reports that HIV "...now affects two million people worldwide."⁴⁴ One doctor interviewed stresses that the disease "...does not discriminate..."; another states that "'Heterosexuals are slower to respond because they think it can't happen to them...We're concerned about teenagers.'"⁴⁵ It's clear that there were selfish motives that jumpstarted the empathetic turn towards people with HIV.

The seemingly redemptive arc embracing homosexuals as people occurs despite limited coverage of gay and lesbian rights activism. Only one *Coast News* article available outright covered a women's activist event,⁴⁶ whilst another angrily berated a reporter for lumping together lesbian rights and women's issues.⁴⁷ Regardless, homosexuals as reported in *Coast News* from the 1960s to the 1990s are elevated from immoral, heinous perverts to tragic victims of an incurable disease. This slight elevation comes largely through a public obsession with homosexuality that is permitted to be explored through books, television, and film. There the caricature of a homosexual individual is broadened to include more human qualities, such as aiding in a murder case, or exploring social gender constructs. These explorations through film followed activism that occurred in British Columbia in the 1960s and 1970s, which resulted in gay people becoming more visible.⁴⁸ Whether coverage of activism was intentionally censored, or whether editors believed that the public would not care, the societal change in attitude toward homosexuality is apparent in its coverage of entertainment, and later, HIV.

⁴² George Cooper, "AIDS and the Young," *Coast News*, 15 January 1990. 5.

⁴³ "AIDS testing shows increase," *Coast News*, p.20, 2 November 1992.

⁴⁴ "Co-ordinated Effort Advocated to Combat AIDS Crisis," *Coast News*, p.1, 30 November 1992.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ "Sunshine sketches," *Coast News*, p.8, 30 March 1976.

⁴⁷ Sharon Craig, "Wrong Rally," *Coast News*, p.2, 13 April 1976.

⁴⁸ Tremblay, *Queer Mobilizations*, 143.

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Objective Historical Laws Meet Subjective Analysis: Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and the Essence of Sino-Marxism

Nolan Jensen – March 2022

HIST 3350 – China in the Twentieth Century: Reforms & Revolutions

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Mao Zedong, former Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), commented, in 1949, that it was only through "... the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism."¹ Soviet Russia's influence on the formation of the CCP was evident; in many regards, the former acted as a blueprint for the latter to follow. One of the founders of Chinese Communism, Li Dazhao, had converted to Marxism, with its deterministic, objective historical laws, after the successful Bolshevik overthrow of Alexander Kerensky's Provisional Government in 1917.² However, for some of Li's future comrades, it was not until disillusionment with the West grew, following the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, that they began to look at Marxism for answers. Students took to Beijing's streets on May 4, 1919, and protested the Versailles settlement that had awarded Shandong province to Japan.³ After this momentous occasion, to become known as the May Fourth Movement,⁴ intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu, feeling betrayed by Western liberalism and its promise of self-determination, came to find solace in Marxist ideology and Russia's relative benevolence.⁵ However, no longstanding history of Social Democracy existed, nor were any

¹ Ishikawa Yoshihito, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*, trans. by Joshua A. Fogel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 7.

² During the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Li corresponded the victory in St. Petersburg with future successes to come in China: "... the success of this revolution in Russia cannot avoid influencing the next revolution in China." For more, see Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (New York: Harvard University Press, 1977), 58.

³ Michael Dillon, *China: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 177.

⁴ Though Marxism would infiltrate academic circles in China in the coming years, the May Fourth Movement, above all else, had a distinctly nationalist character. Before the Treaty of Versailles settlement, the Shantung province was in Germany's possession; this partitioning of China's homeland spurred strong patriotic sentiments amongst the nation's young and educated. For more, see Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 99.

⁵ The Karakhan Manifesto of 1919, renouncing gains made by Russia's former Tsarist regime, was praised by China as an act of goodwill. In comparison with China's experience with foreign interventionism and expansionism of the last century, Russia's act was not insignificant. The Manifesto detailed how Russia wanted to establish a "... firm and lasting peace." How this was to be implemented was through the "... renunciation of any seizure of foreign territory ..." that was claimed under Tsarism. For more, see Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953,) 270.

academic circles present that debated the shape or form Marxism would take in China before the CCP's formation in 1921.⁶ Had Chinese revolutionaries accepted the doctrine of Marxism, even though its theory was largely incongruent with China's situation? Had they accepted the Leninist model of Party centralization? Or had something different arisen in China in the 1920s that, though borrowed from pre-existing Marxist ideologies, presented a new way to approach Communism? While recognizing ideological similarities with its European counterparts and acknowledging the role of Japan in the promotion of Marxism amongst Chinese intellectuals, this paper will ultimately argue that a distinct interpretation of Marxist theory appeared in China in the 1920s. Early Sino-Marxist theoreticians, such as Li Dazhao, underscored the Populist strands of Marx's early philosophical writings. And if Marx's later deterministic formulations were incongruent with China's existing conditions, Li either repudiated or altered them as needed. Thus, the ideological framework was provided for future revolutionaries to remould Marxian objective historical laws through subjective analysis, a core element of what was to become known as Maoism or "... Mao Zedong Thought."⁷

This paper will analyze the distinctiveness of Sino-Marxism; the debates amongst its founders on theoretical issues and how they corresponded with existing conditions; the influence of foreign forces in the formation of the CCP; and the legacy the Party left for future revolutionaries during China's chaotic decade of the 1920s. The following two paragraphs will illustrate parallels between Lu Xun and Jin Xinyi's conversation as seen in the former's short story, *Diary of a Madman*, and Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu's debate on direct political action and the question of traditionalism and nationalism in 1915. Following Li and Chen's debate, an analysis will be provided on Karl Marx's 1853 article, "Revolution in China and Europe,"⁸ which looked at China's revolutionary potentialities amid the Taiping Rebellion. How Li interpreted this text justified his position on China's historic mission in the pending international revolution. It also served to justify the contortion of objective laws to match the actuality of the CCP's situation. Li's pre-Marxian worldview will be critically analyzed, which survived once Li adopted Marxism with its rigid, deterministic historical laws. The Populist strand of Sino-Marxism, so present in Li's ideological underpinnings, was also espoused by Mao Zedong in subsequent decades.

Jin Xinyi and Lu Xun's Conversation in "Diary of a Madman"

As debates raged on in Russia surrounding the proper course of action in promoting social revolution in the build-up to October 1917, Chinese intellectuals reeled from the failures of its own 1911 revolution. Writers such as Lu Xun encapsulated feelings of sorrow and isolation that

⁶ Dillon, *China: A Modern History*, 179.

⁷ Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 450.

⁸ Maurice Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," *The China Quarterly*, no. 16 (1963): 100, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651575>.

must have permeated the Chinese academic circles of the period. When Jin Xinyi approached Lu to write in the radical publication *New Youth*, the latter's response was a sombre reflection on the state of Chinese consciousness.⁹ Why should Lu awaken the masses, alert them of their ignorance, disrupt the transition " ... from a deep slumber into oblivion ..." ¹⁰ and make them aware of their plight? Jin replied that since some were awakened, " ... you can't say they would have absolutely no hope of finding some way to break out." ¹¹ Lu found this evaluation adequate and conceded. After all, dismissing hope was out of Lu's jurisdiction, for such belonged to the future. The debate between Lu Xun and his friend Jin Xinyi as expressed in the short story *Diary of a Madman* was markedly similar to the 1915 disputes between the two eventual founders of the CCP, Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu.

Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu's Pre-Marxian Worldviews and Conversion to Marxism

Chen, later to become the first General Secretary of the CCP, had championed the innate goodness of liberal democracy and the progressive nature of Western science before converting to Marxism in 1919.¹² Chen condemned China's infatuation with traditionalism, which had caused stagnation, apathy, and took on a parochial patriotic character that acted as a barrier to consciousness.¹³ Despite Chen's disenchantment with China's situation, the future Marxist was opposed to direct political action because such was viewed as redundant. Until Chinese intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats studied, learned, and repudiated foolish nationalistic sentiments, which blinded them from rational analysis, political efforts were fruitless.¹⁴ The autocrat Yuan Shikai hijacked China's revolutionary period, and following his death in 1916, the nation descended into a chaotic period of warlordism.¹⁵ Direct political intervention would have naturally appeared superfluous for many intellectuals amidst a period of flux and repression. Historian of China Maurice Meisner argued that, for Chen, to withdraw from politics until " ... political conditions offered real opportunities ..." ¹⁶ was the only solution. Even after subscribing to Marxist objectivism, Li refused to be relegated to the sidelines until the material conditions ripened. Li saw revolutionary utility in the present; his thoughts aligned with Lu's epiphany in *Diary of a Madman* that the future could be moulded through the actions of today. Or, whereas Chen aligned Confucianism with

⁹ Lu Xun, *Diary of a Madman and Other Stories*, trans. William A. Lyell (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 26.

¹⁰ Lu Xun, *Diary of a Madman and Other Stories*, 27.

¹¹ Lu Xun, *Diary of a Madman and Other Stories*, 27.

¹² Chih Yu-ju, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: His Career and Political Ideas," in *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China*, ed. Chun-tu Hsueh (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971,) 348. Chen commented that "Republicanism in politics and science in academics are the two priceless treasures of modern civilization."

¹³ Maurice Meisner, "Li Ta-chao and the Intellectual Prerequisites for the Maoist Strategy of Revolution," in *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China*, ed. Chun-tu Hsueh (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971,) 368.

¹⁴ Meisner, "Li Ta-chao and the Intellectual Prerequisites for the Maoist Strategy of Revolution," 368.

¹⁵ Dillon, *China: A Modern History*, 158.

¹⁶ Meisner, "Li Ta-chao and the Intellectual Prerequisites for the Maoist Strategy of Revolution," 368.

the ills of contemporary China, Li embraced the Confucian tradition that urged scholars to take "... an active part in public affairs" ¹⁷ Chen, whose views aligned with Lenin's on the topic, rejected chauvinism. Even after converting to Marxism with its universalistic theories, Li believed that Chinese statehood would remain distinct and intact. ¹⁸ As late as 1917, Chen rejected the adoption of Marxism in China due to the material conditions that disallowed its application; ironically, an agreed-upon point by any orthodox Marxist. However, in the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Chen adopted Marxism and placed his faith in its scientific laws while renouncing his earlier beliefs in Western liberal democracy. ¹⁹ Chinese historian Timothy Cheek noted that, amid China's tumultuous milieu in the post-Manchu period, liberalism had fallen victim to the "... historical moment." ²⁰ After the awarding of Shandong province to Japan and the outrage that followed the Treaty of Versailles settlement, China lost one of its strongest proponents of liberalism in Chen Duxiu.

In an autobiographical memoir, Mao Zedong, perhaps surprisingly, wrote that former General Secretary Chen Duxiu influenced him "... more than anymore else." ²¹ However, Mao was never afraid of challenging orthodoxy. In this regard, he was more of a student of Li Dazhao. Chen would be made a pariah following the failures of the first united-front policy and CCP's break with the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1927. ²² The KMT ushered in an area of ruthless suppression against the remaining Communist elements in China that remained above the surface. Chen, described first and foremost as an intellectual by Chinese historian Yu-Ju Chih, was unable to manoeuvre through the obstreperous decade of the 1920s with the "high resolve" ²³ required of a Marxist revolutionary and Party leader. However, a separate argument can be made that those early years of the CCP's existence acted as Russia's 1905 period and that the Party would have been subjugated to the authoritarian desires of Chiang Kai-shek ²⁴ regardless. Such an argument

¹⁷ Li Zehou, *A Study on Marxism in China* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1993,) 7-8. Chinese historian Li Zehou argues that the transition from Charles Darwin's evolutionism to Marxist historical materialism was smooth due to a developing tradition of Chinese intellectuals' reverence to Western evolutionary theory. Since these theories were rational and based on reason, Chinese scholars had no problem adopting them because "... Chinese usually subject their emotion to control."

¹⁸ Li would contradict this earlier viewpoint in his writings at the beginning of 1919. Li had concluded that "... 'for thousands of years' Chinese life had been 'without a bit of significance'" For more, see Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 183-184.

¹⁹ Chih notes that Chen turned "... irrevocably towards a Marxist revolution in China" in 1920; the scientific laws he once thought were incongruent with China's situation he had now accepted wholeheartedly. For more, see Chih, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: His Career and Political Ideas," 352.

²⁰ Timothy Creek, "Revolution: Awakening New China (1915-1935), in *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015,) 86.

²¹ Edgar Snow, "The Early Life of Mao Tse-tung," in *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China*, ed. Chun-tu Hsueh (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971,) 419.

²² Chih, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: His Career and Political Ideas," 357.

²³ Chih, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: His Career and Political Ideas," 357.

²⁴ Pinyin: Jiǎng Jièshí; the more familiar romanization is retained here. Ed.

would be augmented because the COMINTERN²⁵, whose role in orchestrating the coalition was paramount, had no response to Chiang's dictatorial aims for China.²⁶ Whatever the case, Chen remained an avid Marxist until he died in 1942, perhaps acting as a case study on why orthodox theory had to "yield to political fact"²⁷ when the situation demanded it. In this context, political fact meant existing conditions, which always had primacy over theory.

Karl Marx's Writings on China and Their Influence

Marxist ideology has perhaps proven more malleable than its original theoreticians may have predicted. Alternatively, maybe its dynamism was to be expected since Marx often conceded to revolutionary impulses even when they belied the philosopher's objective historical laws. A variety of contradictions exist within Marxist ideology that its founders, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, never resolved. For instance, the individual was both the maker of history but was paradoxically subjected to the material conditions that determine the being's consciousness. A social revolution could only occur in advanced, capitalist societies, whose socio-economic orders allowed for the highest form of working-class consciousness. Still, Marx acknowledged the revolutionary utility of nations that had yet to reach bourgeois capitalism. Following the Taiping Rebellion in China during the 1850s, Marx wrote of social revolution beginning in the Celestial Empire.²⁸ Despite not having the requisite urban proletariat and thus no sense of class consciousness, it was now theorized that backwards agrarian China would bring social renewal to Western Europe's doors.²⁹ Marx had also looked at Russia in the 1870s, whose intelligentsia began to question and challenge the Tsarist regime, as the catalyst for international revolution.³⁰ China and Russia in the nineteenth century hardly provided the blueprints as to how to bring about revolution according to Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto*, published in 1848. Both authors contradicted their theory that the economic base determined the political superstructure. Because Marx and Engels looked at economically 'backward' nations such as China and Russia, future revolutionaries could challenge their original conception and claim that politics should act as a catalyst for economic reforms instead of the other way around.³¹ Li Dazhao did just that; Li

²⁵ The Communist International

²⁶ Dan J. Jacobs, "Soviet Russia and Chinese Nationalist in the 1920s," in *China in the 1920s*, ed. F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Etzold (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976,) 54. Jacobs credits Stalin's fear, his unwillingness to concede to political opponents as prohibiting him from admitting that a successful Communist movement in China was highly improbable in the 1920s.

²⁷ Benjamin Schwartz, "Marx and Lenin on China," *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 15 (1949): 176, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3024355>.

²⁸ Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 101.

²⁹ Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 108.

³⁰ Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 109.

³¹ As noted by Meisner, Li Dazhao had translated Marx's "Revolution in China and Europe" in 1926. Given how Li contorted Marxist objectivity to match the former's subjective analysis, the importance of Marx's document on China cannot be overstated. For more, see Maurice Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 101.

had " ... insisted that political forces could change the direction of economic developments."³² Marxist theory has often opened itself for interpretation, and the shrewd propagandist can match aspects of Marxism to fit a grand narrative. Vladimir Lenin, who established his brand of Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, wrote that there existed "no single book"³³ to guide Communist actions in China. The universalistic laws of Marxist ideology, at times, were subjugated to provincial or local interests. Marx insisted that intellectuals study the " ... *particular* (my italics) characteristics ... of historical developments,"³⁴ which implied that nations could reach the historical epoch of Socialism differently. The younger, philosophical Marx wrote that it could be China — after England brought revolution to the Celestial Empire — that could return the favour and bring revolution back to England and Europe through the disruption of colonial trade, which would have drastic implications on European economies.³⁵ Marx was also critical of England's imperialistic actions during the Second Opium War, which would have naturally appealed to Li's patriotic sentiments.³⁶ These non-deterministic, subjective strands of Marx's writings were what appealed to Li Dazhao, who would work in earnest to create a distinct variation of Marxism that would be palatable to Chinese revolutionaries. Chinese historian Li Zehou described this as the " ... integration of Marxist theory and China's actuality."³⁷ Sinologist Benjamin Schwartz referred to it as "Chung-hua," the Sinification of Marxism, or the adoption of Marxist thought to match " ... Chinese conditions and culture."³⁸ However, Li's and subsequently Mao's conception of Marxist ideology was not without its own contradictions.

Li Dazhao's Concepts of "Surplus Energy" and "Proletarian Nation"

In certain cases, Li reconciled his pre-Marxist subjectivism with Marx's objective laws of history, such as in his concept of "surplus energy"³⁹ and China's status as a "proletarian nation."⁴⁰ Li pitched China's backwardness as advantageous since it was mainly left uncorrupted by bourgeois values. China, which lagged behind Western nations that had rapidly industrialized in the last few centuries while it lay dormant, had accumulated a surplus of energy while the developed world now declined.⁴¹ Mao similarly wrote, " ... that which has accumulated for a

³² Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 126.

³³ Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, 38.

³⁴ Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 105.

³⁵ Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 108.

³⁶ Meisner, "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China," 106.

³⁷ Li Zehou, *A Study on Marxism in China*, 41.

³⁸ Schwartz, "Marx and Lenin on China," 178.

³⁹ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 65.

⁴⁰ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 188.

⁴¹ In this regard, Li shared more with Russian Populists, such as Alexander Herzen, who wrote of Western countries' avaricious descent through the " ... unclean worship of material gain," than he did orthodox Marxists. For more, see Maurice Meisner, "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China," *The China Quarterly* 45 (1971): 5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651881>

long time will surely burst forth quickly.”⁴² The idea that old China would finally shed itself from its antiquity, replaced by a new China — as Russia had done in October 1917 — that was to awaken from its centuries-long slumber spurred on the voluntaristic tendencies existent in Li’s pre-Marxian worldview. Li, and subsequently, Mao, preached of a remoulding of the individual, the changing of material conditions was not enough to bring about social revolution.⁴³ And though China lacked an urban proletariat, a pre-requisite for social revolution according to Marx and his proponents, Li argued that China was nonetheless a proletarian nation since it was subjugated to the oppressive nature of imperialism.⁴⁴ Capitalism had been imposed from above by foreign powers in China. Thus, it could be argued, that China had passed through the stage of acquiring capital and could push towards the next historical epoch, Communism.

The Debate Surrounding China’s Socio-Economic Order and Its Revolutionary Vanguard

Li was wary of the urban dweller, as was Vladimir Lenin. However, Li’s reason for lack of trust in the city was quite distinct from Lenin’s. Lenin was wary of the “spontaneity”⁴⁵ of the masses, who could easily fall victim to the inadequacy of Social Democracy or succumb to bourgeois corruption without a cadre of experienced and conscientious revolutionaries that was to guide their actions. Without a rigid hierarchical system, the working class could fall victim to bourgeois trade unionism and forget their true revolutionary purpose.⁴⁶ Li, by stark contrast, wrote favourably of the “... creative forces of the collective mass.”⁴⁷ Before his article “Land and Peasants,”⁴⁸ written in 1926, Li was vehemently opposed to making China’s relatively non-existent urban proletariat its revolutionary vanguard. After all, in China, where nearly 85 per cent of the Chinese populace resided in the countryside, the collective mass was the peasantry.⁴⁹ Li wrote

⁴² Meisner, “Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China,” 17.

⁴³ In Mao’s 1957 document, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” there existed an abstract distinction between elements of society that need “remoulding” to fit the CCP’s concept of an ideal citizen and those counterrevolutionaries who, at a seemingly bare minimum, need their freedom of speech abolished until further notice. For more, see Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” in *Mao Zedong and China Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents*, ed. Timothy Cheek (New York: Bedford/St.Martin’s, 2002,) 145-152.

⁴⁴ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 152.

⁴⁵ V.I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (London: Aziloth Books, 2017,) 31.

⁴⁶ Mao shared Lenin’s sentiments to an extent. Mao often wrote favourably of the revolutionary spirit of the peasants, seemingly opposing bureaucratic intervention in the countryside. However, in this 1927 Hunan report, he paradoxically wrote of the need to “... *lead* (my italics) the peasants to put their greatest effort into the political struggle” For more, see Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” in *China’s Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents*, ed. Timothy Cheek (United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 64. On the urban proletariat’s relationship with the bourgeoisie, Mao was afraid that the latter would be susceptible to the corrupting influence of the former. For more, see Meisner, “Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China,” 23.

⁴⁷ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 134.

⁴⁸ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 251.

⁴⁹ Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, 65.

that the working conditions in China were different from the rest of Europe and that the urban workers could not engage in the class struggle because they were “ ... unable to find capitalists to struggle against!”⁵⁰ Trade unions had existed in China during the 1920s, and the CCP was often at the forefront of strike movements. However, dissent was often met with ruthless suppression. Sometimes by local police under Warlord control, as in the case of Weifu Pu, who crushed the Beijing-Hankou Railway General Trade Union in 1923, other times by foreign legation police, as was the case of British constables subduing unrest in Hong Kong in 1925.⁵¹ Still, the consciousness of the urban proletariat was in its nascent stages, as was the development of the CCP. Historian Arif Dirlik wrote of the ongoing debate being had by three factions — the Kuomintang Marxists, Communists, and Trotskyites — in 1927.⁵² Though each faction sought the same goal, that is, social revolution, the main point of contention surrounded the current socio-economic order in China and what character the revolution was to assume. The KMT Marxists opposed class struggle and instead preached unity.⁵³ The Communists, such as Pan Dongzhou, thought China was still a semi-feudal state but did have a marginal presence of capitalist development.⁵⁴ Finally, Trotskyites, soon to be purged following Stalin’s consolidation of power after 1929, believed that China was already capitalist and thus promoted intense struggle against the bourgeoisie from the urban proletariat *and* the rural peasantry.⁵⁵ Factional disputes amongst Marxists were often as intense as their fight against bourgeois or counterrevolutionary elements, and China was no exception to the rule. Li, the first Communist to accept the COMINTERN -advocated alliance with the KMT in 1924 while regarded as a “friend of everyone”⁵⁶ in both factions, was never shy in voicing his opinion on who was to lead China to a revolutionary victory. It was Li’s evergreen emphasis on the role of the peasantry — not the urban proletariat — as China’s revolutionary vanguard that had the longest-lasting effect on Communist strategy and policy following the CCP’s break with the Kuomintang in 1927.

Li Dazhao’s Emphasis on the Revolutionary Utility of the Peasantry

Marx had been clear in his denunciation of the revolutionary potentiality of rural villages, writing of “ ... the idiocy of rural life.”⁵⁷ Li wrote of the purity of village air relative to the “filthy air of the city.”⁵⁸ Mao Zedong, an assistant librarian at Beijing University, who had “ ... rapidly

⁵⁰ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 222.

⁵¹ Dillon, *China: A Modern History*, 195.

⁵² Dirlik, “National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought,” *The China Quarterly* 58, no. 58 (1974): 288-289.

⁵³ Dirlik, “National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought,” 292.

⁵⁴ Dirlik, “National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought,” 298.

⁵⁵ Dirlik, “National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought,” 302-303.

⁵⁶ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 220.

⁵⁷ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Gareth Stedman Jones (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 224.

⁵⁸ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 82.

developed towards Marxism⁵⁹ while working under Li, was to fully embrace the peasantry as China's revolutionary vanguard in subsequent years. It is hard to imagine that Li's Populist calls for intellectuals to "go to the people"⁶⁰ in 1919 and 1926 did not affect Mao's "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" in 1927. Peng Pai's campaign in the Guangdong province, which had found tremendous levels of success in 1925, should also be noted.⁶¹ However, one can argue that though Communists did find regional success in recruiting peasants to their cause, China, amid all the chaos of the 1920s, was not quite ready for wholesale regime change. Li was suspect of especially quixotic thinking when it came to the revolutionary character of the armed peasant societies, misjudging their *raison d'être*. The COMINTERN was wary of the peasant revolts of 1926, warning of "Left-deviationism,"⁶² fearful that the armed units would get ahead of themselves. In an article titled "The Red Spear societies of Shantung, Hunan, and Shensi," Li, that same year, wrote that he was confident that the "... armed peasant societies alone could rid China not only of warlordism, but imperialism as well" ⁶³ Li, who always looked for opportunities in the present, perhaps placed too much confidence in the revolutionary capabilities of the peasant societies. French historian Lucien Bianco ultimately argued that secret societies in rural China were not genuinely revolutionary — despite being armed units capable of challenging the established order — because such commitment was beyond their scope. The goal of these secret societies was not to free China from the yoke of imperialism or capitalism but was that of what Bianco termed "group defense."⁶⁴ Bianco implied that the armed resistance of these peasant societies was always defensive and never offensive; they acted on behalf of the gentry or the propertied classes against banditry or heavy taxation, not on behalf of the peasantry to further social revolution.⁶⁵ Despite the setbacks experienced and the failed adventures of the 1920s, the Chinese Communists got invaluable experience in the mass mobilization of the peasantry. That experience would suit them well in the coming decades.

The Problems of Merging Populism with Leninist Party Centralization

Mao would adopt Li's populist strand⁶⁶ of Marxist ideology and converge it with Marxist-Leninist Party centralization in later years. Li, believing in the inherent revolutionary will of the people,

⁵⁹ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 72.

⁶⁰ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 75.

⁶¹ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 240.

⁶² Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 244.

⁶³ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 249.

⁶⁴ Lucien Bianco, "Secret Societies and Peasant Self-Defense, 1921-1933," in *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950*, ed Jean Chesneaux, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972,) 224.

⁶⁵ Bianco, "Secret Societies and Peasant Self-Defense, 1921-1933," 221.

⁶⁶ Li wrote frequently of Peter Kropotkin's concept of "mutual aid." For more see, Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 249. It is not far-fetched to assume that he was also influenced by the Kropotkin's warning that a revolution gone astray would be one where opportunists give themselves "... an awful importance while the

opposed bureaucratic intervention in his calls for intellectuals to go to the countryside in 1919, writing that the peasants' autonomy should be left untouched; they could "plan their own lives."⁶⁷ Similarly, in his 1927 report on the Hunan Uprising, Mao espoused the pure revolutionary impulses of the masses, which disrupted the "... feudal-patriarchal ideology ...," through the growth of "... peasants' power."⁶⁸ When Li adopted Marxism after 1917, there existed a palpable excitement that the international revolution was at hand, and that China was to play a critical role in the emancipation of workers across the globe. However, Li's early populist writings on the inherent revolutionary spirit of the peasantry took on a distinct Leninist character in 1926. Perhaps Li's disenchantment with the progress of social renewal in China brought him to seek more radical solutions. Moscow had experienced disappointment after nations, such as Germany, failed to raise the Red Banner and carry the torch of international revolution. It is also not far-fetched to claim that Li must have felt distraught that China remained relatively isolated, and that social revolution appeared out of reach. Perhaps that is why he emphasized groups of dedicated revolutionaries and propagandists guiding what he once referenced as the people's "common will."⁶⁹ Or maybe he came to see value in Party centralization. Whatever the case, Li would never resolve this contradiction. Thus, a separate argument can be made that the Populist Li Dazhao may have fallen under the same bureaucratic spell as his Marxist-Leninist successors. Mao's prose often showcased Populist leanings; however, Maoism, in practice, as noted by a young student in Peiping in 1949, was a regime that called upon individuals to "... accept the will of the majority."⁷⁰ The will of the majority was often subjugated to the whims of the Party, which spoke on its behalf.

Chinese Intellectuals Travel to Japan

Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Lu Xun, amongst other Chinese intellectuals, travelled to Japan for formal education. Chen enrolled at Kobun Gakuin in Tokyo, Japan, which only admitted Chinese students.⁷¹ Relative to China's anachronistic pedagogical methods, Japan was believed to be modern, innovative, and intellectually progressive to some of the most prominent Chinese intellectuals of the period. Lu was fascinated with Japan's educational institutions, which he noted had experienced modernization in medicine through extensive studies of Western methods.⁷² Japan was viewed favourably compared to Chinese doctors, who Lu referred to as "

real strength of the movement is in the streets." For more, see Peter Kropotkin, *Anarchist Communism: Everywhere You Will Find that the Wealth of the Wealthy Springs From the Poverty of the Poor* (UK: Penguin House, 2020,) 29.

⁶⁷ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 206

⁶⁸ Mao Zedong, "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan," in *China's Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents*, 64.

⁶⁹ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 209.

⁷⁰ A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985,) 360

⁷¹ Yu-ju Chih, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: His Career and Political Ideas," 338.

⁷² Lu Xun, *Diary of a Madman and Other Stories*, 22.

... nothing more than quacks."⁷³ Li, praised for his efforts during the CCP's formative years and received by contemporary China as a Communist martyr, had his first encounter with Marxist theory as a student in Japan.⁷⁴ Likewise, following the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and the radicalization of Chinese youth that succeeded the event, there was a " ... feverish effort ...," as noted by Sinologist Benjamin Schwartz, to translate Marxist articles from " ... Japanese and other languages"⁷⁵ into Chinese. Thus, the history of the origins of Marxism in China was intertwined with Japan's already-existent Marxist movement.

Moscow's Influence on the CCP

It can be argued that Chinese intellectuals would have never seriously looked at Marxism had the Bolsheviks not stormed the Winter Palace in 1917. The CCP's relationship with the COMINTERN in the 1920s was, at best, rocky, but the latter's influence on the former was noteworthy. The COMINTERN, which was to promote revolution outside of Russia's borders, never had a firm understanding of China's distinct situation. This misjudgement of China's situation was because Moscow's eyes were hyper-focused on Western Europe with their advanced, capitalist societies, believing they would be the catalyst for international revolution — a prerequisite for Russia's revolutionary survival — and not Asia.⁷⁶ The COMINTERN hypothesized China's situation using Marxist terminology. China was to begin its "national-revolutionary"⁷⁷ phase, thus making it entirely reliant on the nationalist KMT for its survival. As acknowledged by Liu Renjing during the Fourth COMINTERN Congress in November 1922, the goal was to coalesce with the KMT but also to infiltrate its circles, recruit active members, and publicly rally the masses around a coalition that was hoped to have great support.⁷⁸ Retrospectively, the coalition experiment should be deemed a failure. However, in defence of the COMINTERN and Chinese Communists — such as Li Dazhao — that was to embrace the alliance between the KMT and the CCP, it would have been nearly impossible to detect the rise of Chiang Kai-shek in 1924. Sun Yat-sen⁷⁹, who died in 1925, appeared much more open to Soviet influence than his successor, Chiang. Dan N. Jacobs underscored Soviet agent Mikhail Borodin's influence on Sun, who, in the last two years of the latter's life, " ... adjusted his thought ..." ⁸⁰ to match that of the Soviet agent. In comparison, Chiang viewed the Chinese Communists, and to an extent the Soviets' mingling

⁷³ Lu Xun, *Diary of a Madman and Other Stories*, 22.

⁷⁴ Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 56

⁷⁵ Schwartz, "Marx and Lenin on China," 176.

⁷⁶ Allen S. Whiting notes that the COMINTERN's view of China, up until Lenin's death in 1924, was almost entirely negative. Europe was emphasized over Asia and Soviet bureaucrats held out " ... little hope for the Chinese proletariat, none for the Chinese peasantry." For more, see Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, 102.

⁷⁷ Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, 240.

⁷⁸ Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, 95.

⁷⁹ As with Chiang Kai-shek, the more familiar romanization has been retained. Ed.

⁸⁰ Jacobs, "Soviet Russia and Chinese Nationalist in the 1920s," 45.

with the CCP, as a larger threat than Japanese expansionism to China.⁸¹ Even after the first united front policy fell through in 1927, Chinese historian Michael Sheng argued that Moscow's influence was still significant on the CCP. Sheng concluded that without Moscow to guide its actions, the CCP would have been no more than one of the many warlord factions in China during the 1920s.⁸² Mao often confided in Stalin, who would convince the Chinese revolutionary to pursue a second united front policy in 1935-36, avoiding civil war just before the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937.⁸³ According to Sheng, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was the logical culmination of decades worth of clandestine activities between the two Communist parties.⁸⁴

It would be disingenuous to ignore Japan and Russia's palpable influence on Sino-Marxism. There were plenty of Chinese Communists that had received formal education in Japan. Likewise, until the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the benevolence shown by the Soviets as exhibited through the Karakhan Manifesto of 1919, Marxism was merely an obscure ideological concept that was insignificant to Chinese intellectuals. However, once Marxism pervaded China's academic circles in the 1920s, a distinct variation of the ideology that oft-ignored its deterministic strands in favour of subjective analysis appeared. Li Dazhao had provided the framework for Maoism, with a strong emphasis on the role of the peasantry and the alteration of Marxist doctrine — through concepts such as surplus energy and proletarian nation — to prove itself congruent with actual conditions. The CCP had experienced its prolonged 1905 period, perhaps unsurprising because Party members were studying and learning this relatively new, to China, at least, concept of Marxism as they attempted to apply it in practice. In essence, Communism in China during the 1920s was a dress rehearsal for Mao and future Party cadres. The original experiment, the united front policy with the KMT, and the attempts to mobilize the masses largely failed. However, the experience would prove invaluable in subsequent decades.

⁸¹ Chiang would state that the “... Japanese are a disease of the skin; the Communists are a disease of the heart.” For more, see Michael Dillon, *China: A Modern History*, 244.

⁸² Michael Sheng, “The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949,” *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (1997): 99, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913407>.

⁸³ Sheng, “The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949,” 100.

⁸⁴ Sheng, “The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949,” 96.

Bibliography

Barnett, A. Doak. *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

American journalist A. Doak Barnett's conversation with a Chinese student in Peiping in 1949 provided a glimpse into how the remoulding of an individual took place. Individualism was condemned; an ideal citizen of the PRC was to subjugate their interests for the sake of the collective whole, the "will of the majority."

Blanco, Lucien. "Secret Societies and Peasant Self-Defense, 1921-1933." In *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950*, edited by Jean Chesneaux, 213-224. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

Bianco ultimately argued that secret societies in rural China were not truly revolutionary in nature — despite being armed units capable of challenging the established order — because such commitment was beyond their scope. The goal of these secret societies was not to free China from the yoke of imperialism or capitalism but was that of what Bianco termed "group defense." Bianco implied that armed resistance by these societies was always defensive, acting on behalf of the gentry or the propertied classes against banditry or heavy taxation, and never offensive, acting on behalf of the peasant masses in a social revolution.

Buckley, Ebrej Patricia. *Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.

Mao Tse'tung's "Red Guards," units of galvanized youth called to action to continue the revolutionary struggle, fully embraced the Chairman of the CCP's ideology as ironclad. They would espouse what was coined as "Mao Zedong Thought."

Chih, Yu-Ju. "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: His Career and Political Ideas." In *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China*, edited by Chun-tu Hsueh, 335-366. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Yu-ju Chih's book chapter detailed the political career of Chen Duxiu. Acting as a starting point was Chen's formative years in politics opposing Manchu rule, his early philosophies and views espousing Western science and republicanism, and his subsequent disenchantment with Western modes of governance following the May Fourth Movement of 1919. After this momentous occasion, Chen adopted the oft-contradictory ideology of Marxist historical materialism. It was to be his strict adherence to Marxist doctrine that would guide his political thought until he died in 1942. Thus, this book chapter is of crucial importance to my research as it entails, perhaps above all else, the contradictions of orthodox Marxism in China from 1919 to 1927.

Creek, Timothy. "Revolution: Awakening New China (1915-1935). In *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History*, 70-105. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

In this book chapter, University of British Columbia professor Timothy Creek detailed the paralleling revolution in the commercial press during China's New Youth movement in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Creek also put forth a compelling argument that liberalism had no presence during this period as it fell victim to the "historical moment."

Dillon, Michael. *China: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

Michael Dillon's work acted as a brief introduction to the history of modern China; Dillon chronicled Chinese history from the beginning of Manchu rule up until the beginning of the

twenty-first century. Thus, this paper called upon his works to fill in some gaps and contextualize certain events.

Dirlik, Arif. "National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought." *The China Quarterly* 58, no. 58 (1974): 286-309. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/652402>.

Dirlik's article detailed the ongoing debate being had by three factions — the KMT Marxists, Communists, and Trotskyites — in 1927. Though each faction sought the same goal, that is, social revolution, the main point of contention was on the current socio-economic order in China and what character the revolution was to assume. The KMT Marxists opposed class struggle and instead preached unity; the Communists thought China was still a semi-feudal state; the Trotskyites believed that the urban proletariat was the true revolutionary vanguard. It was this last group that were to be purged from Party ranks following Stalin's consolidation of power. Through Dirlik's article, I get critical insights into how the Chinese revolutionary cause fell victim to fragmentation as the battle for power shook the Kremlin in the late 1920s.

Jacobs, Dan J. "Soviet Russia and Chinese Nationalist in the 1920s." In *China in the 1920s*, edited by F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Etzold, 38-54. New York: New Viewpoints, 1976.

Dan J. Jacobs concluded this book chapter by stating that Mao and the CCP gained invaluable experience in mass mobilization through the 1920s, though the KMT pushed the movement underground. Jacobs looked at the relationship between Soviet agent Mikhail Borodin and KMT leader Sun Yat-sen as one that teemed with mutual respect; however, Chiang Kai-shek did not share similar affinities worked in earnest to defeat the Communists. A move that the Kremlin refused to acknowledge as likely until it was too late.

Kropotkin, Peter. *Anarchist Communism: Everywhere You Will Find that the Wealth of the Wealthy Springs From the Poverty of the Poor*. UK: Penguin House, 2020.

Chinese historian Maurice Meisner noted the discernible influence that nineteenth-century Russian thinkers had on Li Dazhao, such as Leo Tolstoy, Alexander Herzen, and Peter Kropotkin. Li would adopt Kropotkin's conception of "mutual aid," thus, the author of this research paper wanted to explore any other similarities between the two thinkers. Kropotkin was vehemently opposed to mindless bureaucrats taking the revolution over — Li was not too different in his early years.

Lenin, V.I. *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement*. London: Aziloth Books, 2017. Perhaps Vladimir Lenin's greatest contribution to the doctrine of Marxism was an emphasis on Party centralization. Believing that the urban proletariat was critical to the pending social revolution, Lenin still mistrusted its intention. Without a cadre of dedicated revolutionaries to guide the "spontaneity" of the masses, they could easily fall victim to bourgeois corruption.

Li Zehou. *A Study on Marxism in China*. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1993.

Written by a Chinese scholar, this chapter is a brief, yet comprehensive outlook of what made Chinese Marxism distinct from other variations of Marxism. Zehou notes the origins of Marxism in China through the instrumental works of Li Dazhou and Chen Dexiu. However, Zehou also acknowledges a developing tradition of Chinese intellectuals' reverence not just to Western thought — such as the ideology of Charles Darwin's evolutionism — but also connects Confucianism with the emergence of Marxism. Marxist thought had not developed in China gradually; as such, some of its core tenets, such as scholars playing a critical role in

public affairs, sharing roots with Confucianism, could be fused with the revolutionary ideas of thinkers such as Peter Kropotkin. Li Dazhao, for instance, did just that, merging Kropotkin's theory of "mutual aid" with a Marxist analysis of class struggle.

Lu Xun. *Diary of a Madman and Other Stories*. Translated by William A. Lyell. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

Lu Xun did not mince words with it came to the author's disenchantment with Chinese apathy; Lu wanted China to modernize, following the blueprint provided by the West or Japan. However, it was not until Lu's conversation with Jin Xinyi that the latter decided to write to the masses then rooted deep in passivity.

Mao Zedong. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." *In Mao Zedong and China Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents*, edited by Timothy Cheek, 127-159. New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002.

Mao Zedong's article "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," published in June 1957, underscored the contradictions in China's socialist society and how to approach them in a way befitting a "...democratic dictatorship." However, There appears no concrete distinction between those who Mao claimed as an internal or external existential threat to the regime and those who veered off the path of Marxist righteousness and needed rehabilitation or remoulding. Mao ominously leaves the distinction open up to interpretation before China's Great Leap Forward in 1958 and subsequently during the Cultural Revolution of the following decade.

Mao Zedong. "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan." *In Mao Zedong and China Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents*, edited by Timothy Cheek, 41-75. New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002.

This pamphlet, written by the future Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, acts as a call to revolutionary action. Similar to Li Dazhao's directives of 1919 and 1926, calling on Chinese intellectuals to enter the countryside and work with the peasantry, Mao also believes that inhabitants of rural China are to act as the revolutionary vanguard in the campaign for Chinese liberation. This was to have dire consequences for the CCP and the Chinese revolution shortly after this document's publication in 1927.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *The Communist Manifesto*, edited by Gareth Stedman Jones. London: Penguin Books, 2002.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of Marx and Engels' 1848 *The Communist Manifesto*. Though Sino-Marxists underscored some of Marx's works, which contradicted theories in this seminal work, they would still have to deal with class struggle, bourgeoisie, the urban proletariat, and revolutionary vanguard theorized in *The Communist Manifesto*. Sino-Marxists would praise the peasantry as inherently revolutionary, Marx wrote of their unsuitably in the revolutionary struggle.

Meisner, Maurice. "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China." *The China Quarterly* 45 (1971): 2-36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651881>

Meisner is consistent in the works researched in this paper on the oft-ignored influence of nineteenth-century Russian Populists, such as Alexander Herzen and Peter Kropotkin, on early Sino-Marxists. In this article, Meisner argued that Mao — just as he did with the

doctrine of Marxism — adopted Populist beliefs and made alterations to them that matched existing conditions in China.

Meisner, Maurice. *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Li Dazhao was not afraid of altering Marxist doctrine practically to fit China's current situation. Pragmatism, to become closely associated with Chinese Marxism, was held in higher esteem than doctrinal ideology. This is of critical importance since Maoism came to be distinct from both European Marxism and even Marxism-Leninism. Li denied the economic (and thus political) determinism inherent within Marxism; he was unwilling to stand by until the economic situations ripened for revolution. Instead, he took the classic Marxist analysis of "class struggle" to justify direct action. Li made pragmatic alterations to Marx's superstructure — political forces could determine or change material conditions. Also of significance was Li's sympathy for Chinese traditionalism and his advocacy of the peasantry, not the urban proletariat, as the vanguard of the revolution.

Meisner, Maurice. "Li Ta-chao and the Intellectual Prerequisites for the Maoist Strategy of Revolution." In *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China*, edited by Chun-tu Hsueh, 367-394. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Meisner chronicled the debate had between Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, two founders of Chinese Communism, in 1915. In this debate, Meisner provides insight as to how both Chen and Li's pre-Marxian worldviews, in many regards, survived once they adopted the doctrine of Marxism. Li advocated for direct action in politics; Chen thought voluntarism was superfluous given China's situation during this period.

Meisner, Maurice. "The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China." *The China Quarterly*, no. 16 (1963): 99-111. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651575>.

This article was of much significance to my research. In it, Meisner noted the influence that the young, philosophical Marx had on Li Dazhao and some of his counterparts. The populist stand of Marx's "Revolution in China and Europe," written in 1853, allowed future Sino-Marxists to underscore China's historic mission in bringing about Communism to the rest of the world.

Schwartz, Benjamin. "Marx and Lenin on China." *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 15 (1949): 174-178. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3024355>.

Schwartz identified the concept of "Chung-hua," which is the Sinofication of Marxism to match China's distinct situation. He argued that Mao's alteration of Marxist doctrine was "...entirely resonant with Lenin's insistence that theory yield to political fact." Lenin's palpable influence on Sino-Marxism cannot be ignored.

Sheng, Michael. "The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (1997): 95-104. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913407>.

Sheng details the influence Stalin and the COMINTERN had on the policies of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prior to the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950; he also challenges the theory that the United States fumbled an opportunity at establishing strong relations with the CCP in the immediate years following World War II. The alliance was the culmination of the clandestine activities between the CCP and Moscow since the former's origins in 1921. Sheng ultimately concludes that without Moscow's influence, the CCP would

have been no more than one of the many warlord factions present in China during this time period. This article complements Allen S. Whiting's book, another critical part of my research, on Soviet policies during the CCP's nascent years effectively.

Snow, Edgar. "The Early Life of Mao Tse-tung." In *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China*, edited by Chun-tu Hsueh, 395-421. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Mao Zedong's memoir indicated Chen Duxiu's influence on the future Chairman of the CCP. However, Mao did not share Chen's deference to rigid ideology; where Chen was an intellectual at heart, perhaps, Mao was a ruthless pragmatist.

Whiting, Allen S. *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953.

Whiting's book chronicles the emergence of the CCP following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917 to the fateful alliance — advocated by the COMINTERN — between the Kuomintang and the CCP that was formalized in 1924. It details how Soviet decision-makers failed to understand China's unique situation as they applied policies that worked for them during Russia's revolutionary periods. Whiting's book is of significance since it illuminates the extent of Moscow's influence on the CCP and relations with China following the Karakhan Manifesto of July 25, 1919.

Yoshihito, Ishikawa. *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*. Translated by Joshua A. Fogel. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Ishikawa Yoshihito acts as a counter to Meisner's emphasis on the role of Li Dazhao in the origins of Sino-Marxism. Japan's influence on Chinese intellectuals is much too significant to brush over; many of the founders of Chinese Communism studied in Japan and brought translations of Marxist materials back home.

The Impact of Canadian Drug Laws on Chinese Immigrant Communities in the Twentieth Century

Shay Lucovic – April 2022

HIST 3150 – East Asian Immigrants to North America

Dr Clement Tong

The history of drug laws in Canada essentially begins with the start of the twentieth century and is met with incumbent racist ideals mainly aimed at Asian immigrants. It is unsurprising that this racism existed, as it is known all too well and upheld by many Canadians even today, but it is the legal acts that upheld that racism through a veil of drug prevention that makes Canada's history of drug laws so connected to Asian immigrant communities, specifically Chinese communities in British Columbia. The first acts and drug laws put in place by 1908 would pave the way for the next few decades to unleash a barrage of harassment, targeting, police violence, community violence, and racially discriminatory laws towards Asian immigrants, their communities, and their culture.¹ Specifically looking at opium, it is evident that the drug laws put in place at the turn of the century were not to protect every person in Canada from health and social hazards; they were specifically created to maintain a white majority in labour and economy, politics, and society.

Before looking at the drug laws themselves, it is important to first look at the precursor to these laws or the reasons people saw them necessary, and the events leading up to their approval. British Columbia specifically was one place in Canada where many could come in the nineteenth century and find easily available work, specifically in mining and on the Canadian Pacific Railway.² At the turn of the century when much of this industry was depleted, those immigrants (especially non-white ones) who remained in Canada began to worry white settler Canadians, mainly because a decrease in jobs meant competitions to maintain wages and survival.³ Many white Canadians believed that non-white Canadians (specifically Asian immigrants) had come to

¹ Opium Act, Statutes of Canada (S.C.) 1908, c.50.

² Robin MacKay. "The Beginning of Drug Prohibition in Canada: What's Past is Prologue." *Queen's Quarterly* (2018): 84.

³ Neil Boyd. "The Origins of Canadian Narcotics Legislation: The Process of Criminalization in Historical Context." *Dalhousie Law Journal* 8, no. 1 (1984): 113.

Canada to 'steal' jobs from them,⁴ and felt it was their racially appointed right to remain superior to these groups. Now, not only were these immigrant communities forced into ethnic neighbourhoods such as Vancouver's Chinatown because of anti-Asian racism,⁵ they were also going to be facing racist legislation inside those communities as well. When the issue on labour and employment between white and immigrant communities did not resolve itself by 1907, a riot occurred.⁶

The 1907 Vancouver Riot was a turning point in Canadian history and is one of the most important events leading to the creation of racialized drug laws in the country.⁷ These riots occurred because of growing tensions between Chinese immigrant workers and white Canadian labourers.⁸ These tensions culminated in a very public display of dissatisfaction with the Chinese immigrant community in which many white people took it upon themselves to vandalize their communities, specifically Vancouver's Chinatown. After looting, destruction, vandalism, and harassment ravaged Vancouver's Chinatown there was an increased public outcry for the government to get rid of Chinese Canadian immigrants. Many reached out to William Lyon Mackenzie King and, looking to appeal to his white voters, he had a desire to push out Chinese immigrants in a way that wouldn't seem overtly racist; moreover, focusing on drug laws allowed people like Mackenzie King to do just that. Mackenzie King just had to find a drug that was connected more to Asian people than white people for it to work.⁹

The discourse surrounding Chinese culture and opium was widely perceived by the twentieth century due to previous historical events such as the Opium Wars between China and Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. While opium *was* used traditionally in China in Opium Dens, Chinese medicine, tea, and largely in everyday leisure for quite some time, the Canadian narrative of opium being the absolute worst drug was put in place because of racism.¹⁰ It wasn't necessarily that out of all recreational drugs opium had the most adverse health effects, it was that out of all of the recreational drugs available to target, opium was used the most by Chinese people. It is not a coincidence that the first drug laws in Canada did not include other drugs used

⁴ Elise Wohlbold and Dawn Moore, "Benevolent Whiteness in Canadian Drug Regulation." *The War on Drugs and the Global Colour Line*, (2019): 29.

⁵ Todd Gordon, "Neoliberalism, Racism, and the War on Drugs in Canada." *Social Justice*, 103, 33, no. 1 (2006): 62

⁶ Neil Boyd, "Anti-Asiatic riots led to Canada's first anti-drug laws in 1908." *Canadian Speeches*, 15, no. 3 (2001).

⁷ Boyd, "The Origins of Canadian Narcotics Legislation", 26.

⁸ Catherine Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession Illegal Drug Use, Regulation, and Power in Canada, 1920-1961* (Toronto, 2015), 17.

⁹ Dan Malleck, *When Good Drugs Go Bad: Opium, Medicine, and the Origins of Canada's Drug Laws* (Vancouver, 2016), 228.

¹⁰ Catherine Carstairs, "Deporting "Ah Sin" to Save the White Race: Moral Panic, Racialization, and the Extension of Canadian Drug Laws in the 1920s." *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 16, no. 1 (1999): 72.

by other ethnic groups at a time where white Canadians wanted to rid society of a 'Chinese Menace'.

The 1908 Opium Act – the first drug-specific law in the country – changed immigration in Canada, but more specifically it harshly affected immigrant communities in Vancouver's Chinatown. The racialized law was based in the idea that opium was a drug used in Chinese medicine, economy, and culture, and would be the easiest drug to get rid of their specific ethnic immigrant group. The history of opium in British dominions would aid in the public message that opium was bad and those who used it were also bad and didn't deserve to be in Canada. The 1908 Opium Act would create a longstanding issue for Chinese immigrants in Canada, and their families and community through economic, medical, criminal, and social means. The 1908 Act made smoking, importing, and dealing opium illegal.¹¹ It also allowed police to specifically target opium dens in Chinatown, which were a large part of the community's culture and economy.¹² Similarly, with the accompaniment of An Act Respecting Proprietary or Patent Medicines, traditional Chinese medicine facilities and practitioners were targeted as opium was largely used in traditional Chinese medicine;¹³ however, many white doctors were given government permission to continue its use.¹⁴ This is likely for two reasons: first, because there was no desire to target white doctors like there was to target Chinese doctors, and secondly because the import of legal opium from China still made up a decent amount of tax profit for the government.¹⁵ It is in these earliest changes with drug laws like the Opium Act of 1908 that racialized and legalized discrimination harshly penetrated the Chinese immigrant communities of Canada, specifically that of Vancouver.¹⁶

It is important to note that smoking opium was a cultural practice in traditional Chinese society for centuries, and was not practiced widely by white people; moreover, typically white opium users found other ways to ingest the drug.¹⁷ The language used in the act which specifically noted smoking is one of the clear representations of racialization in this new law.¹⁸ Other uses of opium were cleared so long as it was confirmed by a white doctor first.¹⁹ It is also important to note that police no longer had to have a strong reason to invade Chinatown in Vancouver; they could say

¹¹ Boyd, "Anti-Asiatic riots".

¹² Susan Boyd and Donald MacPherson, . "The Harms of Drug Prohibition: Ongoing Resistance in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside." *BC Studies*, no. 200 (2018).

¹³ Malleck, *When Good Drugs Go Bad*, 20.

¹⁴ Catherine Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession Illegal Drug Use, Regulation, and Power in Canada, 1920-1961* (Toronto, 2015), 17.

¹⁵ Wohlbold and Moore, "Benevolent Whiteness", 38.

¹⁶ Opium Act, S.C. 1908, c. 50.

¹⁷ Boyd, "Anti-Asiatic riots".

¹⁸ Wohlbold and Moore, "Benevolent Whiteness", 31.

¹⁹ Boyd, "The Origins of Canadian Narcotics Legislation", 181.

they were investigating on suspicions of opium smoking with a weak warrant, tear up a business or even an entire street, arrest those they thought *might* be guilty without real cause, hold them for few days, and leave the mess for the Chinese immigrant community to deal with. This kind of police profiling did not occur in other white neighbourhoods at the time of this act;²⁰ the forced segregation of Chinese immigrants into smaller communities made their specific targeting by police all that much easier with the introduction of this law.²¹

In 1911, the 1908 Opium Act was amended into the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act which created harsher penalties for drug offenders and expanded the list of illicit drugs to include morphine and cocaine, both of which had been used largely as replacements for opium in Chinese communities.²² The punishment for drug offences under the new act changed to a minimum \$500 fine (which officials knew Chinese immigrants could not afford and so would have to be put in jail) and a year in prison; moreover, new consequences included deportation.²³ It is even more evident in this amendment and with the addition of deportation as a possible punishment that the aim of the act was to rid Canada of a 'Chinese Menace', but not the white offenders who would only have to pay their dues in cash.²⁴ The 1911 Act also made it illegal for anyone to possess opium, whether or not they were using it and whether or not they had the intent to distribute it.²⁵ This made it much easier for police to harness their profiling and target anyone under suspicion of possession, being that they no longer had to suspect use or dealing of the drug alone. This meant more police raids of businesses under the guise of criminal safety checks, which destroyed more property and lives.

In 1921 the Act was amended once again after the First World War.²⁶ Because of increased anti-Asian racism into the 1920s, the government once again looked for ways to 'get rid' of Asian immigrants, specifically after racist sentiment spread during the War. The new Act consisted of an increased maximum sentence for drug offenders of seven years, and an unprecedented minimum sentence of six months.²⁷ The new Act also made it one hundred percent legal for police to investigate anywhere or anyone they suspected of holding opium without a warrant at all.²⁸ Also, a new punishment was created in which offenders could opt for lashings in 1922.²⁹ Because

²⁰ Carstairs, "Deporting 'Ah Sin'", 82.

²¹ Timothy James Stanley, *Contesting White Supremacy School Segregation, Anti-racism, and the Making of Chinese Canadians* (Vancouver, 2011), 131.

²² Malleck, *When Good Drugs Go Bad*, 5.

²³ Boyd and Macpherson, "The Harms of Drug Prohibition".

²⁴ Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, S.C. 1911.

²⁵ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 17.

²⁶ Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, S.C. 1921.

²⁷ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 20.

²⁸ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 20.

²⁹ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 30.

of these amendments to the Opium Act, by 1922 almost three percent of the Chinese population in Canada had been convicted of drug crimes, and sometimes this number was higher in proportion depending on the city;³⁰ it was absolutely higher in Vancouver. The new amendment also came around the same time as a connected immigration act: the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act.

The 1923 Chinese Immigration Act was what the government had been slowly building up to with the Opium Acts of the twentieth century. This Act was largely unprecedented in that it was outwardly racialized, and specifically discriminatory.³¹ It is evident in the connections between all of this new legislation that the Opium Acts set up the slow discourse for how Chinese immigrants and their communities could be dealt with by government officials. With the end of the first World War and lasting racist sentiment from that, it was the perfect time for the Canadian government to see how much they could get away with in racial discrimination. The Act laid out that Chinese immigrants would no longer be accepted into Canada altogether unless for very specific reasons,³² such as being a merchant or a student who would benefit Canada and its economy in some way.³³ Chinese Head Tax was also raised dramatically at this time. This legislation came up at the same time as the 1923 Opium Act amendment which created the Act to Prohibit the Improper Use of Opium and Other Drugs.³⁴ This new amendment continued to add 'oriental' drugs to the list of contraband and increased the sentence length for those found guilty of visiting Opium Dens; businesses largely owned and frequented by Chinese people.³⁵ Between the 1921 amendment, the 1923 immigration laws, and the 1923 amendment, drug laws in Canada were fuelling the continued racist narrative about Chinese immigrants. More police profiling, community harassment, and deportations were occurring in the early 1920s, and along with the now illegal act of coming to Canada in the first place, Chinese immigrant communities such as Vancouver's Chinatown were drastically diminishing.³⁶

In 1929 another amendment was made to the Opium and Narcotics Drug Act which left those in possession of or in use of opium with even harsher consequences if caught. These new consequences included longer minimum sentences, and a higher risk of deportation.³⁷ In 1929 over half of the total drug convictions in Canada were from people caught either smoking opium

³⁰ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 44.

³¹ Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1923.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 30.

³⁴ Carstairs, "Deporting 'Ah Sin'", 82

³⁵ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 32.

³⁶ Carstairs, "Deporting 'Ah Sin'", 82

³⁷ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 32.

or partaking in opium dens, both of which were made up by mostly Chinese immigrants.³⁸ By the 1930s, over two percent of the Chinese immigrant population in Canada had been deported, and many naturalized and even first-born Chinese Canadians living in immigrant communities were sent back to a country they felt no connection to.³⁹ Because of the lack of business in Chinatowns that were able to function properly either because of harassment, vandalism, or a lack of staff and patrons, Chinese communities were hit harder than most in Canada during the Great Depression in the 1930s.⁴⁰ The economic toll this took on Chinese immigrant businesses was catastrophic for many, especially those who had relied on parlours, casinos, and social dens as businesses before the drug laws.⁴¹

This piece of legislation would remain Canada's key drug prevention law through World War II until the 1960s when Hippie Culture impacted drug culture in the country and across North America.⁴² By this time the maximum sentence for drug trafficking doubled to fourteen years; however, not long after, the minimum was changed to fourteen years, with undetermined maximums. This sentence would mean that families would be separated for over a decade, largely resulting in a lack of income and a need to move back to China. This would also mean that younger offenders would not have the opportunities to educate themselves, start businesses of their own, or start families of their own at the ideal age. All of these were ways in which Canada could ensure a part of the Chinese population was locked up, while also deterring possible population growth.⁴³ Even though by the 1960s drug culture was becoming more socially acceptable and less harshly policed, and Japanese immigrant communities had become some of the highest target of racism since WWII, the damage was already done to Chinese immigrant communities.

One of the largest long-lasting impacts on the Chinese immigrant community was the shift in economic means because of imposed drug laws. Through a culmination of failing businesses, police profiling, jailed breadwinners, lessened family help, and contraband targeting, many Chinese businesses that once relied on opium to maintain their lives,⁴⁴ or that once had a successful business that was destroyed by these laws in other ways, had to rely on drug trafficking to stay afloat.⁴⁵ Many businesses had to rely on smuggled opium, and many people had to rely on being those smugglers. Not only did this give weight to the claims being made by

³⁸ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 32.

³⁹ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 44.

⁴⁰ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 47.

⁴¹ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 34.

⁴² Wohlbold and Moore, "Benevolent Whiteness", 33.

⁴³ Carstairs, "Deporting 'Ah Sin'", 82.

⁴⁴ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 24.

⁴⁵ Wohlbold and Moore, "Benevolent Whiteness", 28.

racist people throughout society of Chinese immigrants being drug menaces in Canadian society, but it also continued to put those smugglers at an increased risk of jailtime or deportation. Chinese immigrant communities were pushed to rely on these illegal activities, then chastised for having to take part in them to survive;⁴⁶ much like we see with the forced segregation into ethnic neighbourhoods, and then the targeted hate of those neighbourhoods. More than anything the drug trafficking increase seen in the early and mid-twentieth century in Chinese immigrant communities only aided in the racist idea that Chinese immigrants were a detriment to a pure white society,⁴⁷ and *must* be deported.⁴⁸

Another large aspect of this issue that had long lasting impacts was how it was portrayed in the media. Although media in the early twentieth century wasn't what it is today, the impact it had during the creation of the earliest drug laws was still felt very strongly. Many white anti-drug advocates used racism to evoke emotion from their readers, often citing how the 'Chinese Menaces' in Canadian society were supplying drugs to innocent white youth, hurting young white girls, and reaping profits from their 'oriental' drug trafficking.⁴⁹ The inherent connection made in the media both by media stations and independent writers absolutely added to the racialization of drug culture and drug laws in Canada. For many, seeing 'how' the Chinese immigrants were damaging their white youth and destroying Canadian society through drugs was enough of an incentive to vote for things like the 1923 Immigration Act.⁵⁰ Increased media into the second half of the twentieth century also meant increased sensationalization surrounding drug culture. This sensationalization meant a broader hatred for the drug and those who supposedly were the drug menaces of Canadian society; in Vancouver this was largely portrayed as Chinese immigrants, as it had been for decades. Not only were Chinese immigrants vilified as workers, neighbours, and practitioners, they were also vilified as a whole group in the media, with vicious comics and portrayals aiding that racist sentiment. Because of this, even when political sentiment shifted into the later twentieth century, much of the media still gave space to racist rhetoric which continued the social narrative, even to this day.

Overall, in the twentieth century in Canada, the first major drug laws were based in racist ideals. It is unlikely that had the Chinese immigrant population been seen as less of a threat to white Canadian society, those drug laws would have been invoked at all. Certainly, the penalties would not have included extremely high fines, lengthy jail time, and deportation. These drug laws were fueled with racism and continued to evolve with amendments and additions as anti-Chinese

⁴⁶ Carstairs, "Deporting 'Ah Sin'", 82.

⁴⁷ Carstairs, "Deporting 'Ah Sin'", 76.

⁴⁸ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 26.

⁴⁹ Wohlbold and Moore, "Benevolent Whiteness", 32.

⁵⁰ Carstairs, *Jailed for Possession*, 23.

racism in Canada continued to evolve throughout the century. It would not be until another Asian immigrant group was deemed worse that these laws would begin to subside, and it was not until the white normalization of recreational drugs that these harsh penalties would turn into treatment plans, but neither of these social changes have meant total reform and reconciliation with the affected Chinese immigrant communities, even to this day. The Opium Act of 1908 and all its predecessors had a devastating impact on the businesses and economy, social norms and traditions, medical practices, social standing, safety, population, and inclusion of Chinese immigrants living in ethnic communities like Vancouver's Chinatown in twentieth century Canada. These effects continue to impact generations today with long lasting racial trauma, economic loss, family divide, media portrayal, and a sense of threat in a country that should have kept them safe. The early drug laws in twentieth century Canada were not a means to keep Canadian society safe and healthy, they were a means to push unwanted groups out in a way that made the country seem less racist than it had been for centuries, and would continue to be.

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The Indian Diaspora: Its Economic Contributions to and Support of Narendra Modi's Government

Ma Ruiyeng – April 2022

HIST 3361 – The Indian Subcontinent since 1947

Dr Robert Menzies

Diaspora is a Greek word (*diaspeirein*) that means dispersion; it has changed in meaning over time.¹ Now, it refers to people who belong to the same culture and have the same origin but for different reasons live outside of their country.² Today, India is said to have a diasporic population of 27 million persons in about 130 countries around the world.³ The United States, is home to 3 million members of the Indian diaspora; there are 1.5 million in the United Kingdom, 1 million in Canada, 1.2 million in South Africa, and 6 million in the Middle East.⁴ The Indian government does not have any specific definition of what a member of the Indian diaspora is. Now, the Indian diaspora consists of non-resident Indians or NRIs, Persons of Indian Origins or PIOs, and overseas citizens of India or OCI, and in 2015, PIO and OCI became one and belonged to the same OCI category.⁵ Importantly, the World Bank's estimate is that India received approximately \$69 billion US dollars in overseas remittances, which made the country the top recipient compared to other countries.⁶ The high numbers that make up the Indian diaspora and these remittances point to the need for one to understand this community in more detail. This paper will prove that while the Indian diasporic community contributes to India's economic development at home and around the world, it can end up as nothing more than the puppet of the Indian state. This paper first examines the role the Indian diaspora plays in the country's economic development, especially in the areas of business ventures and entrepreneurship. It then explores how important the Indian diaspora is to the Indian state and demonstrates that the former often echoes the latter in political sentiments, especially views related to the Muslim community.

¹ Junuguru Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy and Role of Indian Diaspora," *Central European Journal of International & Security Studies* 13, no. 2 (2019): 76.

² Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy," 76.

³ Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy," 76.

⁴ Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy," 76.

⁵ Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy," 76.

⁶ Arijit Mazumdar, "India's Soft Power Diplomacy under the Modi Administration: Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga," *Asian Affairs* 49, no. 3 (2018): 475.

The Indian Diaspora and India's Economic Development

To understand the economic contributions of the Indian diaspora, one must understand one specific category or group of the Indian diasporic community. This category of Indian diaspora is the educated class or the elite class that left India in the last few decades.⁷ They are Indians that have much more salient ties with their families, cultures, economies in India, and there are more of them as diaspora repatriates than other categories of India diaspora, like the Indian temporary guest workers in the Middle East or the Indian indentured workers in the Caribbean, Africa, Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka whose migration began in the 1830s.⁸ This elite class is also the group of diaspora that the Indian government is most interested in because they are more in line with the state's goal to build capacity, extend rights and extract obligations.⁹ These well-educated class tends to draw on cross-cultural references and take part in opportunity entrepreneurship, and they are more prone to new business ventures and possibilities.¹⁰ In other words, it is members of this educated, elitist diasporic community that are most important to economic development in India. This is because they can likely use their entrepreneurial spirit and business knowledge from overseas to the benefit of the Indian economy.

Indeed, this group of Indian diasporic elites is committed to business ventures and risk-taking, which are crucial to economic development. According to Vivek Wadhwa, professor at Duke University, who surveyed 1203 members of Chinese and Indian diaspora who had gone back to their home countries, 56.6 per cent of Indian respondents said they planned to launch a business initiative in India in the five years to come, and compared to the 3.5 per cent of the US population every year, the per cent for the Indian diaspora is a great example of entrepreneurial interest and risk-taking tendency of diaspora repatriates to India.¹¹ Consider the following four benefits of Indian repatriates: 1) they have cultivated their entrepreneurial nature abroad; 2) they have received foreign education, networks and experiences that promote cross-cultural ties; 3) they are not tied down by the norms in India, which means their business ideas come with unpredictability that can bring in innovations; and 4) they have local ties and family connections. It is therefore clear members of the Indian educated, elite diaspora could harness their economic drive to the advantage of India's economic development. Their knowledge, expertise, education, experience, and investment provide additional economic push for India.

⁷ Ravi Mantha, and Meng Weng Wong, "A Diaspora Route to Professional Success in the Indian Context: A Perspective." In *The Political Economy of South Asian Diaspora* edited by G. Pillai, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 110.

⁸ Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 110.

⁹ A. Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are They, and What Kinds of States Use Them," Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper, No. 32 (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2006), quoted in Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 109.

¹⁰ Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 112.

¹¹ V. Wadhwa, A. Sazenian, R.B. Freeman, and G. Garyet, *America's Loss is the World's Gain: America's New Immigrant*, (Social Science Research Network, 2009), quoted in Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 112.

For example, the Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), founded in Silicon Valley in 1992, plays a key part in supporting young entrepreneurs, and it is an organization whose annual conference attracts over 3000 diaspora entrepreneurs.¹² TiE has been advocating for Foreign Direct Investment with the Indian government, and it is said that it oversaw the liberalizing of major industries like the Telecom & Venture Capital investments in India.¹³ One of TiE's most recent initiatives is the TiE India Angels, which is a network of investors in 24 of its branches in India, and the initiative is to help entrepreneurs find global investor, funding, insight, feedback, industry-specific expertise, networks.¹⁴ With organizations like TiE, India stands to win or profit from the resources, capital, funding and overall financial support that flow in from the outside. In short, the diaspora and its economic activities and financial support play a vital role in India's economic development, especially when it needs expertise and support for funding.

Importance of Diaspora to the Indian State

Diaspora works to the advantage of the Indian government, which knows the importance of its diaspora and in fact works to welcome members of diaspora. In *Diaspora Engagement Policies*, Gamlen describes states that engage with their diaspora community as a process of "transnationalizing citizenship," explaining that diaspora engagement policies consist of building capacity, extending rights, and extracting obligations.¹⁵ Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, for example, was a major advocate of active engagement with India's diaspora, and during his time in office, he put together the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.¹⁶ In 2003, his government passed a bill called the Citizenship Amendment Act to create a new category of citizenship known as Overseas Citizen of India, a citizenship that gives eligible members of India's diaspora all benefits of Indian citizenship minus voting rights and employment or services in public office.¹⁷ When current Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office, he decided to shut down the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, combine it with the Ministry of External Affairs, and give one single identity card to all Indian diaspora so that they could maintain contact with their homes and roots in the long run and even become Indian citizens.¹⁸ The engagement with the Indian diaspora community, as evident in Vajpayee and in Modi's changes to the citizenship acts and ministries, suggests that the Indian state's pro-diaspora stance and acknowledgement that the diaspora community is a vital part of India as a nation.

¹² Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 112.

¹³ About-tie-faqs, 2012, quoted in Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 117.

¹⁴ TiE Global. "TiE India Angels." <https://tie.org/tie-india-angels/> [accessed 25 November 2021].

¹⁵ A. Gamlen quoted in Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 109.

¹⁶ A. Gamlen quoted in Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 109.

¹⁷ Mantha and Wong, "A Diaspora Route," 109.

¹⁸ Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy," 85.

These attempts to include and involve the diaspora community continue today and often become efforts to spread pro-establishment stances and views. More recently, Modi has worked to maintain good ties with his diaspora community, and the result of his efforts to do so is largely welcomed, as shown in solidarity of 200 Indian organizations in the United States to express support for Modi's "proactive initiatives to curb the spread of Covid-19 in India."¹⁹ Indeed, in 2018, Modi addressed Indian diaspora in Dubai at a ceremony that celebrates the construction of a 55,000 square metre temple called the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (BAPS) Temple.²⁰ In 2019, Modi met diaspora community in Houston during a visit to the US.²¹ By May 2017, Modi had gone on 49 foreign trips to appeal to the India diaspora, and on virtually every occasion, he would ask of the diaspora to take part in India's development through direct investment in India's economy, through donations to environmental efforts like cleaning up river Ganges program, and through providing for rural development programs.²² Modi's efforts to stay in touch with India's diaspora, together with the efforts of Vajpayee and other amendments to citizenship acts, reinforce the idea that the Indian state values its relationship with the diaspora and uses this relationship to its advantage at home and overseas, as shown in the positive response of the pro-government Indian organizations in the US to the Indian state's handling of Covid-19. In other words, one can see that the diaspora community is an overseas extension of the Indian state, and, to some extent, a Modi mouthpiece that speaks for Modi. Of course, one might argue that there are differences within the diaspora community, even within the educated, elite category of diaspora, and that not every one of this category would be unflinching pro-state. However, the point here is that the overall sentiments of the Indian state and the prevailing sentiments of the diaspora are aligned, to the benefit of the state's political and diplomatic image.

Here, one can look at Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist movement, to understand how the diaspora community feeds on and Modi's nationalist appeal, especially on Modi's Hindu nationalism and anti-Muslim narratives. First, one must understand that Modi's government has been associated with Hindutva and Islamophobia. In the book *Hindutva as Political Monotheism* Anustup Basu explores Hindutva as a monotheistic attempt that works to erase the complex web of religions and faiths in India, and Basu makes the case that Hindutva is inseparable from and even integral to Modi's right-wing, anti-Muslim government.²³ In Basu's words, "The political rise of this Hindu right culminated in the ascension of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

¹⁹ *The Times of India*, "Indian-American Diaspora Expresses Solidarity with PM Narendra Modi's Efforts to Tackle Covid-19 Pandemic," 2020.

²⁰ *The Times of India*, "PM Narendra Modi Addresses Indian Diaspora in Dubai: Key Points," 2018.

²¹ Indrani Bagchi, "Donald Trump May Drop in at PM Narendra Modi's Houston Diaspora Meet," *The Times of India*, 2019.

²² Srinivas, "Modi's Cultural Diplomacy," 74.

²³ Anustup Basu, *Hindutva as Political Monotheism*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020), 3.

under Narendra Modi, when the party came to power in the Indian General Elections of 2014 with an overwhelming mandate."²⁴ In a study of media coverage of Modi's "Howdy Modi!" rally in Houston, Rebecca de Souza and Syed Ali Hussain found using content analysis that the coverage of Modi's rally played up Hindu nationalism that drew on "cultural pride and anti-Muslim sentiment."²⁵ Evident here is the association between Hindutva and Modi's government's right-wing, anti-Muslim stance. Thus, when one thinks of Modi's government and his party, one will find right-wing, anti-Muslim sentiments, as expressed at the Houston rally, and the fact that the Houston rally and its media coverage echoes right-wing politics implies that the diaspora community internalizes and normalizes or takes on the voice of Modi's right-wing politics. This normalization of Modi's politics by the Indian diaspora community, especially those the educated, elitist category, means that Modi can use this overseas population to promote his political agenda.

In fact, the Indian diaspora continuously joins in with the Indian state under Modi to spread right-wing political views. Diasporic Hindu nationalists, who come from a long line of right-wing politics, are often supporters of the Hindutva political party, *Bhartiya Janata Party* (BJP), which has been the ruling party since 2014 under the leadership of Modi, and since the 1980s, these nationalists have formed various Hindu Nationalist organizations in the West.²⁶ Like founders of the Hindutva movement in the 1920s who overtly connected Hindutva to Aryanness and described India as "the cradle of Aryan civilization" and who have influenced modern-day suppression of and discrimination against the Muslim community in India, diasporic Hindu Nationalists in the West tend also to support the goal of Hindu Supremacy through the project of making India Hindu.²⁷ Moreover, it is found that Hindutva Democrats would be swift in their criticism of social injustice in the United States but refuse to condemn human rights abuses that are clearly recorded in India, including casteism and Islamophobia.²⁸ This contradictory position of Hindutva Democrats suggests that the diasporic community is, as it were, hypocritical defenders of Modi's right-wing politics. As well, Hindutva as an ideology often means efforts to label Muslim as "the other" and as different from Hindu, which becomes especially problematic and frequent after 9/11, and this labelling often translates as "anti-Muslim anxiety."²⁹ These anti-Muslim sentiments also find support in diasporic Hindutva, Sikh, and Christian diasporas in the

²⁴ Basu, *Hindutva*, 3.

²⁵ Rebecca de Souza and Syed Ali Hussain, "'Howdy Modi!': Mediatization, Hindutva, and Long Distance Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* (2021): 1.

²⁶ Shambuka, "Neoliberalizing Racial Justice: Caste, Race, and Diaspora Hindutva Democrats," *Peace and Change* 46, no. 4 (2021): 385-6.

²⁷ Shambuka. "Neoliberalizing Racial Justice," 384-5.

²⁸ Shambuka. "Neoliberalizing Racial Justice," 386.

²⁹ Eviane Cheng Leidig, "Immigrant, Nationalist and Proud: A Twitter Analysis of Indian Diaspora Supporters for Brexit and Trump." *Media and Communication (Lisboa)* 7, no. 1 (2019): 80.

UK, and Hindutva has made its presence in the US, Canada, the Caribbean, eastern and southern Africa.³⁰ What one can conclude here is that the Indian diaspora can be active participants of the Indian state's contemporary and historical narratives against Muslim and vision of India as a Hindu nation or culture. In this sense, the Indian diaspora can be an extended voice or representative of the Indian state and it can promote pro-government political agenda.

Given the diaspora's participation in Indian politics, despite their distance from India, one can understand the effectiveness of Hindutva and the Indian government's imagined nation that goes beyond the physical confines of India as a state. In reference to Benedict Anderson's "long-distance nationalism" and idea of "nation" as an "imagined political community," de Souza and Hussain show that Hindutva, like other long-distance or ethno-nationalist movements, attempts to break physical and national borders to appeal to members of this community and to connect them to a shared identity and a shared community.³¹ So, as far as Hindutva goes, one can say that it is a historical and contemporary ideology that works to create the imagined India that is supremely Hindu, one that comes to be at the expense of its Muslim connections and other religious influences. In this sense, when members of India's diaspora, say those in Canada, think of India and dream of returning to it or connecting to Indian roots, they are contributing, unconsciously and remotely and intangibly, to the making of India as a nation state, a community. They can, no doubt, downplay or even reject this community, but by virtue of their claim to an Indian identity or heritage, they are promoting Indian culture and India itself, and by extension, India as a place and a state.

However, the use of the Indian diasporic community by Modi's government is not always confrontational, hostile, or explicitly anti-Muslim; it can in fact be more subtle. In "India's Soft Power Diplomacy under the Modi Administration" Arijit Mazumdar shows that Modi surprised many critics and political commentators when he came to office and actively used diplomacy: it was said that he went to over thirty countries, sometimes more than once, to either be an attendee of a summit on a regional or global level or pay a state visit.³² He has worked to create economic ties and trade and business opportunities with numerous countries, such as the US, the UK, Japan, France, Israel, Germany, and China.³³ Mazumdar argues that Modi's foreign policy and soft power are focused on Buddhism, diaspora, and yoga. In Mazumdar's words, these three resources "complement India's conventional diplomacy, boost its international image, project it as peaceful rising power, improve relations with other countries and help attract foreign

³⁰ Leidig, "Immigrant," 80.

³¹ de Souza and Hussain, "Howdy Modi," 3.

³² Mazumdar, "India's Soft Power," 468.

³³ Mazumdar, "India's Soft Power," 468.

investment, technology and tourists in order to promote economic growth and development.”³⁴ Put another way, the Modi government is proactive in its use of soft power, diaspora included, to multiple purposes, all in favour of India’s place as a nation that appeals to Indians far and near and to members of other nationality.

This paper studied the Indian diaspora because of the considerable population of Indians who are part of the diaspora. It examined their economic contributions to India’s development. It acknowledged members of the diaspora and their part in improving India’s economy as a whole. The paper then examined the Indian state’s use of the diaspora to its advantage, specifically Narendra Modi’s right-wing, anti-Muslim politics and soft power diplomacy. By reviewing various articles and book chapters, this paper has tried to prove that the Indian diaspora is indispensable to India’s economic development, but it can become a mouthpiece or a chess piece of the Indian state in promoting its political agenda.

³⁴ Mazumdar, “India’s Soft Power,” 468.

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On the “Non-Bombing” of Auschwitz and Other Extermination Camps

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HIST 4430 – The Holocaust in History
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The longstanding debate on the (non)-bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau and other extermination camps has been described by some as having “defied scholarly resolution”¹ whereby no resolution may ever be attained.² For many years the debate waned as individuals wrestled with their desires to “master the ‘unmasterable’”³, only to be rejuvenated by impassioned historians seeking answers to the fundamental question, “why didn’t the allies bomb extermination camps like Auschwitz-Birkenau during WWII?” In this paper, both sides of the scholarly debate (i.e., pro-, and non-bombers) are presented with reference to three overarching factors: *could* the allies have bombed the camps? *Should* the allies have bombed the camps? And ultimately, *why didn’t* they bomb the camps? While the arguments both in favour of and against the bombing of Auschwitz and other extermination camps do have their merits, each have been plagued by numerous factors including cognitive biases, moral and ethical qualms, and historical “what-ifs” contributed to this longstanding debate. Therefore, the decision to not bomb Auschwitz and other camps cannot be simply reduced to either of the *could(n’t)* or *should(n’t)* dimensions; rather, the material conditions of a world at war and all that that entailed necessitated a political response unfavourable to all sides.

What exactly could have been known of the camps circa 1940? It has been largely agreed upon by both sides of the debate that the allies had knowledge of the camps dating back to as early as 1940 when the British were asked to bomb what was then thought to have been a prison for Polish partisans: Auschwitz.⁴ With these demands swiftly brushed aside by the British, attention remained focused on the front-line battles. In the years that followed, information about Auschwitz and other concentration/extermination camps began to trickle in from numerous

¹ Vernie W. Newton, ed., “Preface,” in *FDR and the Holocaust* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), vii.

² Vernie W. Newton, ed., “Introduction,” in *FDR and the Holocaust* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 171.

³ Karen J. Greenberg, “The Burden of Being Human: An Essay on Selected Scholarship of the Holocaust,” in *FDR and the Holocaust* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 29.

⁴ Edward Shapiro, “America and the Bombing of Auschwitz: The Importance of Asking the Right Questions.” *Society* 56, (2019): 627.

sources. From April 1942 onwards, allied intelligence agencies intercepted communications between German Order Police and other arms of the Nazi regime regarding the transportation to and murder of Jewish individuals at these camps;⁵ however, it wasn't until August of 1944 when the allies would see with their own eyes, via aerial reconnaissance photos and entirely by accident, what is now infamously known as the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex [see Figure 1].⁶ Importantly, what these images confirmed (or at least were capable of confirming) were the stories of two young Jewish Slovaks, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, who, having escaped the Birkenau camp, recounted their experiences in chilling detail within the now-famous 30-page Vrba-Weltzer report.⁷ This report outlined, among other things, the deaths of approximately 1.75million Jewish individuals who perished within the walls of the camps. Not only did this critical document describe the harrowing purpose of this camp via key eye-witness recounts, but it also provided the allies with detailed information regarding the layout and functioning of the camps, what daily life was like for prisoners, and how prisoners were selected for extermination or labour.

Unfortunately, this holy grail of inside information was not provided to the allies in full until November of 1944 when German forces were already in retreat and laying waste to the camps in their wake.⁸ Author David Wyman describes to their readers how the Vrba-Wetzler report slowly made its way from the hands of the two escapees, through Hungarian Jewish leadership, through the Slovak underground to be smuggled to neutral Switzerland, and finally to the allies in the latter months of 1944.⁹ Nonetheless, historians such as Rondall Rice have asserted that the corroboration of evidence with other sources should have provided the allies with sufficient information regarding the camps no later than July of 1944.¹⁰ A communiqué between the American Secretary of State and the Minister in Switzerland dated July 21st 1944 lends further credence to the notion that the summary report was in fact sufficient evidence of the atrocities being conducted within the camps: "According to your 4295 of July 6 and all other information available 'general treatment accorded to eastern Jews' is synonymous with cold-blooded

⁵ David Engel, "In the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Jews, 1939–1942" (2014), quoted in Caitlin Neal and Jonathan Jackson, "Responding to war crimes: Debating the bombing of Auschwitz-Birkenau," *Journal of Global Faultlines* 8, no. 2 (2021): 262.

⁶ Neal and Jackson, "Responding to war crimes," 262.

⁷ Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, *The Extermination Camps of Auschwitz (Oświęcim) and Birkenau in Upper Silesia* (FDR Library, n.d.) originally published 1944.

⁸ Rondall Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz: US 15th Air Force and the Military Aspects of a Possible Attack," *War in History* 6, no. 2 (1999): 208. Nazi forces in retreat destroyed camps as they retreated in the last months of 1944 and early into January 1945. By January 27th, the camps were liberated by Russian soldiers advancing from the East.

⁹ David S. Wyman, "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed," in Michael R. Marrus, ed., *Part 9: The End of the Holocaust* (Berlin, New York: K. G. Saur, 2011), 307.

¹⁰ Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz," 209.

murder.”¹¹ Thus, it is largely agreed upon that the allies had sufficient intel on the camps to know of the horrors taking place within them by no later than the summer of 1944.

Was this knowledge of what was taking place within the camps sufficient cause for carrying out a military mission? The fact that allied forces made the choice to not take decisive action on the camps would suggest that, for those capable of making these decisions, it was not sufficient. For several decades the debate as to why they made this choice largely fell to the wayside until being revived in the late 1970s and 80s by the aforementioned author, David Wyman. Wyman’s 1978 article, “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed,”¹² and subsequent book chapter taking the same name in 1989,¹³ are scathing critiques of the allied forces and their decision to not bomb the camps. Consequently, there has been no dearth of scholarly literature defending the ally’s decision to not bomb the camps, and in many instances the debate has devolved into historical revisionism and ad hominem attacks on individuals long-since dead. Nonetheless, each side’s arguments warrant further attention.

Proponents of the pro-bombing side have suggested that the allies could have indeed bombed the camps, and they provide compelling evidence therein. Considering the military capacity to carry out a successful attack on Auschwitz and/or other concentration/extermination camps, pro-bombers lean heavily on fact that aerial bombardment of the camps would have been more than possible given the allies domination of European airspace.¹⁴ Not only did the allies have control of the skies, but pro-bombers suggest that the United States Air Force [USAAF] had the wherewithal to carry out an attack from their base in Italy as established through previous and concurrent missions.¹⁵

These claims were not unfounded. With the successful D-Day invasion and subsequent diminishing of the Luftwaffe’s prowess in the spring of 1944,¹⁶ the tides of war began to turn in the ally’s favour, and they were poised to strike at the Wehrmacht’s lifeblood: *oil*. The German

¹¹ Washington, “The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison),” telegram, July 21, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Volume 1, 840.48 Refugees/8-2144: Telegram, *Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/>. The 4295 in reference is shorthand for an earlier telegram.

¹² David Wyman, “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed,” 1978, <https://www.commentary.org/articles/david-wyman/why-auschwitz-was-never-bombed/>, accessed March 2, 2022.

¹³ Wyman, “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed,” 1989.

¹⁴ E.g., Wyman, “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed,” 1989.

¹⁵ E.g., Richard H. Levy, “The Bombing of Auschwitz Revisited: A Critical Analysis,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 10, no. 3 (1996); Paul B. Miller, “The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz: Perks and Perils in Counterfactual History,” in Andras Kovacs and Michael L. Miller, eds., *Yearbook IV: Jewish Studies at the CEU, 2004-2005*, 97-109, (Budapest: 2006); Rice, “Bombing Auschwitz,” 212; Shapiro, “America and the Bombing of Auschwitz.”

¹⁶ Rice, “Bombing Auschwitz,” 213. For a long while the Luftwaffe were of primary concern to the allies mission of advancing on the heart of the Reich. Rice explores this in greater detail within their article, but by many accounts the Luftwaffe were reduced to an annoyance by Spring 1944 rather than a rigid military obstacle.

conglomerate and military-industrial-complex behemoth known as I.G. Farben was now firmly within the sights of the allies and would soon be the subject of heavy surveillance.¹⁷ Not ten kilometers from the oil refinery and factories was the primary camp at Auschwitz which can be seen in aerial photographs gathered during allied reconnaissance missions purposed for gathering intel on the I.G. Farben complex [see Figure 1]. The argument therefore follows that the allies not only had the range to carry out the attacks, but that they had the willpower to gather intelligence if they so chose.

Beyond these suggested capabilities are the more morally and ethically charged suggestions that they allies *should* have bombed the camps. Pro-bombers lean heavily on the cries for help emanating from many Jewish leaders and their sympathizers,¹⁸ using this as evidence that any concerns of potential collateral damage or the killing of innocents was morally excused by those seen to have authority on the matters. One important statement by American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt at the inception of the War Refugee Board on January 22nd, 1944, is perhaps most damning: “It is the policy of this [American] government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war.”¹⁹

Pro-bombers have suggested that this executive order implicated acting on the camps,²⁰ and it is difficult to see it in any other light. After failed attempts at urging the British to assist in an attempted rescue, the Americans would swiftly redact this statement, laying out the following policy in its stead to placate worried British officials who feared for the wellbeing of their nation and its people: “It is not contemplated that units of the armed forces will be employed for the purpose of rescuing victims of enemy oppression unless such rescues are the direct result of military operations conducted with the objective of defeating the armed forces of the enemy.”²¹ This was the final nail in the coffin for those wishing for swift action.

This idea of the attacks being too risky has been repeatedly rebuked by pro-bombers in their most compelling claim that the allies could have saved countless lives by attacking the camps,²²

¹⁷ Miller, “The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz,” 102.

¹⁸ E.g., Dariusz Stola, “The Polish Government-in-exile: National Unity and Weakness,” *Holocaust Studies* 18, nos. 2-3 (2012): 112.

¹⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Executive Order 9417 Establishing the War Refugee Board,” *The American Presidency Project*, January 22, 1944, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-9417-establishing-the-war-refugee-board>

²⁰ E.g., Levy, “The Bombing of Auschwitz Revisited.”

²¹ Thomas T. Handy, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,” PBS, February 8, 1944, <http://www.shoppbs.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/bombthomas.html>

²² E.g., Wyman, “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed,” 1978; Wyman, “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed,” 1989.

suggesting further that the allies and non-bombers have been prone to overexaggerating the cost-benefit analysis of the mission, including the lack of photo evidence making it beyond possibility to accurately locate the camps and the potential loss of life amongst aircraft pilots.²³ Regardless of the concerns in locating the camps and for collateral damages (which the pro-bombers claim to have been excused), any effort to delay the mass killing of Jews and others was suggested to have been morally imperative and worth the potential cost.

Why didn't the allies attack the camps at Auschwitz? Hefty accusations leveled against the allies claim that they themselves were, if not entirely antisemitic, indifferent to the lives of Jewish individuals.²⁴ While difficult if not impossible to prove, these accusations are not entirely baseless. For example, institutions such as the Catholic Church are accused of having a long history of antisemitism, and, like other parties involved in the war, were primarily concerned first and foremost with their own survival.²⁵ This sense of political self-interest is given weight when one considers arguments such as those put forth by Breitman and Lichtman which have suggested that president Roosevelt, like the Catholic Church, did not want to appear like he was fighting *for the Jews*; rather, he wished to convey an image of fighting *against the Nazis*. Fighting for the Jews, so the argument goes, was a potentially divisive act within American domestic politics as a large subset of the voter base was accused of harbouring antisemitic beliefs.²⁶ Clearly then, the allies were concerned with far more than this singular issue: they were concerned with the war in its entirety and all its externalities.

Defenders of the allied decisions to not attack the camps at Auschwitz resist these accusations of indifference with intense vigor, suggesting that attacking the camps was not as simple as pro-bombers have suggested. Indeed, this counterbalance between over exaggeration of one's abilities when it favours their position and downplaying of said abilities when they work against such claims, are representative of the debate in its entirety.²⁷ The suggested ease at which the allies could have carried out attacks on the camps has been resisted, with non-bombers claiming that a considerable diversion of air support that was required elsewhere would have been necessary.²⁸ Elsewhere, as so astutely stated by historian Paul Miller, "was five miles from *anus mundi*, the

²³ Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz."; Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz," 214-218.

²⁴ E.g., Neal and Jackson, "Responding to war crimes," 263; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Did FDR Betray the Jews? Or Did He Do More Than Anyone Else to Save Them?" in *FDR and the Holocaust* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 160; Shapiro, "America and the Bombing of Auschwitz," 630.

²⁵ Shapiro, "America and the Bombing of Auschwitz," 630.

²⁶ Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews* (Boston, 2014), 187.

²⁷ On the topic of bombing, the USAAF never missed an opportunity to propagandize their abilities to the public; however, non-bombers within tight-knit circles as well as contemporary military historians did/do not shy away of being truthful about the bombers: that they were indeed quite prone to inaccuracy and clumsiness.

²⁸ E.g., Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz."; Neal and Jackson, "Responding to war crimes," 262; Wyman, "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed," 1989, 311, 312, 315.

asshole of the world, which both survivors and perpetrators have called Auschwitz-Birkenau."²⁹ Nonetheless, their claims went even further so as to suggest that unfavourable conditions prevented an accurate and effective mission, stating that enemy defences³⁰ and poor weather conditions³¹ were simply too great. Partially due to these unfavourable scouting conditions was a lack of intel on the camps which has often been cited as a reason to not risk an attack.³² The location of the crematoria as specific targets, let alone the camps themselves, were seen to have been unattainable. This lack of intel blends seamlessly into non-bombers claims that their aircraft pilots were simply too ineffective to carry out accurate attacks, and that their clumsiness would have risked innocent lives in the process.³³

Beyond the objective capability (or rather, *incapability*) of the air force, non-bombers have defended their moral and ethical stance as to why they shouldn't have attacked the camps, claiming primarily that they would have required a significant diversion of air support from their primary objective: winning the war outright. Allied leaders claimed that winning the war would be the only effective way to fully liberate those in the camps and the oppressed in Europe more broadly.³⁴ Not only would an attack divert this air support, but any damages were understood to be quickly rebuilt by German forces, as they did in innumerable previous cases.³⁵ As such, repeated bombing of these targets would have been required if there were any hope at making a lasting impact on the deportation and extermination process.

As has been mentioned numerous times hitherto, the ally's concerns for collateral damage were seen as being morally and ethically insurmountable. Whether the Jews themselves within the camps, civilian labourers in neighbouring areas, or allied pilots themselves, the means were not seen to have been capable of justifying the end. In a related sense, it seems justifiable that carrying out an attack on the concentration/extermination camps could have precipitated an intense Nazi reaction whereby they would devolve further into barbarism and engage in unfettered and unrelenting abuse of Jewish prisoners. Indeed, the Nazi's were apt at finding unorthodox ways of carrying out murder. At the very least, having no clothes, identification, or sustenance, fleeing prisoners were likely to perish in the unforgiving wilderness which beckoned to them.

²⁹ Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz," 105.

³⁰ James H. Kitchens III, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Reexamined," in *FDR and the Holocaust* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 192; Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz," 104; Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz."

³¹ Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Reexamined," 194; Levy, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Revisited," 282-284; Wyman, "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed," 1989, 320.

³² Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Reexamined," 193, 204; Levy, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Revisited," 285; Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz," 100; Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz," 207-209.

³³ Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Reexamined," 196; Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz," 100; Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz," 218-222; Shapiro, "America and the Bombing of Auschwitz," 631.

³⁴ Greenberg, "The Burden of Being Human," 32; Schlesinger, "Did FDR Betray the Jews?" 160.

³⁵ Miller, "The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz," 102; Shapiro, "America and the Bombing of Auschwitz," 631.

How is one to evaluate these claims from both sides? From the perspective of what was possible, it seems clear that it was within the capabilities of the USAAF to target the camps at Auschwitz-Birkenau, and they proved this by attacking the I.G. Farben complex which was, for all intents and purposes, within the same locale. Debates abound on the efficacy of American bombers; one is compelled to believe both arguments. Retrospective analyses of American bombing capabilities paint a less-than-desirable picture whereby countless bombs would have had to have been dropped to successfully eliminate targets. These numbers range anywhere from 105 to 220 bombs being required to hit five or more targets at Auschwitz.³⁶ Indeed, while this may seem high, it was customary for bombing raids to drop these many bombs and more. How accurate this was is another question altogether, and whose answer is a resounding: adequate but less than desirable.

The claims made by non-bombers that the weather at this time was unfavourable has been entirely discredited. In fact, the summer months in which this debate was taking place were *the best* times to carry out air raids, and the allies regularly did so in and around the camps (e.g., at the I.G. Farben complex).³⁷ For those worried about anti-aircraft defenses, the attacks on I.G. Farben proved that these targets were barely defended – relatively speaking –,³⁸ and only one aircraft pilot lost their life during these raids.³⁹ Lack of intel was partially to blame for these concerns, but as the pro-bomber arguments suggest, lack of intel never stopped the allies from gathering it to carry out other missions.

Again, one finds themselves regressing to the moral and ethical questions of whether or not attacking the camps was a risk worth taking, and this is perhaps the greatest point of contention which is unlikely to be resolved. For those who believe any risk was worth the possibility of saving innumerable lives, this infallible assertion immediately resists rebuttal; however, hindsight affords us the luxury of knowing that it was unlikely to have made any significant impact on the loss of life within the camps or during the war more broadly. Indeed, by the earliest time of attacks being possible, nearly 5 of the 6 million Jews which would have come to have been killed by the Nazi regime had already perished.⁴⁰ When compared against the entirety of lives lost throughout the war, these numbers pale in comparison to the experiences of other groups, such as the Soviet Union and China who lost more than 40 million lives collectively.⁴¹ In stating

³⁶ Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz," 222.

³⁷ Rice, "Bombing Auschwitz," 206.

³⁸ Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Reexamined," 195.

³⁹ Wyman, "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed," 1989, 320.

⁴⁰ Levy, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Revisited," 268.

⁴¹ Baumermann, infographic 3509, *WWII Casualties as Percentage of Each Country's 1939 Population*, August 24, 2009, <https://topforeignstocks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/World-War-II-Death-Toll-by-Country.jpg>.

this, it is important to note that it was well beyond any one individual's capability to see in to the future and to predict when the war would end. In this sense, it is possible that the war, and thus deaths, would have continued indefinitely. Thus, this retrospective conclusion bears the important caveat of hindsight bias. Nevertheless, when taking this perspective of the overall loss of life during the war, the humanitarian mission of attacking the camps to free its prisoners would have had little effect on the front lines. Thus, the argument for the primacy of defeating the Wehrmacht entirely is most compelling, and rightfully so.

In summary, the question as to why the allies did not bomb Auschwitz or other camps has been in no short supply of claims and counterclaims, each appearing to be valid in their own right. Parties looking to defend their actions or inactions have been prone to cognitive biases which served their respective ends, including the exaggeration and downplaying of what was possible in light of contradictory evidence. For military officials weighing out their options at the time, it was so "unmistakably obvious"⁴² that aerial bombardment of the camps was a fruitless endeavour that it necessitated little consideration. Contemporary researchers must take this into account when resisting the tendency to attribute causes and effects in retrospect. For contemporary actors seeking answers to one of humanity's worst atrocities, it is understandable to see any effort short of selfless attempts of rescue as justifiable; however, this stance misses entirely the simple fact that a great war was unfolding, and that those capable of pursuing said rescue were balancing numerous other missions and political relationships concurrently. The decision to not bomb the camps was thus a political choice, and one which was unfavourable to all who claim to be concerned for the wellbeing of the world's oppressed. As victims of the Holocaust continued to perish within these concentration and extermination camps, valiant efforts were taking place beyond their walls, eventually culminating in victory for the allies and liberation of the camps by 1945. As we look to the past for guidance in navigating contemporary issues, we cannot forgo context in favour of absolute moralism.

⁴² Kitchens, "The Bombing of Auschwitz Reexamined," 204.

Figures and Illustrations



Figure 6. Aerial Photograph of I.G. Farben Complex and Auschwitz Camps. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I.G. Farben Complex, Monowice, Poland, June 26, 1944, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa21499>

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The Impacts of the Cultural Revolution on the Development of the Chinese Political System after 1976

Jesmond Zheng – March 2022
HIST 1131 – The Twentieth Century World II¹
Dr Tracey J. Kinney

The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” is a heavy trauma in modern China. When the members of “Gang of Four”² were arrested in October 1976, the Cultural Revolution was officially stopped, but its influences have deeply remained in several generations in China and affected many aspects of society. After 1976, the economy has been the highlight in Chinese society due to the continuous economic growth, and China has become an economic superpower in the world and a global leader in technology and manufacturing; this can be seen in the photo to the right that shows the grand buildings in Shanghai, one of hubs of Chinese economy now. According to one of the most important Marxist theories, “The changes in the economic foundation lead, sooner or later, to the transformation of the whole, immense, superstructure”³; thus, the energetic economy should lead to the development of the Chinese political system. Unfortunately, the political system has stood still and even fallen back. Now, the Chinese political system becomes more and more authoritarian, and the political system reforms have become the impossible missions, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The reasons for this disappointed situation are diverse and complex, but the Cultural Revolution should be a key factor. The cruel struggles during the Cultural Revolution made the common people feel fearful about political topics, and the ruling party has not completely denied and



¹ In this assignment, students were asked to select a topic that is meaningful to them and that falls within the temporal parameters of the course: 1945-2000. The annotated bibliography was a key component of this assignment. Ed.

² Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen – the group often blamed for the greatest excesses of the Cultural Revolution era. Ed.

³ “Base and superstructure,” Wikimedia Foundation, last edited February 20, 2022, 12:49, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_and_superstructure, accessed March 2022.

cleared away the thought of the Cultural Revolution, so it is inevitable that there has been no progress in Chinese political system.

The cruel struggles during the Cultural Revolution made the common people feel fearful about political topics. In Anne Thurston's article, "Victims of China's Cultural Revolution," the Cultural Revolution is described as a kind of 'extreme situation' because the Chinese people had to face the extreme physical violence and the extreme spiritual violence at that time, whether they attended the movement or not, and there was "a profound sense of loss as a result of the Cultural



Revolution - loss of culture and of spiritual values; loss of status and honor; loss of career and dignity; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth, and of life; loss, in short, of nearly everything that gives meaning to life".⁴ Both suicide and insanity were universal patterns for the victims, and many families or persons had to suffer their painful loss during this extreme period. The photo to the left shows the scene when Wang Guangmei was criticized in Tsinghua University during the Cultural

Revolution. Wang Guangmei was the wife of Liu Shaoqi who was the president of the People's Republic of China at that time, and this event happened in one of the most famous universities in China. Wang's husband died in 1969 under the cruel political pressure, and she was put in jail. Through the painful experiences in Wang's family, it is easy to image the tragic fate of the common people. The common people, or the non-party members, were invited to join in the different campaigns inside the CCP. These people were used as tools for intra-party struggles, and they were ruthlessly thrown away when they were not necessary for the struggles. Similar events happened many times after 1949, and it reached the peak during the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, the common people lost enthusiasm for the political topics and tried to be away from the politics after 1976, which meant that the most important driving force for the development of Chinese political system disappeared, and it should be considered as one of negative effects caused by the Cultural Revolution.

The ruling party has not completely denied and cleared away the thought of the Cultural Revolution since 1976. What is the thought of Cultural Revolution? It is described as Mao's ultra-leftist dogma of class struggle, accompanied with "a ghost of the old obsession with power

⁴ Anne Thurston, "Victims of China's Cultural Revolution: The Invisible Wounds: Part I," *Pacific Affairs* 57, no. 4 (1984): 605-606.

inheritance that occupied the minds of Chinese rulers for thousands of years".⁵ In other words, it is on the opponent side of the values of Enlightenment modernity since the May Fourth Movement as well as the classical Marxism, and it should be regarded as "new forms of age-old feudalism".⁶ It is certain that this thought would block the development of political system, and it has never been cleaned away from the ruling party although it could not be found in any official



documents now. Democracy and science, which have been appealed since the May Fourth Movement, are simply used as the slogans for propaganda by the ruling party. The photo on the left shows the scene when a young man blocked a column of tanks heading east on Beijing's Chang'an Boulevard (Avenue of Eternal Peace) near Tiananmen Square during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

When a civilian needed to stand in front of the tanks to express the opinions, how to describe the political system in this country? In 1978, Deng Xiaoping set aside the requirements about debating and denying the thought of the Cultural Revolution and asked his comrades to look forward because he knew that these requirements would lead to question the CCP's legitimacy, but he could never imagine the political scenes now in China, which include "the silencing of intellectuals and civil society, the imposition of a kind of 'monoculture', the banishment of 'Western thoughts' from university campuses and the new, Mao-like personality cult around Party leader".⁷ In short, the approval for the thought of the Cultural Revolution inside ruling party heavily blocks the development of political system, and it should be considered as another of negative effects caused by the Cultural Revolution.

In conclusion, the Cultural Revolution has led to negative effects for the development of Chinese political system after 1976. To avoid the political topics has become a common sense for most Chinese people because the brutal blows and ruthless repression during the Cultural Revolution have deeply remained in their minds. The common people hate the Cultural Revolution, but the ruling party believes that the thought of the Cultural Revolution is helpful for maintaining its rule, so to completely deny the thought of the Cultural Revolution becomes an impossible

⁵ Guo Jian, "Resisting Modernity in Contemporary China: The Cultural Revolution and Postmodernism," *Modern China* 25, no. 3 (1999): 364.

⁶ Guo Jian, "Resisting Modernity in Contemporary China: The Cultural Revolution and Postmodernism," 363.

⁷ Thomas Heberer and Feng-Mei Heberer, "Fifty Years on: The 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' in the Age of the Internet—Still Haunting China," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 15, no. 2 (2016): 231.

mission. These two factors make the Chinese political system stand still and even fall back. Most Chinese people hope that the theory of the relationship between the economic foundation and superstructure might take effect in China one day, which means that to have a democratic, free, and equal political system would not be a dream.

Annotated Bibliography

Andreas, Joel. *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class*. Vol. 56. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009.

This book explains the origins of the class of technocratic officials who exist in CCP today through the case study of Tsinghua University, which is one of the most famous universities in China. The author believes that Mao's attacks during the Cultural Revolution spurred inter-elite unity, and a new class which ruled China now was formed after 1976. In my opinion, these so-called "Red Engineers" are only the managers, for example, the CEO in a company. Once the Chairman of the Board wants to full control over the company affairs, they have to take the back seats. It is happening in China now.

Guo Jian. "Resisting Modernity in Contemporary China: The Cultural Revolution and Postmodernism." *Modern China* 25, no. 3 (1999): 343-376.

The article focuses on the critical investigation of postmodernism's "Chinese connection". The author points out that the Chinese government still refuses to come to terms with democratic modernity although Mao's ultra-leftist dogma of class struggle was rejected and an economy- and technology-oriented modernization theory was put in its place. I believe that this policy could only make China remain its stable situation temporarily and the reckoning to the Cultural Revolution would be the necessary step for the development of China. As the author illustrates in the article that the Cultural Revolution "simply created new forms of age-old feudalism and brought China backward", and that is the reason why the Cultural Revolution should be denied completely.

Heberer, Thomas. "The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution": China's Modern Trauma." *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 3, no. 2 (2009): 165-181.

The article analyses the causes and consequences of the Cultural Revolution through tracing the historical setting and the process of this tremendous political and social movement in China. Among the five causes listed in the article, I believe that the personality cult promoted by Mao as well as his leadership style is the important one. Due to the autocratic monarchy which had ruled China for thousands of years, it is difficult to clear away the feudal autocratic thought in China. Mao was favourite to look for examples in Chinese history books to rule his country, and that should be the important reason led to the Cultural Revolution.

-----, and Feng-Mei Heberer. "Fifty Years on: The 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' in the Age of the Internet—Still Haunting China." *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 15, no. 2 (2016): 209-236.

The authors discuss the topics that how to assess the Cultural Revolution in China and it is possible to occur again under the circumstance now. The authors provide the assessments of the Cultural Revolution from different aspects in China within the forty years after 1976, and they believe that it seems to be impossible that the Cultural Revolution would recur in the age of Internet. I believe that the issue about the silencing of intellectuals and civil society and the imposition of a kind of 'monoculture', which is pointed out in the article, is the most dangerous problem in Chinese political

system now, and this issue might lead to the negative effects in the future although these effects would never reach the extend of damage of the Cultural Revolution.

Ho, Denise Y. "Culture, Class, and Revolution in China's Turbulent Decade: A Cultural Revolution State of the Field." *History Compass* 12, no. 3 (2014): 226-238.

The article studies the Cultural Revolution through three keywords: culture, class, and revolution. The author places the culture and class in a new framework and defines that the “revolution” of the Cultural Revolution is a crucial factor. The way of studying in the article is unusual and interesting. If the official archival collections could be opened in the future, it would be helpful to the reckoning to the Cultural Revolution and benefit the Chinese people.

Thurston, Anne F. "Victims of China's Cultural Revolution: The Invisible Wounds: Part I." *Pacific Affairs* 57, no. 4 (1984): 599-620.

The article provides the examples of the victims of the Cultural Revolution through the author’s interviews in China. The author defines the Cultural Revolution as a kind of “extreme situations” because the Chinese people had to face the extreme physical violence and the extreme spiritual violence at that time whether they attended the movement or not. Both suicide and insanity were universal patterns for the victims, and many families or persons had to suffer their painful loss during this extreme period. It is difficult for us to understand why these crazy events happened in a country with five-thousand-years civilization, and the only way to avoid them should be to clean away the thought of Cultural Revolution completely.

Wikimedia Foundation. “Base and superstructure.” Last edited February 20, 2022, 12:49.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_and_superstructure.

Image sources:

Baycrest, [Photo] Shanghai World Financial Centre / Jin Mao Tower / Shanghai Tower, tallest buildings in Lujiazui, Shanghai. Wikimedia Commons, February 29, 2016.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lujiazui_tallest_buildings.jpg [accessed January 28, 2022].



This photo shows the grand buildings in Shanghai, which is one of hubs of Chinese economy now. According to an economy- and technology-oriented modernization theory, China has become a superpower of economy in the world and a global leader in technology and manufacturing since 1976.

Jeff Widener, [Photo] Tank_Man. The Associated Press, September 1, 2011.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tank_Man_\(Tiananmen_Square_protester\).jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tank_Man_(Tiananmen_Square_protester).jpg) [accessed January 28, 2022].



This photo shows the scene that a young man blocked a column of tanks heading east on Beijing's Chang'an Boulevard (Avenue of Eternal Peace) near Tiananmen Square during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The Tiananmen Square protests seems to be the last struggle in the reforms of Chinese political system, and the authoritarian political system would exist in China in the next several decades.

Wikipedia, [Photo] Criticizing Wang Guangmei in Tsinghua University, during Cultural Revolution. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Guangmei_cultural_revolution.jpg [accessed January 28, 2022].




This photo shows the scene when Wang Guangmei was criticized at Tsinghua University during the Cultural Revolution. Wang Guangmei was the wife of Liu Shaoqi who was the president of the People's Republic of China at that time, and this event happened in one of the most famous universities in China. Wang's husband died in 1969 under the cruel political pressure. Through Wang's example, it is easy to image the tragic fate of the victims of the Cultural Revolution, and that is one of the reasons why the common people feel feared about the political topics in China.

Digital Projects

These ArcGIS StoryMaps were created in a special topics course, offered by Kari North in Fall 2021. The course – “Travelling and Travellers in the Medieval and Early Modern World” – encouraged students to explore the interconnections among peoples and places during these periods of history. Click on the cover image to access the sites.

Afanasy Nikitin, Voyage Beyond Three Seas: A Devoted Orthodox Christian, or a Converted Muslim (ArcGIS StoryMap)

Dominica Rakowski



A Crusading Nobleman: Jörg van Egingen (ArcGIS StoryMap)

Rebecca Vantil



@the_real_pontiac (Instagram Biography)

Joti Sekhon

History 1110 – Kanata: Indigenous Histories in Canada
Dr Maddie Knickerbocker – Spring 2022

I created an Instagram page posed as Chief Pontiac to spread awareness of his role during colonial settlements. My thesis statement is clear in my first post, where I mention that it is Pontiac's responsibility to protect his people from the growing number of settlers, and that he will fight against them to keep his territories. His journey is clear throughout each post and follows a timeline. He was very involved in fighting for his rights throughout the French and Indian War and Pontiac's Rebellion. His posts express how he felt with the quick changes around him, and how he retaliated in battle against the British. This project was very fun to create, since it was my first time creating digital media for an assignment. There were not many pictures I could find of Pontiac himself, there were a few paintings and drawings but there were no expressive pictures of him. I would have loved to use pictures of different facial expressions to show how he felt, but I'm glad that I was able to find good maps of what was changing in those times. I followed a few pages which are related to Indigenous causes, and I also followed a couple of Indigenous influencers who I think people look up to today.



Material History Projects

Indigenous Languages in Canada: An Unbroken Chain (Visualization)

Jessica McRae

History 1110 – Kanata: Indigenous Histories in Canada

Dr Maddie Knickerbocker – Spring 2022

According to UNESCO, 75% of Indigenous languages in Canada are actively endangered and none are considered safe¹. Because this decline can be difficult to conceptualize through data alone, this crochet project is intended to serve as a visualization of the UNESCO statuses of 70 specific indigenous languages² within 11 language groups. Each group is represented by a different motif³, with status represented by specific colourways of variegated yarn – blue, purple, and red palettes from least to most endangered. There is also one square in a grey palette, which represents the Iroquoian language of Tuscarora; the last fluent speaker of Tuscarora, Chief Kenneth Patterson of the Tuscarora Reservation in Buffalo, NY, died in 2020.⁴



¹ "Mapping Indigenous Languages in Canada," Canadian Geographic. Royal Canadian Geographic Society, May 31, 2018. <https://www.canadiangeographic.ca/article/mapping-indigenous-languages-canada>

² Dataset from the Endangered Languages Project, <https://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/country/Canada>.

³ Motif patterns designed by Tracey Lord, et al., *The Big Book of Granny Squares: 365 Crochet Motifs*.

⁴ Dale Anderson, "Chief Kenneth Patterson, 93, Leader in the Tuscarora Nation," Buffalo News, December 11, 2020, https://buffalonews.com/obituaries/features/chief-kenneth-patterson-93-leader-in-the-tuscarora-nation/article_68fe5b4e-3a7c-11eb-9de9-4b45ec69a428.html; the last speaker of Tuscarora within the borders of Canada was Helen Salter of the Six Nations Reserve in Ontario, who dies in 1996 (Deseret News, 1996).

Yarn may appear to be an unusual way to visualize data, but the concept is not unique, and has been used for this purpose as far back as the First and Second World Wars⁵. Though crochet is not traditionally practiced by Indigenous peoples in Canada, it is symbolically relevant to the subject matter: a crocheted motif is created with one continuous strand of yarn, chained and woven to create a durable, functional fabric. In much the same way, Indigenous languages have long, unbroken histories spanning perhaps thousands of years. They are interconnected but separate, and they are resilient, remaining today despite systematic attempts to destroy them.


⁵ Natalie Zarrelli, "The Wartime Spies Who Used Knitting as an Espionage Tool," Atlas Obscura (Atlas Obscura, March 16, 2022), <https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/knitting-spies-wwi-wwii/>.

Mary Two-Axe Earley (Original Painting)

Lilya Carter

History 1110 – Kanata: Indigenous Histories in Canada

Dr Maddie Knickerbocker – Spring 2022




In my project I decided to take an image of a woman that stood out the most to me when I think of the topic of Indigenous Women fighting to regain their status or during the time they fought for their indigenous status and portray that in my own way through a painting on canvas. I took inspiration from many images of Mary Two-Axe as she was the first Indigenous to fight and regain her status. I decided to leave Mary Two-Axe in a black and white tone as that is how she is seen in most of her photos, portraying an emotional and saddened effect.

Salmon in Pacific Northwest Communities (Chapbook)

Tory Sargent

History 1110 – Kanata: Indigenous Histories in Canada

Dr Maddie Knickerbocker – Spring 2022



I created this book for Indigenous Histories in Canada (HIST1110) with Dr. Maddie Knickerbocker in Spring of 2022. We were asked to take a creative approach to a historical research assignment, and I was inspired to research Coast Salish traditional relationships with Salmon, how that relationship was impacted by colonialism, and how those First Nations resisted against that intentional disruption. I have always been fascinated with history, particularly the history of the lower mainland, and with Dr. Knickerbocker's encouragement I was able to learn many things about the traditional relationship between local First Nations and Salmon. To say I was intimidated by this project would be an understatement, as I do not consider myself to be a very creative person, but I am very proud

of what I accomplished. Seeing for myself the resilience of First Nations in the face of oppressive, assimilationist policies was amazing and I hope to continue to learn and appreciate those who cared for this land long before we arrived.

ch 2022
IT 1110: Creative Project

Indigenous Relationships With Salmon and Resistance to Disruptive Colonial Practices

"We Are Salmon People"¹




Figure 1. Two Sockeye Salmon during Spawning season.

"Our history tells us that at the beginning of the world salmon was given to the Stó:lō by Xä:ls, the creator and great Transformer. He taught us how to survive by maintaining a good relationship with salmon. He taught us how to fish for salmon, how to cook it, and how to look after it."²

"In the winter, when the work of the summer was done and the longhouses were full of the salmon they had dried and smoked, they celebrated with singing and dancing for weeks at a time"

- Salmon Boy, by Donna Joe³

Pre-contact salmon catches are estimated to be higher than modern day numbers.⁴



Figure 2. A fishing canoe.




Figure 1. Table showing estimate of pre-contact Indigenous salmon catch and comparison to modern commercial catches.



Figure 3. Spawning chum salmon.

3

Indigenous fishing technologies were effective at both sustaining individual needs as well as preventing a decrease in the salmon population.⁵




Figure 4. Salmon weir.



Figure 5. First Nations fishing on the Fraser River

Fisheries were carefully managed through lineages, with different families having rights and responsibilities for each site.⁶



Figure 6. Spawning pink salmon

5

6

The Kwakwaka'wakw First Nation practiced "Winter Ceremonials", during which much of the feasting, potlaches, and important events take place. This happened during the winter once the salmon runs had ended and the caught salmon had been processed for winter food stores.⁷

Figure 7. Hanging dried salmon




7

Coastal First Nations have a spiritual as well as material relationship to salmon. Many Nations performed a "First Salmon Ceremony", which had variations dependant on the First Nation Community.⁸

Figure 8. Stó:lō First Salmon Ceremony in 1996



Figure 9. A Gitxan First Nation Girl fishing



Many coastal Nations in what is now called British Columbia understand themselves to be related to nonhuman animals, including salmon.⁹

Figure 11. Spawning Coho Salmon.



Figure 10. Spawning Chinook Salmon

9

10



The presence of so many First Nations employees at canneries was a form of resistance itself, as Indian Agents wanted them instead to tend to agricultural duties on reserve lands.¹⁵


Figure 15. Cannery workers cleaning Salmon

15

For many Heiltsuk women, working at the Namu Cannery was a source of pride. Children often went to work with their mothers as well.¹⁴

The Heiltsuk local branch of The Native Sisterhood of B.C. and the "Plant Committee" were both organizations that advocated for the rights and benefits for Heiltsuk cannery workers in Namu Cannery.¹⁵

Figure 16. Namu Cannery



16



Figure 17. Drying spring salmon from the Babine River.

17

The continuation of a traditional Stó:lō salmon processing technique of wind drying can also be interpreted as a statement of resistance against the colonization of salmon fishing.¹⁶

18

“Fish is our life”¹⁷



Figure 18. Gaffing salmon at Moricetown (now Witsset)

Image & Table Index

Figure 01. Sockeye Salmon in Spawning Season. Stock Photo, from Georgia Strait Alliance. Accessed 15 March 2022. <https://georgiastrait.org/salmon/>

Figure 02. A fishing canoe, made by Jack Adams, Suquamish people; Box 6, File 12. John Leechman. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *John Douglas Leechman Fonds*, Item I-61945. (May 1920). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/fishing-canoe-made-by-jack-adams-suquamish-people-box-6-file-12>

Figure 03. Spawning Chum Salmon. Chum Salmon in Lynn Creek, by Fernando Lessa. From Daily Hive. Updated 10 November 2017. Accessed on 15 March 2022. <https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/bc-salmon-run-photos>.

Figure 04. Cowichan Indian salmon weir. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *Archives Visual Records Collection*, Item G-06604. (ca. 1900). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/cowichan-indian-salmon-weir>

Figure 05. First Nations fishing on the Fraser River. Charles Macmunn. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *Archives Visual Records Collection*, Item A-06077. (188-). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/first-nations-fishing-on-fraser-river-macmunn-no-277>

Figure 06. Spawning Pink Salmon. Pink Salmon, by Fernando Lessa. From Daily Hive. Updated 10 November 2017. Accessed on 15 March 2022. <https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/bc-salmon-run-photos>.

Figure 07. Hanging Dried Salmon, from Northwest Tribes. Accessed 15 March 2022. <https://northwesttribes.wordpress.com/foodways/hanging-dried-salmon-1/>

Figure 08. First Salmon Ceremony. Gary Fiegehen (Coqualeetza grounds, Chilliwack, BC). *Stó:lō Research and Resource Management Centre*, 2010.P.00041. (1996) <https://stolonation.pastperfectonline.com/photo/6F7BD2C1-E11C-437C-ABCE-856020355195>

Figure 09. A Gitksan First Nation girl fishing in the Skeena River at Kitwanga (Gitwangak/Gitwangax), British Columbia, with a dugout cedar canoe in the foreground and two more in the background. James Topley (Kitwanga). Government of Canada Library and Archives, *Topley Studio Fonds*, Item ID 3366973. (1915). <https://central.bac-lac.gc.ca/.redirect?app=fonandcol&id=3366973&lang=eng>

Figure 10. Spawning Chinook Salmon, Pacific Salmon Foundations. From The Ashcroft-Cache Creek Journal. Updated 24 June 2019. Accessed on 15 March 2022. <https://www.ashcroftcachecreekjournal.com/news/grants-will-help-chinook-and-coho-get-past-the-damaged-bonaparte-fishway/>

Figure 11. Spawning Coho Salmon. Coho Salmon in Stoney Creek, Burnaby by Fernando Lessa. From Daily Hive. Updated 10 November 2017. Accessed on 15 March 2022. <https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/bc-salmon-run-photos>.

Figure 12 and 13. British Columbia – Correspondence regarding an order in council which prohibits salmon fishing for sale, barter, or traffic without a lease or licence from the Minister of Marine and Fisheries. Government of Canada Library and Archives, *Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Fonds*, Black Series, Item ID 2060781. (1889-1892). <https://central.bac-lac.gc.ca/.redirect?app=fonandcol&id=2060781&lang=eng>

Figure 14. Gaffing salmon at Moricetown. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *Beautiful British Columbia Magazine Slide Albums*, Item I-11794. (1975). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/gaffing-salmon-at-moricetown-2>

Figure 15. Inverness cannery Skeena River, Cleaning salmon. BC Archives at BC Royal Museum, *Film and Photographic Branch travel industry and tourism photos*, Item I-28894. (1947). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/inverness-cannery-skeena-river-cleaning-salmon-2>

Figure 16. Namu Cannery. Frank Swannell. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *Frank Cyril Swannell Fonds*, Item I-33618. (19 April 1906). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/namu-cannery>




Figure 17. Drying spring salmon from the Babine River; Chief Old Fort Michel on the right. Frank Swannell. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *Frank Cyril Swannell Fonds*, Item SW-02975. (June 1926). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/drying-spring-salmon-from-babine-river-chief-old-fort-michel-on-right-2>

Figure 18. Gaffing salmon at Moricetown. BC Archives at Royal BC Museum, *Beautiful British Columbia Magazine Slide Albums*, Item I-11793. (1975). <https://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/gaffing-salmon-at-moricetown-2>

Table 1. Walter, Emily., R. Michael M'Gonigle, and Celeste McKay. "Fishing Around The Law: The Pacific Salmon Management System As A "Structural Infringement" Of Aboriginal Rights". *McGill Law Journal* 45 no. 1 (September 2000), 274.

Endnotes

¹ Keith Carlson, *You Are Asked to Witness: The Stó:lō in Canada's Pacific Coast History*. (Chilliwack, B.C.: Stó:lō Heritage Trust, 1996), 140.

² Carlson, *You Are Asked to Witness*, 140.


³ Joe, Donna. *Salmon Boy*. (Gibsons, BC, 1999), 6.

⁴ Walter, Emily., R. Michael M'Gonigle, and Celeste McKay. "Fishing Around The Law: The Pacific Salmon Management System As A "Structural Infringement" Of Aboriginal Rights", *McGill Law Journal* 45 no. 1 (September 2000), 274.

⁵ Walter, M'Gonigle, and McKay, "Fishing Around the Law," 273; Miles Powell. "Divided Waters: Heiltsuk Spatial Management of Herring Fisheries and the Politics of Native Sovereignty." *Western Historical Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 464.; Pamela Therese Brown "Cannery Days: A Chapter in the Lives of the Heiltsuk." MA Thesis (Vancouver, 1993): 9-10

⁶ Walter, M'Gonigle, and McKay, "Fishing Around the Law," 275; Powell, "Divided Waters," 464, 472

⁷ Berman, "Red Salmon and Cedar Bark", 57-59.



⁹ Judith Berman. "Red Salmon and Red Cedar Bark: Another Look at the Nineteenth-Century Kwakwaka'wakw Winter Ceremonial." *BC Studies*, no. 125/126 (2000).

¹⁰ Thrush, "Vancouver the Cannibal", 22.

¹¹ Brown, "Cannery Days," 15

¹² Powell, "Divided Waters," 473

¹³ Schreiber, "Our Wealth Sits On The Table", 363.

¹⁴ Brown, "Cannery Days," 18

¹⁵ Brown, "Cannery Days," 13-14

¹⁶ Brown, "Cannery Days," 17

¹⁷ Schreiber, "Our Wealth Sits On The Table", 375.

¹⁸ Brown, "Cannery Days," 1

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