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As in previous editions, we have broadened the scope of our journal to include historically-themed papers from students in the KPU Asian Studies Program.

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Two's a Nation, Three's a Crowd: The Use of Monogamy as a State Tool to Promote White Nation-Building

Sarah M. Brooks-Szakacs HIST 2314: Gender & Sexuality in Canada Dr Eryk L. Martin March 13, 2019

Throughout Canadian history, ideas regarding sexuality and gender have fluctuated in ways that were often incongruent with state ideals and state legislation. State attempts to liberalize social policy in an attempt to appease political activists¹ were at times incompatible with accepted societal norms: the enfranchisement of women, the "no fault" divorce law of 1985,² and the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2005, were seen by many Canadians as leading to the destruction of the "nuclear-family". Yet despite this backlash, the state weighed the benefits of undergoing these institutional changes and decided it best slowly to loosen its repressive grip on sexuality and marriage. However, while the state has made the dissolution of legal unions easier, and has broadened the inclusivity of marriage, the idea of marriage being an exclusively monogamous construct has remained intact. In fact, laws regarding polygamy have remained almost entirely unchanged since Confederation: to this day, monogamy is the only union which is legally recognized in Canada – with polygamy being an offence under the criminal code.³

This research portfolio will uncover the motivations for this decision, by answering the following question: why has the Canadian state so adamantly opposed non-monogamous marriages, and were all non-monogamous unions equally reprimanded? In order to answer this question, this portfolio will explore the sexual expression of Canadian women, through a primary and secondary source, and reveal that the state exercised discretion in the policing of non-monogamous sexual behaviour of 20th-century women based on the race of their chosen partners. This claim will then be substantiated through an analysis of secondary sources, which document the state efforts of white "nation-building", and further solidify the link between sexuality and race. Lastly, this portfolio will assess a final source that establishes that the North American perception of polygamy is based in it being an inherently non-white,

¹ Eryk L. Martin, *History 2314 Lectures*, March 12th, 2019.

² Lara Campbell and Willeen G. Keough, *Gender History: Canadian Perspectives* (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2014), 277.

³ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, <u>rcmp-grc.gc.ca</u>, "NDBB List of DNA Designated Offences - Section 487.04 of the Criminal Code of Canada," Sec. 487.04(a), Form 5.04. Accessed via: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nddb-bndg/form/ddo-did-eng.htm#secondary, last modified 2019-01-11.

ethnic practice. These sources will work in conjunction with one another to prove the assertion that monogamy has been utilized by the Canadian state as a tool for furthering a narrative of white Anglo-Saxon supremacy, and that women who deviated from this narrative by challenging sexual norms faced disproportionate regulatory measures as compared to their male counterparts.

Primary Source #1: Velma Demerson, Incorrigible (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2004).

This primary source is a retrospective account of a Canadian woman, born in 1920 to a white family, who was charged with the crime of "incorrigibility" in 1939, and subsequently confined. Her actions were punishable under the "Female Refuges Act" (FRA) of 1897; under this piece of legislation, sexual behaviour that fell outside of the realm of monogamous marriage could be considered a criminal offence – but as the title suggests, it was explicitly gendered, with only women being punishable.⁴

Demerson herself noted that she was charged as a result of her father's intolerance for miscegenation: he reported his daughter's infraction - premarital sex and cohabitation - to the police.⁵ In the same way that fathers could charge their daughters' premarital sexual partners with the crime of "seduction," Demerson's father held the fate of his daughter's future in his hands – demonstrating the Canadian state's promotion of paternalistic control over women's sexuality, and showing how much more inflammatory the response was if a romantic partner happened to be a racialized person.⁶ Yet, while the crime of "seduction" could often be dropped if the defendant married the plaintiff,⁷ Demerson's charge of "incorrigibility" was not one that could be forgiven based on such an agreement: at the time of her sentencing, her Chinese partner, Harry Yip, was already her fiancé, and yet the chance of legalizing their union was not offered.⁸ This element of racial discrimination is complemented by another motive of the Canadian state: Demerson was asked, upon detention, if she had had any partners aside from Yip - this reveals the state's preoccupation with the idea of sexual plurality.⁹ Demerson's answer to this question is crucial in understanding how non-monogamy was viewed, "To save my boyfriend from blame I will have to damage my character. 'Two', I say."¹⁰ Demerson is clearly aware that the idea of her having multiple partners would override Yip's culpability in their having of premarital sex.¹¹ While

⁴ Campbell and Keough, Gender History, 270.

⁵ Velma Demerson, *Incorrigible* (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2004), 47-8.

⁶ Karen Dubinsky, "Maidenly Girls or Designing Women: The Crime of Seduction in Turn-of-the-Century Ontario," in *Gender Conflicts: New Essays on Women's History*, ed. Franca Iacovetta and Mariana Valverde (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992): 27-66. Dubinsky explores the paternalistic nature of this law, and compares cases involving white defendants to cases involving racialized defendants. ⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Demerson, *Incorrigible*, 43-51.

⁹ Ibid., 43.

¹⁰ Ibid.

 $^{^{11}}$ Ibid., 167. At this time, the Canadian Criminal Code deemed it an indictable "moral offence" to have premarital intercourse with a girl of "previously chaste character."

interracial sexual relations were enough to garner the attention of the state, non-monogamy was the final nail in the coffin. This is supported by another woman in the same institution, with whom Demerson became acquainted; she described her crime as "[having] a little nookie sometimes" - and with a "bigamist."¹² While the state's concern over this could be partially attributed to a scare over sexually transmitted diseases, the physicians responsible for the health of the confined women were eugenicists; their primary concern was not only venereal disease, but also uncovering potential biological causes of sexually deviancy that undermined the healthy proliferation of "the race".¹³ Demerson was subjected to a disproportionate amount of abusive experimentation at the hands of such physicians; that this coincides with the fact that she was one of few women, if not the only woman, carrying a mixed race baby during her internment is important to note.¹⁴

Secondary Source #1: Varpu Lindström, Defiant Sisters: A Social History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada (Ontario: Aspasia Books, 2003).

Just like Demerson's acquaintance, many women in Canada did enjoy an active romantic and sexual life, yet without the same repercussions. Varpu Lindström provides an in-depth history of Finnish women who immigrated to Canada between the years 1890 and 1930. Though Lindström's work ends almost a decade before Demerson's incarceration, the sexual and romantic behaviour that she catalogues is quite liberal. While some Finnish women did, of course, opt for traditional marriages, three common viewpoints were held by Finnish women in opposition to such unions: some opted for monogamous partnerships that were not recognized under the state or by the Church ("common-law", or monogamous cohabitation), some were vocal advocates for single lifestyles, and others believed in "free-love" (sexual plurality). The support for monogamous cohabitation often came from those who sought partners that were legally married in another country, or from socialist Finns who preferred to practice monogamy, without accepting recognition from institutions that they did not support. Advocates for both single lifestyles and for "free-love" possessed a shared philosophy: that marriage was a form of "slavery" which promoted unequal gender dynamics. Though abortion was illegal during this period, Finnish women that were married, partnered, or single practiced it when needed or wanted, and were also well-educated with birth control methods.¹⁵

Aside from the act of abstaining from partnership all-together, the aforementioned behaviours exhibited by Finnish women were ones that would have been punishable under the FRA; while the FRA was a piece of provincial legislation exclusive to Ontario, the perspectives that allowed it to come into existence were held nationally. While the majority of these Finnish women lacked the patriarchal surveillance that led to Demerson's

¹² Ibid., 53.

¹³ Ibid., 63-8; 165-9. "The race" being the term used by eugenicists to describe the white Anglo-Saxon population. ¹⁴ Ibid., 8. Demerson commented that she believed herself to be the only pregnant woman in her ward.

¹⁵ Varpu Lindström, *Defiant Sisters: A Social History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada* (Ontario: Aspasia Books, 2003), 62-83.

incarceration,¹⁶ public knowledge of "free-love" settlements and unmarried cohabitation was readily available.¹⁷ Yet while some Finnish-Canadian communities received scrutiny over contentious political beliefs,¹⁸ Finnish women did not face the same level of resistance for expressing their sexuality that Demerson did.

To understand why, one could look at the Canadian media: the same year as Demerson's internment, 1939, the Canadian press began to use the image of Finnish women to promote depictions of ideal femininity.¹⁹ Yet while these campaigns advocated feminine heroism in the face of an emerging war, a key feature was the blatant emphasis placed on the physical appearance of Finnish women; 'ideal femininity' was not merely defined by a value-system, but by specific standards of 'whiteness'.²⁰ Demerson, though white, was "often taken for French" with her dark features being a source of shame within her family.²¹ She also differs from the Finnish community in another respect: while Finnish women engaged in non-monogamous relationships, this was almost entirely an ethnically homogeneous practice.²² Demerson's act of miscegenation was the key difference between her behaviour, and the behaviour of many Finnish women.

Secondary Source #2: Enakshi Dua, "Exclusion through Inclusion: Female Asian Migration in the Making of Canada as a White Settler Nation," in *Gender, Place, and Culture* 14, no. 4 (2007): 455-466.

The conclusions drawn about race from the case studies of Demerson and the Finnish-Canadian population are in keeping with the conclusions drawn by Enakshi Dua. Dua's article provides an in-depth examination of racially-discriminatory immigration policy in Canadian history, with a focus on Asian immigration. That Chinese women were excluded from Canada in order to prevent permanent Chinese settlement establishes the racist agenda

¹⁶ Ibid. Most Finnish women immigrated to Canada either alone, or with a partner.

¹⁷ Ibid., 75; Ellen Machin to *The Woman Worker*, March 1928, "The Hollinger Mine Disaster: The Federation Letter to the Timmins League," in *The Woman Worker: 1926-1929* ed. Margaret Hobbs and Joan Sangster (Canada: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1999): 203-204. The founder of the free-love commune "Sointula", Matti Kurrika, broadcasted information about free-love in the "widely circulated" newspaper *Aika*. While it could be argued that this had little effect on the Canadian state due to the obvious language barrier, the "Hollinger Mine Disaster," which left many Finnish widows without legal rights due to the lack of legal recognition for common-law marriages, brought the issue of common-law unions to English newspapers - demonstrating that discourse of Finnish marriage structures existed in English publications.
¹⁸ Lindström. *Defiant Sisters*, 138-162.

¹⁹ Varpu Lindström, "Propaganda and Identity Construction: Media Representation in Canada of Finnish and Finnish Canadian Women during the Winter War of 1938-1940," in *Sisters or Strangers? Immigrant, Ethnic, and Racialized Women in Canadian History,* 2nd ed., ed. Marlene Epp and Franco Iacovetta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016): 315-345.

²⁰ Ibid., 325. One image depicts two young Finnish girls, with the header reading "Finnish Girls are Fair," and contains only information about their fair features.

²¹ Demerson, *Incorrigible*, 36.

²² Lindström, *Defiant Sisters*, 63-9. Marital records show that only 17% of Finnish women married outside of their ethnic group. While there are admittedly few ways to tell if non-monogamous Finnish woman engaged in more diverse arrangements, free-love settlements like Sointula show a similar level of ethnic homogeneity, as do the records pertaining to the widowers of the Hollinger mine disaster.

of the Canadian state,²³ but Dua adds layers of complexity to this that are particularly useful for this portfolio: the first being a Canadian report from 1885, which expressed fears of Chinese women's "extraordinary fecundity [that] would soon overrun the country,"²⁴ with what John A. Macdonald himself would describe as a "mongrel race."²⁵ This concern with rapid procreation of non-white offspring reveals not just an aversion of other races, but the need to protect the established dominance of the white race through reproductive control.

Dua also quotes a 1914 article from *The Globe and Mail*, which included a "public notice" that warned white women of marrying men who hail from countries which allowed "polygamy or concubinage...[t]he influx of Hindus in British Columbia with the exclusion of their womankind lends point to such a warning."²⁶ This demonstrates that the Canadian state established a direct link between alternative forms of sexual unions and racialized people, and used non-monogamy as a part of larger narrative to prevent white women from participating in interracial relations.

Prevention tactics like this often operated in the same way: they attempted to appeal to the judgement of white women, rather than the judgement of the racialized men. White women were tasked with the responsibility of "self-regulation" (i.e. choosing white, rather than racialized, partners), and if they neglected to employ this "self-control", it was the white women who were admonished and deemed "worthless".²⁷ This is demonstrated quite clearly in Demerson's case, as she alone received harsh punishments for an act that involved a male partner.

Secondary Source #3: Enakshi Dua, "Beyond Diversity: Exploring the Ways in Which the Discourse of Race has Shaped the Nuclear Family," in *Scratching the Surface: Canadian Anti-Racist Feminist Thought*, ed. Angela Robinson and Enakshi Dua (Toronto: Women's Press, 1999): 238-62.

Through this article an even broader understanding of the pressures placed upon white women can be reached, as Dua again tackles the issue of white "nation-building,"²⁸ but does so through a different lens: instead of focusing on immigration policy, Dua shifts her focus to the family unit. She links the eugenics movement with the idea of upper and middle-class white women as being the "mothers of the nation"²⁹; this turn of phrase is revealing as it embeds whiteness into national identity, while imbuing women with a sense of maternal

 ²³ Enakshi Dua, "Exclusion through Inclusion: Female Asian Migration in the Making of Canada as a White Settler Nation," in *Gender, Place, and Culture* 14, no. 4 (2007): 455-466; doi: 10.1080/09663690701439751.
 ²⁴ Ibid., 451.

²⁴ Ibid., 451. ²⁵ Ibid., 452.

²⁶ Ibid., 457-8.

²⁷ Ibid., 459-60.

²⁸ Enakshi Dua, "Beyond Diversity: Exploring the Ways in Which the Discourse of Race has Shaped the Nuclear Family," in *Scratching the Surface: Canadian Anti-Racist Feminist Thought*, ed. Angela Robinson and Enakshi Dua (Toronto: Women's Press, 1999): 248.

responsibility. This is tied to the state's fear surrounding the declining anglophone-Canadian birth rate during the late-19th and early-20th centuries,³⁰ which further explains the state's fears surrounding miscegenation: it was not only that mixed-races were undesirable, but also that anglophone women marrying non-white men would lead to a sharp drop in the already declining white Anglo-Saxon birth rate.

Dua pinpoints the merging of the eugenics movement with these fears as the moment in time when the "nuclear-family" became solidified as a narrowly defined goal.³¹ Aiming simply to increase the anglophone reproductive rate was not the sole purpose: encouraging particular types of anglophones to breed was. Eugenicists were concerned with what was known as "racial deterioration", which resulted from the propagation of "inferior racial stock".³² This derogatory category could indeed include anglophones: those who failed to conform to state imposed sexual norms, disabled persons, or those who were impoverished or of the lower class could all be considered unworthy of carrying on "the race".³³ In order to guarantee that the "correct" type of anglophones would enter into successful childbearing unions, the idea of "institutionalizing" marriage took stock. Dua relays that prolific eugenicists "called for 'more stringent marriage laws"³⁴; by vesting itself with direct legal control over sexual unions, the state ensured that it could shape the internal structures of the family.

Direct control meant tying marital laws to citizenship (whereby Canadian women would lose their citizenship if they married a Chinese man),³⁵ Indigenous treaty rights to marriage (whereby Indigenous women would lose their treaty rights if they solidified a union with someone outside of their band),³⁶ and the prohibition of polygamy.³⁷ These laws were concerned entirely with the idea of creating a racially homogeneous heterosexual monogamous family; they were not in place to protect women. Indeed, consanguineous marriage and/or acts of incest had fewer punitive repercussions than marrying someone with a different citizenship, and could often be disputed on the grounds of ignorance, especially if the unions did not result in reproduction.³⁸

Secondary Source #4: Margaret Denike, "The Racialization of White Man's Polygamy," *Hypatia* 25, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 852-874.

With its almost obsessive focus on reproduction, one may wonder why the Canadian state championed monogamous unions rather than polygamist unions, which would have resulted

³⁰ Martin, March 12th.

³¹ Dua, "Beyond Diversity," 250.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

 $^{^{\}rm 34}$ Ibid.

³⁵ Demerson, *Incorrigible*, 39.

³⁶ Martin, January 22nd.

³⁷ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Form 5.04.

³⁸ Joan Sangster, *Regulating Girls and Women: Sexuality, Family, and the Law in Ontario, 1920-1960* (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21-6.

in much higher birth rates. Further complicating the argument of this portfolio is the presence of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons): white polygamist farmers who were skilled at dealing with poor soil quality.³⁹ Yet despite their highly desired talents, and lack of racialized identity, the Canadian state made no exception in terms of allowing polygamy.⁴⁰ The reasons for this are made clear by Margaret Denike, who also ties together the ideas of nationalism, race, and marital laws with which this portfolio has thus far dealt.

Denike affirms that polygamy has been directly associated with racialized peoples, and makes the argument that it was not only seen as an "aberration" when practiced by white communities (e.g. the Mormon population), but that it has been perceived as an affront to national identity.⁴¹ While Finnish immigrants practiced unregulated "free-love" settlements, Mormons attempted to have plural unions recognized by the nation and bound by law – thus forcing the state to address this deviance.

While also substantiating this portfolio's earlier claim that polygamy was seen by the Canadian state as an "uncivilized" sexual expression in Asian populations, Denike brings two new important elements into play: religious ideologies that conflicted with Anglo-Protestantism, such as Islam, and the interconnectedness of slavery and polygamy.⁴² While the former is of considerable importance in a modern context, the latter point will be focused on here. Denike describes the connection between slavery and polygamy as constituting several elements: the association of enslaved people with their perceived traditional sexual practices, the analogous use of the term "slavery" to describe the relationship between master and slaves as being comparable to husband with wives, and the idea that polygamy is reminiscent of the immoral sexual relationships between white slave owners and their slaves.⁴³ This is important to note as Canada's engagement in the slave trade is a part of history that is often underplayed in terms of significance, yet based on Denike's argument its impact has rippled so far as to affect views on human sexuality and marital structure.

Thus far, only the interplay of polygamy and 'foreign' cultures has been addressed, so the argument from Denike that polygamy was seen as a "relic of barbarism"⁴⁴ is extremely important, as Indigenous peoples of Canada practiced polygamy and sexual plurality long before the land was colonized. While aforementioned reports and newspaper articles link foreign cultures with alternative sexual structures, it is entirely likely that the Canadian state drew direct associations between the "primitive" cultures that they attempted to dismantle, and the sexual practices in which those cultures engaged.

³⁹ Campbell and Keough, Gender History, 127.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Margaret Denike, "The Racialization of White Man's Polygamy," *Hypatia* 25, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 855-6; https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/40928660.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

A pattern that is ever-present in Canadian history is the state regulation of gender and sexuality, often under the guise of "women's protection": pieces of legislation such as the "FRA" and "seduction" laws were put in place to ensure that feminine behaviour was not the product of free-will, but rather, a mandated act designed to support state goals. This is demonstrated in the case of Velma Demerson, who's expression of sexuality and romantic engagement was criminalized for not fitting into state ideals of premarital chastity, racial homogeneity, or monogamy. The state maintains similar types of control today. While certain advances have been made to remedy the harsh restrictions of sexual freedom in Canada, marital structures still remain repressive, and reminiscent of the landscape that they were constructed in. A recent piece of legislation which prohibits polygamy is entitled "Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act"45 – paying unveiled homage to the state's perception of racialized cultural practices as being literally "barbaric." Un-racialized cultures, such as the Finnish immigrants who settled in Canada, were able to express themselves sexually with a degree of liberality; they rejected state intervention, but remained racially homogeneous enough for the state to not only use discretion in their policing of them, but to even utilize the Finnish image to the state's benefit.⁴⁶

The colonial powers, both before and after Confederation, envisioned the flourishing of a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation. In order to promote this ideal, the state utilized concepts of family structures that were shaped by gender, class, race, and sexual norms. By defining the "nuclear-family" with those categories in mind, the state was able to ensure that certain types of families would have access to state resources (such as welfare) by institutionalizing, and thus regulating, marriage. While the Canadian state makes the argument that anti-polygamy laws are in place to protect the vulnerable, the use of that justification can be found in the state's past defence of anti-homosexuality laws, and legislation that prevented women from having bodily autonomy.

Like those who suffered in the past as a result of intensive state regulation over body and behaviour, women in Canada suffer today: polygamist unions continue to exist, resisting state expectations, and the result of criminalization of this structure is the inaccessibility of state resources for women in such unions.⁴⁷ The relationship between race, sexuality, and gender is rigorously regulated and housed under the realm of state power; these examples from the past should not exist only in memory, but should operate as a constant reminder of the structures which insidiously govern our lived experiences.

⁴⁵ Government of Canada, Justice Laws Website, "Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practice Act," S.C. 2015, c. 29, last modified 2019-03-12, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2015_29/page-1.html.

⁴⁶ Lindström, "Propaganda and Identity," 317-344.

⁴⁷ Megan Gaucher, "Monogamous Canadian Citizenship, Constructing Foreignness and the Limits of the Harm Discourse" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (September 2016): 516-538.

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Japanese-American Relations in the Meiji Period: Japanese-American Cooperation and its Impact on Japan's Position as an Emerging Power

Shahid D. Daudjee HIST 3370: Modern Japan Dr. Jack P. Hayes March 22, 2018

For the Japanese, the West would serve as a model to modernize their nation. In the Darwinian world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, to survive the disturbing brutality of colonialism required one to become a colonial master. Japan then, had to modernize to escape the unequal treaties set upon them by the West. To modernize was to be like the West, thus Japan looked to the West to be *like* the West; not surprisingly, the everrising economic power that was the United States was one of Japan's key collaborators in the pivotal late Meiji period. The Japanese, however, encountered various problems. For one, the Japanese were an "Asiatic" race in a world of Western domination, and in a time where racial scientific theories were taken as facts, the Japanese faced racial discrimination in the United States (and in the world). Despite this, the Japanese in the Meiji period gained important diplomatic and economic cooperation through intimacy with the United States, which effectively bolstered Japan's position as a global power.

Any examination of Meiji Japan must begin by introducing the Iwakura Mission. Endorsed by the Japanese government, the Iwakura Mission began in 1871 to find effective ways to be like the West so that Japan could be equipped to combat foreign meddling. As argued before, the Japanese had to modernize and become like the West, but this was to combat the West. Unequal treaties had left the Japanese humiliated, thus Japan had to be on par or like other Western powers, so they could become eligible to renegotiate these treaties. The Iwakura Mission then was the first step to solving Japan's problems.

Facilitated by both the Japanese and American governments, the Iwakura Mission was only the beginning of a fruitful co-operation between both nations. There was, however, more to gain for Japan. In the United States, the Japanese mission took note of America's industrialized cities. All manner of observations were recorded in Kumi Kunitake's journal. Kunitake was Prince Iwakura's secretary. While in America, Kunitake described his journey as he travelled by train from one destination to others. He summarized his travel in this passage: "[s]uch people have opened up and pioneered this land of freedom and have nurtured their spirit of enterprise here."¹ Kunitake added later that "because manufactured goods and

¹ Kume Kunitake, with Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young, eds., *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871-1873* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104.

agricultural produce are abundant, a tolerant country with a thriving economy has been established."² His main take-away was arguably the strength of America's capitalistic, individualistic spirit. As an aspiring modern nation, Japan had to borrow ideas from America and Britain's success in capitalism to engineer an economic system that was less feudal and more capitalist.

Japan's path to becoming a modern capitalist nation can not be argued to be entirely foreign, but foreign inspiration and relations aided in this development. As Kunitake observed himself, America boasted large lands with abundant resources and a drive to create manufactured goods, then it is no surprise that Keynesian economist Kumichi Takahashi noted that Japan began to imitate this concept³. Along with borrowing Western technology and science, Japan understood that it had to tap the natural resources it boasted. Coal, copper, and other mineral resources were exported in their raw form or as manufactured goods. Japan, like the West, and as Kunitake had observed in the United States—had utilized railways and steamships as the chief mode of transporting goods across the country and across seas. A valuable lesson in modernization was the push towards capitalism, which Japan successfully learned and embraced from the United States.

Integral to Japanese industrialization in the late Meiji period, was Japan's cooperation with the United States. For example, Japan's export trade for much of the later Meiji period was centred on exporting raw silk to the United States.⁴ This commodity, along with cotton, amounted to twenty-two percent of Japan's exports targeted to American markets. ⁵Equipped with American tools, the Japanese oil industry also saw a boom, with crude oil exportation rising from 33,000 barrels to 1¹/₄ million barrels of crude oil.⁶ The consumers were largely those in the West, including the United States. In 1905, General Electric Motors, an American company, also provided capital to organize the electric engineering industry. It provided capital and organized two companies: Tokyo Electric Company and Osaka Electric Lamp Company⁷. They would work together to create Mazda Lamp. The Americans and Japanese worked together to aid Japan and its rising industry. Industrialization would be one of the key ingredients in the pursuit of 'becoming the West'. Although Japan was still lagging, the Americans had a positive view of this modernizing East Asian nation and were willing to work together. As historian Sidney Pash observed, America saw in Japan a nation not that dissimilar to itself. Japan had eliminated its hereditary class (the samurai) in 1868, as America perceived itself to have destroyed hereditary-bound labour in the Civil War.⁸ Both

² Kume, et al., *Japan Rising*, 104.

³ Kamekichi Takahashi, "The Rise of Capitalism in Japan", *The Open Court*, Iss. 3, Article 3 (1933): 165; https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ocj/vol1933/iss3/3

⁴ G.C Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867-1937 (New York: Routledge, 2003), 89.

⁵ Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 87.

⁶ Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 75.

⁷ Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 78.

⁸ Sidney Pash, *The Currents of War: a New History of American-Japanese Relations, 1899-194* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2014), 4.

nations saw a surge in literacy, wealth, and industrial output after they had disposed of older, anachronistic systems and that made Japan and the United States similar.

By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, American and Japanese leaders did not necessarily see eve-to-eve on military affairs, as Japan contested for Pacific hegemony. This would be a strain in Japanese-American relations for years to come, but it came to a halt during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Perhaps one of the most iconic examples of cooperation between both nations occurred during this war. For Russia, Japan had become a threat in the Pacific, as its interest in dominating Korea had been thwarted by Japan⁹. For the Japanese, the Sino-Japanese War marked the beginning of Japanese imperialism in China. Manchuria, which was the northern portion of China, was vital to Japan's imperialist plans. In 1902, Russia had agreed to withdraw troops from Manchuria in three stages but much to Japanese dismay they agreed to only the first¹⁰. An ultimatum issued by Japan after Russia entered Korea was ignored and a "surprise" attack ultimately began the war two days later. Japanese naval commanders trained at the American Naval War College struck and sunk the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. After a brutal campaign, the Japanese won with a heavy sacrifice. It was a decisive victory in late May of 1905, however, at Tsushima that saw Russia's Baltic Fleet sunk¹¹. Peculiarly, for the Japanese it was an American banking agency, headed by Jacob H. Schiff, an American of German-Jewish descent, that provided large sums of loans to Japan to fund the war effort. Schiff's Kuhn, Loeb, and Company had loaned Japan \$100 million USD¹², a staggering amount for its time. Russia's antisemitic views had offended Schiff to the point of consciously supporting its enemy in Japan. Schiff was thanked for his contribution in Japan's victory with Japan's "Order of the Rising Sun" by the Meiji Emperor himself.13 American cooperation did not come directly. Finances from a billionaire, and American training of its navy proved fruitful in what was arguable one of the turning points in Japan's emergence as a great global power.

The American stance in the Russo-Japanese War had been neutral and occasionally pro-Russian, but this would change with President Theodore Roosevelt's intervention. One of the more remarkable events of cooperation was what happened *after* the war. The story, however, must begin with an introduction to American President Theodore Roosevelt. Four weeks before the attack on Port Arthur, Roosevelt had expressed sympathy with Japan and vowed to enforce neutrality if Japan went to war with Tsarist Russia. He made sure via Secretary of State John Hay that he would protect China's rights¹⁴ (referring to the Russian-

⁹ John Hunter Boyle, *Modern Japan: The American Nexus* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993), 139.

 ¹⁰ Yasutoshi Teramoto and Tosh Minohara, "The Emergence of Japan on the Global Stage, 1895–1908," in *The History of US-Japan Relations*. Iokibe M. and T. Minohara T., eds. (Singapore: Palgrave Macmilian, 2017), 28.
 ¹¹ Boyle, *Modern Japan: The American Nexus*, 140.

¹² Edward S. Miller, "Japan's Other Victory: Overseas Financing of the Russo-Japanese War", in *Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. (Leiden: BRILL, 2005), 476, ProQuest Ebook Central (accessed November 20, 2017).

¹³ Boyle, Modern Japan: The American Nexus, 139.

¹⁴ Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War; a Critical Study of American Policy in Eastern Asia in 1902-5, Based Primarily Upon the Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1925), 27.

Manchurian problem). It should be noted that America was one of the major actors in the Far East and Pacific, and Russia's loss would be America's gain, as Russia sought to dominate Korea, whereas America and Japan sought to champion an Open-Door policy. ¹⁵ While at Harvard University, Roosevelt had lodged with Japanese diplomats Kaneko Kentarō, and Komura Jutarō, the former would be integral in dealing with the Americans in the Treaty of Portsmouth. It was men like Ito Hirobumi and his *genrō* compatriots that persuaded Komura to dispatch Kaneko to New York to bring the Americans on their side to negotiate. The Japanese having realized that they could not survive a protracted war saw it best to end the war diplomatically. Kaneko Kentarō sent a letter to President Roosevelt while in New York reminding him of their time at Harvard. Following a White House meeting, Kaneko sent another letter describing that American capital, combined with Japanese skill and knowledge of the East Asian markets would prove beneficial to the Americans. Ultimately, Roosevelt reciprocated and Kaneko and his colleague Takahira became close acquittance of the White House.¹⁶

To Japan's fortune, Roosevelt agreed to mediate for the Japanese and arrangements had been met to negotiate a deal between Japanese and Russian delegates. Roosevelt's motivation was not necessarily for the love of Japan nor for his fellow Harvard man. For Roosevelt, the balance of power of East Asia was paramount in the interests of America.¹⁷ Per Roosevelt's recommendations, he argued that Japan's influence in Korea be recognized¹⁸. This had a significant impact for the future fortunes of Japan as Korea would be incorporated into the Japanese Empire in 1910. The Liaotung peninsula in China and the South Manchurian railway also went to Japan, with an entry to Manchuria and the commencement of economic exploitation in this region.¹⁹ This would remain significant for the Japanese for decades and heightened tensions between China and Japan. The Russo-Japanese War embodied two forms of cooperation between Japan and America. One, the Americans had no qualms about aiding Japan with capital. Despite any rising hysteria of the "Asian peril" among some Westerners, the Americans were willing to help, albeit with a self-serving purpose. Second, Roosevelt, who remarkably won the first Nobel Peace Prize as a head of state for his role as a mediator, proved as the American President that he was willing to aid the Japanese government. This diplomatic alliance with America was significant. Japan effectively incorporated both Manchuria and Korea into their empire. Japan successfully got what they wanted despite the Russians not paying indemnities as per Roosevelt's recommendation which enraged the citizens of Japan—it did not shatter the sound of victory for the Japanese government. Even more remarkable, America aided Japan almost directly into become a global power effective immediately after the victory was given to Japan after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.

¹⁵ Teramoto and Minohara, "The Emergence of Japan on the Global Stage", 27.

¹⁶ Teramoto and Minohara, "The Emergence of Japan on the Global Stage", 30.

¹⁷ Teramoto and Minohara, "The Emergence of Japan on the Global Stage", 30.

¹⁸ Boyle, Modern Japan: The American Nexus, 143.

¹⁹ Boyle, Modern Japan: The American Nexus, 144.

As historian Akira Iriye noted, Japanese-American relations declined after the Russo-Japanese War, but there was no decline in naval or economic cooperation, this was, as Iriye argued, due to "ideological, moral, and psychological" factors²⁰. However, to Japan's benefit, America still cooperated in important ways all the way to the end of the Meiji period. President William Howard Taft's short-lived but still extremely important Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed in February of 1911 saw for the first time Japan achieve treaty equality after the nation was granted tariff autonomy.²¹ Astonishingly, Americans traded and invested three times more in Japan than they did in China, a partner the Americans would embrace for the next few decades. Why did the treaty matter? For the Japanese, modernization and imitation of the West was the only way to be equal to the West. The Treaty then allowed Japan to be a fully equal partner in the imperialist game. Japan had effectively become a global power with aid from America, but the overturning of American-imposed unequal treaties was perhaps the most symbolic victory of them all. This meant that Japan was an economic equal to the United States.

Akira Iriye noted that the economic policy in the 1910s had remained positively fruitful.²² Japan and America were involved in better trade relations than ever before. Irive observed that that imports from the United States increased four times, while American exports to Japan increased five-fold²³. Even Britain's capital meant less compared to American capital being dumped in Japan. General Tarauchi Masatake, who was one of the forces behind Japan's continental expansionist policy, sought to maintain peaceful relations with the United States. Statesman and future Japanese prime minister Hara Kei, as well as Shidehara Kujo, a high Foreign Ministry official, saw that the future of Japan's prosperity lay in American economic links²⁴. Both Shidehara and Hara recognized that Japan's diplomacy policy should maintain a strong economic tie with the Americans, whether that be in Siberia or China. They predicted that military ambitions in the East Asia would harm the Japanese in the long run. Their forewarning would haunt the Japanese for an aggressive expansionist policy in East Asia would antagonize the Americans into siding with the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the close economic ties though the 1920s would end; this would however demonstrate that Japanese prosperity depended once more on economic cooperation. Historians may ponder a counterfactual scenario: if the state and military had remained true to their American allies, would they have become a major allied power alongside the United States in World War II?

Historians may place a greater emphasis on the co-operation between Japan and other Western nations in the Meiji period, but readers must note why Japanese-American cooperation in the Meiji era mattered more. First, Japan and America both had ambitions in

²⁰ Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific; an Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967), 112.

²¹ Teramoto and Minohara, "The Emergence of Japan on the Global Stage", 47.

²² Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present (London: Routledge, 1997), 43.

²³ Iriye, Japan and the Wider World, 43.

²⁴ Iriye, Japan and the Wider World, 44.

the Pacific, an issue which would play a significant part in the history of World War II. Second, Japanese-American relations set a precedent for the future. The eventual spiral to antagonism and Japan's reckless ambition led to Pearl Harbor and eventually to the war in the Pacific, ending with the Atomic bomb. Eventually, American domination during the MacArthur era was, in a sense, a rapprochement (albeit a coerced one). Japan undoubtedly flourished and emerged once again as a great economic power after MacArthur's tenure had ended.

The relationship between Meiji Japan and the United States began positively. The Iwakura Mission proved to be the first pivotal cooperation between the two nations. Prince Iwakura and his entourage observed the U.S. from California to Washington D.C They observed the trams, experienced the railways, the abundance of resources, and the American success in being an important manufacturer of goods. With the two nations becoming closer, American companies began to invest in Japanese companies at the turn of the twentieth century. The second pivotal point for American-Japanese relations was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This saw Japan effectively become the world's only great Asian power. It was Theodore Roosevelt who recommended the recognition of Japan's influence in Korea and Manchuria. Taft's Treaty in 1911 saw Japan officially become a full-fledged imperial power, free from the imposition of unequal treaties. Undoubtedly, the United States played an integral role in Japan's modernization and ascension to a great power. Cooperation with the United States might very well have allowed Japan to benefit so much that it could be an equal to the West. While not to downplay Japan's own brilliance in its nation-building efforts, nor the assistance of other great powers such as Britain, France, or Germany-the American relationship with Japan was special. Even amid racial tensions, the American state still managed compromises to keep peaceful cooperation in play, like for example Woodrow Wilson's compromise in allowing Japan to take Shandong province in 1919. Americans would play a similar role when Japan would emerge out of the ashes of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, in guiding Japan to the second phase of modernization and completing Japan's process of absorbing the West. It was American aid that allowed Japan to come back to economic strength after the Pacific War came to a bitter conclusion.

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Building the Perfect Soviet City

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The growth of the video game industry is directly impacting the way the population of the globe is consuming media. Video games offer a very interactive way of storytelling and a presentation form that other media sources cannot provide. Because of the interactivity involved in video games and the depth of experience that video games allow, many different groups and organisations, including scholars, are examining the effectiveness of video games as a tool to present various kinds of data. Video games as a tool to present history offer a perfect way to introduce people to general topics and periods, acting also as an enhancement to written work; video games are therefore a useful tool. Video games, because of their commitment to present a fun and engaging experience, often cut out historically accurate presentations to preserve gameplay aspects, for this reason, video games cannot replace written work as a source for historical learning. Utilising video games as a pedagogical tool is possible if targeted to the proper audience and utilising appropriate genres.

In the next sections, I will present a game concept that incorporates historical facts into an appropriate genre targeted at a smaller demographic of people to utilise video games as a historical tool properly. The game I am presenting is a city building game set in the Soviet Union. The game will present aspects of both an economic simulation in developing a town within the Soviet system, as well as incorporating political intrigue and elements of Soviet society to create a fun and historically accurate tool to teach people about development and life within the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal of the game is to transform the vast openness of the Soviet countryside into an industrial heartland, without being removed from power for failing to adhere to government policy.

The economic aspects of the game will revolve around the planned economy.¹ Players will have to work within the system, managing bribery and corruption, to focus on attaining goals and production quotas. The balance between strict adherence to government policy and ensuring that objectives are completed will reflect the struggles many officials faced during the Soviet period. Within this system, players will have to manage inefficiencies and shortages, for example, shortages of food and luxuries to maintain happiness, and ineffective

¹ Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, 1997), 41-42.

transport systems that deliver vital resources and people to the city.² The development of a black market in town will ease the burden of providing resources, while increasing the likelihood that government scrutiny will fall upon the player. Planning within the Soviet system and choosing how to reform and refine the economy is key in determining the success of the city. The player will make choices, for example, whether to allow small private holding to boost local food production or to adhere to the Soviet ideals of no private property.³ Local conditions and available local resources are significant factors in determining how players will need to specialise and develop their cities. Local conditions play a further role in how the player interacts with the land they are developing. Harsh weather conditions directly impact the player's ability to develop the city. Having access to large river systems will allow the player to utilise dams to produce electricity, not only for the city but for the country, giving the player a powerful source of income.⁴ Dealing with these various issues surrounding the environment and government economic policy itself will determine how the player initiates political systems that deal with the people in their city.

The political aspects of the game will be focusing on two areas, dealing with the central government and dealing with the people of the city themselves. The balance between these two aspects will determine how successful the player will be in creating their city. To build dams, collective farms and large-scale industrial centres the player will need to mobilise a large number of people. The use of military forces and conscripts as workers to create these massive infrastructure projects is very effective. However, the player will need to manage the impact of using the military.⁵ Using military forces is effective but temporary; another solution is to utilise propaganda to bolster the spirits of the workers and create shock workers to speed construction and gain valuable experience among the people.⁶ Using shock workers too has downsides because people will demand better services including housing and food. People will not work if they live in tents and mud huts dying from exposure and malnutrition.⁷ Dealing with the powers of the central government is vital in ensuring that the player remains in control and at peak effectiveness. Dealing with the impact of purges on the city and intrusion from forces such as the NKVD very readily pose problems for the player who is attempting to create an efficient industrial machine and balancing further the impact of ousting a person for dissent or keeping them for their strong managerial efforts.⁸ The goal ultimately of the game is to provide a fun experience that is entirely based on historical evidence and the realities of a city planner and industrialist in the Soviet Union.

Gaming as a tool to be used to present history is beneficial if proper time and investment are allocated to developing games in genres that lend themselves to creating a very accurate

² Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 72.

³ Stephen Wegren, Land Reform in Russia: Institutional Design and Behavioral Responses (New Haven, 2009), 29-30.

⁴ Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 90-92.

⁵ Paul Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World (Washington, 2002), 28.

⁶ Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 89-92.

⁷ Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 157-158.

⁸ Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark Steinberg, A History of Russia (Oxford, 1997), 522-525.

historical experience. Games of this manner though are not largely popular with the vast majority of the public and are therefore overlooked. Video games that do not strictly adhere to historical accuracy are not useless as a teaching tool or point of contact with historical themes. Video games such as the Assassin's Creed series are largely inaccurate historically but create sprawling cities with historically accurate architecture. Assassins Creed's ability to deliver the player into an environment that they can freely explore and view the buildings up close gives the player a detailed and immersive experience that writings and 2D forms of media cannot provide. The 3D representations and player ability to be utilised as a pedagogical tool. Gaming is also a valuable tool in creating considerable public interest for history especially with younger people who may not be as interested in studying history through texts, or who learn better through experiences. Video games will never be able to replace writings as the most effective form of teaching historically accurate events and themes because of gaming's reliance on gathering sales and producing a fun experience that will not be able to adhere to historical accuracy strictly.⁹

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⁹ Kevin Kee, Shawn Graham, Pat Dunae, John Lutz, Andrew Large, Michel Blondeau, and Mike Clare,

[&]quot;Towards a Theory of Good History Through Gaming," Canadian Historical Review 90, no.2 (2009): 325-326.

Surrey's East Clayton Community Development from an Environmental History Perspective

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One of the City of Surrey's first attempts to create a sustainable, pedestrian-oriented community was in the East Clayton Heights region.¹ This development plan was a great idea for transforming a previously rural area into an urban residential community. However, three negative environmental impacts occurred due to this residential expansion. These issues include land use management, light pollution, and noise pollution. During the actual process of development, the suggested land use proposal was altered leaving residential areas with less of the natural environment than initially intended, while both light and noise pollution have had detrimental effects on the quality of human life in this area.

Planning for development of East Clayton began in the late 1990s. In 2003, the City of Surrey came up with an official proposal with a set of goals. These goals consisted of: constructing a community where basic services are within approximately five minutes of dwellings, thus encouraging citizens to walk rather than drive; houses that face the streets with car storage hidden in the rear thus promoting social interactions between citizens; traffic being dispersed by an interconnected street grid which would also allow for a convenient transit system connecting East Clayton to the surrounding area; building a more green and friendly environment that would be cost efficient with "narrow streets shaded by rows of trees"²; and finally, supporting a natural drainage system, as well as protecting the natural environment.

While the proposed plan may have seemed quite ambitious, the City of Surrey succeeded in meeting quite a few of its goals. For example, the houses in the area are close to basic services such as schools, parks, grocery stores, medical offices, banks, and restaurants. All dwellings face the street with their garages or other vehicle storage areas in the rear of the buildings. There are a number of roads connecting to major roads or highways making it easy for citizens to visit areas nearby. Throughout the community, trees are spaced roughly every eight to ten feet apart in residential areas and no more than thirty feet apart along the

¹ South Fraser Blog, "East Clayton and Commercial Development," https://sfb.nathanpachal.com/2013/ [accessed 10 Mar 2018].

² SF Blog, "East Clayton."

commercial areas providing a shaded sidewalk along the slender streets. In the original plan, trees were to be "closely spaced (10-12m. / 33-40 ft. apart)."³

The pedestrian-oriented community was also an effort by the city to be more environmentally friendly. The aim of having a community able to walk or cycle to all basic services and amenities was to improve air quality by reducing vehicle use. This type of community also promotes the use of transit by having a bus stop "within a 400-metre (1/4 mile) walk-able radius of all residents."⁴ East Clayton was successful in creating a pedestrian-oriented community in the residential areas but failed in commercial areas. In the case of East Clayton, commercial buildings have become auto-oriented strip malls, thus counteracting the reduction of automobiles on the road.

Land use management looks at the way in which land will be used and developed in either rural or urban settings. In order for Surrey to begin this project, there had to be road expansion in the area first: for example, the expansion of 188th Street north through to Fraser Highway.⁵ The City of Surrey's proposal for East Clayton allocated 296 acres for residential areas, 21.20 acres for commercial use, 35.36 acres for business parks and 83.27 acres for parks, open space, and preservation areas.⁶ A major issue with this land use method is the fact that the majority of land was designated for buildings rather than natural spaces. Natural habitats were devastated and the environment in the area changed completely. No matter how many trees are planted along streets, that does not make up for those lost to make the community.

East Clayton's residential area was created with the idea of single-family homes.⁷ Along with the single-family homes, many of the dwellings were built with a coach home on the property as well. These concepts resulted in a lack of parking for the residents in the area. "The parking havoc stems from the high densification of homes in the area [a]s well, many homeowners in the area are renting out one or two suites, and don't have adequate parking for those tenants."⁸ This was an issue that was not taken into account when deciding how to best develop the community. Parking remains an issue in the East Clayton community as of 2018.⁹

Light pollution is when the night sky is brightened by artificial light sources (man-made sources such as street lights). Some of the problems that come with light pollution are "energy

 ³ "East Clayton Neighbourhood," March 2003., 52.
 ⁴ "East Clayton Neighbourhood," 54.

⁵ Kevin Diakiw, "Road work unveiled: Feds, province announce major plans." *Peninsula News*. Mar 5, 2003.

⁶ "East Clayton Neighbourhood," 56-59.

⁷ "East Clayton Neighbourhood," 56.

⁸ Amy Reed, "Neighbourhoods: East Clayton's a good idea but in reality, it's a 'high density mess," http://prodadmin1.glacier.atex.cniweb.net:8080/preview/www/2.2551/2.2934/2.5326/1.902977 [accessed 21 Mar 2018]

⁹ Elliot W, "LETTER: Surrey's ho-hum approach created parking hell in Clayton,"

https://www.surreynowleader.com/opinion/letter-surreys-ho-hum-approach-has-created-parking-hell-in-clayton/ [accessed 21 Mar 2018]

waste, sky glow, and environmental impact."¹⁰ The most concerning issue with light pollution is the health effect it has on humans. In order to produce a large amount of artificial light, fossil fuels are burned which is a direct cause of air pollution.¹¹ Air pollution "causes higher asthma rates and increased respiratory problems for people with lung disease and other medical issues."¹² Constructing a safe pedestrian-oriented community means that a large number of street lights are a necessity. Rachel Thessin and Beatty Kelley note that "[a]n estimated 35 to 50 percent of all light pollution comes from streetlights, which typically are on every night from dusk until dawn"¹³.

The most common health issue with light pollution is known as glare. Exposure to artificial light at nighttime builds up calcification in the lenses of human eyes scattering the light. Glare happens when one's eye is forced to adjust to a brighter light than would be naturally occurring.¹⁴ Unfortunately, the majority of people with this problem do not know that glare is the issue. The most serious concern with respect to light pollution is that breast cancer has recently been linked to it as well. "In fact, researchers now estimate that up to 30% of breast cancers may be due to light at night suppressing circadian rhythm."¹⁵ Circadian rhythm is the natural body clock, which tells one when to sleep, rise, and eat. The World Health Organization (WHO) now views disruption of circadian rhythm as equally as harmful as smoking tobacco for lung cancer.¹⁶

Noise pollution is defined as harmful or annoying levels of noise. Examples of noise pollution are the sounds produced by airplanes, industry, or traffic. "Urbanization and industrialization are constantly increasing the number of noise sources [and] there is almost no working place or settlement not exposed to noise."¹⁷ Major roads surround the East Clayton area. Bordering the community are the "north-south routes of 188th, 192nd, and 196th Streets, and along the east-west 68th, 70th, and 72nd Avenues"¹⁸. Along these roads there are a number of homes. The closer that a dwelling is to one of these major roads, the worse the noise pollution becomes. As the community grows, so does the amount of traffic on these major roads.

The most concerning health risk associated with noise pollution is the disruption of sleep. Having interrupted sleep patterns is a major problem because it "further leads to mood swings, feelings of tiredness, apathy, decrease in working ability, headache and pronounced nervosis."¹⁹ Heavy vehicles and trains have been proven to negatively affect sleep the most.

¹⁰ Mario Motta, "Light Pollution's Medical Effects," Sky & Telescope, Vol. 122, Issue 3 (Sept. 2011): 86.

¹¹ Motta, "Light Pollution's," 86.

¹² Motta, "Light Pollution's," 86.

¹³ Rachel Thessin and Beatty J. Kelley, "Bright Lights, Big Problems," *Sky & Telescope*. Vol. 104, Issue 6 (Dec. 2002): 35.

¹⁴ Thessin, and Kelly, "Bright Lights," 34.

 $^{^{15}}$ Motta, "Light Pollution's," 86.

¹⁶ Motta, "Light Pollution's," 86.

¹⁷ Sanja L. Korica and Kristina D. Popovic, "Noise, Sources of Noise and its Influence on the Quality of Work and Living Environment," *Military Technical Courier*, Vol. 65, Issue 4 (2017): 1020.

¹⁸ "East Clayton Neighbourhood", 51.

¹⁹ Korica, and Popovic, "Noise, Sources of Noise," 1020.

Other sources of noise in urban areas also come from neighbourhood industrial noise. In the case of East Clayton noise would come from traffic and the neighbourhood itself. Noise is also a problem for physical health along with psychological health. The intensity of sound can cause hearing damage over time.²⁰ Living in close proximity to these noise sources can be detrimental to one's health.

East Clayton is unique because it was one of Surrey's first attempts at building a community based on a citizen's ability to travel easily without the use of automobiles. The "goal of creating a pedestrian-oriented neighbourhood has succeeded."²¹ Unfortunately, the way that the community's land was managed created two major problems. A lack of green space impacted the area's natural environment and the single-home/coach home dwellings have created a horrendous parking system for residents. On top of these land use issues are the light and noise pollution effects for citizens residing in the area. Surrey's East Clayton development successfully created a pedestrian-oriented community, but it also created several unexpected challenges for this community that cannot be resolved easily.

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²⁰ Korica, and Popovic, "Noise, Sources of Noise," 1018.

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An Analysis of the Success of Japan's Video Game Industry

John Niescier HIST 3370: Modern Japan Dr Jack P. Hayes March 27, 2019

The video game industry first emerged in the 1970s, and since then has continued to expand. In the early 2000s, it surpassed the global film industry in terms of revenue.¹ As of 2018, the largest markets were the United States and China.² The United States in particular has remained a leading market in the industry since its inception, as the industry was born on the country's west coast.³ Yet, despite being its birthplace, the United States market would eventually be overtaken by another: Japan. Japan's game industry eclipsed that of the United States during the 1980s, remaining the dominant market for decades.⁴ Even by 2002, when it was clear its position was weakening, Japan still controlled 50% of global video game market share.⁵ How was Japan able to attain such a position? What comparative advantages did Japan have over the United States? This paper will explore the histories of video games in the United States and Japan, studying the unique traits of modern Japan that allowed it to excel at the creation of a large and stable video game industry. In doing so, it will conclude that the significant factor that allowed Japan to pursue video game development so effectively was connections; connections thanks to its small geography; connections between workers and companies thanks to Japan's business culture; and, most importantly, connections with the consumer electronics, comic book, and animation industries, that all combined to shape modern Japan as an ideal location for establishing a video game industry.

Video games first gained popularity in the late 1970s. The game that kickstarted this was *Pong*, which was published by Atari.⁶ Atari was founded by Nolan Bushnell, an engineer fresh out of university who wanted to make a name for himself in the world of technology,

¹ "The Video Games' Industry is Bigger Than Hollywood," <u>https://lpesports.com/e-sports-news/the-video-games-industry-is-bigger-than-hollywood</u>, accessed March 24, 2019.

² Tom Wijman, "Mobile Revenues Account for More Than 50% of the Global Games Market as It Reaches \$137.9 Billion in 2018," <u>https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/global-games-market-reaches-137-9-billion-in-2018-mobile-games-take-half</u>, accessed March 24, 2019.

³ Yuko Aoyama and Hiro Izushi, "Hardware gimmick or cultural innovation? Technological, cultural, and social foundations of the Japanese video game industry," *Research Policy* 32, (2003): 427.

⁴ Hiro Izushi and Yuko Aoyama, "Industry evolution and cross-sectoral skills transfers: a comparative analysis of the video game industry in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom," *Environment and Planning A* 38, (2006): 1857.

⁵ Mia Consalvo, Atari to Zelda: Japan's Videogames in Global Contexts (Cambridge, 2016), 150.

⁶ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 427.

while distancing himself from the US military.⁷ Bushnell and Atari had a similar relationship to that of Steve Jobs and Apple, or Bill Gates and Microsoft. These companies emerged alongside the growth of Silicon Valley, as young Americans with an education in computers and electronics sought to make it on their own in emerging markets.⁸ Many of these companies existed along the west coast, resulting in networks between them. Steve Jobs for example worked at Atari before moving on to Apple. He expressed interest in video games, as evidenced by Apple's early computers, which were capable of playing some of the first computer games.9

The important takeaway was that video games emerged from existing structures of computers and electronics, because these were necessary for the creation and spread of video games. Initially, Atari and its competitors found success from entering the new industry.¹⁰ In 1978, the American video game industry grew to \$200 million, and by 1981 to \$1 billion.¹¹ However, as the business spread, it became more complex, and a wider variety of skills were necessary for creating games. Musicians were suddenly needed for constructing music, artists for visual components, programmers for creating the increasingly complex structures of the games, testers for finding errors in the code, and so on.¹² American companies responded to this complexity by expanding their businesses. However, they reached a point at which companies were unable to keep up with consumer demand, leading to the video game crash of 1983. By this time, the quality of video games had dropped so much that consumer confidence and desire for video games had been largely eroded in the United States, driving many firms out of the business.¹³

The United States, however, was not the only country seeing a growing technological market that would lead to the creation of video games. Japan during this same period had begun developing and selling its first video games. Like the United States, Japan had large consumer electronics industries, and government policies that helped facilitate innovation and technological development.¹⁴ However, examining the emergence of the video game industry revealed noticeable differences from that of the United States. First, there was no video game crash in Japan, nor any downturn in consumer confidence towards video games. Second, even before the 1983 crash, many of the most successful video games in Japan and the United States came from the island nation. Pac Man and Space Invaders, the most popular games in the United States during this time, were both Japanese products.¹⁵ Japan was finding success in video games even during this early stage.

⁷ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1850.

 ⁸ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1850.
 ⁹ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1850.

¹⁰ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 427.
¹¹ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 427.

¹² Federico Riboldazzi, Cornelia Storz, and Moritz John, "Mobility and innovation: A cross-country comparison in the video games industry," Research Policy 44, (2015): 125.

¹³ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 427.

¹⁴ Jack Hayes, "Economic Recovery and the Tokyo Games" (lecture, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, March 13, 2019).

¹⁵ Mark Wolf, The Medium of the Video Game, (Austin, 2001), 44.

To reiterate, the process of creating and selling video games was a complex one. A video game industry could only emerge out of markets that already had infrastructure for both the technological and artistic skills that were necessary. This is why during the early years of video games, the major markets existed primarily in the United States and Japan.¹⁶ These countries had industries that were geared towards innovation and had a diverse economy of various skill sets. However, while being in possession of these industries was one thing, being able to effectively connect them to one another was a different matter, and key to understanding Japan's success.

A first point in Japan's favour was its geographic layout, or to be more specific, Tokyo, and its significance as the industrial centre of Japan. Tokyo was not only the economic and political capital of Japan, but it also was right next to Japan's second largest city (Yokohama), allowing it to attract the majority of talented individuals.¹⁷ The result was that Tokyo became the centre of most technological industries within the country.¹⁸ This concentrated nature of not just Japan's industries, but technical and artistic schools for training new employees, made it the perfect location for the emergence of a new business that required connections with workers of many different skills sets.¹⁹ As of the early 2000s, Tokyo had over 80% of all of Japanese video game firms, showing how significant the area was for establishing the industry.²⁰ To contrast this, Silicon Valley in the United States was not the ideal location for such an industry. Much of the previous technological, entertainment, and manufacturing industries were established on the east coast or central United States, hampering the easily available resources of video game creators by being on the west coast.²¹

While Japan's geography helped the video game industry to establish connections with existing structures, another element at play was the business culture of modern Japan. Studies have shown that within Japan's work culture there was less emphasis on the individual element of groups of employers compared to the United States.²² This worked well for video games, because they required so much coordination and cooperation between workers of many different fields. Shigeru Miyamoto, a well-known video game designer at Nintendo, had this to say on its importance and difference among countries: "UK software publishers pay attention to the structure of games at all stages of the development process...their approach is based on a solid understanding of hardware architecture, widely shared by Japanese software publishers, but seldom found among US publishers."²³

¹⁶ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1846.

¹⁷ Seiji Hanzawa and Daisaku Yamamoto, "Recasting the agglomeration benefits for innovation in a hits-based cultural industry: evidence from the Japanese console videogame industry," *Geografiska Annaler: Series B*, *Human Geography* 99, no. 1 (2017): 67 – 68.

¹⁸ Hanzawa, 67 - 68.

¹⁹ Hanzawa, 64.

²⁰ Hanzawa, 66.

 $^{^{21}}$ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1850-1851.

²² Cornelia Storz, "Dynamics in innovation systems: Evidence from Japan's game software industry," *Research Policy* 37, (2008): 1485.

²³ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 435.

This emphasis on group thinking had been criticized as stifling innovation, making it a hinderance when constructing products in an artistic medium.²⁴ Japan's success in video games, however, showed this was false. Cornelia Storz found in a study on Japan's economy that while Japan did have less entrepreneurship than the United States, "it is remarkable to observe that they [small and medium sized enterprises] play a much more important role in the Japanese economy than in most other OECD countries."²⁵ This was because Japan's business culture encouraged small group businesses rather than individual businesses. It did not limit the ability for new businesses to emerge and grow, and had played an important part in driving Japan's economy and innovation since the 1960s.²⁶

Another common critique of Japan's work culture was its labour laws that required employers to hold on to employees for long periods of time. The average Japanese software developer worked for a company twice as long as their American counterpart.²⁷ This created business norms that encouraged workers to feel obligated to their employer for nurturing them for so long.²⁸ This was argued as limiting innovation by tying workers to a few companies. However, this argument had also been debunked. Many studies showed that having workers stay at a company for longer periods of time, it encouraged them to change positions and learn new skills within the company, rather than between companies. This, plus the added security of working in the same company, encouraged workers to experiment more with their work and try to innovate.²⁹

This was not the only way Japan's business culture encouraged innovation. Having so many industries stationed within Tokyo also helped. Seiji Hanzawa argued that large clusters of companies drove innovation by creating a safety net. Through the large amount of consumers and protection the connected industries had from each other, plus the increased job security, workers were penalized less for a failed experiment, thus encouraging firms to try novel ideas for their products.³⁰ The same study also found that companies frequently outsourced and worked with other industries as a means of driving innovation within, which often worked.³¹ Such connections were only possible in metropoles such as Tokyo. This resulted in workers having different specializations: in the United States, employers valued basic skills that could be translated between different industries more due to the less secure nature of employment.³² In Japan, workers had a greater number of sophisticated skills, and were better at multitasking.³³ All of this is to say that Japan's business policies, geography, and norms gave workers an effective skill set when it came to forming compromises and finding

 29 Riboldazzi, 121 – 122.

³² Riboldazzi, 123 – 124.

²⁴ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 425.

²⁵ Storz, 1485.

²⁶ Storz, 1485.

²⁷ Riboldazzi, 128.

²⁸ Rika Morioka, "Gender Difference in the Health Risk Perception of Radiation from Fukushima in Japan: The Role of Hegemonic Masculinity," *Social Science and Medicine* 107, (2014): 106.

³⁰ Hanzawa, 70.

³¹ Hanzawa, 69.

³³ Riboldazzi, 131.

ways to innovate and use limitations to their advantage. Keiji Inafune, a game designer best known for his creation of the *Mega Man* series, had this to say on a key part of the success of early Japanese game developers:

I think, to use the car industry as an analogy, nowadays American and European cars, they can be massive and they can throw in loads and loads of technology, and that's great. But if you want to get a car which is very, very small, but you still have to fit 4 people in it, or you've still got to fit hybrid technology in it, Japan is where people are good at looking at those limitations and working out how to marry those limitations with their goals.³⁴

The geography and business culture of Japan helped facilitate connections between its many businesses; however, specific industries leading in consumer electronics and computers were necessary for the growth of a video game industry. Japan had these, and it was this technological infrastructure that helped video game companies to grow and mass produce their products in a short time. Rather than create brand new lines of manufacturing, they were able to utilize existing infrastructure to create their software. Looking at the success of Japanese firms confirmed this. Nintendo, one of Japan's most successful video game companies, was previously a toy company which took an interest in electronic toys starting in 1964. They gained expertise in electronics through the help of domestic companies such as Sharp and Mitsubishi electronic.³⁵ If these companies did not exist, Nintendo would have been unable to develop the expertise needed for video game development. Sega, another successful company, used small engineering firms in Tokyo for its production of video game components, again showing the usage of existing firms for video game production.³⁶ Finally, Sony found success when entering the video game industry, and much of it was owed to its already existing investments and infrastructure for consumer electronics.³⁷ At the time, international supply chains were underdeveloped, so these companies had to rely on domestic structures within other industries of Japan.³⁸

However, while all these connections helped lay the groundwork for the creation of a video game industry, they alone did not shape the industry's projection. The United States also featured such computer and electronic infrastructure, as did the existence of clusters of many industries. Again, why was Japan able to outgrow them so quickly? To answer this, the other creative industries that held the largest influence on Japan's video game industry must be examined: the comic book and animation industries.

Japan owned one of the largest and most profitable comic book and animation industries in the world. In 1999, one third of all books and magazines sales in Japan were comic books, with approximately two thirds of boys and one sixth of girls aged between five and 18 reading

³⁴ John Szczepaniak, The Untold History of Japanese Game Developers: Volume 1 (self-pub., Kindle, 2014).

³⁵ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1847.

³⁶ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 432.

³⁷ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 432.

³⁸ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 431 – 432.

comic books.³⁹ More significant, however, was the amount of adult comic books that populated the industry. In 1999, 53% of all comics published were targeting adult audiences.⁴⁰ While the video game industry was emerging, the comic book and animation industries were growing exponentially. They had not yet reached an international audience, however, they had become mainstream in Japanese culture. As the video game business took shape and began to become profitable, many animators and artists looked at the comic book and animation industries, with schedules that had them working overtime far too much and with little pay to compensate for this, and saw an opportunity.⁴¹ This plus the close proximity of all the industries meant that many animators and artists quickly migrated to the video game industry, picking up computer skills along the way. The migration was so great that, there were a few years in which Japan's animation industry had a shortage of workers because so many were moving to the video game industry.42

To compare, the comic book and animation industries of the United States did not have the sort of popularity that Japans' did. While both industries emerged much earlier, comic books and animation eventually came under government censorship. The 1954 Comics Code Authority (CCA) crippled the creative freedom of artists within the country: "The number of comic book titles declined from 630 in 1952 to 250 in 1956, and circulation almost halved, leading many publishers to leave the industry or be forced into bankruptcy."43 The CCA also created a popular image of comics and animations being artistic mediums primarily for children, limiting their mainstream appeal.⁴⁴ American comic book artists also had less control over their products, further hurting the industry.⁴⁵ As of 2006, the size of the American comics industry was only 6% of its Japanese counterpart.⁴⁶

The significance of these businesses was that the video game developers of Japan had a unique background and expertise when it came to video game creation. While most if not all initial video game developers in the United States came from a technical background, many of Japan's developers, while also having a technical background, possessed some knowledge and skills in drawing and animating.⁴⁷ Video game creation and training started to take place in schools that also specialized in teaching animation and drawing for students, resulting in the skills between the disciplines intersecting.⁴⁸ This gave them a comparative advantage when it came to the nature of scenario and character creation, as well as rendering simple visuals in creative ways. As games became more complex, it was possible to render detailed characters and create more complex scenarios, something to which audiences responded

³⁹ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 438.
⁴⁰ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 438.
⁴¹ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 439.
⁴² Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 439.

⁴³ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1851.

⁴⁴ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1854.

⁴⁵ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 438 – 439.

⁴⁶ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1851.

⁴⁷ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 439 - 440.

⁴⁸ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 439 - 440.

highly favourably.⁴⁹ Due to the limited technology however, developers would have to be creative if they wanted to create appealing characters and scenarios. Solving this dilemma was much easier for developers with a background in drawing.

When the games and development systems of Japan and the United States are compared. one clear distinction between them arises: games in the United States had a greater emphasis on realism as a visual style. Designs from the United States were drawn largely from realistic counterparts, such as well-known athletes or film characters.⁵⁰ The large influence of Hollywood on North American culture, which found most success through live action films, was the key factor in this. American developers of video games were largely influenced by live action films.⁵¹ This influence remained a part of the industry; a study comparing game development in the United States and Japan in 2015 found that American video games were more often based on licensed characters, usually from the film industry.⁵² However, this reliance created a problem for developers, due to the limited technology of video games at the time. Because video games considered the interactions of the player, it was not possible to render characters or backgrounds that resembled live action films, creating a dilemma for developers.⁵³. Upon a closer inspection of the American video game industry, Aoyama and Izushi argued that the video game crash could be viewed as the result of American developers being unable to solve this dilemma. Struggling to create appealing characters, American firms increasingly turned to licensing characters from films in an effort to find success.⁵⁴ However, due to the limited storage capacity and microprocessors, these characters and their subsequent games, such as Atari's Raiders of the Lost Ark and E.T. the Extra Terrestrial were economic failures.⁵⁵ This failure between video games and licensed film characters contributed to the rapid decline of American consumer interest, and the eventual market crash.⁵⁶ The American video game industry failed because it was unable to successfully establish connections with Hollywood and other popular entertainment industries within the country.

Japanese developers, however, were better prepared for this technological dilemma. Their background in comics and animation gave them tools necessary to combat these limitations. Comics and animations, by not being live action, had a smaller emphasis on realism. Characters with unorthodox proportions and shapes could be created and put into interesting scenarios. This meant that among the Japanese public and developers, there was a smaller desire for creating realistic video games.⁵⁷ The limited technology of video games was a problem that Japanese developers were able to overcome much easier. As quoted again by Aoyama and Izushi: "Here, technological limitations worked to their advantage: characters

⁴⁹ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 437.

 ⁵⁰ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1851.
 ⁵¹ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1851.

⁵² Riboldazzi, 128.

⁵³ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1857.

⁵⁴ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1857.

⁵⁵ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1857.

⁵⁶ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1857.

⁵⁷ Storz, 1487.

from comic books and animated films are far more suited to video games than are their more realistic counterparts from films.".⁵⁸ Doing so allowed them consistently to create and release quality games that became successful in both Japan and the United States. A clear example of this is found in Nintendo. Much of their success was attributed to games with unique and appealing characters and scenarios: *Donkey Kong, Super Mario Bros,* and *The Legend of Zelda* being notable examples.⁵⁹ All of these games were created by Shigeru Miyamoto, a famous figure in the industry who, growing up, loved Japanese comics so much that he was part of a comic book club in middle school, and after that went to art school.⁶⁰ He was one of Nintendo's first artists, and it was this artistic background that led him to create such successful games, which could only be possible thanks to the animation and comic book industries unique to modern Japan.⁶¹ Indeed, as in the American industry, the influence of comic artists stayed with the industry. A look at international recognition of video games in 2015 found that Japanese firms gained the most awards within categories related to design and digital representation.⁶²

To conclude, video game industries should be viewed less as a brand-new business, and more as the result of existing entertainment and electronic industries within a country. The video game industry emerged and grew out of existing networks and using existing technologies. Understanding this was key to why Japan became so dominant in the early decades of the global game industry. Thanks to many of its institutions being centered in close proximity by virtue of Tokyo, the presence of a business culture that encouraged compromise and group thinking, and most importantly, having access to a mainstream consumer electronics, comic book, and animation industries, developers were given unique tools that were not available outside of Japan. These gave Japanese developers a comparative advantage that allowed them to create video games with appealing characters and scenarios much easier and at a much faster pace than their competitors. It was the video game industry's ability to successfully establish links with other industries in Japan that allowed it to grow so quickly. The best example of this is the Pokémon series. The first games were published by Nintendo in 1996, with comics featuring the characters beginning publication later that year. The next year, an animated television series began airing, with films coming in the following years.⁶³ *Pokémon* would become one of the most profitable video game franchises, and it found great success because it was able to utilize the video game, animation, comic book, and film industries in Japan to create a successful brand of easily recognizable characters, and it could only do so thanks to the existence and connection of all these industries.

⁵⁸ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1857.

 $^{^{59}}$ Aoyama and Izushi, "Hardware," 427-428.

⁶⁰ Osamu Inoue, Nintendo Magic: Winning the Videogame Wars, (New York, 2010), 64.

⁶¹ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1848.

⁶² Storz, 1487.

⁶³ Izushi and Aoyama, "Industry," 1848.

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Zaibatsu Machinations and Imperialist War

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Japan may have entered the colonial game late, but the small island nation still managed to acquire an empire that spread far across East Asia. These colonial holdings not only provided Japan with a strategic buffer zone between its potential enemies, but also proved to be invaluable in supplying the home islands with raw materials and other valuable resources such as foodstuffs, many of which were not domestically available in sufficient quantities. Japan's empire benefitted not only the state, but also those who would go on to exploit the newly acquired resources and markets, namely the *zaibatsu*. These large-scale financial and industrial conglomerates used savvy managerial tactics and political manoeuvring to assume control over large swaths of the Japanese economy, and operated according to strict, centralized policies dictated by the familial head and his board. In order to retain legitimacy and keep profits high, the *zaibatsu* carefully nurtured their relationship with the state. The subsequent collaborations would come to be seen as emblematic of entanglements between private enterprise and the Imperial Japanese state, reminiscent of those seen in Nazi Germany. The fact that the *zaibatsu* held incredible economic and political sway and benefitted from the subjugation and exploitation of the country's colonial possessions raises an important question in the study of post-Meiji Japan. To what extent did ties in high places demonstrate *zaibatsu* culpability in imperialist war? By accumulating incredible economic and industrial power and by marrying into the political system, the zaibatsu garnered significant influence in the dealings of the state. Furthermore, the *zaibatsu* had priorities and goals that could be realized with empire, thus common interest was found with the state. The zaibatsu indeed found themselves entangled, and readily committed themselves to assisting the state both in the facilitation and exploitation of empire.

To begin, an examination of how the *zaibatsu* managed to control such large swaths of the domestic economy is in order. By utilising shrewd managerial strategies centered around a holding company to manage affiliate firms and a central bank, the *zaibatsu* were able quickly and efficiently to enlarge their conglomerates. For example, through an expansive series of acquisitions, as well as the investment in and establishment of complementary concerns, Mitsui *zaibatsu* established strong footholds in many industries. Other *zaibatsu* groups, such as Nissan, would follow a similar path, expanding their holdings at an incredible rate of

speed.¹ In order to oversee their newfound business empires, the *zaibatsu* established central holding companies that held the stock of all affiliated companies.² The purpose of these holding companies was to ensure that affiliate businesses would comply with and adhere to the policies of the parent company.³ These holding companies would become one of the primary devices requisite for the establishment and maintenance of the *zaibatsu* business conglomerates, the other being the central bank. After achieving the majority takeover of a specific firm, the holding company would 'hold' the *zaibatsu*-owned stock and facilitate restructuring and reorganization policies in line with the parent company. This meant assigning new directors to the boards of associate firms, many of whom served on the boards of multiple affiliated firms simultaneously. These interlocking directors held incredible power over personnel and policy decisions within the firms and made sure every decision was okayed by the parent company.⁴ These managerial strategies allowed the *zaibatsu* quickly and effectively to accumulate large economic empires, essentially taking control of certain commodity and industrial sectors, all the while enriching the vaults of their very own banks.

Zaibatsu banks held immense financial power all the way to the end of the Pacific War. On the eve of surrender in 1944, their dominance as creditors was on full display as 74.9 percent of all bank loans came from four *zaibatsu* banks.⁵ This wealth translated directly to influence, and allowed the *zaibatsu* to further facilitate acquisitions and gain increasing control over industrial and commercial industries.⁶ For example, Mitsubishi Bank saw potential in Tokyo Steel, a firm that was facing bankruptcy, and offered an emergency loan on the condition that the company transfer a majority of its shares into the hands of the *zaibatsu*.⁷ By utilizing financial incentive structures afforded by their position as a prime creditor, Mitsubishi was able to protect the steel manufacturer, a firm deemed "indispensable to the industries of Japan", from acquisition by rival enterprises, further increasing the economic power and majesty of Mitsubishi itself.⁸

When handled effectively, the utility of managerial expertise and the central bank created a virtuous cycle wherein the *zaibatsu* were able to grow ever larger while ownership and leadership remained firmly centralized in the hands of the family. An examination of the failure of the Suzuki *zaibatsu* further illustrates the importance of these two mechanisms. First of all, the head of Suzuki was unworldly, had no more than a grade-school education, and was unwilling to delegate authority.⁹ His weak and inflexible leadership neglected

¹ Tetsuji Okazaki, "The Role of Holding Companies in Pre-War Japanese Economic Development: Rethinking Zaibatsu in Perspectives of Corporate Governance." *Social Science Japan Journal* 4, no. 2 (2001): 247-250. ² Okazaki, "Holding Companies," 250.

³ Okazaki, "Holding Companies," 250.

⁴ Kozo Yamamura, "Zaibatsu, Prewar and Zaibatsu, Postwar." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 23, no. 4 (1964): 548.

⁵ Young Namkoong, "Impact of the Zaibatsu on Japan's Political Economy: Pre and Post War Period." International Area Review 9, no. 2 (2006): 8.

⁶ Namkoong, "Political Economy," 10.

⁷ Okazaki, "Holding Companies," 263.

⁸ Okazaki, "Holding Companies," 263.

⁹ Leonard H. Lynn and Rao Hayagreeva, "Failures of Intermediate Forms: A Study of the Suzuki Zaibatsu." *Organization Studies* 16, no. 1 (1995): 68.

necessary internal reforms, weakening the power of the central holding company and doing little to protect associates from losses due to speculation.¹⁰ These managerial failures created problems that would stack up over time, feeding into the ultimate collapse of Suzuki itself. In terms of finance Suzuki depended not on a bank of its own, but on a third party, the Bank of Taiwan. While this relationship was beneficial in many regards, the mercurial nature of tying so closely to an external bank proved devastating for Suzuki, primarily because the Bank of Taiwan took loans from rival *zaibatsu* Mitsui to an extent that outstripped Suzuki's debt.¹¹ Through calling in these loans, Mitsui could bankrupt Suzuki. The financial crisis caused by the Tokyo Earthquake in 1923 saw the end of Suzuki, as attempts to lobby for government assistance failed, and Mitsui called in its loans.¹²

The failure of Suzuki also illustrates the importance of political ties and public legitimacy. The group did not have a diverse enough array of connections, and subsequently had trouble persevering through financial difficulties and public denunciations.¹³ The larger and more successful *zaibatsu*, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, had extensive political ties, and often used them to further facilitate expansion, and stifle smaller competitors. Mitsui and Mitsubishi were intimately involved with the two leading political parties, the *Seiyukai* and the *Minseito*, respectively.¹⁴ This reciprocal intermingling of executives and government officials allowed the *zaibatsu* to assume responsibility for state-sanctioned expansion, acting as "agents of a government committed to the success of their enterprise."¹⁵ These business-government ties prove problematic when examining *zaibatsu* war-time culpability. As explained previously, the nature of *zaibatsu* was that they accumulated powerful economic empires and united them under the leadership and policy of a single-family group. The conglomerates were autocratic in nature, and subject to the whims of the family head. By establishing ties to government, the *zaibatsu* effectively became an economic arm of the state. The head of Mitsubishi's holding company reflected these sentiments in 1916, stating:

We must never lose sight of the fact that while we pursue material objectives in our enterprises we also strive for spiritual goals. ... the growth or decline of production is intimately related to the prosperity or decline of the nation and to the cultural progress of society. Since we have thus been entrusted, by the state, with this important task of production, it must remain the supreme goal of management of our enterprises that they serve the country first, it is our ideal to exert all our energies in the pursuit of this ultimate goal.¹⁶

This proclamation was an attempt to assuage the public and arouse legitimacy by associating profit-seeking with service to the state.¹⁷ Whether or not the *zaibatsu* officials would strive

¹⁰ Lynn and Hayagreeva, "Suzuki," 69.

¹¹ Lynn and Hayagreeva, "Suzuki," 65.

¹² Lynn and Hayagreeva, "Suzuki," 66.

¹³ Lynn and Hayagreeva, "Suzuki," 73-74.

¹⁴ Namkoong, "Political Economy," 10.

¹⁵ E. Sydney Crawcour, "Industrialization and technological change, 1885-1920," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol 6. ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 448-449.

¹⁶ Namkoong, "Political Economy," 12.

¹⁷ Crawcour, "Industrialization", 448.

toward or adhere to these claims of service, it is telling of how they viewed their relationship with the state. The job of the *zaibatsu* was to work toward the greater good in accordance with state demands. In the decades following the Meiji era, 'serving the country first' meant assisting in the construction of empire. Imperialism presented common interests for the two parties. Leaders in both government and business came to recognize Asia's economic promise, and it's level of strategic importance was undeniable.¹⁸ For the state, colonialism was presented as an opportunity for Japan to assume a more prominent competitive position on the global stage, with newly acquired territories serving not only as military buffer zones, but as sources of valuable resources, or as areas for resettlement.¹⁹ For the *zaibatsu*, the exploitation of colonies offered a variety of incentives including new markets, resources, free labour, and government contracts. Rather than common interests, it should be said that the state and the *zaibatsu* had goals that could be realized by a common endeavour in imperialism.

There are many instances of *zaibatsu* groups clearly benefitting from involvement in Japanese colonies following their annexation, particularly in regard to the exploitation of resources and new markets. With the annexation of Taiwan, many Japanese firms and zaibatsu groups descended upon the island, eager to be the ones to attain control over its ample resources. Suzuki was able to politic its way into acquiring two-thirds of Taiwan's camphor oil, the profits from which allowed them to establish a rigid economic foothold and close political ties on the island, as discussed previously.²⁰ Similarly, Mitsui and Mitsubishi enjoyed a period of great success in Manchuria overseeing the export of soybeans by means of the South Manchurian Railway.²¹ Colonies offered the *zaibatsu* opportunities that in many regards were unattainable on the home islands. Their new markets also offered a means of expanding sales for previously established commodities, such as beer. In the winter of 1933-1934, Mitsubishi- and Mitsui-affiliated firms Kirin and Dai-Nippon both constructed breweries in Seoul, collectively shipping more than ten thousand kilolitres of beer per annum.²² At face value, these instances of *zaibatsu* profiteering seem rather benign in that subjugation was limited to resources. This was unfortunately not the case in many other instances.

Colonies offered not only resources and markets for Japan, but also a source of forced labour. This can be seen in the case of wartime coal mines, something from which both the state and the *zaibatsu* benefitted; coal was very valuable for the military, and *zaibatsu* groups were largely the ones who would provide it. In the year 1937, nine *zaibatsu* groups collectively controlled 35% of Japan's mining industry.²³ That same year, mining industry leaders began

¹⁸ Mark R. Preattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945', in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol 6. ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.), 223.

¹⁹ Preattie, "Japanese Colonial Empire," Cambridge History, 218.

²⁰ Lynn and Hayagreeva, "Suzuki," 62-63.

²¹ Louise Young, "When Fascism Met Empire in Japanese-Occupied Manchuria," *Journal of Global History* 12, no. 2 (2017): 292.

²² Jeffrey W. Alexander, *Brewed In Japan: The Evolution of the Japanese Beer Industry* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 133-134.

²³ Okazaki, "Holding Companies," 246.

lobbying the government requesting that subject Koreans be imported to work in mines that were facing labour shortages.²⁴ These efforts, along with others aimed at loosening overall regulations, were successful, resulting in a substantial pool of labour for the mining industry that was effectively free of cost. Koreans would come to dig more than half of Japan's domestic coal during the war, and account for one third of mining industry workers by the time of surrender.²⁵ Pushing this wartime collaboration even further, the military assigned Mitsubishi and Sumitomo to mine coal, copper, and various other metals in Southeast Asia to coincide with military expansion.²⁶ As in the above case, these mines would utilise the forced labour of thousands of conscripted Javanese, many of whom were malnourished.²⁷ In these cases, it is clear that the *zaibatsu* were working alongside the state, directly supporting colonial subjugation for military purposes, making profits all the while.

Another clear example of the *zaibatsu* collaborating with the Japanese military is in the production of naval warships. In 1896, the Japanese government began subsidizing the private construction of large ships.²⁸ Through this law, large firms capable of producing ships of the requisite size, namely *zaibatsu* such as Mitsubishi and Kawasaki, benefitted heavily, netting a formidable 90% of subsidies and allowing them to emerge as industry leaders.²⁹ This would become important as the Japanese navy began offering shipbuilding contracts to private firms. In the years leading up to the war, the large shipyards operated by Mitsubishi and Kawasaki would account for the production of 80% of the Japanese navy's tonnage.³⁰ In this manner, the *zaibatsu* were not only profiting directly from Japanese militarism, they were essentially manufacturing the very weapons that the military would use to facilitate its imperialist war.

The *zaibatsu* maintained close ties with the government from the Meiji restoration to the end of the Pacific War. Clever utilization of managerial ingenuity and competitive business expertise amassed large industrial empires that were overseen by a domineering central family. These policies garnered incredible economic and political influence, to the point that the *zaibatsu* began to tie themselves to the government itself, becoming essentially the industrial wings of the rapidly modernizing state. As Japanese imperialism wound up, the *zaibatsu* drafted close behind the military, their commitment to serving the country galvanised by the new markets and opportunities presented by imperialism. It may be the case that the *zaibatsu* were primarily motivated by profits, and that their assisting the state came about through common interest. What cannot be denied, however, is the extent to which

²⁴ W. Donald Smith, "Beyond 'the Bridge on the River Kwai': Labor Mobilization in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." *International Labor and Working-Class History* no. 58 (2000): 224.

²⁵ Smith, "River Kwai," 223-224.

²⁶ Smith, "River Kwai," 232.

²⁷ Smith, "River Kwai," 232.

²⁸ Yukiko Fukasaku, Technology and Industrial Development in Pre-War Japan: Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, 1884-1934. London: New York; Routledge, 1992, 64.

²⁹ Fukasaku, Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard 65.

³⁰ Fukasaku, Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, 69.

zaibatsu groups championed the imperialist cause, thus benefitting from the subjugation of those deemed lesser peoples and the resources found on their lands.

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War on the Home Front: Impacts of the First World War on Canadian Society from 1916 to 1917

Amy Tremblay History 1114: Forged in Fire – Canada since 1867 Dr Eryk L. Martin March 14, 2019

For my final research project, I created a fictional character named Marie Gagnon. Born in Montréal, Marie is a young, single woman still living with her parents in Verdun. After losing her job at a textile factory, Marie moved to work in a British munitions factory in Verdun, Québec, at the beginning of 1916. She has a 25-year-old brother, John, who is opposed to the First World War and does not enlist, leading Marie and John to participate in anticonscription demonstrations in Montréal in 1917. Marie is a supporter of women's suffrage and watches with eager and apprehensive eyes as the Wartime Elections Act of 1917 enfranchises a limited group of women as a tool to pass conscription, something that she has conflicted feelings about. Marie's view of the war is impacted by her love for her brother and her support for her French-Canadian countrymen, but also her conflicting love for her beloved cousin Jane, whose fiancé serves overseas.

Marie's letters to her cousin Jane, an Anglophone woman living in Ontario, take place between the beginning of 1916 and the end of 1917 and relate to the theme of war and society, specifically how the First World War impacted Canadian society through the eyes of a young, French-Canadian woman. This theme is crucial, both for understanding the significant impacts that the First World War had on the home front and for understanding the complexity of these impacts, accelerating a growing divide in Canadian society along ethnic lines, causing a temporary but significant shift in gendered work, and leading to a crucial but limited step towards women's suffrage. Marie's letters look beyond the war overseas to analyze some of the significant, complex, and lasting ways that the First World War changed and impacted Canadian society in Marie's home of Québec and in Canada at large.

4 February 1916 Dear Jane,

I write to you, dear cousin, because I hope that you can understand some of my confliction during this imperative war era here in Montréal. I have experienced a great change; I lost my job in the textile factory, but you need not worry, for I have recently been hired to work at a British munitions supply factory in Verdun, near home. I started work in this factory a few weeks ago and have been here now for nearly a month. I have included a photograph that I took of my fellow women workers on the assembly line, producing for the war effort.

I understand my brother's denunciation of this Great War overseas; John does not like that I have taken work in the munitions factory. He'd prefer I stayed home, but he knows that I must contribute to the family income if I am to live at home, and although you know that I have reservations about this English war, I also know that your fiancé is fighting overseas at this very moment, Jane, and I endeavour to support him by helping to fill the shortage of labour created by the sending of so many Canadian men overseas.

There are, of course, voices of dissent. Society resists the movement of women such as myself into men's work. As you can see in the photograph, the factory employs solely women, except for some of the men in charge who oversee our work—you can see them in the photograph, too, but we women workers far outnumber any man in my factory. There are simply not enough men left in the country to fill every factory, and so we women have stepped up. We work on the munitions assembly line—gritty and masculine work. It is a great change from my work in textiles, where I maintained a sense of femininity even while working in a factory. The munitions factory conditions are sometimes dirty, perhaps, but not poor; as you can see in my photograph, the factory is relatively clean and as fit for working women as I believe it can be.

I feel that this new industrial landscape brings about an important change in society, Jane. Men write in the papers that they fear women taking their jobs, that they fear us leaving our domestic spheres and abandoning our femininity. Men denounce our ability to produce quality materials outside of feminine trades. And yet here I show you a factory full of women, and we've increased production with the hiring of women such as myself. We are showing society that we can do men's work, no matter how temporary the change. We are proving to society that we do not have to be confined by such a strict and fragile feminine sphere.

You know I had planned to leave my job at the textile factory once I found a husband, Jane, to become a mother and a housewife, but that has not yet happened, and for now, as I have been telling John, this is work that pays. And, although John may not like it, I know I can tell you how I really feel, Jane: my work in the munitions factory is driven by an excitement that conflicts with my trepidation over the war—an excitement at the prospect of new opportunities for Canadian women, no matter how small (men *are* still in charge, as the photograph shows. You can see them supervising us; they stand out in their suits and fancy clothes.)

You know that I support women's suffrage and the challenging of gender norms, Jane. I can only say that, though I see great issues with this war, though I understand why my brother says that French-Canadian men have no role fighting for the imperial endeavors of the British Empire, I think that this war may in fact have at least one positive impact on Canadian society, Jane, and for that I rejoice. I and my sisters on the assembly line have thrown ourselves into masculine work, as you can see in the photograph, and we produce well. If women can break into and succeed in masculine spheres of work, what else can we do? That is the question I hope society will answer in the years to come. I pray for you and your fiancé and send all my love, Marie




Photo citation: Assembly Line, British Munitions Supply Co. Ltd., Verdun, Québec. 1916-1918. Canada Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-024436, MIKAN 3370953. Accessed 14 February 2019. https://www.flickr.com/photos/lac-bac/34410554336/in/album-72157672743513160/.

25 May 1917 Dear Jane,

It is a sad day in Québec, dear cousin. I am still working at the munitions factory in Verdun, and I still pray for the safety of your fiancé every night, but I cannot support the war as it is unfolding now. As I'm sure you know, Prime Minster Borden has declared his intention to introduce conscription nationwide, to force my brothers here in Québec to fight for the British Empire. I've included a photograph that I took yesterday of my brother, John, at an anti-conscription parade here in Montréal. As you can see in the photograph, men took to the streets to protest the passing of this motion. You can see that it was a peaceful protest, with a few children in the crowd, but I fear that there is anger brewing here in Québec, Jane.

Much of English Canada denounces us. They call our men cowards. They are outraged by our refusal to fight. But we are not cowards. What could be braver than standing up for your language, your religion, your very culture under Anglophone attack? In Ontario they restrict French education. The Canadian army is led by Anglophones. They fight for territory, although they say that they are fighting for democratic freedoms. What part do we have in this? French Canadians must band together to protect our language and religion or Anglophones may crush us completely. Frankly, Jane, I do not want to see my brother die in an English war.

I know your fiancé is serving overseas, Jane, and I know that you, like much of the rest of English Canada, may see our men as traitors and cowards for refusing to fight. But I implore you to understand why we resist, Jane.

At the anti-conscription parade in Montréal yesterday, the protestors said that Borden's commitment to the war is part of a desire for a unilingual Canada, a Canada that is an extension of the British Empire. But many here in Québec want to fight for a Canada that is its own country, Jane. A Canada that stands on the pillars of two languages, French and English, where Francophones are equal in every way to our English countrymen. To us, Jane, the true fight for Canadian nationhood happens here, at home. Fighting in this imperial, foreign war is a rejection of Canada as its own country—what is supposed to be a bilingual country, home of French and English men alike. Yet this is not where our government stands, Jane. It is an Anglophone independence that they fight for.

Anglophone culture has long ago taken root in Montréal. As you can see in the photograph, Victoria Square, where the anti-conscription parade was held yesterday, is full of English signs and the like. Support for the war thrives here as well, as you can see the British flag in the background of the photograph. And yet our men marched. We want Canada to hear our voices and know that we resist their efforts to kill our culture and, now, to kill our men.

It appears now, dear Jane, that loyalty to Québec is imperative for us Francophones who do not want to see our culture destroyed. We cannot look to the Canadian government; Borden wants to rip our men from their homes and send them to die for Britain. Based on what is happening with schools in Ontario, and on the vocal revulsion coming from much of Anglophone Canada for our people here in Québec, I fear that the old rift between Francophone and Anglophone Canada grows stronger. As you can see in my photograph, men have already taken to the streets to protest conscription. I fear the anger that will emerge if conscription is passed. I fear violence. And I fear that the distrust of Francophones for Anglophone Canada will never be mended if our men are forced to fight in their war.

You know I love you Jane, and that I pray for the safety of your fiancé always. I pray that you understand my position, and John's position, and why John will not fight—not by choice. I send all my love,

Marie



Photo citation: Anti-Conscription Parade at Victoria Square. 24 May 1917. Library and Archives Canada, C-006859, MIKAN 3193206. Accessed 14 February 2019. https://www.flickr.com/photos/lacbac/4055478061/in/album-72157622565188207/.

30 December 1917 Dear Jane,

I write to you now, cousin, both out of exultation and out of deep rage. My heart is at war with itself; all of the conflicting anger and excitement that I've been feeling since I started work in the munitions factory nearly two years ago has finally come to a head. As you know me so well, cousin, I am sure you know why. Conscription has officially passed; the Union government has won. I fear what will happen if John is forced overseas. But that is not what I write of today.

I've attached a photograph I cut out of a newspaper I picked up at the factory. Perhaps you have seen this photograph in the papers yourself? It shows Canadian nursing sisters in France voting in the recent federal election. Can you imagine? Canadian women voting in a federal election—what an accomplishment for those of us who support the enfranchisement of women, Jane! And yet, what a bitter disappointment—a slap in the face to all suffragettes in the country. This photograph of voting nursing sisters tells the story well: Borden's recent enfranchisement of women was a tool to rig the election in his favour. Who did he give the vote to? Women at war, such as the nursing sisters, as well as any other women likely to vote for the Union government. I, of course, was not given this right. I have no close relatives fighting in the war—yet, at least, and if God answers my prayers, ever—and thus I was not included in the Wartime Elections Act that Borden passed a few months ago. This step towards women's suffrage is in some ways nothing but a tool for evil—though I know you do not agree that conscription is evil. Yes, some women were able to vote in the federal election white women with a vested interest in winning the war—but the rest of us remain as we are, voiceless in some of the most important ways.

I'm sure you hear my anger, Jane. And yet, perhaps against my better judgment, I also feel hope when I look at this photograph. For those are Canadian women voting in the federal election, Jane, even if they do so as part of Borden's manipulation of the election. The government has now said to the country that women, at least some women, *can* be trusted with the most important vote. I know some women had the provincial vote already, though we do not have it here in Québec, but for women to have the federal vote in Canada? Unprecedented. When Borden passed the Wartime Elections Act, he changed the fabric of Canadian society forever: for what government can say that women are intelligent and capable enough to vote on matters of the state and then later rescind that statement? They cannot. There is no going back. The government and the people must concede that women are, at least in some small part, on equal footing with man. Perhaps, for now, the government has only conceded that right to the type of woman you see in the photograph—white women, that is, and for now only those with direct ties to the war—but, like my work in the munitions factory, it is a step.

I imagine you can share in my joy, if not my sadness. I know you support conscription; you know I vehemently do not, though I still pray for your fiancé. Though I am angered by the motivation behind the enfranchisement of the women you see in the photograph, and the women here in Canada with close relatives overseas, I am also hopeful and excited for the future this change may bring about in terms of women's suffrage. I can only hope that the wrongs of this legislation—that only a limited group of women can vote, not including myself—will be righted when the war is over, that the vote will be extended to all Canadian women, and that women's roles in society can continue to evolve as they do now, slowly—ever so slowly—but surely.

Sending my love and prayers, Marie



Photo citation: William Rider-Rider, Nursing Sisters at a Canadian Hospital Voting in the Canadian Federal Election. December 1917. William Rider-Rider, Canada Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-002279, MIKAN 3194224. Accessed 14 February 2019. https://www.flickr.com/photos/lacbac/4055469351/in/album-72157622565188207/.

Annotated Bibliography:¹

Flanagan, Luke. "Canadians in Bexhill-on-Sea during the First World War: A Reflection of Canadian Nationhood?" *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 27, no. 2 (2014): 131-148. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.kpu.ca:2080/10.3828/bjcs.2014.9.

- By studying the Canadians at Bexhill-on-Sea in East Sussex, this article argues that the First World War did not create an entirely independent sense of Canadian nationalism as a country free from loyalty to the British Empire, but rather created a sense of Canadian nationalism that was tied-up in Empire. The author argues that, though there seemed to be a stronger sense of Canadian nationhood after the war, there was still a strong sense of loyalty to the British Empire at the same time, and that the fragility of this new sense of Canadian nationalism from the First World War was highlighted in the worsened tension and division between Anglophone and Francophone Canada over conscription. I used this article to help me portray some of the Anglophone and Francophone sentiments over conscription in my second letter. The article explains how French Canadians responded to the war differently than English Canadians. It explains that Anglophone support for the war was tied into support for British imperialism and that French-Canadian nationalists argued that Anglophone Canada's support for the war was a part of a lack of support for a bilingual Canada. I used this to shape some of my character's grievances in her letter when she said that Canada's commitment to the war was in part a desire for a unilingual Canada. The article explains that many French Canadians started to see Québec as the sole Francophone stronghold of Canada as much of the rest of Canada's idea of Canadian nationalism was tied up in Britishness and Empire. I used this in my article to explain how my character felt that loyalty to Québec was imperative for Francophones to protect their culture and how this worsened the tensions between Québec and Anglophone Canada. This article explains many of the reasons why conscription was so controversial in Francophone Canada, particularly Québec, saying that some Francophones saw it as a rejection of Canada as a bilingual nation in which both French and English Canada were equal because conscription was forcing French Canada to follow English Canada's lead in support for the British Empire. It also explains the counterpoint of anger from those serving or those with loved ones serving, revealing the huge tension between French and English Canada from both sides. I used all this information to craft my letter on the anti-conscription parade in Québec and how conscription-and the anti-conscription sentiments of many Francophones-divided French and English Canada worse than ever before.
- Jensen, Richard. "Nationalism and Civic Duty in Wartime: Comparing World Wars in Canada and America." *Canadian Issues* (2004): 6-10. https://search-proquest-

¹ Since the annotations were a major part of this research assignment, the editor has included them along with Ms Tremblay's final research paper.

com.ezproxy.kpu.ca:2443/cbcacomplete/docview/208698772/abstract/73E866CAA22A4A04 PQ/1?accountid=35875.

- This article examines and compares the sense of nationalism that different groups in America and Canada experienced during the world wars, particularly the First World War, examining how citizenship and nationalism was sometimes defined differently within the two countries during these eras. The author argues that language and religion was a crucial, often divisive factor in Canada but a relatively inconsequential factor in America during the world wars, and he examines how political leaders in both countries dealt with these, often conflicting, visions from the first world war to the second. I used this article to help craft my second letter about the anti-conscription parade in Montréal, as it examines much of the conflict around conscription and the tension between Francophone and Anglophone Canada during the First World War. The article explains how legislation against French schools in Ontario was a contributing factor to the anger felt by many French Canadians leading up to conscription, and how many Québécois feared the loss of their culture in the rest of Canada, seeing the need to protect themselves within Québec and stand against Borden's Anglophone government. I used this article to understand how Francophones generally defined their duties as Canadians differently than Anglophones, with many Francophones opposing conscription because they saw Canadian duty as loyalty only to Canada as its own country, while many Anglophones saw Canadian duty as wrapped up in loyalty to Britain. Further, this article explains how many supporters of the war argued that the war was a fight for democracy and for Canadian independence, while many Francophones saw conscription as a tool to force French men into an Anglophone army to die for Britain and many thus opposed fighting in what they identified as an imperial war for the expansion of the British Empire. I used this information on Québec opposition to conscription to help me construct my character's grievances on behalf of many in Québec over Borden's announced intention to introduce conscription and to show some of the conflicting visions of the war and of Canadian duty along ethnic lines in Canada at the time, helping me explain how the idea of conscription impacted Francophone society; this article also explains how many Anglophones were angered by Francophone refusal to fight, which I also used in my letter to portray some of the Anglophone-Francophone tension in Canadian society at the time.
- Martin, Andrea, and Tyyne Petrowski. "Are You 'Doing Your Bit'?': Edith Robertson, Letter-Writing, and Women's Contributions in First-World-War Winnipeg." *Manitoba History*, no. 82 (2016): 4-11. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.kpu.ca: 2443/cbcacomplete/docview/1931574508/citation/3F3E3C35658A4C4CPQ/2?accountid=358 75.
 - This article examines the experiences of Manitoba women on the home front during the First World War by studying the letters between Edith Robertson, a young, middle-class, white college woman in Winnipeg, and her fiancé Frederick Baragar, who served in the war overseas. The article argues that women in Manitoba made significant contributions to the war effort through multiple avenues, including providing moral support to soldiers,

fundraising, and entering the workforce to supplement the labour shortage created by the sending of so many Canadian men overseas. Although this article focuses on Manitoba, it goes into detail about how employment changed during the war and many of the public reactions to women's movement into traditionally masculine work, which I found to be useful in crafting my letter about my character, Marie, working in a munitions factory in Verdun during the war. The article details how women began entering munitions factories and other 'masculine' parts of the workforce due to labour shortages created from the sending of Canadian men overseas to war, and it covers some of the negative public reactions against women doing men's work. For example, the article describes how an issue of The Winnipeg Evening Tribune published an article in 1917 warning men that women were taking their jobs; this article also explained that there had been increased production with the hiring of women in munitions factories and that factory conditions were somewhat improved to suit working women. The article also describes how many working women in this period left the workforce when they got married, which my character says she had been planning to do in her first letter. Finally, the article describes how, though some men reacted against women doing 'masculine' work, there was a growing sense of approval for women doing this work as it was crucial to the country's war efforts; it explains how women therefore had increased presence in the workforce during this era. I used this information to shape Marie's experience in a munitions factory in Verdun, to describe the societal pushback against women in traditionally manly spheres of work, and to explain the hopefulness Marie feels towards women cementing a new place for themselves in Canadian society.

- Millman, Brock. "The Politician Who Attempts to Wander About in No Man's Land Must Be Ruthlessly Destroyed': The Election of 1917," in *Polarity, Patriotism, and Dissent in Great War Canada, 1914-1919,* 147-82. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016.
 - This chapter in Millman's scholarly monograph on the First World War discusses the details surrounding the Canadian federal election of 1917. Millman argues that there were several factors that contributed to the outcome of the election, including the Wartime Elections Act which enfranchised and disenfranchised varying groups according to who was most likely to vote for Borden's Union government, as well as government propaganda and pressure to vote Union overseas; he further argues that the election caused anger and division among certain groups, including French Canadians and farmers who felt betrayed by Borden, and even divided Laurier's liberal party between liberals who supported conscription and those who did not. I used this chapter to help craft my third letter on the Wartime Elections Act and the federal election of 1917. First, this chapter provided me with details about the timeline of the election, the formation of the Union government and its victory in December of 1917, and Borden's role in ensuring this victory. I used this chapter to understand who the Wartime Elections Act enfranchised and why, including women who served overseas and women who had close relatives serving; the chapter discussed how Borden's government used this act to help ensure a victory for the Union government and conscription based on a "win the war" policy. The chapter also touched on the opinion of the president of the Canadian Suffrage Association on this limited

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enfranchisement of women, including a quote from her saying that the Wartime Elections Act served to enfranchise anyone who would vote for Borden's government and disenfranchise anyone who would not as a manipulative scheme of the government; Millman also argued that many women who supported the Union government and conscription did not care that they were being enfranchised as a tool of Borden's government rather than as a matter of equal rights. I used this information to help craft my character's angry and hopeful response to the limited enfranchisement of some Canadian women. The chapter also explained that women in some provinces had already been given the provincial vote, though not in Québec, which I included in my letter. Overall, this chapter was extremely useful in constructing my third letter on the federal election of 1917, the Wartime Elections Act of 1917, and their joint impact on Canadian society.

Clothing the Empire: Han China and Ancient Rome

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Throughout the centuries, clothing has played a significant role in countless civilizations and societies. Of course, clothing has an obvious importance: to protect one from the elements, and properly suit them in their day to day activities. However, clothing also had symbolic, and cultural significance. In fact, clothing served as a highly important social marker of hierarchy and status, both of which were imperative in enforcing and maintaining hierarchical systems. The ancient Roman and Chinese civilizations were inherently oppressive. Inequality was fundamental to maintaining the hierarchical systems which created an elite upper class, a poor peasant class, and varying levels in between. Inequality was not only the way of life for these ancient civilizations, but was accepted in both empires.¹ While the concept of fashion did not exist in the ancient world as it does today, clothing was a critical part of the lives of Roman and Chinese citizens, particularly for the upper classes. For the ancient Romans, heavy emphasis was placed on achieving the ideal image of perfection,² as was also the case for the Chinese. Through traditions regulating what people could wear, to sumptuary laws, and even elaborate burial practices, clothing was used to represent where a person stood within the realm of the society. This paper will demonstrate that clothing and jewelry was a significant visual element in the establishment of hierarchies in both ancient China and Rome. Clothing distinguished who was who, providing a visual representation of their social standing.

Before beginning a discussion of the significance of clothing, we must first establish what type of evidence is used in such studies. Most of the knowledge of the clothing worn by the ancient Romans and Chinese is derived from an assortment of historical documents and texts, including artwork, poetry and literature, sculptures, and some archaeological evidence.³ Unfortunately, it is the case that many of the textiles from ancient Rome have not survived the test of time. Therefore, much of the knowledge that we have today is fragmented. It is the same case for ancient China. There are only a few surviving garments from Ancient

¹ Jack Hayes, "Roman and Chinese Social Norms and Populations: Hierarchy, Inequality, and Reciprocity" (lecture, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, September 18, 2018).

² Jeri DeBrohun, "Power Dressing in Ancient Greece and Rome," History Today 51, no. 2 (2001): 18.

³ David Symon. Costume Reference: *Costume of Ancient Rome* (USA: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), 5; see also, Michael Loewe, "Craftsmanship," *Everyday Life in Early Imperial China* (New York: Dorset Press, 1968), 184.

China, like Rome.⁴ However, what does remain tells a great story about these ancient civilizations. Though many of the textiles of the ancient world have been lost through history, a significant amount of the jewelry has survived, and been discovered by historians and archeologists. With that being said, it is important to note that much of what has been preserved through history is representative of the upper classes, as many of the textiles that have been discovered come largely from the tombs of emperors and important figures. The upper classes have thus been disproportionately represented in archaeological evidence as the upper-class men and women were able to preserve their legacy through means that will be discussed later in this paper. Regardless, we can evaluate the evidence that is available and make guided assumptions about their significance to a culture or society.

For the Romans, clothing served as a marker of Roman identity. To be a Roman citizen meant playing the part. And, to play the part meant acting like, speaking like, and entertaining oneself as a Roman.⁵ One had to perform the part of a Roman, in order to be Roman; this included the proper costume.⁶ While many elements of Roman dress had been appropriated from the Greeks and Hellenistic culture,⁷ Roman dress was distinctive in nature and had its own set of guidelines. The clothing of the ancient period served as an important marker of social status, rank, title, or profession. Clothing distinguished people from one another and reinforced oppressive systems of hierarchy, highlighting who was on the top and who was on the bottom. It was used to differentiate plebs from the patricians, senatorial and equestrian classes. Of course, with this being said, there are some obvious assertions to get out of the way. The financial aspect of this is simple; peasants could not afford the same luxurious clothing as the upper elites. Therefore, they clearly dressed differently. Roman's viewed clothing as a "distinguished costume draped with meaning: it symbolized the distinctive character of an individual, a country, an epoch and a civilization, and these costumes would hold fast—for four hundred years".⁸ This sentiment is evident in the strict sumptuary systems put in place to regulate clothing.

So, what did Romans wear? The answer to this question is much more complex than the caricature of a Roman wearing a toga and laurel wreath around his or her head. To begin, we must first discuss the types of clothing being manufactured based upon the technology that was available during the time. Artistic evidence suggests that the ancient Romans used wooden looms to weave silks and other fine materials.⁹ The wooden loom allowed for a variety of styles and patterns to be woven into artistic and unique garments.¹⁰ Yes, Roman men wore

⁴ Loewe, Everyday Life, 184.

⁵ Jack Hayes, "Romanization Sinification: Reinforcing and Creating *Pax Romanum* and *Pax Sinica*" (lecture, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, October 30, 2018).

 $^{^{6}}$... I use the term 'costume' interchangeably with clothing, as I would argue that the clothing of the period serves a similar purpose as costume: to fit people into their role in society.

⁷ Erich S. Gruen, "Romans and Others," in N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx, eds., A Companion to the Roman Republic (London: Blackwell, 2016), 459.

⁸ Charlene Elliott. "Purple Pasts: Color Codification in the Ancient World," *Law & Social Inquiry* 33, no. 1 (2008): 177.

⁹ Symons, *Costume of Rome*, 6.

¹⁰ Symons, *Costume of Rome*, 6.

togas with tunics underneath,¹¹ but that was certainly not all. Labourers, farmers, and the average peasant would not wear togas at all. Instead, they wore clothing that included tunics, cloaks, and trousers.¹² These garments were usually made out of wools and linens and were often left in their natural colours, especially for those of the lowest social classes.¹³ In Roman society, the toga symbolized the power of the Roman Empire, Roman humanity, and Roman culture.¹⁴ So, if a lower-class citizen was to wear this garment, it would convey a message of universal power and a unitedness between the upper and lower classes. As we have already established, equality was not a trait of the Roman empire, therefore, it is no surprise that this garment would be reserved for the upper class.

But, wearing the toga was by no means a free-for-all within the elite patrician class of Roman society. Sumptuary laws enforced a system of hierarchy even within the upper class; the type of toga, and material it was made out of depended upon the rank and socio-economic status of the wearer. Togas were not simply loosely fitting fabric; the fit, style, and colour varied according to class. First, it is important to note that by the second century women were no longer allowed to wear the toga.¹⁵ While the toga was style of clothing which was an appropriation of the Greek costume, but the sumptuary laws were distinct to Rome.¹⁶ The togas worn by lower elites, or those in lower classes of slightly higher socio-economic statuses were simple. They were usually undyed, as dyes were expensive, and left in their natural offwhite colour.¹⁷ A fifth century statesman would wear a large cloak instead with rectangular patterns woven into the design.¹⁸ This piece would exude power and status, commanding the respect or admiration of those whom he encountered. Longer togas were reserved for elite. The higher one's status, the longer their toga would be.¹⁹ This is likely for two reasons. The wealthier a person is, the more frivolous and unnecessary fabric they could afford to wear. As well, if someone was in a position of high power, mobility would not be an issue for them. They could then wear the most impractical clothing because they would not need to move around or do any sort of physically demanding work. There were several variations on the style of the toga; however, the most notable marker of status when it comes to the toga was the colour and fabric which will be discussed later in this paper. Like the Romans, the Chinese had hierarchy ingrained in their clothing.

The Chinese population was far greater than that of the Roman world and expanded over a territory far greater. But, like the Romans, hierarchy was a major contributor to the functioning of Chinese society. There were three main class distinctions in Ancient China:

¹¹ Elliott, "Purple Pasts,"181.

¹² Caroline Vout, "The Myth of the Toga: Understanding the History of Roman Dress," *Greece & Rome* 43, no. 2 (1996): 209-210.

¹³ Symon, Costume of Rome, 6.

¹⁴ Melissa Levington, What People Wore When: A Complete Illustrated History of Costume from Ancient Times to the Nineteenth Century for Every Level of Society (New York: St. Martin's/Griffin, 2008), 34.

¹⁵ Levington, What People Wore When, 34.

¹⁶ Henny H. Hansen, *Costume Cavalcade* (London: Methuen and Co Ltd, 1956), 114.

¹⁷ Levington, What People Wore When, 34.

¹⁸ Levington, What People Wore When, 34.

¹⁹ Symon, Costume of Rome, 8.

the imperial family and aristocrats; magistrates, scholar officials, village leaders, and rich merchants; and finally, there were the peasants, commoners, and slaves.²⁰ The common person during the Han Dynasty would generally wear clothing woven from hemp and vegetable fibres,²¹ in a similar fashion to that of Ancient Rome. Of course, in Ancient China, heating systems were essentially non-existent in the homes of everyone except the wealthy upper classes.²² Therefore, it was essential that clothing be made to protect people from the harsh cold of the Chinese winters. Clothing often included fur linings in order to preserve warmth, even in the coolest of temperatures.²³ Clothing for those in the peasant class was intended to serve a function, unlike the clothing of the upper classes which was symbolic of their elite status. Similarly, this is the case for Roman lower classes who, as mentioned previously, wore trousers and tunics, rather than togas.

The middle and upper classes in China would wear garments that were far more luxurious and expensive in nature. This is, again, due to the fact that these classes were not engaged in hard labour, so their clothing could be slightly more frivolous and less practical. One of the many markers of status came in the form of embroidered fabrics. Some of these embroidered fabrics incorporated messages or prayers.²⁴ The most elaborate form of embroidery incorporates chain stitching silk thread into a garment.²⁵ This form of stitching was not common. It required extreme skill and was very uncommon. While only a few pieces of this style of cloth have been discovered thus far, historians speculate that these pieces were part of small ladies' handbags, which were used to carry mirrors.²⁶ These items would then demonstrate a person's status, as an ordinary citizen would not be able to own such a luxury item. It also distinguishes the level of wealth one had within the context of the upper class. For example, if one woman has a small embroidered purse, this indicates she is of high social status. But, if a second woman has an embroidered purse with a gold, silken thread chain stitched throughout the design of the purse, this would indicate that the second woman is of higher status than the first. This concept makes it so a person's presentation of themselves served as a marker of social class, and their place in a hierarchical system. It is indicative of a fixation with status.

Like China, Rome had layers of hierarchy within the hierarchy. Clothing in Rome incorporated colours dyed from vegetable juices, animal or mineral dyes, or sulphur.²⁷ Often times, professional dyers would dye just one piece of the wool and weave this coloured wool into the fabric to create a one-of-a-kind design.²⁸ The type of fabric that was used depended

²⁰ Jack Hayes, "Roman and Chinese Social Norms and Populations: Hierarchy, Inequality, and Reciprocity" (lecture, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, September 18, 2018).

²¹ Loewe, Everyday Life, 180.

²² Jacques Gernet, "Housing, Clothing, Cooking," *Daily Life in China: on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion1250-1276* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 127.

²³ Gernet, Daily Life, 127.

²⁴ Loewe, Everyday Life, 184.

²⁵ Loewe, Everyday Life, 184.

²⁶ Loewe, Everyday Life, 185.

²⁷ Symon, Costume of Rome, 6.

²⁸ Symon, *Costume of Rome*, 6.

greatly upon the population in said area. For example, less expensive linens went to areas that were densely populated, whereas finer fabrics such as silks and high-quality linens and Egyptian cotton went where the elites lived.²⁹ Silk of course was a luxury, as it had to travel a vast distance from Asia to Rome, making it highly valuable.³⁰ The vast majority of people could not afford to dress in full silk, so many people wore a silk-linen blend.³¹ To bring this back to the idea of togas, a rich man of the patrician class would more than likely wear a silk toga with many coloured patterns, because it represented wealth and status. This is the same idea as the silk threaded stitching in Chinese culture. If someone could afford to have these small details in their clothing, they had power. But it is important to discuss that when it comes to colour, once again, there were rules. Sumptuary laws established rules prevented people from dressing above their status, with an emphasis on what colours were reserved for whom.

Up until beginning of the Sung dynasty in China, rules dictated what colours an individual could wear.³² These regulations were not universal; they depended upon the status and rank of a person.³³ For example, the sumptuary laws that determined what an Emperor could wear would be different than what a scholar official could wear, and of course very different than what a peasant could wear. Ordinary people wore black and white, persons above the third rank wore purple robes, persons above the sixth rank wore vermillion, above the seventh, green, and above that turquoise.³⁴ It was imperative for people to comply with these sumptuary laws in order to reinforce the power of the social hierarchy. Because of the emphasis on enforcing hierarchy, even those at the highest of status had to comply with their colour codification. This means person of high social status could not dress as an ordinary peasant by wearing black and/ or white.³⁵ This was because identify was so interwoven with status, it was seen as inexcusable for a person of high status to present him or herself in a manner that would suggest a status inferior to what they really were.

These rules that dictated what people could wear were strict, many even being codified law. Historical accounts describe, in detail, the specifics to the costume one would wear. These details include the small details of the clothing worn by the Emperors, and his officials.³⁶ These visual representations of status were said to intentionally produce the psychological effect of reinforcing the idea of prestige and status based on one's outward appearance.³⁷ By adorning elites in symbols of wealth, it creates a visual gap between the upper and lower classes. To elaborate, if two groups are so vastly different in appearance, it further marks the idea that they are different. And if the elite classes are seen dressed in elaborate and expensive garments made put of exotic fabrics and rich pigments, they will appear in an

³⁶ Gernet, *Daily Life*, 128

²⁹ Symon, Costume of Rome, 7.

³⁰ Hansen, Costume Cavalcade, 115.

³¹ Hansen, Costume Cavalcade, 114.

³² Gernet, Daily Life, 128.

³³ Gernet, Daily Life, 128.

³⁴ Gernet, Daily Life, 128.

³⁵ Gernet, *Daily Life*, 128.

³⁷ Gernet, *Daily Life*, 128.

unattainable light. They become so unreal because their appearance is so unlike what is familiar to the lower classes. I do not wish to disregard the fiscal aspect of this. Poor people simply could not afford the same luxuries as the rich, that is a fact. But by encouraging, and at times enforcing a system where people must dress in a way in which labels them according to their social class, this is a system reliant on hierarchy to survive. In fact, the need to the upper class to reassert their power through visuals such as clothing only reinforces the idea that social hierarchy is only as powerful as those who believed in the system.

Regardless of the socio-economic implications of colour, colours such as red, gold, and purple had specific connotations. For example, red was associated with good fortune. Gold and yellow were associated with heroism and prosperity. Purple was indicative of royalty.³⁸ This association with royalty also lived into the middle ages and renaissance in Western European nations. Purple was significant in both Roman and Chinese societies and cultures. The fascination with this colours dates as far back as 360 BCE. Plato noted in *The Republic*, "Suppose that we were painting a statue, and someone came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black."³⁹ Not only was purple adored for its rich pigment, it was also a rarity in ancient times, coming from a Mediterranean shellfish known as bruccinum.⁴⁰ During the Roman Republic and Empire "purple was one of the most highstatus and expensive"⁴¹ colours. The most expensive of these shades was produced from a dying agent called "murex"; the colour this dye produced was aptly named "imperial purple"42. In fact, the associations with royalty were so strong that there were ruled prohibiting nonpriests or emperors from wearing even a stripe of purple on their togas in Rome.⁴³ This goes without saying, colour played a significant role in the connotations of clothing, but colour was only a part of the appearance of status. It took colour and rich fabric to make the look complete. It is interesting to note how two civilizations that are so far in distance share the same fascination in a seemingly arbitrary colour.

Though I have mentioned the idea of material being indicative of status an hierarchy in passing, the significance of silk in both China and Rome requires further discussion. Not only were silk garments beautiful, but silk was also an essential part of China's political and economic expansion during the ancient period up until the middle ages.⁴⁴ Silk was the most valuable export in Qin and Han China.⁴⁵ The 'Silk Road', to this day, is one of the most well-known aspects of early economy. It brought together many regions and allowed for the

⁴⁰ Elliott, "Purple Pasts," 177.

³⁸ Gernet, *Daily Life*, 128.

³⁹ Elliott, "Purple Pasts," 177.

⁴¹ Levington, What People Wore When, 34.

⁴² Levington, What People Wore When, 35.

⁴³ Elliott, "Purple Pasts," 176.

⁴⁴ Aurel Stein "Central-Asian Relics of China's Ancient Silk Trade." *T'oung Pao*, Second Series, 20, no. 2 (1920): 130.

⁴⁵ Stein, "China's Silk Trade," 130.

exchange of culture and knowledge.⁴⁶ But, as the name suggests, silk was one of the most significant elements of trade along these routes. China dominated trade along the silk road due to its monopoly over the secret of the silkworm. By maintaining the secret of how silk was manufactured, China was able to create a high demand for its silk goods, along with a high price tag. The Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and even Indians sought after luxurious Chinese silks.⁴⁷ This brings about the obvious question, why? Why was silk so popular, and why were people so willing to pay for it? Silk was like no other fabric. Silk grew in popularity due to the exotic nature of the fabric. Because nobody other than the Chinese were manufacturing silk at the time, to own silk was a luxury. Silk was certainly not uncommon because of the massive influx of trade along silk road, but it was expensive, and luxurious. As well, the metallic sheen that the fabric radiated allowed for it to absorb colours while still reflecting the light. This allowed for bold, and pigmented colours to appear richly upon the fabric.⁴⁸ Though silk was popular amongst traders and merchants along silk road, most people living in China did not wear silk, as silk was costly to manufacture and purchase.⁴⁹ Like Rome, silk was not for the lower-class people, it was worn by the upper and scholar official classes.

Not only was clothing significant for the living, it was oddly enough significant for the dead. Both China and Rome have had historically elaborate funereal and burial practices which relied heavily of symbolism and superstition. Emperors and important political and military figures were buried in elaborate garments and jewelry. This reinforced their status even after

they were dead. This is partially due to the vastly different funereal practices for the upper and lower classes. In addition to the sophisticated garments in the burial tombs, important figures were given embroidered silk with messages that spoke to their legacy. This is evident in archeological findings.

For example, Figure 1 right, from the Hunan museum in China, is a photograph of a "floss silk padded robe with lozenge pattern on vermilion Luo silk robe"⁵⁰, excavated from Xin Zhui's tomb from the western Han Dynasty, approximately 163 BCE. As noted by the museum, the dye is evenly distributed upon the garment, indicating



Figure 1: Photograph of a floss silk padded robe with lozenge pattern on vermilion Luo silk robe, excavated from Xin Zhui's tomb from the western Han Dynasty, approximately 163 BCE from the Hunan Museum in China.

⁴⁶ Subhakanta Behera, "India's Encounter with the Silk Road," *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 51 (2002): 5077.

⁴⁷ Behra, "India's Encounter with Silk Road," 5077.

⁴⁸ Jack Hayes, "Romanization / Sinification: Reinforcing and Creating Pax Romanum and Pax Sinica," ASIA 4499 lecture, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, BC, November 13, 2018.

⁴⁹ Loewe, Everyday Life, 180.

⁵⁰ Figure 1: *Floss silk padded robe with lozenge pattern on vermilion Luo silk robe*. Photograph. Length: 140cm, overall length of the sleeves: 245cm, width at waist: 52cm; from: Hunan Museum China, http://www.hnmuseum.com/en/gallery/node/1048/7 (accessed November 2018).

excellence in craftsmanship. This type of garment, in this colour would be granted only to the most well-respected, and rich upper classes. It demonstrates not only power, but legacy as this woman was graced with riches even after her passing. Not to mention the quality of the piece is certainly excellent for it to last for so many centuries after originally being entombed. The upper classes had the luxury of preserving a legacy for themselves, which reasserted their position in the social hierarchy even after they have passed.

Jewelry, like clothing, played a major role in making status visible in the ancient world, and in many ways has a similar effect today. The value and significance of the jewelry stemmed from the materials from which it was made. In many ancient cultures, gold was the "chief symbol of prestige and incorruptibility"51. For the Chinese, however, gold was not the most precious metal. Of course, gold was valuable and respected, and only the upper classes would have the luxury of getting their hands on a gold object, or piece of jewelry. But, for the Chinese, bronze and jade were the objects of highest value and prestige.⁵² Not only was jewelry significant for the living, it was, again, also important for the dead. If a person of high status, such as an Emperor died in the Ancient world, he would be buried in riches, including the finest jewels and metals. The idea behind this is twofold. Firstly, there was cultural significance in burying one with their riches. For more superstitious societies, it was said to bring them good fortune in the afterlife by providing them with the luxuries of the living world. Secondly, it was a way to once again assert power and status. The more luxurious one's burial, the more important the person, or so the idea was. I would also speculate this was a means of preserving a legacy for future generations. There is no doubt that people of the ancient periods were concerned with preserving history for the future civilizations to discover, therefore it is likely that these burials were made as an act of preservation of legacy and status. Even after a member of the elite died, they would not dare participate in a burial suited for the common peasant. This was a deliberate attempt to reinforce hierarchy through the ages.

But jewelry served the living, just as it served the dead. In the Roman Republic, excessive usage of jewelry was prohibited by law and looked down upon.⁵³ However, by the period of Augustine, jewelry started to become more popular, and mass produced.⁵⁴ The style of jewelry worn by Romans was subtle. It was made usually of gold, and later began incorporating some

 ⁵¹ Emma Bunker, "Gold in the Ancient Chinese World: A Cultural Puzzle," Artibus Asiae 53, no. 1/2 (1993): 27.
 ⁵² Bunker, "Gold in China," 27.

⁵³ Andrew Oliver Jr., "Greek, Roman, and Etruscan Jewelry," *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, vol. 24, nr. 9 (May 1966): 269.

⁵⁴ Oliver, "Greek, Roman," 275.

gemstones, gradually becoming more and more ornate.⁵⁵ Gold was a popular choice for jewelry in Ancient Rome. However, the most popular stone for the Romans was the emerald.⁵⁶ Emeralds were expensive, and therefore prestigious. They were praised for the bold green colour. However, emeralds were believed to aid fertility in women, and have healing properties.⁵⁷ Likewise, pearls were used in jewelry, and were even more valuable than emeralds.⁵⁸ Owning either of these stones was a great luxury, and needless to say, only for the elites. Figure 2 depicts the type of green and gold jewelry that would be highly sought after in Rome.⁵⁹ While the piece itself is



Figure 2: Gold, emerald, amethyst, and pearl earrings from 1st-3rd century Rome.

quite simple, the volume of stones and the colour of the stones would indicate wealth. While there is no doubt that women wore jewelry like the piece depicted for its beauty, it was also a way to demonstrate that they had wealth and subsequently status.

Fibulas became a common type of jewelry owned by most people common and noble in Rome.⁶⁰ Fibulas were essentially a safety pin. They were used to fasten garments such as togas and cloaks. The term "fibulae" translates roughly to broach in contemporary English; however many of these decorative pieces were not decorative at all. They were needed for a purpose, which varied slightly depending on the position of the wearer. They were commonly worn by soldiers with small inscriptions in Latin which would convey a certain message.⁶¹ I make mention of this, seemingly insignificant accessory, to emphasize that one's role in society was so significant in



Figure 3: Roman Gold Fibulae. Early 4th Century. From the Metropolitan Museum.

their appearance. Something as small as a pin to hold one's clothing together could hold great meaning and signify their class. The image above (Figure 3) depicts the type of fibulae a

⁵⁵ Figure 2: Keely Martinek, "Emerald Earrings". <u>http://archaeologicalmuseum.jhu.edu/the-collection/object-</u> <u>stories/archaeology-of-daily-life/jewelry/emerald-earrings/</u> Photograph. From: Johns Hopkins Archeological Museum. (Accessed November 2018).

⁵⁶ Martinek "Emerald Earrings".

⁵⁷ Martinek, "Emerald Earrings".

⁵⁸ Martinek, "Emerald Earrings".

⁵⁹ Martinek, "Emerald Earrings".

⁶⁰ Oliver, "Greek, Roman," 284.

^{co} Oliver, Greek, Kollan, 264.

⁶¹ Oliver, "Greek, Roman," 284.

soldier in Rome may wear.⁶² Everything that everyone wore served to place them somewhere on the social hierarchy.

Clothing has served a substantial purpose in history. Looking into the micro-elements of history tells a story that helps aid contemporary understanding of the ancient world. Not only is the study of clothing significant to understanding how ancient cultures dressed for their everyday affairs, it also provides insight to some of the emotional and psychological motivations of people of the day. The way people dressed emphasized their role in the society of which they were a part; therefore, the study of clothing becomes a critical aspect of the study of civilizations and the people in them. It is also a significant element to study through history as it illustrates similarities between vastly different cultures and societies. China and Rome are prime examples of this. Despite China and Rome being separated by a vast distance, clothing served much the same function within these societies. The clothing, or costume, of this time emphasized power, hierarchy, and the class system. Also, it served to emphasize one's social identity. A critical similarity between these two civilizations was the idea that people were a product of their relationship to the state and their function in society, rather than an individual. The clothing of the ancient period highlights the obsessive fascination with hierarchy and status, themes that still linger in today's society.

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⁶² Figure 3: Andrew Oliver, "Roman Gold Fibulae," Photograph: Metropolitan Museum Bulletin. (Accessed November 2018).

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- Figure 1. "Floss silk padded robe with lozenge pattern on vermilion Luo silk robe". Photograph. Length: 140cm, overall length of the sleeves: 245cm, width at waist: 52cm Hunan Museum: China, http://www.hnmuseum.com/en/gallery/node/1048/7. Accessed November 2018.
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A Comparative Analysis of Religious Concepts within Ancient Rome and Han China

John Niescier ASIA 4499: Selected Topics – Han China & Ancient Rome Dr Jack P. Hayes November 27, 2018

Ancient Rome and Han dynasty China were two of the earliest and largest empires in world history. While both empires emerged on the opposite sides of Eurasia, there are many traits both civilizations have in common. From their political structures, to their methods of war, to their economic policies, and more, Rome and China both saw success in their ability to expand and create a diverse and unified empire that would have massive consequences on their regions in the following centuries. Investigating and comparing both empires in all of these topics would be far too complex and difficult for a single research paper. Thus, when comparing these two ancient empires, this paper will focus on the similarities and differences between their religions. Religion played an important role in both directing the empire and influencing how those within it viewed and acted upon the world. In order to understand the mindset of individuals within these empires, this will be a comparative analysis of specific religious concepts and ideas in ancient Rome and Han China. It will first explain and examine the religions of Rome and Han China, and then compare them and their effects within their empires, focusing on their conceptions of the origin of the universe and cosmic order, conceptions of the empire and rulers of man, and finally, their conceptions of death and the afterlife.

To begin, a brief overview of religion within Rome and Han China is needed, starting with Ancient Rome. In Rome, religion can be thought of as being primarily concerned with the 'gods.' The gods were viewed as magical beings from another world, whose actions affected and drove events in the physical world that humans inhabited.¹ Because the gods were the primary driving force of what goes on in the physical world, individuals were encouraged to be aware of their surroundings and able to best work with and understand them. In Rome, this meant being aware of the gods, how they might react to a specific action, and what the correct path to pursue was in order to gain their favour.²

¹ Hans-Friedrich Mueller, Roman Religion in Valerius Maximus (London, 2002), 149.

² Clifford Ando, The Matter of the Gods: Religion and the Roman Empire (Berkeley, 2008), 3.

In Roman religion, a wide pantheon of gods existed, with each one being responsible for a specific action, location, family, or cult, such that every part of the empire and every action had its own god. For example, if someone wanted to ensure a bountiful harvest and family gathering, they would pray to the gods of the family and the gods of harvest.³ If someone hoped for nice sunny weather for safe travel, they prayed to the gods concerning that particular weather pattern. If someone were then traveling from one city to another, they would pray to the gods of both cities to ensure safe travel. If someone was afraid of an approaching army and wanted to ensure safety and success for themselves, they prayed to a god concerning war and peace.⁴ Take this example from a Roman source on what is called the Harvest Ritual: "Offer a sow as *porca praecidanea* to Ceres before you harvest spelt, wheat, barley, beans, and rape seed. Offer a prayer, with incense and wine, to Janus, Jupiter, and Juno, before offering the sow."⁵ Note that for the simple action of sowing a seed, Cato prayed to four different gods to ensure it has a good harvest. The Roman pantheon was extensive, covering all parts of Roman life.

However, it should also be noted that the nature of these gods was different to later interpretations. The gods of Rome were not like the Christian God, who is so far away that it is impossible to contact them. Within Rome, the gods could be communicated with, and they were seen as a part of everyday life in the same way that trees, houses, and neighbors were a part of everyday life.⁶ Thus, communication was both possible and necessary in order to ensure a happy life. The primary means of communication with the gods were through special rituals such as sacrifice, prayer, and understanding divination.⁷ For example, during one of the Punic Wars, Rome was in a crisis. The leaders were unsure of how to proceed if they hoped to achieve victory. In order to understand how to proceed, they sought a sacred text known as the Sibylline Books. It was read only when important guidance was needed from the gods. The result was the bringing of a foreign god in the form of their sacred stone into Rome. This was interpreted as offering assistance in the war.⁸ The war was eventually won for Rome, and within Rome this was seen as a result of the gods' actions, as well as successfully following their commands. Through actions similar to the above, individuals were able to understand and work with the actions of the gods. They did this from prayer, interpreting dreams, going to a temple, etc., and from there acting accordingly.

Because communicating with the gods was such an important matter, the rituals performed to both understand and please them were very serious and required meticulous understanding. It was not through a virtuous heart and clear mind that one was able to understand the gods, but through a thoroughly planned and well executed ritual that allowed

³ Cato the Elder, From The Harvest Ritual, 160 BCE (Ancient History Sourcebook, Kwantlen Polytechnic University Primary Sources).

⁴ Pluarch, From Life of Numa, 110 CE (Ancient History Sourcebook, Kwantlen Polytechnic University Primary Sources).

⁵ Cato the Elder, From The Harvest Ritual, 160 BCE.

 $^{^{6}}$ Ando, 5 - 6.

⁷ R. M. Ogilvie, The Romans and Their Gods in the Age of Augustus, (New York, 1969), 22.

⁸ Ogilvie, The Romans, 110.

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one to see what might befall them.⁹ For an example of this, see a roman source on how meticulous and precise performing a planting ritual is: "Wash your hands, and then take the wine and say:...The feast of Jupiter consists of roasted meat and an urn of wine. Present it to Jupiter religiously, in the proper form. After the offering is made, plant millet, panic grass, garlic, and lentils."¹⁰

For these reasons, rituals and ceremonies were very important to Roman religion. The types of rituals varied wildly. At the local level, families had their own family gods that they performed rituals to, and a similar procedure was performed for community gods, gods of towns, and finally, the gods of cities. Each city in the Roman Empire had its own god that was worshipped and an everyday part of the city.¹¹ The most important and widely known God from the Roman state was that of Jupiter, the god of Rome.¹² Jupiter was a Roman god seen as being responsible for Rome itself, and so he was a popular God throughout the empire as Rome's influence spread. Indeed, the gods were so widespread and a part of everyday life that they even made it up to the highest political level. During the Roman republic, Senate meetings would always begin with offerings to the gods to ensure a bountiful meeting, and during the empire, the emperor always took a moment to offer a sacrifice to Jupiter or other gods upon holding ceremonies and meetings.¹³

Roman religion was often contrasted with Christianity. Christianity would eventually become the main religion of the Empire, but only after several conflicts between it and the roman religions and their believers. There is a reason Christianity caused such trouble for the religions of Rome, as it was so different from roman religion that conflict was inevitable. Most importantly, the religions of Rome did not have any strict code, laws, or myths like Christianity had.¹⁴ There were origin myths and gods, but they varied from location to location. There was no sacred text with all the rules of the religion plainly written out. For this reason, Roman religion was very accommodating and syncretic with other religions.¹⁵ Unlike Christianity, which, upon entering a new location would attempt to dislocate the local religion and have Christianity supplant it, when Rome conquered a new territory and incorporated it into the empire, the senate and emperor would observe the local gods, and incorporate some into the pantheon of the roman religion. For example, in the year 73 BCE, the Roman senate met to discuss the validity of a Greek God and how to incorporate it, if at all, into the Roman pantheon.¹⁶ This was in response to the conquest of Oropus, a city north of Athens. As Rome expanded, its religious deities expanded, incorporating foreign gods into its own religious cults. After all, under the logic of Roman religion, each city had its own god, as did each individual family. Thus it made sense for gods outside of Rome to be a part of the

⁹ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 18–19.

¹⁰ Cato the Elder, From The Planting Ritual, 160 BCE (Ancient History Sourcebook, Kwantlen Polytechnic University Primary Sources).

¹¹ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 10, 12.

¹² Ogilvie, The Romans, 15 - 16.

¹³ Ogilvie, The Romans, 21 - 22.

¹⁴ Scheid, John, An Introduction to Roman Religion, (Edinburgh, 2003), 131.

¹⁵ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 2.

¹⁶ Ando, *The Matter of the Gods*, 7.

Roman pantheon and fit right in. Not all fit in however, as some had strong cults that required strict and specific rituals, and refused to intermingle with other religious deities. Over time these cults would bring much chaos to Roman religious life, especially in the east.¹⁷ However, what was important to note here was the syncretic nature of Roman religion before Christianity, and its emphasis on the gods and understanding them and their place in the wider world.

Religion within China has many similarities to Roman religion, but with a few key differences. Where the metaphysical world of Rome was populated by Gods, in Han China, it would be more accurate to call the beings that incorporated heaven 'spirits.' This is because, while Han China had individual powerful spirits with their own characteristics and domains like in Rome, it was less common, and the individual spirits were viewed as less powerful and divine as the gods of Rome. It would be accurate to say that where Roman religion placed the most emphasis on the gods and beings that inhabited the spiritual world, in Han China, the most emphasis was placed on the spiritual world itself, and how this world functioned. As a result, much of Chinese religious doctrine greatly emphasizes the cosmic order, focusing on the many intricate ways the metaphysical world interacts with and connects to the physical world.¹⁸

There are other differences to be found when examining the religion of Han China. Like the gods of Rome, the spirits of Han China were able to affect and make great changes to the physical world and its inhabitants. However, unlike Rome, within China, the spirits were also impacted by events that took place within the physical world, often just as much as the spirits affected them.¹⁹ Understanding the spirits and how to best handle them was important in Han China just like it was in Rome, though with a slightly greater emphasis on the actions of the individual, given that it could have great effects on the spirits of the spiritual world.

Another difference from Roman religion comes when examining the spirits that were emphasized. In Han China, the individual spirits at the family level had a greater emphasis then in Rome. While Roman religion did have gods denoted to individual families, in Han China, the power of these family spirits was magnified, with these ancestral spirits having a large impact on determining the path of families.²⁰ Thus, understanding and worshipping the family spirits effectively was paramount to an individual's life, and it marked great importance in the lives of Han Chinese individuals.

That is not to say that the religions of China and Rome were completely different. They had many similarities, from the emphasis on strict rituals and performances, to the focus on awareness and a constant need to acknowledge and pray to the spirits. Han China also had

¹⁷ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 2.

¹⁸ Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge, 2007), 178.

¹⁹ Lewis, *The Early Chinese Empires*, 178.

²⁰ W.A.P. Martin, The Worship of Ancestors, 1900, (East Asian History Sourcebook, Kwantlen Polytechnic University Primary Sources).

great spirits that governed over rivers or the sky that could wreak havoc and show signs of the future, with the most well-known example being the dragon. Both religions even had emperor figures that were said to be the legitimate rulers due to their divine will. In Rome, the emperor was seen as the personification of Jupiter, being a god himself.²¹ He was worshipped throughout the empire, even during his own lifetime. In China, the emperor was seen as being given the divine right and powers to rule thanks to the mandate of heaven. He was the most spiritual of all and had the ability to communicate and understand the spiritual world.²²

Finally, in Han China, certain individuals were perceived as being more in touch with the spiritual world and its mysteries. These individuals would be located and used when someone sought insight from the spiritual realm, just like in Rome. Certain sacred temples and locations housed points of contact between the physical and metaphysical, so individuals would travel here if they best wanted to understand the other world and how to react to it.²³ These special spiritual locations were also a part of Roman religion.²⁴ Overall, while both Han Chinese and Roman religions had some differences in which part of the spiritual realm they emphasized and which spirits had greater importance, in general they shared many similarities in how they functioned. With this in mind, it is worth asking how their concepts on the universe, the empire, and death compared. Were they similar, or did they have clear divides?

Before examining the specifics of both religions however, it should be noted that, religion within Han China and Rome was very complex. Many local communities had their own traditions, a different set of beliefs, and might even worship entirely different beings.²⁵ The religions and their views also changed over time, with Rome in particular seeing a large change when the republic transformed into the empire, and again when Christianity became the main religion of the empire. The religions of both empires were constantly in a state of change and movement. For the sake of brevity, this essay will focus on the most common religious ideas promoted by the state religion, and in a simplified manner as gained from a few primary and secondary sources. However, it should be noted that much of what was said about the religion of both empires is subject to change.

Regardless, given that the emphasis on the cosmic order and nature of the spiritual world within China was of great importance, and is a significant distinction from Rome, it is worth examining just how both civilizations viewed this grand universe within their state religions. The cosmic order in China is somewhat unique upon ancient civilizations for its origin and creation myths, or rather, its lack thereof. Han Chinese religion only has very brief mentions of the origin of the universe, with Derk Bodde mentioning that the closest to such a thing can

²¹ John Ferguson, The Religions of the Roman Empire (New York, 1970), 90.

²² Stephen Teiser, "The Spirits of Chinese Religion," in Donald Lopez, *Religions of China in Practice* (Princeton: 1996), 26.

 $^{^{\}rm 23}$ Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 178-179.

²⁴ Scheid, An Introduction, 63.

²⁵ Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 201.

only be found from sources in southern China, which were not incorporated into the Han sphere of influence for quite a while.²⁶ This myth states that the world was originally one, a large connected being shaped like an egg. Eventually, the egg split in two, creating two parallel connected worlds that live in either harmony or disharmony.²⁷

Ancient Chinese religion also has no mention of any sort of god like deity that is responsible for the creation and driving of all things that is found in many other religions. The majority of Han Chinese texts concerning the universe primarily focus on understanding the two worlds of the universe, their connections, and what effects they have on each other. There is little concern for what brought these two worlds to be, or where they might be heading.²⁸

Within this universe of two worlds, what is significant about them is that in Han Chinese religion, the spiritual and physical worlds were connected. The cosmic order dictates that earth and heaven operate on two connected orbits, with each one mirroring each other. This idea or divine law that the universe operates as two complimenting forces that give life to all things is explained in an ancient text covering the concept of yin and yang: "The principle of Yin and Yang is the foundation of the entire universe. It underlies everything in creation. It brings about the development of parenthood: it is the source of life and death: it is found within the temples of gods."²⁹ This rule of yin and yang, of two complimentary forces affecting each other and working together, is the basis for all Chinese thought, from its usage in explaining the changing seasons and the balance of day and night, to its understanding as a means of medicine, with disease being caused by a lack of balance between these two forces within an individual.³⁰ All of life is viewed as being the result of two complimentary forces working together in harmony, manifesting itself in the two worlds of the universe.

All in all, this conception of the universe is why Han Chinese religion places such emphasis on locations in which the two connected worlds meet, and thus have the most spiritual power. It is why the source of someone's spiritual energy, or Qi as it is called, is their ability to connect with the parallel world and live in harmony with it.

Within Roman religion, the cosmic order of the spiritual and physical worlds bears similarities to that of Chinese religion, yet with some key differences. To understand the Roman view of the cosmic universe, a writing by Cicero that details Scipio having a dream of the afterlife and seeing the whole universe shall be examined. It was a great example of the common view of the universe within Rome. In Roman religious thought, it was common to have origin myths and stories of the beginning of all life on Earth. Often this origin is attributed to a supreme deity with the power to create all things and connect all things to itself: "All things, therefore, must originate from one source. This it follows, that motion must have its source in something which is moved by itself, and which can neither have a beginning

²⁶ Derk Bodde, Essays on Chinese Civilization (Princeton, 1981), 59.

 $^{^{27}}$ Bodde, Essays, 58-59.

²⁸ Bodde, *Essays*, 81.

²⁹ The Interaction of Yin and Yang, 1027 – 221 BCE (East Asian History Sourcebook, Kwantlen Polytechnic University Primary Sources).

 $^{^{30}}$ The Interaction of Yin and Yang, 1027-221 BCE.

nor an end."³¹ At one point in the dream, Scipio is able to gaze a view of the entire universe: "everything appears of such magnitude as could not have imagined...Now the globes of the stars far surpass the magnitude of our earth which at that distance appeared so exceedingly small, that I could not but be sensibly affected on seeing our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth with a point."³² The universe to the Romans was a vast expanding space, of which Earth was only one small part of it, a speck compared to the power and domain of the gods.

There were a significant amount of differences between the conception of the universe in Rome compared to Han China. Note that in Chinese mythology, the universe is only heaven and earth, with heaven being a reflection of earth, on the same spiritual level even. Compare this to Roman mythology, in which heaven is far superior, vast, and all powerful compared to earth. Heaven is so much greater then earth that heaven itself is what created earth, unlike in Chinese mythology in which both heaven and earth existed simultaneously at all times. As Stephen Teiser words it, the universe in Chinese thought did not come into being from a divine battle like in Roman thought, but instead the universe was thought of as a complex living organism that has always existed and has simply grown more complex over time.³³ This important distinction would lead to a different emphasis within both civilizations in their scholarship and research. Because heaven was seen as so much greater then earth, much of Roman religious doctrine and practice was primarily concerned with heaven, with the gods, and how to understand and be more like them. In China however, because heaven was seen as directly similar to earth, much of the religious scholarship was instead concerned with how to act while living on earth. If heaven was a reflection of earth, then acting in good faith here would ensure a good life in heaven, or so the logic went. This is a clear difference between the two and would have massive consequences for the future studies of religion within both geographical areas.

This is not to say that Roman and Chinese conceptions of the universe were totally different however. To discuss one key similarity, in Roman religion, it was believed that Numen was the energy that flowed through the world and contained energy of the gods. This conception was very similar to the idea of Qi in China. The gods created the world and its laws, with Rome and its inhabitants simply hoping to adjust to them and best personify those laws in a way that they can understand. This is similar to Chinese conceptions of laws, in which these were also viewed as divine and being applied to both heaven and earth.

However, there is another key difference between the Roman and Chinese conception of the universe, and that involves the administration of the empire. Recall that in Chinese religious thought, the spiritual world was viewed as parallel to the physical world. As a result, it stands that both worlds should mirror each other. And in Chinese theological thought, heaven is

 $^{^{31}}$ Cicero, From On the Republic (Scipio's Dream), 105 – 43 BCE (Ancient History Sourcebook, Kwantlen Polytechnic University Primary Sources).

 $^{^{32}}$ Cicero On the Republic (Scipio's Dream), 105-43 BCE.

³³ Teiser, The Spirits, 29.

viewed as being ruled by a Jade Emperor.³⁴ This emperor ruled heaven through an administration, which is divided into separate domains, with each being run by a god. The officials below them are the gods of walls and moats, and below them are the gods of hearth, of which each family has one.³⁵ Because both worlds mirror each other in Chinese thought, there is a much more specific and precise view of heaven and how to model it, going all the way to how the empire should structure its administration, which it attempted to follow. This sort of thinking is not seen in Roman religious thought, due to the spiritual world being so different from earth and thus so difficult to understand. It shows an effect of viewing heaven in such different ways within the greater universe.

The bureaucracy however was not the only political institution that religion shaped the views and design of. A second important topic in religious doctrine in both Rome and Han China concerns the political role of religion within the empire. For if both religions existed within these ever-expanding political units and among many individuals, how did it view and direct them? To start, both religions contained a clear political dimension in how they worked into understanding the structure of these empires. Unlike modern societies, there was no clear divide between church and state, so political leaders had to adopt to and utilize their religions, transforming them and being transformed by them.

In Rome, political and religious positions were identical, to the point that any sort of separation between the two would be impossible. To hold a position of political authority was also to hold one of religious authority.³⁶ The senate always made religious offerings before meetings, and religious duties such as creating the calendar, running religious rituals, etc. were all performed by those of high political status.³⁷ When the republic transitioned into the empire, the emperor himself possessed full control of the religious institutions of Rome. When Augustus Caesar became the first emperor of Rome, he positioned himself to be the religious leader of Rome. In Egypt, he marketed himself as the inheritor of the Pharaohs, to the Greeks he compared himself to Zeus, and in most of the Roman empire he was declared as the personification of Jupiter.³⁸ Indeed, in many parts of the empire he was even worshiped as a god, as this reception during his time shows: "Caesar Augustus, Father of his own fatherland, divine Rome, Zeus Paternal [he is referred to as Zeus instead of Jupiter due to the Greek nature of the author], and Savior of the whole human race."39 It was not a difficult task for Augusts to accomplish, as the fall of the republic resulted in many religious cults and omens proclaiming the end of things, and after the end of conflict, these cults went on to view Octavian as a god who had come to save Rome.⁴⁰ It, to be clear, was both a religious and political change to the Roman structure, as the policy of enshrining emperors as gods created

 $^{^{34}}$ Teiser, The Spirits, 27 - 28.

³⁵ Teiser, *The Spirits*, 28.

³⁶ Scheid, An Introduction, 129.

³⁷ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 107 – 108.

³⁸ Ferguson, The Religions, 90.

³⁹ Halicarnassus, Another Inscription Dedicated to Caesar Augustus,

http://people.uncw.edu/zervosg/Pr236/New%20236/Augustus.htm, accessed November 25, 2018.

⁴⁰ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 7 - 8.

the empire's sole god to unite the empire religiously,⁴¹ while also being enforced most of all in the outer regions of the empire, where its legitimacy was most needed.⁴²

In Han China, religion was also deeply tied to the state, however, in a few different ways. In China, there was also an emperor, though he was not viewed as a god, but as a son of heaven, who possessed the greatest ability to communicate between the physical and spiritual realms. Additionally, there was a greater emphasis on the imperial family within China. This is because of the central role dynasties played in Chinese political units. According to Chinese religious tradition, when an emperor and his family gained enough virtue that it is clear to all that he is able to show his religious devotion and power, then he is able to possess the 'mandate of heaven,' declaring himself the rightful son of Heaven, and therefore, the rightful ruler of the Chinese empire.⁴³ This mandate of heaven however, carried the idea that if a family and emperor were unfit to rule and did not possess enough virtue, heaven would pick a new individual to found a new dynasty. This religious myth gave legitimacy to the Han ruling family of the Han dynasty, and ensured that the greater Chinese region would be ruled under this religious context, starting a continuous cycle of dynasties ruling China. This sort of religious logic to rule is completely unheard of in Rome.

The differences in the political structures however are not limited to the emperor and source of legitimacy. Unlike Rome, in which all political members could perform and take part in religious practices, in Han China there was a specific branch of the government that was directed at studying, understanding, and performing religious affairs for the state and its people. Special shamans and individuals would have initiated sacred religious practices both individually and for communities and the state.⁴⁴ The emperor took part in these practices as well. Notably, a few of the first emperors of Han China traveled to the far mountains of the empire to offer tribute to the spirits, as mountains were considered to be points of which heaven and earth touched.⁴⁵ Both Rome and Han China featured religious practice that intertwined with duties of the state, but in Rome every politician was capable of performing them, while in the Han it was left for a more specific group of individuals within the administration.

While the bureaucracies of both empires featured differences, additional points of interest concern the shamans themselves. A consequence of the different views of the universe, different ideas of the power relationship between the physical world and the spiritual, were seen in the interpretation and usage of oracles or shamans and their advice concerning the spirits. In Rome, because the gods were seen as so superior to humans, the directions given by sages were interpreted more as orders to be followed obediently, under a certain determinist mindset.⁴⁶ Such a mindset certainly played into the strict hierarchy of Roman

⁴¹ Ando, The Matters of the Gods, 97.

⁴² Ferguson, *The Religions*, 95.

⁴³ Teiser, *The Spirits*, 26.

⁴⁴ Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 181.

⁴⁵ Lewis, *The Early Chinese Empires*, 186.

⁴⁶ Ferguson, *The Religions*, 193 – 194.

society, as it also reinforced common Roman assumptions such as "a man's character is something fixed, something given to him at birth."⁴⁷ The gods have planned all things in the universe, thus the best way to live is to understand what the gods plan to do, and then simply live with them.⁴⁸

Within Han China, however, because the spirits are seen to inhabit a world similar to their own, the advice of shamans tended to be seen as information of what the spirits will do, however, the individual can change the actions of the spirits if they act correctly.⁴⁹ In this way, individuals were given more agency in Chinese prayers and sacrifice. This mindset of humans that gave them greater potential has been theorized to have played a part in the creation and implementation of the civil examination system, in which individuals of any background can theoretically work in the government if they show exceptional merit in the classics. As Derk Bodde states: "The moral basis for this society was the belief...that...any person, even the lowliest, is potentially capable of becoming a sage."⁵⁰ Due to the greater perceived powers of humans on the spiritual realm, advice from the spiritual realm involved more human actions and change, while Roman advice would be characterized more as instructions to follow.

Finally, a concept core to all religious thought and practice was death, or more specifically, the afterlife. Death has always been an important part of religions due to the limited understanding on the nature of death and what happened to an individual when they passed away. Tombs and mausoleums were an important part of both Chinese and Roman culture, and the tombs were an expression of religious thought in both civilizations concerning death and the afterlife. In Han China, tombs were built in a style similar to how houses looked in ancient times. Tombs were meant to paint the afterlife as a world parallel to the living.⁵¹ Because the spiritual world was seen as intrinsically connected and parallel to the physical, the tombs portrayed death and the afterlife as an individual moving to a new yet similar world.

However, if an individual is buried inside the tomb, then what happens to their body and consciousness after death? In Han religious thought, humans were believed to be made up of three parts. They consisted of a body, an earthly soul, and a heavenly soul.⁵² The earthly soul was thought to stay with a body after death, while the heavenly soul went to the afterlife, where it would go on to affect the world at a particular location or family.⁵³ To illustrate the similarities between the two worlds, individuals were buried with their belongings to take to heaven, and tombs looked similar to houses, depicting scenes of the individual living, to signal what they will do in the afterlife.⁵⁴ Husbands and wives would be buried together, and there

⁴⁷ Ogilvie, *The Romans*, 18.

⁴⁸ Ogilvie, The Romans, 23.

⁴⁹ Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 183.

⁵⁰ Bodde, *Essays*, 136 – 137.

⁵¹ Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 189.

⁵² Teiser, *The Spirits*, 31.

⁵³ Teiser, The Spirits, 31 - 32.

⁵⁴ Lewis, *The Early Chinese Empires*, 191.

was a general feeling that the afterlife was structured in a way similar to the living, which comes from this idea of connectivity in Chinese religious thought.⁵⁵

When it comes to Roman religious views on death and the afterlife, there were many similarities with Han religion. In Roman theology, humans were also made up of three parts, which bear striking similarity to those of Han thought. An individual contained a body, a 'soul' and a 'spirit.' The spirit was thought to be connected to your lineage, while the soul would leave into the realm of the gods after death.⁵⁶ Thus, it was important to live a life serving the gods and making correct offerings for the sake of one's soul. For this reason, tombs were also greatly taken care of. Similar to Han Chinese tombs, Roman tombs also featured structures that mirrored the way houses looked in Roman society.⁵⁷ This was done because the tomb was seen as a link between the family of the living and the world beyond. Thus, the tomb was intended to be a location for both the family and its residents to reside in, as well as a location for the gods to receive the soul of an individual upon death.⁵⁸ As shown in the example within Scipio's dream above, heaven in Roman religious circles was thought to be a far grander and greater place then earth ever was. Thus, tombs were shown great care and individuals were often buried with their greatest treasures to take into the afterlife, just like in Han China. Both civilizations also spent a wealth of resources on large tombs for their emperors or those with high status, to ensure a safe trip into the next world. This shows an example of how, despite having different conceptions of the afterlife, both ancient Rome and Han China built tombs in similar fashions.

In conclusion, religion and its role in the way individuals conceive of themselves and the wider world has large consequences on the civilizations that they inhabit. Two great examples of these are the ancient civilizations of Rome and Han China. Within both of these empires, their conceptions of the universe and its origin, the political structure within the religious world, and death and the afterlife had great ramifications on the way these civilizations were structured. Examining these beliefs reveals that both empires shared common theological ideas, but also had some noticeable contrasts. Where Rome viewed heaven as far away and superior to earth, Han China viewed the two as connected. Where Rome viewed the emperor as a god among men, Han China viewed its emperor as the son of heaven, yet not heaven itself. Finally, where Rome saw men as living lives predetermined by the gods, China saw man as powerful, having the ability to affect the spiritual world, and thus having the ability to change. All of these beliefs manifest themselves in the similarities and differences between both empires. From the study of the gods as opposed to the study of earth, to the cult of both emperors, to the design and making of tombs, and finally, to the civil examination system itself, many distinctions and similarities between both empires can be traced back to their religious beliefs. Through examining and comparing the religious beliefs

⁵⁵ Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 190.

 $^{^{56}}$ Cicero On the Republic (Scipio's Dream), 105-43 BCE.

⁵⁷ Laurie Brink, Deborah Green, and Richard Saller, *Commemorating the Dead: Texts and Artifacts in Context – Studies of Roman, Jewish, and Christian Burials*, (Berlin, 2008), 53.

⁵⁸ Brink, Commemorating, 77.

of both Ancient Rome and Han China, this paper has attempted to shed light on the complexities and influence of religion within societies.

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Feminist Action in Japan: From Wars Won in the Meiji to Battles Lost in the Heisei

Amanda Stern ASIA 4499: Selected Topics – Revolution & Feminism Dr Jack P. Hayes March 19, 2019

Japan had to advance rapidly to match the rest of the world after re-opening its doors during the Meiji Restoration, an era lasting from 1868 until 1912. The change was swift, and technologically Japan has become one of the world leaders in robotics and has applied this in two vital areas: public health and customer service. Robots were designed and manufactured to alleviate the pressure that the increasing elderly population place on the health care system. As well, these same advancements created a buzz that brought in business from curious shoppers, such as the multitudes of Pepper robots seen in stores across major cities across the country. However, it seemed that less attention was given to the human realm. For many feminists around the world, Japan has been notorious for its lack of gender and sexual equality improvements for many years now. In fact, Japan scored 114th in the Global Gender Gap Report of 2017, performing five places worse than the previous year.¹ This reversal of progress was due to the "Political Empowerment" sub-index, as well as the "Economic Participation and Opportunity" sub-index. Japanese women simply were not participating in Japanese politics, even with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's promise to make Japan a place where women would "shine." Yet, even in his cabinet, women make up less than ten percent of the current members.² As well, the estimated earned income for women, and the country's share of female legislators, senior officials, and managers, as well as professional and technical workers were simply not high enough to guarantee any movement towards equality in these areas. While this report is not a catch-all for gender equality issues, with only four categories being judged ("Educational Attainment" and "Health and Survival" being the other two sub-indexes), it has nonetheless aided the public in researching and criticising the general trends in gender equality within their own society. With this report made public every year, it would be logical to strive for a better ranking than the last, so why has Japan consistently landed in such a low spot in relation to the rest of the world?

¹ Leopold Till, Vesselina Ratcheva, and Saadia Zahidi, "The Global Gender Gap Report 2017." *World Economic Forum.* http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2017/.

² Ito Takatoshi et al., "Did Abenomics Succeed?" Asian Economic Policy Review 13, no. 1 (2018): 11.

Historically, Japanese women have expressed their disapproval within society whenever given the opportunity. In the Meiji era, feminist movements encompassed newly empowered females who defied their designated places in the education system and defined what it meant to be a "Meiji schoolgirl." In the Taishō and Early Shōwa era, movements included the serialisation of feminist writings, made available to the public to show that women were more than ryousaikenbo, 良妻賢母, or "good wife, wise mother", but these encompassed many controversial paradigms. Following this era, the post-war situation left feminists in both bliss and exasperation, as suffrage was finally obtained, but the period after the war dampened the spirits of many gender revolutionaries, as their efforts had to be used rebuild what was lost in the wartime. However, this fighting spirit was revived during the 1970s and '80s, where *uumanribu*, ウーマンリブ, women's liberation, or *ribu* for short, saw women actively fight against the system that had continued to define them, even through some extreme means. This lasted until the late 1990s, when women's movements began stagnating alongside the failing economy and slowly declining birthrates, until women's contrary voices became muddled amongst the masses of the modern era. Japanese women of today have received feigned support from Abe's government via policies that will be discussed later. A more in-depth look at the feminist movements, from the Meiji era and onwards, will provide historical context for the modern feminist era. This paper will argue that due to the weakening support for feminism in Japan, nation-wide policies set forth to aid women have been failing, crimes against women, such as stalking, have been increasing, and society continues to micromanage an idealised image of a woman, including how she should speak. During modern times, the ideals of the feminist revolution in Japan have weakened, leading to an era of stagnation and decline in a once bold feminist history.

Over the 150 years from the Meiji Era to the modern day, there have been a handful of waves of Japanese feminism. These movements are better described in terms of either eras or decades, as there is no clear division among them, and their goals were similar. The introduction of feminism in the Meiji era was due to the halting of sakoku鎖国, the policy of formal isolation which had, with the exception of a small amount of trade, insulated Japan from the rest of the world. When sakoku was finally abolished, Japanese citizens were exposed to the new ideas from a world that had seemed to be growing faster than Japan in terms of technologies, industry, and ideologies, such as feminism and gender equality.

The Meiji Restoration abolished the *bakufu* 幕府 – the rule of the shogunate – in order to give more power to the emperor. This signalled the beginning of the new era that lasted from 1868 until 1912. A first "wave" of feminism in Japan attempted to move at the same pace as the Movement for Democratic Rights in America and was simultaneously thwarted and advanced by the new Meiji constitution introduced in 1889. One success for the feminists of this era was that this constitution aided girls from the Japanese elites with the Girl's Higher School Order of 1899, allowing affluent families to send their girls to public schools, rather than private tutors, so that they had a chance to interact with the outside world in a social setting. However, it is interesting to note that the point of this was to further reinforce the image of the "good wife, wise mother" status that was expected of women; with a proper, formal education they could become a more knowledgeable wife to aid their husbands and raise wiser children. Some girls, however, took this chance to rebel and to reinterpret what it meant to be a woman. These "bad schoolgirls" as Melanie Czarnecki dubs them, would openly interact with boys from other schools, even publicly display affection towards them, while otherwise showing delinquent behaviour that was contrary to their innocent image that was expected of them. An excerpt in the Yokohama *Times* discussed these schoolgirls, openly criticizing behaviours that did not coexist with the image of Japanese femininity:

Their kimono and hakama lay scattered about carelessly. Their rooms look just like one of those used clothing shops that you find on some big street. In the morning, they leave without cleaning up after themselves, their dirty trays and bowls left about. Even boys aren't this bad. Of course, I am not saying that all schoolgirls follow this pattern, but there are a great many who apply. They come back from school and sprawl themselves out in the middle of their room, carrying on about mindless matters, speaking nonchalantly about that which is offensive to the ear and bragging about the number of schoolboy acquaintances that they have. Naturally, such behaviour inevitably leads to immorality.³

While it is interesting that the condition of the girl's quarters relative to those of the boys was considered noteworthy for the newspaper, it was the last line that gave the impression that the girls' worth was dependent on their morality: whether or not they had relationships with boys. There was little concern over their educational status, as news outlets instead chose to publicly shame students out of their girlish behaviours. This would only fan the flames, as one of these delinquents was Raichō Hiratsuka, who would become an integral member of the later feminist movements.

Social movements in the Taishō and Early Shōwa era focussed on universal male suffrage, but not votes for women, despite growing societal pressure. However, in 1922 the prohibition of women's participation in political meetings was abolished, due to pressure from the women's organisations. This win meant that, while they could not yet be a part of political parties, women could attempt to have their voices heard for the first time. However, there was a larger feminist outlet that took both women and men by storm. *Seitō*青鞜, or *Bluestocking*, was at first a Japanese magazine that published women's writing, that turned into a feminist platform. It had been established in 1911 by Raichō Hiratsuka, a former "bad schoolgirl", Yasumochi Yoshiko, Mozume Kazuko, Kiuchi Teiko, and Nakano Hatsuko. The topics included women running away from arranged marriages, love trysts, legalising abortions, and the like; women could air their frustrations or try their hand at writing for the public. Raichō Hiratsuka was particularly passionate as a creator of this outlet ; she spoke a

³ "Jogakusei daraku monogatari," Yokohama Mainichi, September 20, 1905.

about her experience creating $Seit\bar{o}$ alongside her partners, decades after the first issue was released:

In the origin of time, females were the sun. They were the true people. Now, females are the moon. They depend on others; they depend on other's lights to be reflected in order to shine. It's a moon like the pallid face of a hospital patient. Well, Bluestocking was the first voice to be raised. By the means of the modern-day Japanese women's intellect and handiwork, "Bluestocking" was born. Things established by women nowadays invite only scorn and ridicule. I know well that underneath these ridiculing smiles there is a certain something hidden. And yet, I am not even a bit fearful. But what are women to do for themselves when those above them have done new acts of cruelness, shame, and disgrace, for their own benefit? ... We, as the women of today, did as much as we could. We have exhausted our hearts, and raised a child, by which I mean "Bluestocking". Perhaps, it's a mentally deficient child, or a deformed child, or even a premature baby, but nothing can be done. This satisfaction should do for a little while. Surely, we have devoted all of our hearts?⁴

Here, it was clear to see that this simple platform for women in this era, meant that feminists could finally let out a scream that they had been holding under the weight of male-dominated media. The serial ran for five years, until its final publication in 1916, when the government finally discouraged stores from selling it until its popularity ran out, but *Bluestocking* was just the beginning for feminist triumphs in the public sphere.

Immediately after World War II, Japanese women gained universal suffrage, and simultaneously, many women's organizations worked feverishly to obtain universal freedoms and rights, as the new Japanese constitution was being written to mirror the US one. Unfortunately, any further success for Japan's feminist movements came to a halt as Japan had to recover from its massive losses from the war. Compared to the mass casualties and destruction of many cities and towns, women's rights were decidedly less important, and put aside without further discussion. The nationalism of the post-war period was strong, and those who stuck out from the framework were seen as deviants; feminists were eventually demonised until the latter half of this era, when Japan began making improvements after the horror of the wartime.⁵

Women had been expected to pick up the slack from the war and return to following patriarchal norms set forth. This did not stop *kasutori zasshi* 粕取り雑誌, "pulp magazines", however, which catered to a market which was now looking for more sensationalist, materialistic articles, and indulged in the new luxury of sexual culture. These began being

⁴ Raichō Hiratsuka, *Genshi josei wa taiyo de atta*, (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1971): 1.

⁵ Barbara Hamill Sato, *The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan*, (Durham, [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2003): 21.

published for married couples who were looking for mutual sexual gratification, and not only featured heterosexual love, but homosexual as well, and also included more radical topics such as sado-masochism.⁶ To explain the burst of interest in sexual culture in Japan, Yoshikuni Igarashi pointed out that for "many survivors, their bodies were the only possession they had managed to preserve from the destruction of the war; Japan's burned-out cities became sites for celebration of the raw, erotic energy of Japanese bodies" which left women and sex as a desired topic.⁷ This was the beginning of the largely commercialised sex culture seen in Japan today.

Like other women's liberation movements across the globe, any groups that surfaced in postwar Japan were "strongly influenced by Marxist historical materialism and liberation theory", creating fears of "American" ideals, and leaving many women unsure of their next move.⁸ During this wave of feminism, Women's Studies had finally been established as an area of study in universities across Japan. These courses were largely introduced by Americans who had researched abroad, as well, they introduced ideas that spurred the women's liberation movement. Some women in this era took their hatred of the patriarchy to an extreme level by performing maternal filicide, the murder of their own child. This, as Alessandro Castellini pointed out, could be perceived in different ways, either as an act of the "violent manifestation of female grudge unleashed upon an oppressive society, or as a meaningless tragedy that destroyed the lives of both mother and child and inflicted a trauma to an entire community, or else, as a symptom of the malfunctioning of modern Japanese society."9 While it was not clear whether instances were increasing, or the media had found a new way to demonize feminists, the women's liberation movement stood alongside these mothers, as they were all forced to live through the roles that the patriarchy had given to them. However, as Setsu Shigematsu acknowledged, maternal filicide was never seen in a positive light by the movement and they never directly advocated such acts of violence. They understood it was necessary to show that the oppressive labels given to women were too constricting, and caused many to hate their positions in life.¹⁰ It would be interesting to note that the verb used by the women's liberation to describe the act of maternal filicide was changed from the korosu 殺す, to kill, to the causative-passive form korosaserareru殺させら れる, to be forced to kill, to suggest that the murder was actually against the woman's will, as an attack on society.¹¹ The importance of such language will also be discussed later in this paper.

⁶ Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 48.

⁷ Igarashi, Bodies of Memory, 48.

⁸ Igarashi, Bodies of Memory, 49.

⁹ Alessandro Castellini, "Silent Voices: Mothers Who Kill their Children and the Women's Liberation Movement in 1970s Japan," *Feminist Review* 106, no. 1 (2014): 11

¹⁰ Setsu Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows: The Women's Liberation Movement in Japan*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012): 125.

¹¹ Castellini, "Silent Voices," 21.

The 1990s and onward proved a difficult time for women in Japanese society. The economic bubble "burst" in the first half of the decade, but the effects were not entirely felt until the latter half, leading to a huge shift in priorities within this era. For example, in 1994, the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality was created within the Cabinet of Japan, largely due to pressure from feminist groups. However, it was not until 1999, with the implementation of the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, that both the Office for Gender Equality and the Council for Gender Equality were established by the Japanese Cabinet, which meant that Japan was behind most of the developed world in terms of gender equality, as they placed importance on the economy, and a predicted population crisis.¹² As the economy fell, women had fewer means to have their voices heard as the nation's attention was focussed on resuscitating the failing economy, much as in the immediate post-war era. As well, because of attitudes against birth control and the predicted population crisis, oral contraceptives were not legalised until 1999. Despite this, the stigma against oral birth control persists, and it is still not widely used to this day.

While only a few key moments from these eras could be mentioned, it is important to note the historical context before continuing. Over many decades in Japan, there had been a strong sense of feminism and support for the fight for women's rights and values. Against this backdrop, we can see how contemporary feminism has been undermined, and the values once clenched tightly in the fists of Japanese feminists have been released. Contemporary women have been coaxed into false security by the modern government, which feigns political and legal support, even as an arbitrary ideal of femininity persists within society.

Despite a strong beginning for feminist movements in Japanese history, the modern-day movements are either ineffective or miss their target entirely. Macro-level policies, such as Shinzo Abe's "Womenomics" and measures to address crimes against women in Japan follow this path. Abenomics, in general, simply exists to look good on paper, but does little to spark inspiration or incentive for women to be integral members of the workforce. As well, the policies set forth for crimes such as stalking incidents, ones that occur heavily towards females, make it so that the victim's daily safety has to be in jeopardy before anything is done. On the micro-level, everyday interactions and conversations are already constrained by the expectations set forth by society around language and femininity. In these ways, women in Japan continue to be powerless in the workplace, politics, under the law, and in social interactions. While Abenomics was set forth as a movement to help women, all of its policies have had meagre success, and it comes down to being an economic policy disguised as a feminist one.

Abenomics was introduced in 2012 with a high hope of kick-starting the stagnating Japanese economy. "Three arrows" were meant to attack the failing economy: money easing to improve export status; paying off their debts while increasing government spending for the public;

¹² Ayako Kana, "Backlash, Fight Back, and Back-Pedaling: Responses to State Feminism in Contemporary Japan," *The International Journal of Asian Studies* 8, no. 1 (2011): 45.

and introducing policies that would increase the growth of businesses. Part of the last arrow included increasing the number of female workers within the workforce so that there is a balance between the genders, increasing productivity. As there is a labour shortage in Japan, some measures that were taken to entice women into working were to have more daycare and after school facilities available, encouraging parental leave, and encouraging the hiring of more females into managerial positions. On paper, it seemed that "*Womenomics*" was succeeding, as 48.9% of women are participating in the labour force, the highest it has been in decades; however, it was not nearly successful as the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare made it appear.¹³ These policies were made to create growth in the financial sector, not actually to help women advance themselves within the working society in Japan.

The government set out goals to show men that they could also take parental leave in order to take the pressure off their wives, so that they could return to the workforce quicker. However, while legally men are allowed to take parental leave, often, if they did take it, there would not be a job left for them when they came back to the company. Traditionally, men were expected to work at their company until they reached retirement, so being loyal towards one's company was one of the duties of being a "man". This is still detrimental to this day as men have been harassed for even considering taking leave, as their team members would often scold them for thinking about taking an "easy holiday" when there was still much work to take care of at the company. As well, as mentioned previously, taking parental leave for men would insinuate a lack of loyalty to the company, resulting in there not being a job for them when they returned, or coming back into a position of lower responsibility, and thus, pay. These societal attitudes and economic factors must be worked upon before men taking parental leave can be an effective part of re-integrating mothers into the workforce. As companies continue to insist that they are more important to a man's life than his own family, women will continue to stay at home rearing children alone while their husbands overwork themselves.

As well, the government set out incentives to hire more women into managerial positions; however, it was just that: encouragement. This incentive was not rewarding enough for a shift in company policies, after all, why fix something when it still functions fine? This attitude resulted in almost no change in women being hired into such positions, and served only as a lipstick makeover to a problem that had persisted in Japanese business culture for so long. Even Abe could not uphold his ideals; his cabinet is over ninety-percent male, not nearly close to the thirty-percent he expected of companies, and not even close to the fifteenpercent that he re-established in response to the unpopularity of his policies.¹⁴ It is difficult to change the inner dynamics of a company if even the man who supposedly wanted women in Japan to "shine", cannot make the same effort to include them within his work either. There needs to be hard policy change, in order to make this economy move in a more gender-equal direction.

¹³ Takatoshi Ito et al., "Did Abenomics Succeed?" Asian Economic Policy Review 13, no. 1 (2018): 11.

¹⁴ Ito et al., "Did Abenomics Succeed?" 12.

To further encourage female labour participation, in 2014, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare set up an incentive program to subsidize companies that promote women to senior positions. In a review of the efficacy of Abenomics, it was said that "under this program, companies who would hire women for managerial positions would receive subsidies going up to \$300,000. This program had a \$120 million budget and the ministry expected to receive around 400 applications, but in its first year, it received a grand total of ... zero."¹⁵ One of the major reasons for lack of change in Japan's corporate sector is the fact that the government has been merely encouraging businesses to comply, rather than pushing them and hitting them where it hurts with legislation and economic sanctions.

As stated previously, 48.9% of women, which is around 28 million, were participating in the labour force in 2016, an all-time high. Unfortunately, the caveat to these glowing numbers was that of those women, nearly half of them were in either part-time work, contracted work, or temporary work. This meant that they did menial tasks, resulting in a lower pay than anyone else, and this meant that they were not expected to move up within the company. Womenomics ignored the glass ceiling effect in Japanese companies; rather than enforcing that women find quality work to encourage their human potential, they simply wanted to pump up their numbers high to look good on paper. Unfortunately, this did very little to aid the economy, and only pigeon-holed women in jobs that were typically less valuable. Abe also lagged in ensuring there were enough day-care and after school facilities for families, which only further delayed any interest or possibility of women returning to work that was generally unrewarding and not worth their time. As this policy was meant to help the economy, it was not surprising to see that women were not aided by these policies that only perpetuated their roles as caregivers in Japanese society. The government offered large tax breaks for married couples where only one person works full time, which the review further criticizes, stating "¥380,000 to be deducted from the taxable income of the head of a household if his or her partner earns ¥1.03 million or less per year. While families need additional income, the current regulations make it more profitable if one of the partners earns less than the other."¹⁶All in all, it was clear from the beginning that while Abe stated that he wanted a society where "women could shine", he had no real intentions to improve the gender disparity in the workforce. As a result, the numbers grew in quantity, but did nothing for the economy or women.

Turning to the question of criminal activity, stalking has consistently been a prominent problem in Japan, with a vast majority of the victims being young women. Foreign student and fashion blogger Mikan Mandarin (a pseudonym), has a modest following of 120,000 on Instagram; she found herself a victim of stalking. After asking her to briefly describe the situation, she stated:

¹⁵ Ito et al., "Did Abenomics Succeed?" 12.

¹⁶ Ito et al., "Did Abenomics Succeed?" 11.

I'm currently waiting for the police to come. Some man started talking to me while I was checking my mail box outside my house, and I was pretending I couldn't speak English because I was so scared. But he kept pushing to make conversation, and then eventually he was like "OK, bye-bye" and then I walked past my house as if he didn't just watch me open my mailbox. And then when I couldn't see him anymore, I went into my house and called my friend because I was really scared, and he started banging on my window and saying "Helloooo?", and my friend called the police, and I left my room because I was so scared. But he'll have left by the time the police get here and he'll come back to stalk me for sure. I'm so fucking scared I can't stop crying... Also, when we met, he touched my hand and kept saying "Wow so slim", and made kissing noises at me. It's not like I felt threatened for no reason... And it turns out they can't arrest him because he didn't actually try to kidnap or assault me but he apparently lives close to me, "So please be careful." I'm moving.¹⁷

This happened in March 2018, when Mikan was twenty-one years old. Her situation is a common one, with most stalking happening between couples who have separated against the men's will, or when men have their sexual advances rejected by women.¹⁸ In this situation, however, she was able to move out of her apartment early due to funding sent by fans, though those with less power are often left stranded by policies that are enacted to not help the victim. Through these laws, victims must file a criminal complaint or a request for a warning before police can act. If it is a more violent or dangerous situation, police can warn the offender verbally. If the warning is ignored, the Public Safety Commission can issue a restraining order against the offender. Then, if the culprit continues to stalk the victim, in violation of the restraining order, they are punishable by up to one year in prison or a maximum fine of ¥1 million (approximately \$12,000 Canadian dollars). If there are repeated acts of stalking, victims can file a criminal complaint and the perpetrator can be prosecuted. Convicted stalkers face a prison term of up to six months or a fine of ¥500,000 (approximately \$6,000 Canadian dollars).¹⁹ However, the anti-stalking law does a poor job of deterring stalkers, as they must threaten the victim's safety before any action, in criminally long bureaucratic process, can be taken. Generally, by that time, the crimes have already escalated or women take matters into their own hands, and have to relocate themselves. Once again, these legal policies, like Abe's Womenomics, continue to fail women in Japan.

However, there is an element beyond the macro scale of policies that has had an immense weight on gender dynamics: language usage. Women are expected to speak a certain way in Japan; there are defined masculine and feminine pronunciations, female-exclusive articulations, verb conjugations, including a high frequency of expressions of respect, politeness, and courtesy, as well as roundabout and tentative speech patterns that are used

¹⁷ Mikan. Mandarin, direct message to author, March 9 2018.

¹⁸ Police Policy Research Center National Police Academy. "広報資料 H29上半期情勢." Tokyo: 2017.

¹⁹ Police Policy Research Center National Police Academy. "広報資料 H29上半期情勢." Tokyo: 2017.

to preserve the demure nature of women, compared to their male counterparts. This reflects women's lower status within social interactions, as they will err on the side of caution and place themselves in humble positions.²⁰ One example would be that women are supposed to act composed in public, and using imperative forms is often seen as rude behaviour. There are a few imperatives that are deemed safe for everyday use, such as *ike* (行け, GO!) at sporting events, and sometimes *yamero* (止めろ, cut it out), but only when the situation calls for such force by a woman. Even prohibitive forms, such as sawaruna (触るな, don't touch me) are too harsh and masculine, leaving little room for women to defend themselves, or make their discomfort known, even to potential assailants. Instead, women are expected to use the request forms for such instances, where "please" is insinuated: *itte* (行って [please] go), yamette (止めって, [please] stop) and sawaranaide (触らないで, [please] don't touch me). When women are put into such situations, they cannot express their anger, especially in the case with stalkers, as seen in Mikan's case. Women are left to politely request that the men leave them alone. In this way, societal expectations also need to be altered so that women can express their anger, rather than hide it behind polite words. Women have emotions and become angry, and when the police cannot do anything about their problems, women should at least be able to tell their assailants "no", rather than "please, no".

These differences in language are related to "asymmetrical relationships within the social power structure", meaning that the way women are shown to speak from a young age suggest subordination and complacency.²¹ All interactions are mapped out, whether with friends, within the company, or within legal systems, as seen with the above story. Even in situations regarding safety, women still must react in certain ways for them to be seen as a functioning member of society, while the stalkers, who are overwhelmingly men, are seen as functioning, as long as they do not threaten a woman's safety by physical assaults or kidnapping.²² Even within these interactions, there is pressure to speak courteously to an assailant. Women should be able to express themselves emphatically in a time of danger, whether imminent or implied.

As seen, the trend in contemporary society has been to weaken the achievements of past feminist movements. Historically, feminist movements have challenged feminine ideals and redefined what it means to them to be female, to the extreme of women killing their children as a protest over "the malfunctioning of modern Japanese society."²³ In the 21st century, have these feminist warriors become complacent in the face of the patriarchal society that they once raged against? Japan continues to slip in the Global Gender Gap Report, and top-down policies, such as Abe's "*Womenomics*", ironically fail to put women in the centre of their concerns. They set goals, with little intention of taking action, as a way to pacify anyone

²⁰ Claude-Eve Dubuc, "When Women Are in Charge: The Language Japanese Women Speak at Work," Anthropologica 54, no. 2 (2012): 294.

²¹ Dubuc, "When Women Are in Charge," 294.

²² Police Policy Research Center National Police Academy. "広報資料 H29上半期情勢." Tokyo: 2017.

²³ Castellini, "Silent Voices," 13.

saying Japan is doing *nothing* to help raise the status of its women. Instead of truly helping the economy or other societal interests, women are continually left in menial positions, or in a lifestyle where "good wife, wise mother" is the only definition of "woman". As well, policies surrounding violence against women, such as stalking, fail to acknowledge the danger that some men possess over women. This is strangely incongruent with current societal values where women are not encouraged to defend themselves, even with words, and leaves them vulnerable in multiple aspects of life. In 2010, the Japanese Cabinet released a report to help with the gender index, and to help close this gap, they gave the following explanations:

Japan is now redesigning and radically rethinking social systems in response to rapid social and economic change. As this happens, we will review social systems and traditions from the stance of gender equality in order to realize a society where both men and women can make flexible lifestyle choices. In addition, we will promote surveys and research into the effect government policy is having on creating a gender-equal society. This will be done in tandem with an effective publicity and education campaign designed to increase understanding of issues like eliminating the stereotypical assumptions about gender roles that are behind social systems and traditions and the legal system required to create a genderequal society.

Performance Objectives

Awareness of the term "gender-equal society": $64.6\% (2009) \rightarrow 100\% (2015)$ Awareness of the term "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women": $35.1\% (2009) \rightarrow$ no less than 50% (2015)Awareness of the term "work-life balance": $37.0\% (2009) \rightarrow$ no less than 50% (2015)Time spent on housework and child care by husbands with a child or children less than six years old: $60 \text{ min. a day} (2006) \rightarrow 2 \text{ hr. } 30 \text{ min. a day} (2020).^{24}$

While there has been an overwhelming focus on campaigns and awareness initiatives, alone these are not enough to aid women in Japan out of their current stagnating position in society, especially with regards to work and politics. No matter how many campaigns are run, or how many people are made aware of certain buzz-words as the government sees fit, changing societal views needs more work than Abe has been willing to undertake. Major changes are unlikely until those making the policies take time to consider how to allow women to use their full potential, rather than using bureaucratic campaigns that only satisfy society on paper. Women in the modern era of Japan have been slowly losing the agency won for them by their action-oriented predecessors, and it is time to look past the claims of government support. The schoolgirls, mothers, and all women in between of this era must

²⁴Police Policy Research Center National Police Academy. "広報資料 H29上半期情勢." Tokyo: 2017.

decide whether they climb from the 114th spot in the Global Gender Gap Report, or their continue complacency and plummet.

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[&]quot;Jogakusei daraku monogatari." Yokohama Mainichi, September 20, 1905.

Original translation piece:

元始、女性は実に太陽であった,

。真正の人であった。

今、女性は月である。他に依って生き、他の光によって輝く、病人のような蒼白い顔の月である。 偖(さ)てここに「青鞜」は初声を上げた。

現代の日本の女性の頭脳と手によって始めて出来た「青鞜」は初声を上げた。

女性のなすことは今は只嘲りの笑を招くばかりである。

私はよく知っている、嘲りの笑の下に隠れたる或ものを。

そして私は少しも恐れない。

併し、どうしよう女性みずからがみずからの上に更に新にした差恥と汚辱の惨ましさを。

私共は今日の女性として出来る丈のことをした。心の総てを尽してそして産み上げた子供がこの 「青鞜」なのだ。よし、それは低能児だろうが、奇形児だろうが、早生児だろうが仕方がない。 暫 くこれで満足すべきだ、と。

果して心の総てを尽したろうか。